2026年11月19日（木曜）午前11時00分～午前12時15分

ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所　C23会議室

We examine whether introducing a bargaining mechanism prior to extraction decisions can promote sustainable resource use by encouraging players to delay extraction rather than deplete the shared resource immediately. We anticipate that bargaining fosters trust and cooperation within pairs, thereby increasing the likelihood of delayed extraction. We implement two forms of bargaining: binding agreements (where bargaining outcomes dictate extraction amounts), and non-binding agreements (where outcomes guide individual extraction decisions). Additionally, we vary the risk of resource depletion to assess how environmental uncertainty shapes these choices. Experimental data from 232 subjects show that bargaining mechanisms significantly improve the efficiency of resource management, even under substantial depletion risk. Moreover, non binding bargaining performs just as effectively as binding bargaining.

Vinh Pham 氏（Waseda University）

渡辺 綾