2026年8月27日（木曜）午前11時00分～午後12時15分

ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所　C22会議室

We study institutional policies assigning decisions based on a materially relevant characteristic correlated with a protected characteristic. We show that the three common anti-discrimination standards—equal outcomes, equal treatment, and meritocracy—form a trilemma: only trivial policies that treat all individuals equally satisfy all three standards, while any pair of the three standards permits non-trivial policies. We then characterize the optimal policies under each pair of the three standards. In the context of admissions where the decision is binary, these optimal policies become a two-threshold waitlist under equal treatment and meritocracy, affirmative action under equal outcomes and meritocracy, and a balanced-score rule under equal treatment and equal outcomes. Finally, we characterize the rationalizable outcomes under equal outcomes and equal treatment, and show that every atomless distribution can be rationalized as the admitted pool in the context of admissions.

Tsong-Hong Tenn 氏（スタンフォード大学）

青木 美璃