2025年7月24日（木曜）12時00分～午後1時15分

ジェトロ・アジア経済研究所　C23会議室 　

Are high-quality institutions under nondemocratic regimes always beneficial for democratic development? This paper investigates the long-run political consequences of competent governance in feudal lords in the Tokugawa-era Japan (1600–1868), asking whether effective feudal rule fostered or hindered democratic participation and local initiative in the modern era. Using original measures of domain-level governance—riot frequency (1700–1868), Dutch-speaking scholar density (1868), and the 1870 discount rate of domain currencies—I examine their effects on voter turnout (1890–1900), anti-democratic vote share (1925), authoritarian vote share (1937), and municipal initiative during depression reconstruction (1932). Paradoxically, I find that domains with more capable feudal governance exhibit lower democratic participation and reduced local initiative decades later. These results challenge the conventional view that “good institutions” under autocracy translate into strong democratic foundations via social trust and rule of law and suggest instead that developmental autocracies may leave a legacy of political passivity and weakened civic capacity.

福元真氏（早稲田大学）

松浦祐樹