No.836 Regionalism and Exclusionary Leadership: The Case of International Sporting Events and Trade Cooperation
This paper empirically tests the plausibility of theories of exclusionary regionalism that make the following predictions: (i) small(er) states pursue small(er) regionalism by excluding larger states in order to assume some exclusionary leadership role, and (ii) as a result, regionalism proliferates in an overlapping and nested manner. To verify the explanatory power of these theories, this paper considers case studies of regionalism in two different fields—trade and sports. Empirical investigation confirms that smaller and smaller regionalism is pursued in both regional trade and regional games in line with the theories. However, we also find some important differences, such as the existence of North American Free Trade Area despite the absence of North American games, which can be explained by factors unique to specific issue areas.
Keywords: regionalism, exclusion, exclusionary regionalism, regional sports games, regional trade agreements
Please note that discussion papers are works in various stages of progress and most have not been edited and proofread and may contain errors of fact or judgment. Revised versions of these papers may subsequently appear in more formal publication series. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). The IDE does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included and accepts no responsibility for any consequences arising from its use.