Meta-level Institutionalization of Negotiations:Explaining Irreconcilable Sino-Japanese Rivalry in TPP, RCEP, AIIB, and AMF

Discussion Papers


by Shintaro Hamanaka

September 2018


Countries that have totally different policy preferences tend to insist upon negotiation modalities convenient to themselves, without entering into substantial negotiations. This is what I refer to as the elevation of rivalry to the "meta-" level. Negotiations often become irreconcilable not because of fierce disagreement on substance but because of the elevation of disagreement to the meta-level. The purpose of this study is to depict the meta-level rivalry between countries that aspire to international leadership, using case studies of Sino-Japanese rivalry in regional cooperation, such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Asian Monetary Fund (AMF).

Keywords:Meta-level rivalry, Irreconcilable Rivalry, Negotiation, Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Trans-Pacific Partnership, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

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