This article overviews recent changes in the political elites of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. Chen Quanguo, who led the detention of Uyghurs and other Muslims as secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang, was removed from office in 2021. Since Ma Xingrui’s appointment as secretary, repression in Xinjiang has eased. However, Ma also points to the continuation of “anti-terrorism” policies. Various re-education, work, and birth control measures—known in the West as forced incarceration, forced labor, and forced sterilization—are expected to continue under the new secretary.

In recent years, the human rights situation of the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter referred to as Xinjiang) has received global attention. Reportedly, more than one million individuals belonging to ethnic minorities were detained in “vocational skills education and training centers.”¹

Spearheading these detention policies was Chen Quanguo (陈全国), Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang from 2016 to 2021. Chen was born in Henan Province in 1955. Having spent nearly all his life in the twentieth century in his home province, Chen became the secretary of Hebei Province in 2010 and then of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2011. As a “result” of his governance in Tibet, protests by Tibetan Buddhists burning themselves to death declined, and Chen was said to have won the appreciation of the upper management of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).² He was appointed Xinjiang’s secretary in August 2016 and led the massive crackdown on minorities that drew global condemnation. Chen was also sanctioned by the United States.

The Fall of Chen Quanguo

Chen Quanguo, who led the detention of Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang, was removed from office in 2021, and such removal indicates relegation. Indeed, Chen’s new position, confirmed in June 2022, was that of deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group of the CCP³ —a lower rank than his previous position. Notably, he was not reelected to the CCP Central Committee later that year.

However, this relegation was meant to protect Chen. Although CCP could have dismissed him immediately after he was sanctioned by the international community, the Party continued to protect him by keeping him in public office in 2022. Moreover, no critical review of Chen has yet been conducted. The dismissal of a sanctioned person may indicate that the CCP has succumbed to the criticism of the international community; nevertheless, Chen has not been accused, even after not being reelected to the CCP Central Committee.

In this regard, the CCP similarly protects Shohrat Zakir (雪克来提-扎克尔), a top-ranking person in Uyghur cadres. Like Chen, Shohrat Zakir was also sanctioned by the United States but has not been relegated. He served as chairman of the Xinjiang government under Chen Quanguo from 2015 to 2021 and was elected vice-chairman of the standing committee of the 14th National People’s Congress in March 2023.⁴

New Secretary of Xinjiang, Ma Xingrui

At the end of 2021, Ma Xingrui (马兴瑞) replaced Chen Quanguo as the new Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang. Ma Xingrui has a background as an engineer and researcher. Before entering politics, he was the general manager of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Group, which is why the appointment is also considered related to his personal connections. In recent years, the Xi Jinping administration has tended to promote technical faculty cadres. For instance, Zhang Guoqing (张国清) and Yuan Jiajun (袁家军)—who have a military-industrial engineering background—were also elected members of the Politburo of the CCP in October 2022.⁵

After leaving the China Aerospace Science and Technology Group, Ma became the deputy director of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in 2013 and also served as deputy secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, secretary of Shenzhen Municipal Party Committee, and chairman of Guangdong Province. His predecessor Chen Quanguo, while not an expert in ethnic policy, had served as secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region Party Committee before being posted to Xinjiang. By comparison, Ma has no experience governing such an ethnic minority region.

The promotion of non-specialists characterizes Ma’s personnel appointment. In recent years, the Xi Jinping administration has increasingly appointed non-experts to positions previously held by experts, such as directors of the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong (LOCPG), Hong Kong and Macau Office of the State Council (HMO), and the National Ethnic Affairs Commission. In 2020, these positions were filled by mainland-originated or ethnic Han bureaucrats with no direct involvement in local administration. The Xi Jinping administration tends to ignore previous personnel practices and promote non-specialists to implement its own policies, and Ma’s appointment is likely part of this trend.⁶

Under the New Secretary

Since Ma’s appointment as secretary, repression in Xinjiang has eased. Although local information is limited, it is known that many checkpoints on roads have been removed. A few of these actions were said to accommodate inspectors from the United Nations; however, it can be argued that a certain rebalancing of society has occurred.

In addition to the political aspect, changes are also taking place on the economic front. Ma’s assignment to Xinjiang was originally related to his ties with coastal areas such as the Guangdong Province, and it has led to investment increases in Xinjiang. Similarly, the development of tourism was advocated and is underway in Xinjiang.

However, what happened to those oppressed under Ma’s predecessor? As Chen’s policies have not been assessed as wrong, no restoration has been conducted for the victims’ honor, and many of those detained remain missing. Ma also points to the continuation of “anti-terrorism” policies.⁷ These various re-education, work, and birth control measures—known in the West as forced incarceration, forced labor, and forced sterilization—are expected to continue under the new secretary.

Notes

1. Joshua Lipes. “Expert Says 1.8 Million Uyghurs, Muslim Minorities Held in Xinjiang’s Internment Camps.” Radio Free Asia, November 24, 2019. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/detainees-11232019223242.html#:~:text=Zenz%20had%20initially%20estimated%20that%20some%201.1%20million,harboring%20%E2%80%9Cstrong%20religious%20views%E2%80%9D%20and%20%E2%80%9Cpolitically%20incorrect%E2%80%9D%20ideas
2. Jun Kumakura. Shinkyo Uiguru Jichiku: Chugoku Kyosanto Shihai no 70 Nen 新疆ウイグル自治区：中国共産党支配の70年 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: The seventy years of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party]. (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2022), 187–88; Jun Kumakura. 2023. Xinjiang: Bei Zhonggong Zhipei de Qi Shi Nian 新疆：被中共支配的七十年 [Xinjiang: The seventy years ruled by the Chinese Communist Party]. (Taipei: Baqi Wenhua, 2023), 184–85.
3. Amber Wang. 2022. “Sanctioned Hardline Former Xinjiang Chief Chen Quanguo Moves to Rural Affairs Role for ‘Last Job Before Retirement.’” South China Morning Post, June 15, 2022. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3181820/sanctioned-hardline-former-xinjiang-chief-chen-quanguo-moves
4. Xinhua. “Xinhuashe Kuaixun.” [In Chinese.] March 10, 2023. http://www.news.cn/2023-03/10/c_1129424399.htm
5. Guoguang Wu. “Aerospace Engineers to Communist Party Leaders: The Rise of Military-Industrial Technocrats at China’s 20th Party Congress.” Asia Society Policy Institute, February 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/aerospace-engineers-communist-party-leaders-rise-military-industrial-technocrats-chinas-20th-party
6. Jun Kumakura. Shinkyo Uiguru Jichiku: Chugoku Kyosanto Shihai no 70 Nen, 220; Jun Kumakura. Xinjiang: Bei Zhonggong Zhipei de Qi Shi Nian, 209–10.
7. Xinjiang Ribao. “Quanmian Shenhua Yifa Zhijiang Zhashi Tuijin Zhengfa Gongzuo Xiandaihua.”[In Chinese.] January 30, 2023. https://xjrb.ts.cn/xjrb/20230130/204366.html

Author’s Profile

Jun Kumakura is a non-resident fellow of Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) and a Professor at the Department of Global Politics, Faculty of Law, Hosei University, Tokyo. He received his Ph. D. in philosophy from the University of Tokyo in 2016. He was a Research Fellow at IDE-JETRO from 2018 to 2021. His research topics include ethnic policies of China and the Soviet Union and the relationships between China and the former Soviet Union.

Related Publications by the Author

Kumakura, Jun. 2023. Xinjiang: Bei Zhonggong Zhipei de Qi Shi Nian 新疆：被中共支配的七十年 [Xinjiang: The seventy years ruled by the Chinese Communist Party]. Taipei: Baqi Wenhua.
https://www.bookrep.com.tw/?md=gwindex&cl=book&at=bookcontent&id=16976

Kumakura, Jun. 2022. Shinkyo Uiguru Jichiku: Chugoku Kyosanto Shihai no 70 Nen 新疆ウイグル自治区：中国共産党支配の70年 [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: The seventy years of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party]. Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha. https://www.chuko.co.jp/shinsho/2022/06/102700.html

Kumakura, Jun. 2020. Minzoku Jiketsu to Minzoku Danketsu: Soren to Chugoku no Minzoku Erito 民族自決と民族団結：ソ連と中国の民族エリート [National self-determination and national unity: Ethnic-minority elites in the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. https://www.utp.or.jp/book/b497143.html

* Thumbnail photo: An Uygur woman with a kid at old town Kashgar, Xinjiang Province, China (Feifei Cui-Paoluzzo / Moment Open / Getty Images)
** The views expressed in the columns are those of the author and do not represent the views of IDE or the institutions with which the author is affiliated.
*** Note 2 and Related Publications were corrected on 23 June 2023.