Round table discussion: an insight into the political changes in the Middle East and the Arab world
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This
is
the
first
part
of
the
following
article:
“An
Insight
into
the
Political
Changes
in
the
Middle
East
And
the
Arab
World,”
Ajiken
World
Trend
,
Jan.
2012
(Original
text
in
Japanese).
Date:
Wednesday
October
5,
2011
Moderator:
Takashi
Shiraishi
(President,
IDE-JETRO)
Participants:
Eiji
Nagasawa(Professor,
Institute
of
Advanced
Studies
on
Asia,
University
of
Tokyo)
Akifumi
Ikeda(Professor,
The
Graduate
School
of
Toyo
Eiwa
University)
Hitoshi
Suzuki
(Senior
Researcher,
Area
Studies
Center,
IDE-JETRO)
Emi
Suzuki(Associate
Professor,
Organization
for
Islamic
Area
Studies,
Waseda
University)
Sadashi
Fukuda
(Researcher,
Middle
Eastern
Studiea
Group,
IDE-JETRO)
Shiraishi
Thank
you
all
for
being
here
today.
At
IDE-JETRO,
we
have
been
watching
the
recent
changes
in
the
Middle
East
with
great
interest.
In
addition,
we
have
invited
Professor
Lisa
Anderson,
president
of
The
American
University
in
Cairo,
to
the
international
symposium
we
will
be
co-hosting
with
the
World
Bank
at
the
end
of
January
next
year,
where
we
attempt
to
understand
the
Middle
East
in
light
of
these
political
changes
from
a
multilateral
point
of
view.
Today
I'd
like
to
hear
everyone's
frank
and
candid
opinions.
The
format
of
the
discussion
will
be
free
but
first
I
thought
we
could
hear
how
everyone
sees
the
status
quo
and
the
latest
situation
in
the
grander
scheme
of
things,
and
then
let
the
discussion
develop
from
there.
Shall
we
start
with
you,
Professor
Nagasawa?
Nagasawa
Ok.
In
regard
to
this
chain
of
movements,
first
there
was
the
view
of
the
Middle
East
framework.
Someone
made
a
start
of
framing
the
phenomena
within
Middle
East.
Then
a
series
of
movements
were
certainly
discussed
for
some
times
as
the
Middle
East
Revolutions.
But
now,
as
everyone
agrees,
the
movements
are
defined
as
the
Arab
Revolution.
Thus
when
viewing
the
current
situation
as
the
Arab
Revolution,
I
believe
that
we
are
in
the
midst
of
the
most
significant
turning
point
since
the
time
of
the
July
Revolution
of
1952
about
60
years
ago
in
Egypt
and
the
various
movements
simultaneously
arising
in
the
Arab
world.
In
my
view,
it
was
the
era
of
the
movements
of
Arab
Nationalism.
The
regimes
created
at
the
time
have
become
outdated
to
a
great
deal
and
must
be
entering
a
period
of
structural
changes.
However,
this
can
be
said
only
for
countries
with
a
republican
system,
with
the
situation
being
a
bit
different
in
countries
with
monarchies.
If
we
look
at
the
trend
over
an
even
longer
period
of
time,
prior
to
the
Revolution
of
1952
there
was
a
period
when
a
major
nationalist
movement,
called
the
1919
Revolution,
took
place
where
Egypt
sought
independence
from
England,
and
so
it
is
also
possible
to
view
that
this
is
the
first
major
change
since
the
1919
Revolution.
That
was
the
time
after
World
War
I
when
the
framework
of
territorial
states
in
the
Arab
world
was
established.
Among
various
prospects,
we
hear
that
these
current
movements
may
grow
to
the
extent
that
could
destroy
that
framework.
However,
I
suspect
that
that
will
happen
immediately.
An
Arab
friend
of
mine
says
that
a
new
Arab
unification
may
be
expected
to
come
true.
I
think
that
would
be
difficult
but
the
depth
of
the
revolution
might
go
that
far.
Thirdly,
as
I
mentioned
earlier,
in
terms
of
regime
changes,
this
chain
of
movements
is
named
the
Arab
Revolution,
but
this
revolution
will
probably
greatly
affect
the
entire
regional
system
of
the
Middle
East.
We
must
take
it
into
our
considerations
how
the
two
non-Arab
powers
in
the
region,
Iran
and
Turkey,
will
be
concerned
with
the
Arab
world,
as
well.
It’s
a
beginning
of
a
new
era.
It’s
a
significant
historical
change.
Needless
to
say,
but
how
NATO,
the
US,
etc
are
to
be
involved
in
this
region
will
be
relevant.
However,
whatever
happens,
I
think
for
structural
changes
in
this
whole
region,
it
will
take
some
time
longer.
Shiraishi Thank you very much. Now, Professor Ikeda.
Ikeda
I
don't
have
a
strong
historical
framework
like
Professor
Nagasawa
so
my
perspective
comes
from
following
the
Middle
East
peace
process
on
a
daily
basis.
I
think
the
features
of
the
uprisings
have,
unsurprisingly,
a
lot
to
do
with
the
military
of
each
country.
This
is
relatively
easy
to
understand
when
we
look
at
Tunisia
where
it
quickly
distanced
itself
from
the
regime,
Egypt
where
it
was
at
least
impartial
and
ultimately
abandoned
Mubarak,
in
the
case
of
Gaddafi
it
was
already
split
from
the
start,
and
in
Syria
the
army
is
still
supporting
the
regime.
Naturally,
because
this
kind
of
political-military
relationship,
or
the
state
of
the
military,
in
a
sense
reflects
the
society
of
that
country,
even
if
the
cause
or
structure
of
the
spark
of
the
uprising
in
each
country
is
common,
I
get
the
impression
that
it
manifests
varies
depending
on
the
tendency
of
the
army
of
each
country.
Further,
one
point
of
interest
was
whether
or
not
the
Arab
Spring
would
actually
trigger
a
Palestinian
Spring
when
the
uprising
reached
Israel
and
Palestine.
Actually
in
mid-March,
mid-May
and
early
June
opposition
movements
of
primarily
younger
generations
like
the
Arab
Spring
and
unlike
anything
previously,
took
place
within
Palestine.
They
appear
to
have
stopped
abruptly
as
of
June
5,
but
are
regarded
as
obviously
new
movements
and
will
probably
have
a
great
impact
on,
for
example,
the
future
peace
process.
In
short,
until
now
central
Palestine
has
basically
split
into
the
two
factions
of
Fatah
and
Hamas
and,
stuck
between
a
rock
and
a
hard
place,
in
May
it
was
briefly
expected
that
a
peace
agreement
would
be
struck
but
even
after
that
it
came
to
a
complete
standstill
and
has
not
progressed.
Opposition
from
the
younger
generations
to
this
situation
from
both
factions
boiled
up
and
the
existing
power
of
political
parties
and
political
power
is
starting
to
feel
threatened.
What
is
particularly
interesting
is
that
this
is
showing
more
strongly
in
Hamas.
When
the
uprising
in
Egypt
was
reaching
its
peak,
Hamas
itself
was
closing
the
door
to
Gaza
with
extraordinary
speed,
desperate
to
stop
it
spreading
to
Gaza
at
any
cost.
On
the
other
hand,
Fatah
has
always
been
planning
to
somehow
adopt
the
young
movement
but
it
has
not
yet
been
successful.
Both
sides
are
truly
perplexed
and
confused
as
to
how
to
handle
the
movement.
We
don’t
yet
know
what
the
people
involved
in
this
Palestinian
Spring-like
movement
want
but
they
don't
seem
to
be
showing
much
interest
in
the
current
two-state
solution
for
peace.
Frankly
speaking,
there
is
an
element
of
seeking
freedom
rather
than
a
nation,
a
fight
for
dignity
rather
than
a
liberation
of
rights.
Inevitably
there
seems
to
be
an
affinity
for
one-state,
a
one-state
solution
rather
than
a
two-state
solution
but
this
is,
unsurprisingly,
a
fairly
big
change.
What
is
interesting
is
that
the
same
thing
is
happening
in
Israel
too.
This
summer
about
400,000
primarily
young
people
were
also
mobilized
in
Israel
and
basically
it
was
no
longer
about
peace:
they
took
to
the
streets
demanding
something
be
done
about
high
rents
and
unemployment.
It’s
clear
that
the
demonstrations
were
carried
out
by
the
younger
generation,
as
the
tent
cities
were
vacated
en
masse
as
the
new
academic
semester
began.
How
we
view
this
chain
of
circumstances
as
relevant
to
regional
stability
is
not
even
entirely
settled
between
all
of
us
yet
but
chaos
may
after
all
be
unavoidable
in
the
short
term.
Particularly
in
the
Middle
East
peace
framework
of
the
past,
the
stable
relationship
between
Egypt
and
Israel,
which
played
the
role
of
a
kind
of
anchor,
has
become
very
strained
as
can
be
seen
in
the
recent
storming
of
the
Israeli
Embassy
in
Cairo.
In
fact,
in
the
context
of
this
Arab
Spring,
now
Turkey,
while
not
an
Arab
nation,
is
enhancing
its
self-assertion.
Particularly
in
the
issue
of
dealing
with
last
year's
raid
on
a
Gaza
aid
flotilla,
relations
between
Turkey
and
Israel
have
become
hostile
in
a
way
not
seen
before.
In
spite
of
everything
until
then,
relations
that
were
thought
to
be
stable
to
some
degree
such
as
those
between
Egypt
and
Israel,
and
Israel
and
Turkey,
that
functioned
as
an
anchor
to
the
tentative
peace
framework
have
already
started
to
shake
and,
if
we
think
about
the
peace
environment
from
now
on,
this
has
become
a
major
cause
for
concern.
This
is
probably
all
I
can
say
at
this
point
in
time.
Shiraishi Thank you. How about you, Mr. (Hitoshi) Suzuki?
Hitoshi
Suzuki
Because
I
have
studied
Iran
and,
these
last
ten
years
or
so,
Afghanistan,
I'm
going
to
talk
about
the
Middle
East
region
from
an
eastern
perspective.
Lately
it
has
been
said
that
Emmanuel
Todd's
Le
rendez-vous
des
civilisations
predicted
this
democratic
movement
in
the
Arab
world.
But
in
having
a
quick
read
of
his
book
prior
to
the
uprisings
that
have
started
since
the
beginning
of
this
year,
I
didn't
feel
he
was
saying
anything
new.
Iran
also
falls
within
the
scope
of
Todd's
discussion
but
with
Iran
in
particular,
I
have
seen
the
post-revolution
social
changes
out
in
the
field
and
have
very
often
felt
what
Todd
is
discussing,
and
while
the
conditions
may
be
different,
problems
arising
among
young
people
were
also
pointed
out
previously
when
I
talked
with
Egypt
and
Arab
researchers.
So
I
didn’t
expect
that
the
book
would
come
to
be
considered
a
book
that
predicted
such
political
change.
One
thing
that
comes
to
mind
as
being
related
to
this
is
the
Egyptian
elections
in
November
and
December
last
year.
I
only
skimmed
through
the
media
reports
but
those
elections
were
totally
staged
by
the
government
and
the
result
was
that
the
ruling
political
party
monopolized
something
like
80%
of
the
seats.
To
be
honest,
when
I
read
those
reports
I
couldn’t
help
but
feel
contempt
toward
the
Egyptian
people.
Even
Iran,
at
least
before
the
presidential
elections
the
year
before
last,
was
said
to
be
a
country
that
held
relatively
democratic
elections
in
comparison
to
other
Middle
Eastern
nations.
In
contrast,
the
situation
in
Egypt,
a
major
power
of
the
Middle
East,
made
me
view
the
situation,
I’m
sorry
to
say,
with
a
feeling
of
disillusionment.
But
to
my
surprise,
this
in
a
sense
became
the
flash
point
and
with
the
fact
that
it
led
to
the
January
25
revolution,
I
am
reflecting
a
little
on
my
own
over-pessimistic
view.
A
similar
thing
is
happening
in
Iran
and
every
region
of
the
Arab
world,
with
young
people
gaining
force
as
a
new
political
core.
However
the
decisive
difference
between
Iran
and
the
Arab
world
was
perhaps
the
1979
revolution.
What
is
currently
happening
in
Iran
is
post-revolution
social
change,
whereas
in
the
Arab
world
this
democratic
reform
movement
is
probably
emerging
after
a
long
dictatorship.
So
even
countries
like
Egypt
are
currently
experiencing
a
democratic
reform
or
a
political
change
called
"revolution,"
and
it
is
said
that
there
is
a
fear
that
they
may
end
up
like
Iran
but
I
feel
that
will
ultimately
not
be
the
case,
or
they
may
not
end
up
like
Turkey
which
has
not
experienced
such
big
political
changes,
so
it
may
be
impossible
to
do
anything
but
search
for
an
entirely
new
form.
Talking
about
what
I
have
felt
over
a
shorter
span
of
about
ten
years,
in
the
ten
or
so
years
since
9/11,
I
think
the
relative
importance
for
America,
for
instance,
has
been
shifting
significantly
to
the
eastern
region
of
the
Middle
East
including
the
Gulf
countries,
Iran
and
Afghanistan.
At
the
same
time
that
meant
that
US
forces
began
to
be
stationed
in
those
areas,
while
individual
countries
also
began
to
strengthen
militarization,
which
I
believe
had
the
opposite
of
the
first
intentions
and
actually
led
to
the
spread
of
a
sense
of
impending
crisis
throughout
the
Arab
world.
I
think
there
are
perhaps
two
points
to
be
considered
as
to
whether
this
situation
centering
in
the
future
Arab
world
will
become
more
stable
or
when
it
will
actually
secure
a
stable
system.
The
first
issue
is,
to
what
extent
it
will
establish
a
"civil
society"
or
rather,
whether
it
will
even
establish
one.
The
second
is,
in
what
form
the
Middle
Eastern
system
that
has
continued
since
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War
as
a
regional
system
will
find
a
new
stable
stage.
This
is
the
outline
of
what
I
am
thinking
at
the
moment.
Shiraishi Thank you. Next we'll have Associate Professor (Emi) Suzuki.
Emi
Suzuki
I've
got
two
thoughts
on
the
political
changes
in
the
Arab
region.
The
first
is
on
the
expression
"Arab
Spring."
Even
in
the
Arab
region
I
have
heard
the
expression
"Arab
Spring"
in
Arabic
from
time
to
time
but
this
is
a
translation
from
the
Western
media.
The
use
of
this
term
shows
that
Western
intellectuals
and
those
in
the
media
compare
this
chain
of
Arab
political
changes
to
the
Czechoslovakian
revolution
movement
of
1968
called
the
"Prague
Spring"
and
the
1989
Eastern
European
revolutions.
However,
since
the
collapse
of
the
Ben
Ali
administration
in
Tunisia,
there
have
been
a
spate
of
simultaneous
protests
in
the
Arab
region
but
people
have
realized
that
the
governments
will
not
collapse
like
dominos
and
will
not
turn
towards
democracy,
thus
this
term
is
no
longer
being
used
as
frequently.
In
terms
of
the
difference
between
the
political
changes
in
the
Arab
region
and
the
Eastern
European
revolutions,
with
the
Eastern
European
revolutions,
there
was
a
political
and
economic
regime
model
in
place
in
the
Western
European
nations
on
their
western
borders
to
move
towards
after
the
revolutions.
However
in
the
case
of
Egypt
and
Tunisia,
it
was
a
revolution
after
the
failure
of
a
move
to
a
market
economy
that
those
Western
European
nations
had
moved
towards,
and
so
not
being
able
to
see
the
path
ahead
is
a
decisive
difference.
I'm
going
to
talk
mainly
about
Egypt
as
I
am
focusing
on
it
in
particular.
Since
Egypt
and
the
IMF
agreed
to
structural
adjustment
policies
in
1991,
it
has
moved
towards
a
market
economy
including
privatizing
state-run
enterprises.
This
is
a
process
that
further
accelerated
upon
entering
the
2000s
and
rising
barons
who
benefited
from
the
move
to
a
market
economy
and
gained
power
were
elected
to
parliament,
also
gaining
political
authority,
thus
it
became
a
situation
called
parasitic
capitalism,
or
crony
capitalism.
By
making
these
rising
entrepreneurs
aides
to
his
second
son,
Gamal,
who
had
a
key
post
in
the
ruling
party,
Mubarak
tried
to
simultaneously
achieve
rapid
and
efficient
economic
development
and
transfer
the
presidency
to
his
son.
However,
with
the
public's
growing
dissatisfaction
towards
elements
that
had
accumulated
before
the
collapse
such
as
corruption,
a
nepotistic
society,
an
authoritarian
administration
and
the
oppression
of
the
security
police,
the
Mubarak
administration
fell.
As
the
Egyptian
and
Tunisian
revolutions
were
the
results
of
a
failure
to
move
to
market
economies,
I
think
the
creation
of
a
future
national
framework
will
probably
attract
a
lot
of
attention.
That
is
my
first
thought.
The
second
is
the
idea
of
"justice"
(adāla)
that
the
Arabic
people
sought.
In
Cairo's
Tahrir
Square,
where
protestors
stationed
themselves,
what
was
often
seen
on
the
placards
that
Egyptians
held
up
were
the
words
"social
justice."
What
protests
not
only
in
Egypt
but
in
all
the
Arab
nations
had
in
common
were
the
words
"social
justice."
I
asked
many
people
in
Egypt
after
the
revolution
what
the
origin
of
the
social
justice
they
were
seeking
was
and
some
said
ancient
Egypt,
and
some
said
it
originated
in
Islam.
I
don't
know
what
the
definite
answer
to
where
this
idea
sprouted
from
is,
but
it
may
be
the
key
to
understanding
the
chain
of
political
changes.
Shiraishi How about you, Mr. Fukuda?
Fukuda
It
is
very
difficult
to
reach
a
firm
conclusion
on
the
Arab
upheaval
at
the
present
stage.
The
Arab
upheaval
has
a
variety
of
elements,
common
elements
to
all
the
nations
or
characteristic
elements
to
a
nation,
making
an
assessment
at
the
current
stage
difficult.
For
example,
the
Iranian
Revolution
in
1979
was
driven
by
a
range
of
forces
from
the
Shiites
to
communists.
Ultimately
the
Shiites
took
power
and
as
a
historical
assessment,
the
Iranian
Revolution
came
to
be
recognized
as
the
Islamic
Revolution.
Thus,
to
accurately
assess
the
Arab
upheaval,
it
may
be
necessary
to
assess
it
in
light
of
the
new
trend
of
the
Middle
East.
There
will
be
elections
in
Tunisia
in
October
and
elections
will
also
be
held
in
Egypt
in
November.
It
also
seems
that
the
situation
in
Libya
will
soon
reach
some
kind
of
resolution.
So,
soon
we
may
be
able
to
see
its
direction
and
trend.
Here
Judging
by
the
current
situation,
I
believe
that,
as
a
result
of
the
elections
in
Tunisia
and
Egypt,
it
does
appear
that
Islam
will
gain
strong
influence,
though
I
do
not
believe
that
Islamic
elements
will
gain
overwhelming
power
enough
to
turn
them
into
so-called
Islamic
state.
Then
if
civil
war
in
Libya
end,
a
domestic
power
struggle
may
ensue.
I
think
the
strongest
in
that
power
struggle
is
probably
the
power
with
the
Islamic
force.
In
the
course
of
things,
the
influence
of
Islam
will
strengthen
more
and
more.
In
the
context
in
which
the
Arab
upheaval
occurred,
there
is
opposition
to
heavy-handed
politics
and
dissatisfaction
towards
the
economy
and
society.
Looking
at
it
from
an
Islamic
view
point,
the
authoritarianism
in
countries
like
Egypt
was
not
simply
authoritarianism,
but
it
was
an
authoritarianism
linked
to
the
US.
Also
it
seems
that
economic
reforms
under
globalism
centering
on
America
has
caused
a
range
of
economic
and
social
problems
such
as
a
gap
between
rich
and
poor.
trends
in
the
Middle
East,
I
think
that
maybe
the
countries
in
the
region
as
a
whole
will
keep
more
distances
from
the
US
and
such
trends
will
also
occur
in
each
country.
We
have
to
watch
the
situation
carefully
for
a
bit
longer,
but
in
Egypt,
Tunisia
and
Libya
in
North
Africa
at
least
I
think
such
movements
will
occur.
Shiraishi Thank you.
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