Asymmetric information and Anti-Dumping Duty (2020_1_40_004)
It is intended that an analysis of asymmetric information would be applied to the issue of anti-dumping duty. As the result of the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round (GATT/WTO), the liberalization of trade has showed remarkable progress. At the same time, implementations of anti-dumping measures have increased. This is because the criteria of dumping have become clear and the procedures for measures have become simple. It is possible to find a tendency such that the dumping price is thought to be below the price that is estimated rationally via investigations of production cost. Especially, in developing economies, which are home to many small firms with weak management, governments consider that anti-dumping measures are important as part of trade policy. It is assumed that a foreign firm exports goods to the home country and that the government of the home country has limited information because of such information being asymmetric. Then, we investigate what degree truly the foreign firm should report on production cost so as to avoid anti-dumping duty.
April 2020 - March 2021
Members of the Research Project
|[ Organizer ]||Yoshino Hisao|
- Asia Keizai (in Japanese)