Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis
Column
Myanmar
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Election Fraud and its Impact
Before
reviewing
the
election
results,
we
first
need
to
examine
how
serious
the
election
fraud
was
and
how
large
its
impact
on
the
results.
If
organizational
and
large-scale
irregularities
had
taken
place
in
voting
and
vote
counting,
there
would
be
no
meaning
to
analyze
the
election
results.
The
election
fraud
would
render
the
elections
nothing
but
a
mere
rite
to
wipe
the
slate
clean
for
the
“legitimization”
of
the
military
regime,
which
seized
power
with
a
coup
outside
the
law.
The
1990
elections
are
deemed
to
have
been
conducted
in
a
free
and
fair
manner,
at
least
in
terms
of
voting
and
vote
counting
(Ino
[1992:15]).
Experts(
*1
)
had
predicted
that
voting
and
vote
counting
would
take
place
relatively
freely
and
fairly
in
the
elections
despite
rampant
fraudulent
and
dubious
acts
prior
to
voting,
such
as
a
clampdown
on
pro-democracy
forces,
including
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi’s
house
arrest;
pressure
on
ethnic
minority
forces,
such
as
a
refusal
to
permit
the
establishment
and
registration
of
political
parties;
use
of
the
national
budget
by
the
USDA/USDP
for
campaigning
and
dispensation
of
favors;
and
employment
of
administrative
authority
in
semi-cohesive
mobilizations.
In
the
elections,
however,
the
military
regime
shunned
international
observers
and
excluded
foreign
media
by
refusing
to
issue
visas.
In
sum,
one
must
say
that
the
2010
elections
took
place
in
more
closed
and
nontransparent
conditions,
in
comparison
with
the
1990
elections.
What
kind
of
fraud,
then,
actually
took
place?
This
is
an
issue
that
is
difficult
to
verify
at
this
point,
and
probably
in
the
future,
too.
Various
means
of
pre-voting
“mobilization”
are
being
used
for
election
campaign
purposes
in
many
countries.
Although
they
potentially
include
illegal
or
nontransparent
acts,
it
is
usually
difficult
to
present
evidence
of
an
unlawful
act.
In
contrast,
fraud
in
voting
and
vote
counting
constitutes
more
apparent
and
serious
election
abuse
because
it
directly
alters
the
result
of
an
election.
A
glimpse
of
the
conditions
on
the
voting
and
vote
counting
is
provided
in
a
report
by
an
NGO
that
organized
volunteers
inside
Myanmar
to
monitor
the
voting
and
vote
counting
at
polling
stations(
*2
)
.
This
is
based
on
reports
submitted
between
September
27
and
November
8,
2010
by
175
trained
observers
working
in
81
townships.
The
report
indicates
that
vote
counting
was
not
conducted
according
to
the
procedures
prescribed
in
the
election
laws
at
about
30
percent
of
the
polling
stations,
although
very
few
cases
of
cohesion,
threats,
or
other
illegal
acts
were
reported
at
the
polls.
According
to
rules
of
the
election
laws,
vote
counting
in
the
elections
was
to
take
place
at
polling
stations
in
the
presence
of
election
staff,
polling
station
representatives,
and
ordinary
citizens(
*3
)
.
While
this
mechanism
is
similar
to
the
one
adopted
in
the
1990
elections,
there
were
some
differences.
First,
due
to
the
large
number
of
polling
stations,
totaling
roughly
40,000,
and
because
national-scale
political
parties
were
confined
to
the
USDP
and
the
NUP,
pro-democracy
party
officials
were
not
able
to
monitor
all
polling
stations
in
Myanmar.
Second,
due
to
financial
and
organizational
constraints,
they
could
not
dispatch
candidate
representatives
to
all
polling
stations,
even
in
those
constitutencies
that
had
a
pro-democracy
party
candidate
running.
Third,
pro-democracy
parties
were
not
able
to
build
a
national
network
for
monitoring
voting
and
vote
counting
owing
to
a
lack
of
collaboration
among
pro-democracy
parties
or
among
the
opposition,
including
the
NUP.
For
this
reason,
they
did
not
have
the
means
to
grasp
the
conditions
of
voting
and
vote
counting
around
the
country,
except
for
informal
monitoring
by
some
NGOs.
Pro-democracy
forces
failed
to
make
such
preparations,
which
should
have
been
made
in
advance.
Another
significant
problem
in
the
elections
is
related
with
advance
voting.
Critics
have
pointed
out
that
advance
voting
is
a
breeding
ground
for
vote
rigging.
Unlike
voting
that
takes
place
at
the
polling
station
on
the
election
day,
generally
in
the
presence
of
some
people,
advance
voting
is
said
to
be
more
susceptible
to
disclosing
who
voted
for
whom,
a
violation
of
the
principle
of
secret
balloting.
As
the
polling
day
drew
near,
it
was
rumored
that
the
USDP
was
scraping
up
votes
among
civil
servants,
military
personnel,
and
employees
of
big
companies
closely
associated
with
the
regime.
It
appears
that
the
USDP
gradually
developed
the
advance
voting,
which
initially
functioned
as
absentee
voting(
*4
)
,
into
a
vote
collection
mechanism.
The
election
laws
allow
advance
voting
by
military
personnel,
students,
trainees,
detainees,
hospitalized
patients,
and
others
who
are
outside
their
constituencies
on
the
election
day.
However,
the
state-run
TV
program
explained
that
all
military
personnel
and
their
families
would
be
able
to
vote
before
the
polling
day
in
an
election
education
program
aired
prior
to
the
elections.
There
is
no
doubt
that
advance
voting
was
used
by
the
USDP
as
a
means
of
gathering
votes.
If
this
is
the
case,
how
much
of
an
impact
did
advance
voting
have
on
the
election
results?
The
example
of
Yangon
helps
gauge
the
ramifications
(
Table
3).
The
ratio
of
advance
votes
to
the
total
valid
votes
for
the
Union
Legislature
(the
People’s
Legislature
and
the
National
Legislature)
was
slightly
less
than
6
percent,
a
relatively
low
figure.
For
instance,
advance
votes
constituted
roughly
20
percent
of
all
votes
in
the
July
2010
House
of
Councilors
election
in
Japan,
although
this
may
not
provide
an
appropriate
basis
for
comparison
in
view
of
the
huge
differences
in
the
environments
surrounding
elections
in
Japan
and
Myanmar.
Table
3 Percentage
of
Votes
Won
by
Major
Parties
in
Yangon
Region
People's
Legislature
(45
seats)
Party | No. of Candidates | No. of Seats Won | % of Votes Won | % of Advance Votes | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vote on Poll Day | Advance Votes | Total | ||||
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 45 | 37 | 48.4 | 78.6 | 50.1 | 9.0 |
National Democratic Force | 37 | 8 | 20.8 | 7.4 | 20.1 | 2.1 |
(37constituencies in contention) | 28.6 | 9.7 | 27.4 | 2.1 | ||
National Unity Party | 43 | 0 | 13.6 | 7.6 | 13.3 | 3.3 |
Democratic Party (Myanmar) | 15 | 0 | 4.3 | 1.2 | 4.1 | 1.6 |
88 Generation Student Youths | 18 | 0 | 6.2 | 2.3 | 6.0 | 2.2 |
Others | 38 | 0 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 2.6 |
Total | 196 | 45 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 5.7 |
National Legislature (12 seats)
Party | No. of Candidates | No. of Seats Won | % of Votes Won | % of Advance Votes | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Vote on Poll Day | Advance Votes | Total | ||||
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 12 | 8 | 47.6 | 78.8 | 49.3 | 8.7 |
National Democratic Force | 10 | 4 | 26.5 | 10.0 | 25.6 | 2.1 |
(10 constituencies in contention) | 31.6 | 11.6 | 30.5 | 2.1 | ||
National Unity Party | 12 | 0 | 15.5 | 8.1 | 15.1 | 2.9 |
Democratic Party (Myanmar) | 3 | 0 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 2.7 | 1.7 |
88 Generation Student Youths | 4 | 0 | 4.9 | 1.4 | 4.7 | 1.7 |
Others | 7 | 0 | 2.6 | 0.9 | 2.5 | 1.9 |
Total | 48 | 12 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 5.4 |
(Source) Myanmar Alin (State-run Burmese newspaper) on Nov. 12, 2010.
Still,
the
percentage
of
winning
votes
clearly
demonstrates
that
advance
voting
worked
to
the
advantage
of
the
USDP.
In
both
Legislatures,
the
USDP
won
nearly
80
percent
of
advance
votes,
compared
with
less
than
50
percent
in
voting
at
the
polling
station.
Slightly
less
than
10
percent
of
valid
votes
won
by
the
USDP
came
from
advance
voting.
This
strikes
a
stark
contrast
with
the
NDF,
which
gained
some
20
percent
of
total
votes
in
the
People’s
Legislature
and
about
a
quarter
in
the
National
Legislature
with
just
7.4
percent
and
10.0
percent
of
advance
votes
respectively.
Consequently,
the
ratio
of
advance
votes
to
the
total
valid
votes
for
the
NDF
was
only
2.1
percent.
As
a
result,
the
NDF’s
victory
in
the
election
day
votes
was
overturned
by
advance
votes
in
four
races
in
the
People’s
Legislature.
Such
turnaround
cases
did
not
occur
in
the
National
Legislature,
however.
If
we
exclude
all
advance
votes
from
the
results,
how
would
the
number
of
seats
be
affected?
In
this
case,
a
total
of
about
30
seats
would
shift
from
the
USDP
to
pro-democracy
or
ethnic
minority
parties.
Although
not
a
negligible
number
for
pro-democracy
and
ethnic
minority
parties,
even
this
kind
of
shift
would
have
not
changed
the
formidable
edge
enjoyed
by
the
USDP
in
the
Union
Legislature.
If
losing
candidates
are
to
lodge
a
complaint
to
the
UEC,
they
need
to
collect
evidence
of
fraud
committed
by
the
opposing
candidate
or
in
the
voting
and
vote
counting
process,
a
challenging
task.
Moreover,
they
need
to
pay
1
million
kyats
(more
than
1000
US
dollars)
for
each
submission.
In
a
letter
sent
to
all
political
parties
on
November
6,
the
UEC
declared
that
any
objections
regarding
election
results
must
be
formally
submitted
in
accordance
with
the
law.
The
UEC
also
warned
in
the
letter
that
making
complaints
about
the
polls
to
foreign
media
would
constitute
a
violation
of
the
election
laws.
Under
these
circumstances,
a
top
official
of
the
Shan
Nationalities
Democratic
Party
(SNDP),
along
with
the
Rakhine
Nationalities
Development
Party
(RNDP),
which
took
third
and
fourth
in
the
elections,
noted,
“We
are
well
aware
of
the
USDP's
cheating,
but
we
don't
see
any
point
in
disputing
the
results
of
the
election.
If
we
sue
them,
we
will
have
to
pay
one
million
kyat
for
every
constituency
that
they
stole.
We
don't
want
to
waste
our
time
and
money
on
this.”
(
The
Irrawaddy
,
November
20,
2010).
This
reflects
their
realistic
recognition
that
the
UEC
is
certain
to
hand
down
a
judgment
in
favor
of
the
USDP,
as
well
as
their
relative
good
showing
in
the
elections,
as
the
parties
garnered
a
fairly
high
winning
ratio:
36.5
percent
for
the
SNDP
and
79.5
percent
for
the
RNDP.
Number of Seats by Political Parties
The UEC announced the representatives-elect in each constituency on November 8 and then from November 11 to 18. These announcements revealed that a total of 1154 candidates – 1148 candidates representing 22 political parties and six independents – won seats in the People’s Legislature, the National Legislature and 14 Region and State Legislatures (Table 4).
Table 4 Number of Representatives-Elect by Political Parties
Name of Party | Union Legislature | Region and State Legislatures | Total for 2010 Elections | Ratio (%) |
<Reference> No. of Candidates |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
People's Legislature | National Legislature | Union Legislature | Ratio in Union Legislature | No. of Seats | Ratio in Region and State Legislatures | ||||
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 259 | 129 | 388 | 78.7% | 495 | 74.9% | 883 | 76.5% | 1112 |
National Unity Party | 12 | 5 | 17 | 3.4% | 46 | 7.0% | 63 | 5.5% | 995 |
Shan Nationalities Democratic Party | 18 | 3 | 21 | 4.3% | 36 | 5.4% | 57 | 4.9% | 156 |
Rakhine Nationalities Development Party | 9 | 7 | 16 | 3.2% | 19 | 2.9% | 35 | 3.0% | 44 |
National Democratic Force | 8 | 4 | 12 | 2.4% | 4 | 0.6% | 16 | 1.4% | 162 |
All Mon Region Democracy Party | 3 | 4 | 7 | 1.4% | 9 | 1.4% | 16 | 1.4% | 34 |
Chin Progressive Party | 2 | 4 | 6 | 1.2% | 6 | 0.9% | 12 | 1.0% | 40 |
Pa-O National Organization | 3 | 1 | 4 | 0.8% | 6 | 0.9% | 10 | 0.9% | 10 |
Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1.0% | 4 | 0.6% | 9 | 0.8% | 18 |
Chin National Party | 2 | 2 | 4 | 0.8% | 5 | 0.8% | 9 | 0.8% | 22 |
"Wa" Democratic Party | 2 | 1 | 3 | 0.6% | 3 | 0.5% | 6 | 0.5% | 25 |
Kayin Peoples Party | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.4% | 4 | 0.6% | 6 | 0.5% | 41 |
Taaung (Palaung) National Party | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.4% | 4 | 0.6% | 6 | 0.5% | 15 |
Unity and Democracy Party (Kachin State) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.4% | 2 | 0.3% | 4 | 0.3% | 9 |
Inn National Development Party | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.2% | 3 | 0.5% | 4 | 0.3% | 5 |
Democratic Party (Myanmar) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 0.5% | 3 | 0.3% | 47 |
Kayin State Democracy and Development Party | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.2% | 1 | 0.2% | 2 | 0.2% | 4 |
Kayan National Party | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 0.3% | 2 | 0.2% | 5 |
National Democratic Party for Development | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 2 | 0.3% | 2 | 0.2% | 22 |
88 Generation Student Youths (Union of Myanmar) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.2% | 1 | 0.1% | 39 |
Ethnic National Development Party | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.2% | 1 | 0.1% | 3 |
Lahu National Development Party | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.2% | 1 | 0.1% | 9 |
Independent | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0.4% | 4 | 0.6% | 6 | 0.5% | 88 |
Total | 325 | 168 | 493 | 100.0% | 661 | 100.0% | 1154 | 100.0% |
- |
The
USDP
came
in
first
in
the
polls,
winning
883
out
of
1154
seats
(76.5%
of
all
seats)
for
a
“landslide
victory.”
The
party
won
78.7
percent
of
seats
in
the
Union
Legislature
(the
People’s
Legislature
and
the
National
Legislature)
and
74.9
percent
in
the
Region
and
State
Legislatures.
With
1112
candidates
fielded,
the
USDP’s
winning
percentage
in
the
election
reached
79.4
percent.
The
NUP
came
in
second
with
just
63
seats
(5.5%
of
all
seats).
With
995
candidates
running,
their
winning
percentage
was
a
mere
6.3
percent.
The
third
and
fourth
places
went
to
the
SNDP
and
RNDP,
both
ethnic
minority
parties,
with
57
seats
(4.9%)
and
35
seats
(3.0%),
respectively.
The
NDF
won
16
seats
(1.4%)
to
remain
in
fifth
position.
The
result
was
surely
the
USDP's
“landslide.”
However,
as
will
be
described
below,
we
were
able
to
observe
some
instances
in
which
pro-democracy
and
ethnic
minority
parties
put
up
a
good
fight
in
constituencies
where
the
USDP
mobilization
turned
out
to
be
less
effective.
While
there
is
no
question
that
the
USDP’s
“landslide
victory”
was
brought
about
by
mobilization
campaigns
backed
by
their
enormous
organizational
and
financial
power,
along
with
their
dispensation
of
favors,
we
are
able
to
discern
the
opinion
of
voters
from
the
poll
results.
There
are
two
key
points
here:
a
relatively
strong
support
for
the
NDF
in
Yangon
and
good
showing
by
ethnic
minority
parties.
Support for the NDF in Yangon
The NDF, which came to represent pro-democracy forces in the elections, had only 16 successful candidates out of 162. Nevertheless, the fact that all 16 candidates were elected in Yangon means the NDF did fairly well as far as this region is concerned. Yangon, the biggest city in Myanmar, has a substantial concentration of businesses and industries. There are many residents who are well-educated and middle-class citizens with specialist jobs. With easier access to information on domestic and international affairs, voters generally have a high political consciousness. For these reasons, it is assumed that the USDP’s “mobilization” was comparatively less effective there, allowing polling to take place in a relatively free environment. In that sense, the election results in Yangon seem to reflect a true will of the people in Myanmar. In other words, the NDF’s good showing in Yangon exemplifies deep-seated support for pro-democracy parties among the citizens.
Table
3
shows
the
poll
results
by
party
for
seats
in
the
Union
Legislature
(45
seats
in
the
People’s
Legislature
and
12
seats
in
the
National
Legislature)
in
Yangon
Region.
Of
45
seats
in
the
People’s
Legislature,
the
USDP
collected
37
and
NDF
gained
eight.
The
USDP
and
the
NDF
won
eight
and
four
seats,
respectively,
in
the
12-seat
National
Legislature.
Other
parties,
including
the
NUP,
could
not
secure
even
one
seat
in
the
Union
Legislature.
In
sum,
Yangon
Region
was
a
battlefield
that
pitted
the
pro-military
party
against
the
pro-democracy
parties.
Let
us
look
at
the
percentage
of
votes
against
the
total
number
of
valid
votes.
The
USDP
got
roughly
50
percent
of
the
total
number
of
valid
votes
for
both
Legislatures,
while
the
NDF
got
around
20
percent
in
the
People’s
Legislature
and
25
percent
in
the
National
Legislature.
Considering
that
the
USDP
collected
about
80
percent
of
the
seats
in
both
Legislatures
against
20
percent
for
the
NDF,
the
USDP
can
be
said
to
have
procured
votes
more
efficiently.
Conversely,
if
the
pro-democracy
bloc,
excluding
the
NUP
which
seeks
to
establish
a
third
force,
had
worked
together
in
the
election
so
that
votes
would
not
be
scattered
among
small
pro-democracy
parties,
the
NDF
should
have
been
able
to
win
more
seats.
When
we
look
at
the
percentage
of
votes
against
the
total
number
of
valid
votes
in
constituencies
in
which
NDF
fielded
candidates
(noted
as
“constituencies
in
contention”
in
Table
3),
we
discover
their
support
was
around
30
percent
for
both
Legislatures.
Considering
that
the
NDF
is
virtually
a
regional
party
in
Yangon,
one
might
assume
that
this
is
the
level
of
voter
support
that
could
potentially
be
attained
by
the
pro-democracy
bloc,
even
with
the
USDP’s
mobilization
campaigns.
This
shows
that
if
the
NLD,
with
its
nationwide
organizational
capability
and
popularity
and
led
by
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi,
even
if
she
were
excluded
from
the
party
in
accordance
with
the
Party
Registration
Law,
participated
in
the
elections
and
fielded
candidates
in
constituencies
around
the
nation,
the
NLD
would
likely
have
won
at
least
about
30
percent
of
the
total
votes.
In
view
of
the
enthusiastic
support
extended
to
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi
after
her
release
on
November
13,
2010,
the
view
that
the
NLD
could
have
secured
even
broader
support
among
the
people
should
not
come
as
a
surprise.
Moreover,
if
the
opposition
bloc
that
includes
both
pro-democracy
and
ethnic
minority
parties
had
won
one
quarter
of
the
seats
in
the
Union
Legislature,
they
would
have
attained
the
power
to
call
for
a
special
session
of
each
Legislature
whenever
they
want(
*5
)
.
That
would
have
enabled
the
opposition
to
launch
political
dialogue
with
the
USDP
in
the
Union
Legislature
at
any
given
time.
We
need
to
bear
in
mind,
however,
that
pro-democracy
and
ethnic
minority
parties
actually
needed
to
win
one
third
of
the
seats
in
the
elections
because
one
fourth
of
the
seats
in
the
Union
Legislature
are
uncontested,
filled
by
military
representatives
appointed
by
the
Commander-in-Chief.
Still,
this
figure
would
have
been
within
reach
had
the
NLD
participated
in
the
elections,
as
discussed
earlier.
Support for Ethnic Minority Parties
Let
us
now
look
at
the
performance
of
ethnic
minority
parties
in
the
elections.
Table
5
shows
the
number
of
seats
gained
and
winning
percentage
by
political
parties
for
the
USDP,
the
NUP,
pro-democracy
parties
including
the
NDF
and
the
Democratic
Party
(Myanmar),
ethnic
minority
parties
including
17
parties,
and
others
including
the
88
Generation
Student
Youths
and
independents.
The
USDP,
which
scored
a
“landslide
victory”
in
the
elections,
boasts
a
winning
percentage
of
about
80
percent
in
all
Legislatures.
Meanwhile,
the
NUP
suffered
a
disastrous
setback
in
all
Legislatures,
capturing
only
3.8
percent
in
the
Union
Legislature
and
8.3
percent
in
the
Region
and
State
Legislatures.
Pro-democracy
parties
also
fared
bad:
their
overall
winning
percentage
fell
below
10
percent,
although
their
figures
were
slightly
higher
in
the
Region
and
State
Legislatures
at
18.9
percent.
In
comparison,
if
we
combine
ethnic
minority
parties
as
one
group
for
analysis,
their
winning
percentage
shoots
up
to
around
40
percent
in
both
the
Union
and
Region
and
State
Legislatures
--
a
fairly
good
showing,
considering
the
circumstances
that
overwhelmingly
favor
the
USDP.
This
reflects
the
success
of
the
ethnic
minority
parties’
strategy
of
focusing
on
fielding
candidates
in
their
home
regions.
Table 5 Election Results by Political Party
Party | Union Legislatures | Region/State Legislatures | Total for the Elections | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
People's Legislature (Seats Won) | Winning Ratio (People) | National Legislature (Seats Won) | Winning Ratio (National) | Union Legislature (Seats Won) | Winning Ratio (Union) | Seats Won | Winning Ratio (Region) | Seats Won | Winning Ratio (Total) | |
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 259 | 82.2% | 129 | 81.6% | 388 | 82.0% | 495 | 77.5% | 883 | 79.4% |
National Unity Party | 12 | 4.1% | 5 | 3.4% | 17 | 3.8% | 46 | 8.3% | 63 | 6.3% |
Pro-democracy Parties (1) | 8 | 6.3% | 4 | 8.9% | 12 | 7.0% | 7 | 18.9% | 19 | 9.1% |
Other Ethnic Minority Parties (2) | 45 | 38.5% | 29 | 36.7% | 74 | 37.8% | 108 | 40.6% | 182 | 39.4% |
Others (3) | 1 | - | 1 | - | 2 | - | 5 | - | 7 | 5.5% |
Total | 325 | - | 168 | - | 493 | - | 661 | - | 1154 | - |
(2) Ethnic minority parties refer to 17 parties including the SNDP and the RNDP.
(3) Others include the 88 Generation Student Youths and independents.
(Source) New Light of Myanmar on Nov. 8, and 11-18, 2010.
Table
6
shows
the
number
of
seats
collected
by
political
parties
for
seven
regions
with
many
Burmese
residents
and
seven
states
inhabited
by
many
ethnic
minorities.
The
Table
6
demonstrates
that
ethnic
minority
parties
did
well
in
the
states.
First,
they
could
not
even
secure
a
single
seat
in
the
seven
regions
but
won
nearly
40
percent
of
seats
in
the
seven
states
in
the
People’s
Legislature.
Second,
in
the
National
Legislature,
ethnic
minority
parties
occupied
34.5
percent
of
seats
in
the
seven
states,
but
none
in
the
seven
regions.
Third,
in
the
Region
and
State
Legislatures,
they
won
five
seats
(1.2
percent
of
the
all
seats)
in
seven
regions,
and
103
seats
(40.7%
of
all
the
seats)
in
the
seven
states.
In
the
seven
State
Legislatures,
ethnic
minority
parties
came
to
form
a
force
that
competes
closely
with
the
USDP,
which
garnered
more
than
50
percent
of
the
seats.
The
good
showing
of
ethnic
minority
parties
in
their
respective
local
states
could
affect
the
political
activities
of
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi,
who
is
now
released
from
house
arrest.
It
was
reported
that
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi
met
with
ethnic
minority
party
leaders
in
Yangon
on
November
20,
one
week
after
her
release,
and
they
agreed
on
the
establishment
of
a
national
council
designed
to
create
a
dialogue
with
the
military
regime
(The
Nikkei,
November
21,
2010).
Ethnic
minority
leaders
are
also
said
to
be
working
to
hold
a
second
meeting
of
the
Panlong
Conference,
held
in
1947
by
late
independence
hero
General
Aung
San,
Aung
San
Suu
Kyi’s
father,
which
pledged
to
restore
harmony
among
all
various
diverse
ethnic
groups
including
Burmese.
It
is
possible
that
the
good
showing
by
ethnic
minority
parties
in
the
elections
could
accelerate
such
moves.
On
the
other
hand,
Burmese
parties,
including
the
USDP,
did
not
manage
to
win
widespread
support
in
states
with
strong
ethnic
minority
party
presence,
reminiscent
of
the
NLD
in
the
1990
elections.
These
results
are
an
indication,
one
might
say,
that
an
axis
of
“Burmese
vs.
ethnic
minorities”
confrontation
still
persists
in
Myanmar
politics
in
addition
to
the
conflict
between
“the
military
government
vs.
pro-democracy
forces.”
We
need
to
monitor
issues
involving
ethnic
minorities,
as
well
as
the
moves
of
armed
ethnic
groups
that
are
slipping
into
deeper
confrontation
with
the
Myanmar
army
over
their
integration
into
the
Border
Guard
Forces
(BGFs)
under
the
command
of
the
Myanmar
army.
Table
6 Number
of
Seats
by
Region
and
State
People's
Legislature
7 Regions | 7 States | Total | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | |
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 192 | 92.8% | 67 | 56.8% | 259 | 79.7% |
National Unity Party | 7 | 3.4% | 5 | 4.2% | 12 | 3.7% |
National Democratic Force Party | 8 | 3.9% | 0 | 0.0% | 8 | 2.5% |
Ethnic minority parties(1) | 0 | 0.0% | 45 | 38.1% | 45 | 13.8% |
Independents | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.8% | 1 | 0.3% |
Total | 207 | 100.0% | 118 | 100.0% | 325 | 100.0% |
National Legislature
7 Regions | 7 States | Total | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | |
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 79 | 94.0% | 50 | 59.5% | 129 | 76.8% |
National Unity Party | 1 | 1.2% | 4 | 4.8% | 5 | 3.0% |
National Democratic Force Party | 4 | 4.8% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 2.4% |
Ethnic minority parties(2) | 0 | 0.0% | 29 | 34.5% | 29 | 17.3% |
Independents | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 1.2% | 1 | 0.6% |
Total | 84 | 100.0% | 84 | 100.0% | 168 | 100.0% |
Region/State Legislature
7 Regions | 7 States | Total | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | Seats | Ratio | |
Union Solidarity and Development Party | 364 | 89.2% | 131 | 51.8% | 495 | 74.9% |
National Unity Party | 31 | 7.6% | 15 | 5.9% | 46 | 7.0% |
National Democratic Force Party | 4 | 1.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 0.6% |
Democratic Party (Myanmar) | 3 | 0.7% | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 0.5% |
88 Generation Student Youths | 1 | 0.2% | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 0.2% |
Ethnic minority parties(3) | 5 | 1.2% | 103 | 40.7% | 108 | 16.3% |
Independents | 0 | 0.0% | 4 | 1.6% | 4 | 0.6% |
Total | 408 | 100.0% | 253 | 100.0% | 661 | 100.0% |
(Source) New Light of Myanmar on Nov. 8, and 11-18, 2010
[Notes]
http://www.networkmyanmar.org/images/stories/PDF5/pfr.pdf .
[References]
- Ino, Kenji [1992] “Results of the 1990 Elections in Myanmar,” Tsushin , No. 75, July 1992, the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, pp.14-41 [in Japanese].
-
International
Crisis
Group
(ICG),
“Myanmar:
Towards
the
elections,”
Asia
Report
No.174,
20
August
2009,
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/174_myanmar___towards_the_elections.ashx [accessed August 24, 2009]. -
Preliminary
findings
report
(8
th
November
2010),
available
at
http://www.networkmyanmar.org/images/stories/PDF5/pfr.pdf [accessed November 27, 2010]. -
Yangon
Media
Group
[2010]
Election
Times:
Guide
for
Voters
,
Yangon
[in
Burmese].