January 31, 2012, (Tuesday)
B2F, Room "Daigo", Sheraton Miyako Hotel Tokyo
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Thank you for inviting me here today. I wish to begin by discussing political conditions surrounding the Arab Spring.

Over the past year, the Arab world has seen transformative change in the political landscape of the region. Authoritarian regimes and dictatorships previously thought to be firmly entrenched have crumbled as a result of popular uprisings. Over the past few decades, the Arab world has remained firmly in the grip of authoritarianism, with largely homogeneous political regimes across the region. However, the current political situation is markedly different depending on the country. How did these differences arise in each country?

The differences in the despotic regimes of various Arab countries were not clearly recognized until now. One reason is that previous analyses confused the three elements of leaders, political structure and states. For example, when focusing on leaders, researchers would often neglect to analyze the political structure. However, Arab countries have different standards of government administration, along with different kinds of relationships among governments and citizens. There are also large differences in national unity and capabilities of each Arab state.

Through the popular uprisings that began in Tunisia and spread to the entire Arab region, people not only demanded economic reforms, but also called for civil rights, freedom and dignity. These demands were common to all Arab states. Notably, young people took the lead in the popular uprisings, empowered by new ways of communicating across national boundaries using the Internet. They played an instrumental role in forcing their governments to change.

So the popular uprisings gave voice to common demands in various countries. Still, the subsequent trajectory followed by each country has differed considerably. What underlying factors were behind these differences? Let’s first take a look at governments that have so far remained in power. We can cite the following two or three features as the main reasons for their survival.

The first is large fiscal revenues. By distributing abundant fiscal revenues from oil resources to citizens, these governments have alleviated people’s economic grievances and quieted the popular uprisings. This approach was taken by countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Oman. However, the case of Libya showed that abundant fiscal revenues do not necessarily provide the means of guaranteeing the survival of a regime.

The second is the importance of timing. By addressing people’s demands promptly and resolutely, regimes increased the likelihood of their survival. If Tunisia and Egypt, whose regimes collapsed, had addressed people’s demands as promptly as Jordan and Morocco, it is highly likely that these administrations would still be in power today.

The third factor is monarchy. If a monarch can distance himself from political failure, while laying the blame on the government, this might be an effective means to assure the survival of the regime. One could see monarchy as the reason why the regimes of monarchical states remain in tact. That said, the Algerian government avoided the collapse of its regime not so much because of monarchy, but more importantly because of the two factors I just mentioned above (fiscal revenues and timing).

Let us now look at countries where popular uprisings have brought down regimes, and countries whose regimes may collapse soon. How have these countries fared? In this group, there is a stark contrast in the trajectories followed by each country. Egypt and Tunisia are both exploring new forms of government whereas Libya and Yemen have yet to see any decisive outcome of civil war, and Syria’s administration continues to fiercely repress its people. An analysis of these differences reveals four additional themes, in addition to the three features I just mentioned. These themes can be derived from the relationship between the regime and state.

First, in strong states (i.e. states with strong foundations), a collapse of regime does not threaten the survival of the state. For example, the citizens of Egypt and Tunisia do not believe that a collapse of their respective regimes would lead directly to the disintegration of state.

Second, in weak states, regime change is usually accompanied by the collapse of state. The overthrow of the Libyan regime has triggered the collapse of state. In addition, Yemen is on the verge of collapsing as a state as its regime crumbles.

Third, the purpose of some regimes is nation building. In these cases, the regime’s ideology is closely intertwined with national identity. Regimes that undertake nation building acquire legitimacy as rulers. State institutions, such as the military, pledge loyalty to the regime. Challenges to the regime are thus construed to be challenges to the state. Consequently, anti-regime elements are fiercely repressed by the military and other state institutions.

Fourth, the weaker the infrastructure of a state, the greater the likelihood of foreign intervention. The regime’s prospects for survival (the outcome of popular uprisings) will depend on the interests of the intervening foreign power.

In light of the foregoing themes, the following outlook for the future paths of various Arab nations can be derived. First, Egypt and Tunisia both have strong state infrastructure and highly experienced political leaders. Therefore, we can be optimistic about the outlook for these two countries. In contrast, we can expect nation building in Libya and Yemen to be extremely difficult. The long-term cooperation of the international community will be vital to building new governments in each of these countries. Syria will probably need intervention by the international community to restore stability, but as with Iraq, effective intervention will not be easy.

Political conditions in the Arab world are currently mired in turmoil and uncertainty. The region shows many different facets, from countries with bright prospects to states on the verge of disintegration. Some countries are likely to remain unstable for the foreseeable future. Fortunately, however, the Arab region as a whole has started moving toward building better forms of government.