APL-Bakery Seminar

APL (Ajiken Power Lunch) is a lunchtime workshop open to public, including IDE staffs, visiting research fellows, IDEAS students, outside researchers and graduate students. This workshop provides a platform for presentation of any work in progress where we can discuss in either English or Japanese.

Those who would attend a seminar are asked to announce yourself to receptionists on your arrival at the IDE and to obtain APL Organizers' signature on your admission card after the seminar.

July 17, 2015. (Friday) 12：00-13：00

Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization C23 Meeting Room 　

Economic and Corruption Voting under a Predominant Party System

Predominant party systems, in which a single party has won three consecutive general elections with at least a ten percent vote margin over its nearest rival, emerge after a long period of economic success but they also nurture corruption. The persistence of a predominant party system such as in Turkey thus suggests that (1) voters base their incumbent support on the long-term rather than short-term economic evaluation and (2) their corruption perception is largely irrelevant to incumbent support. This paper tests those two hypotheses using data from two nationwide surveys. Two-stage least squares regressions were run to address the endogeneity of economic evaluation and corruption perception. The results reject the first hypothesis and provide qualified support for the second. First, voters are sensitive to both long- and short-term economic conditions. Second, corruption perception has no significant impact on incumbent support once party identity is controlled for. Politically informed voters, however, punish the incumbent for corruption regardless of party identity.

Yasushi HAZAMA

Japanese/English