Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Aims of the Study

Post-communist Central Asia has long been regarded as a region of instability. With no previous experience of modern statehood, the Central Asian states inherited complex ethnic compositions and complicated—previously internal but now external—borders, drawn under Soviet rule. Thus, in the early post-Soviet years, many analysts predicted that independence in Central Asia would lead to ethnic and territorial conflict in the region.[1] Kazakhstan's substantial ethnic Russian population, in particular, was viewed as problematic. In the early- and mid-1990s, alarmist warnings of the danger of state collapse in Kazakhstan were widespread; it was often assumed that ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan were unlikely to reconcile themselves to minority status in the newly independent state, and that an ethnic Russian rebellion against the government of Kazakhstan would invite potentially disastrous interference from neighbouring Russia.[2] Indeed, in the late 1980s and up until 1991, Central Asia, like other Soviet republics, did experience a series of conflicts and political struggles that took on an ethnic flavour, and it was these developments that provided the grounds for the argument that conflict would continue after the break-up of the Soviet Union.

In fact, Central Asian states have experienced little ethnic violence since independence. Every new state has ethnic minority populations drawn from neighbouring states, but those ethnic minorities have rarely called for separation

[1] For typical predictions of ethnic conflict in Central Asia and their shortcomings, see Megoran (2007: 256-258).

[2] See Section Two and Four of this chapter. To be fair, any accounts of the 'Russian question' in the early- and mid-1990s should be read in the context of increased tensions and signs of mobilisation over this issue in Kazakhstan at that time.

from the states in which they reside. None of these states—or Russia—has dared to interfere in the affairs of neighbouring states for the purpose—real or professed—of protecting ethnic kin, even when inter-state relations were strained. This raises the following question: why has ethnically motivated conflict rarely occurred in this region despite many pessimistic predictions that this would be the case? Indeed, in recent years, the absence of ethnic conflict, instead of its danger and possible outcomes, has come to attract scholarly interest from analysts of this part of the world.[3]

This study provides an empirically grounded account of how and why ethnicity failed to emerge as an arena of conflict in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. To that end, it examines the mechanisms that have underpinned political stability in the republic since the breakdown of the Soviet State. This study identifies a post-Soviet strategy in Kazakhstan designed to effectively manage ethnic divisions, and provides an in-depth analysis of the dynamic interaction between the government of Kazakhstan, minorities residing in that state, and the ethnic homelands of those minorities. The study focuses on the following four groups: Russians, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Koreans. Russians have attracted the greatest attention in the debate about possible ethnic mobilisation in Kazakhstan, due to their population size and Russia's unique significance to Kazakhstan. This approach has often resulted in analytically collapsing the interests of non-Kazakhs into the interests of the Russians, neglecting the unique backgrounds and conditions of each minority group. By comparing different minorities, this study sheds new light on the heterogeneity of relationships between Kazakhstan, ethnic minorities residing inside Kazakhstan, and those minorities' ethnic homelands, while simultaneously identifying a common pattern of government control over ethnic movements.

The second section of this chapter provides a critical review of the extant

[3] Hughes and Sasse (2001) stress the importance of non-conflict cases for conflict studies of the former Soviet Union. Sasse shows in her own studies (Sasse 2001, 2002) the ways in which potentially serious ethno-regional conflict in Crimea, an autonomous territory within Ukraine, was accommodated through elite bargaining.

literature dealing with the puzzle of why Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states have managed to avoid ethnic conflict. Here, the chapter identifies three main arguments: one that focuses on the dilemmas in post-independence nation-building, a second that draws attention to cleavages cross-cutting or dividing ethnicity, and a third that emphasises the stabilising role of political elites in ethno-national mobilisation; the analysis in the chapter critically examines each approach's explanatory power and limitations. The third section discusses the theoretical framework of this inquiry. Following a brief review of the literature on stability in ethnically heterogeneous societies, this section discusses the relevance of the concept of control to the case of Kazakhstan. The fourth section provides a justification for the selection of the four ethnic communities, and explains the analytical framework employed to examine Kazakhstan, its minorities, and their external homelands. The fifth and final sections discuss methodology and outline the structure of the remainder of the study.

1.2 Why Conflict Did Not Occur: Explanations in the Extant Literature

As elaborated below, previous studies explain the fact that Kazakhstan (or, more broadly, Central Asia) has succeeded in maintaining stability in three main ways: an argument that emphasises obstacles to full-fledged Kazakh nation-building; a cleavages argument that focuses on identities that cross-cut or divide ethnic groups; and a 'framing' strategy perspective that focuses on the role of the elite in manipulating populations. The arguments of each perspective are examined below.

1.2.1 Imperfect Kazakhisation?

The first type of reasoning is linked to the post-independence nation-building project. There exists a broad agreement among political observers that Post-Soviet Kazakhstan can be categorised as a nationalising state (Brubaker 1996), although

it is relatively moderate compared to its Central Asian neighbours.[4] In seeking to build a Kazakh nation state, history is being mobilised to support the notion that Kazakhs alone have the right to claim the status of a people indigenous to Kazakhstan. As part of the nationalising project, Soviet and Russian names of cities, streets, schools, and various organisations have been, and continue to be, changed to Kazakh names. The Constitution and the language law define Kazakh as the sole state language of the republic, while the Russian language, which is spoken by almost the entire population, has been denied such a status. What is most obvious (and the most worrisome for non-Kazakhs) is the domination of all branches of power and public offices by members of the titular ethnicity. Understandably, these policies and practices have elicited concern and a feeling of unrest among non-Kazakhs. Thus, many analysts have warned that the preferential treatment of Kazakhs in a variety of spheres might lead to protest actions by the rest of the population.[5]

Yet analysts have also stressed that Kazakh elites face a dilemma in the process of nation-building: on the one hand, the government feels pressure to make Kazakhstan a state of and for Kazakhs, while on the other, non-Kazakhs demand a guarantee of equal status for all ethnic groups residing in the republic. Some analysts have argued that weak Kazakh identity, caused by linguistic, clan, and regional cleavages within and across the Kazakhs themselves (see below), hinders the advance of ethnically defined nation-building. Also, as the Kazakhs make up barely half of the population, some have pointed out that the authorities cannot afford to carry out a radical nationalising project because this would bring the risk of state collapse. Despite the increasing share of Kazakhs in the country's demographic profile, the numerical significance of non-Kazakhs who comprise almost half of the total population does not allow the government to completely

[4] See, for example, Masanov et al. (2002), Kolstø (2000), and Bohr (1998).

[5] Perhaps one of the most frequently quoted studies in this area is Bremmer (1994a), based on his field work in the city of Ust'-Kamenogorsk, the capital of the East Kazakhstan *oblast*. Bremmer observed strong protests by Russians in the north (not only ethnic movement leaders but also those in city administration as well as local legislature) against Kazakhisation.

ignore the minorities.

The arguments based on social structure (and its changes) seem plausible, but the relationship between demography and ethnic policy is not as clear. Generally speaking, it makes sense to argue that the legitimacy of a regime comes into question if it fails to consider the interests of a group or groups with a non-negligible share of the state's population. However, it is not obvious that a superordinate group, when it cannot overwhelm others in numbers, will be tolerant. There are cases in which a *Herrenvolk*, despite, or precisely because of its numerically minor position, seeks to coerce other groups into assimilation, or offers citizenship to others only in so far as its superior status is not be threatened.[6]

In Kazakhstan, ethnic balance has been changing in favour of Kazakhs since independence due to the large-scale out-migration of non-Kazakhs (among others Slavs and Germans), a higher birth rate among the Kazakhs, and government policy facilitating in-migration of ethnic Kazakhs residing abroad.[7] As to the consequences of this phenomenon, two opposite interpretations appear to be valid, at least in theory. One argument holds that a sharp decline in the number of non-Kazakhs leads to decreased tension in the republic as it makes ethnic-based protest against the state difficult. In other words, the Kazakhs' victory is guaranteed by default. From a different perspective, however, it is possible that increased numerical power allows the government to actively pursue policies that strengthen the Kazakhs' claim to political and cultural hegemony.[8] In such a case, the Russians may feel that they have to act before it is too late, that is, before they are completely outnumbered by the Kazakhs and are no longer in a position to compete with them.[9] It has been also argued that those Russians who chose to

[6] South Africa during the apartheid era is a typical example. Also, the slim majority status that Latvians and Estonians enjoy is often cited as one of the reasons for the rigorous requirements for the acquisition of citizenship in Post-Soviet Latvia and Estonia.
[7] These issues are explored in Chapter Three. On the debate on demography in Kazakhstan, see Kolstø (1998).
[8] See, for example, Olcott (2002: chapter 3).
[9] On the predictions of growing ethnic tension in Kazakhstan in Russia and in the West, see Kolstø (1998: 63-64).

remain have strong emotional attachments to the territory in which they live, and it is they who are most likely to demand autonomy or even separation from Kazakhstan.[10]

In sum, on the one hand, 'Kazakhisation' has attracted many authors' attention as a process that has the potential to lead to ethnic antagonism, while on the other, analysts have pointed to the limited capacity of the Kazakhstani state to enforce a radical nationalising policy in the face of demographic and other challenges. This dilemma is certainly an important aspect of ethnopolitics in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. This line of argument, however, tells us little as to why Kazakhstan has succeeded, at least so far, in maintaining interethnic stability. This study is an effort to move beyond the debate on whether or to what extent Kazakhstan is becoming an ethnic Kazakh state.

1.2.2 Identity

A second group of explanations for the low level of ethnic mobilisation in Kazakhstan (and Central Asia in general) concentrates on identity. Social movement theory suggests that a strong sense of common identity is one of the most important factors behind collective actions. In order to explain why ethnic movements have been inactive in the region, this body of literature stresses the impact of cleavages within and across ethnic categories, which, it is believed, have served to prevent ethnic mobilisation and conflict.

One argument contends that ethnic categories should not be considered as given, fixed or homogenous. Neil Melvin (1998; 1995) suggests that it is a weak and diffused identity within the Russian community that has made mobilisation difficult.[11] Russians, he argues, formed the nucleus of highly Sovietised,

[10] See, for example, Chinn and Kaiser (1996: 185, 190-191, 200) and Brubaker (1996: 50, 176-178). Brubaker also commented that the Russians in the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan may be forced to leave if government policies take on a more sharply anti-Russian orientation, and if intensifying conflict is militarised or otherwise linked with violence. He thought that there was a real possibility this could happen in Kazakhstan over the long term.

[11] In another article Melvin (2001) demonstrates that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, centralisation of power and coercion under authoritarianism

predominantly urban, and largely industrial settler communities that included people from a variety of ethnic origins. Their identity was primarily defined in socio-economic rather than ethnic terms. At the same time, Russian identity has developed as an inclusive concept, and the category of 'Russians' was considerably expanded to include a variety of Russian-speaking non-titular groups.[12]

Meanwhile, there is a deep linguistic cleavage within the Kazakhs; while linguistic Russification took place elsewhere under Soviet rule to one or another degree, the Kazakhs were linguistically the most Russified group among non-Slavic titular nationalities of Central Asia. Bhavna Dave (2007) argues that Kazakhstan's ruling elites—many of whom feel more comfortable speaking Russian than Kazakh—have used language as an identity symbol but have been very cautious in exploiting it for ethnonational mobilisation, being wary of alienating Russophone Kazakhs. As a result, the state has opted to leave society 'alone.'

Another argument holds that ethnic conflict did not occur because ethnic division had been depoliticised by another, more important cleavage. Pauline Jones Luong (2002) argues that it is not ethnicity, clan, or Islam, but regionalism that is politically most salient in Central Asia.[13] In her view, Soviet administrative units crosscutting ethnic boundary and cadre policy nurtured loyalty within *oblast* (province) and resulted in strong regional identity among political elites. This regionalism based on administrative-territorial divisions, Jones Luong contends, continued to serve as a mechanism by which conflict was peacefully resolved among regional elites even after the Soviet collapse. Meanwhile, for Kathleen Collins (2003) it is clan identity that prevented conflict along ethnic and/or

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led to the containment of significant ethnic and/or regional mobilisation in these Central Asian republics. In the case of Kazakhstan, Melvin has also identified co-optation of ethnic Russians as one of the key strategies for the management of ethnic diversity in the country.

[12] For a detailed review of the accounts of Russian identity, see Chapter Two.

[13] Jones Luong did research on the three Central Asian republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

religious lines in the region.[14]

These studies have greatly increased our understanding of a variety of identities existing in Central Asia, and caution us against reifying ethnic cleavages and essentialising ethnic identity. They have also demonstrated the internal heterogeneity of a community called by a single ethnic name. However, the arguments of Jones Luong and Collins that downplay the political importance of ethnicity by privileging regional or clan cleavages fail to acknowledge a generally accepted scholarly consensus that identity should be understood as multilayered, overlapping, and contextual. In Central Asia, clan, regional, and ethnic identities are not mutually exclusive.[15] Although it is beyond the scope of this study, we should rather investigate how these identities are interrelated with each other.

1.2.3 Frame Analysis

A third explanation for the lack of ethnic conflict focuses on cultural framing, one of the key components of social movement theory.[16] This group of studies seek to explain, building on the concept of framing, the *absence* of ethnically based collective actions in some seemingly possible cases.

Edward Schatz (1999) addresses the question of why Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear movement in the late Soviet era did not assume ethno-nationalist contours despite the fact that environmentalist movements in other Soviet republics typically did so. For Matteo Fumagalli, the puzzle was why very little ethno-nationalist mobilisation has occurred among the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and

[14] Kazakhstan is not included in Collins' research; she focused on Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. On the importance of clan in the modern politics of Kazakhstan, see Schatz (2004).

[15] In a separate analysis on Kazakhstan, Jones Luong (2002: 91-98) admits that the Soviet legacy promoted cleavages based not only on region but also on nationality. Yet she contends that regionalism is more salient than ethnicity, as *oblast* boundaries drew lines between Russians and Kazakhs, and as a result regional identities within and across both nationalities were created and reinforced.

[16] In his analysis of minority ethnic mobilisation in the Russian Federation, Dmitry Gorenburg defines frames as 'interpretive schemes that condense and simplify a person's experience by selectively highlighting and encoding certain situations, objects, events, and experiences' (2003: 11). See also his concise reference to the extant literature on the framing theory (Gorenburg 2003: 11-12).

Tajikistan, two countries whose relationship with Uzbekistan has been at times quite strained. To understand this puzzle, Fumagalli introduces the concept of a demobilising idea, 'a type of frame strategically developed by elites which leads the target community from mobilisation to demobilisation' (2007a: 571). In Kyrgyzstan, against the backdrop of widespread concern that the 1990 Osh conflict might repeat itself, the frame put forth by Uzbek leaders emphasising the importance of supporting whoever could preserve interethnic stability effectively resonated with ordinary Uzbeks. In Tajikistan, it was the memory of the Tajik civil war that served as a demobilising influence (Fumagalli 2007a).

Another article by Schatz (2000) focuses on the framing strategy of Kazakhstan's power elite, who deployed a frame which he calls 'internationalism with an ethnic face' to simultaneously seek ethnicisation (supported by Kazakhs) and civic nation-building (demanded by non-Kazakhs and the international community). Schatz maintains that this discursive frame served to gloss over contradictory practices among the authorities and to avoid, at least so far, mobilisation along ethnic lines in Kazakhstan. While he does not explicitly apply the framing theory, Pål Kolstø (2004) refers to a successful frame articulated in the official propaganda of the Kazakhstani government. Kolstø contends that President Nazarbaev has secured support from a multiethnic constituency through a propaganda effort that portrayed him as the only politician capable of preserving inter-ethnic harmony and stability. Nazarbaev also took advantage of the fear among non-Kazakhs that if someone else came to power, that person might be more nationalistic than the incumbent. This 'perception of a lack of alternatives and a serious concern for the future successor' (Fumagalli 2007a: 578) is common among ethnic minorities in other parts of Central Asia as well.

The advantage of these studies that use the concept of framing lies in their ability to convincingly explain the near absence of ethnonational mobilisation in a particular context without excluding the possibility of ethnicity becoming politically salient. Indeed, an abundance of factors that might trigger grievances among a particular ethnic group in and of itself does not necessarily lead to

collective action by that group. Yet it is also true that the weakness of ethnonational mobilisation does not preclude the existence of ethnically based problems.

The frame analysis, however, has its own limitations. While the concept of framing successfully describes the relationship between political elites and targeted populations, it is ill-suited to explain the interactions among political entrepreneurs themselves—those who are in a position to mobilise or demobilise people. To that end, another approach is necessary. Focusing on the relationship between predominantly Kazakh power holders and non-Kazakh elites, this study aims to show that the Kazakhstani state has been seeking to manage ethnic divisions through control of ethnic movement leaders.

1.3 Theoretical Framework of the Study

The previous section reviewed answers in the extant literature to the puzzle of why anticipated ethnic conflict did not arise in Kazakhstan. Key domestic factors— the limits of Kazakhisation, identities cross-cutting or dividing ethnicity, and a demobilising frame articulated by state and community leaders—were identified. As discussed above, these factors have a certain explanatory power, but explaining Kazakhstan's political stability requires a new approach that explores state strategies geared to depoliticising ethnic cleavages. As shown below, a control model, originally proposed by Lustick (1979) and later developed by McGarry and O'Leary (1993), serves this purpose.[17] This concept is derived from the debates on consociational democracy. Thus, this section begins with a brief review of consociationalism before moving to the control model, and then

[17] Referring to the concept of control proposed by Lustick, Kolstø (2004: 176, see also note 59) maintains that Nazarbaev's strategy is not control but 'bipolarity elimination.' Based on the premise that Kazakhstan is a bipolar society divided between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs who share basic linguistic and cultural characteristics, Kolstø argues that Nazarbaev has been seeking to facilitate ethnic cleavages among non-Kazakhs in order to avoid supra-ethnic consolidation. For details, see Section One of Chapter Five.

introduces the ways in which the latter is applied to the case studies in the following chapters. It also discusses the implications of consociational theory for the examination of Kazakhstan's authoritarian control mechanisms.

1.3.1 Consociation

Ethnic and other divisions between groups do not in and of themselves necessarily trigger antagonism. However, it is also a fact that groups divided by cleavages often disagree over issues in which their interests are at stake. In particular, if political power and/or economic resources are monopolised by a certain group of the population in a given state, this almost inevitably leads to discontent among members of other groups.

The theme of ethnic conflict regulation[18] has occupied the minds of many authors, who seek to identify the most effective ways to tackle the problem. Here, a taxonomy by McGarry and O'Leary (1993) is useful. They divide conflict regulation strategies into two categories: methods for eliminating differences and methods for managing differences. The first approach includes genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition, as well as integration and/or assimilation. Today, physically eliminating ethnic communities or forcibly expelling them from their place of residence is considered incompatible with internationally recognised democratic values. Theoretically, ethnic homogeneity in a given state might be increased by detaching a territory in which co-ethnics of a neighbouring state reside, yet in peacetime it is very unlikely that a state would choose to relinquish territory. Assimilation, a more moderate strategy, also includes coercive elements if compelled by state authority against minority wishes. Integration, which seeks to cultivate a common civic identity among its members, is not a panacea either. As integration does not recognise group rights and cultural differences in the

[18] As suggested by McGarry and O'Leary (1993: 4), the term 'regulation' is used here as an inclusive concept: it covers both conflict termination and conflict management. Lustick holds that conflicts that are under control are not regulated, but are absent. In this study, however, conflict regulation strategies are understood to include control—a strategy to contain conflicts, either temporarily or for a long period of time.

public domain, in the eyes of minorities it often appears to be synonymous with assimilation or majority rule.

What kinds of methods, then, are available if we are to cope with existing ethnic differences? One policy prescription is consociational democracy advocated by Arend Lijphart. Based on the experience of small European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland), he argued that democracy and political stability can be achieved in societies that are divided by cleavages. Lijphart identifies four defining characteristics of consociation: a 'grand coalition' of political elites representing each ethnic group; mutual veto in decision making over the issues critical to each group; proportionality in the allocation of public offices and resources; and territorial and/or cultural autonomy (Lijphart 1969, 1977). By challenging an established idea—that a homogeneous political culture is a prerequisite of stable democracy, his work has strongly influenced theorists of comparative politics. The consociational approach has also been applied by a number of scholars to their own case studies.[19]

Although consociationalists' ideas are not uniform, their basic premises can be summarised in three points. First, they take as their point of departure the necessity of political engineering of ethnic and other cleavages in divided societies. As integration based on a common civic identity is, if not impossible, difficult to achieve, it is, they argue, not effective as a method of conflict regulation. Second, consociationalists maintain that it is dangerous to impose a majoritarian system of democracy in ethnically fragmented societies, as this may lead to the permanent exclusion of minorities from power. Third, consociational theorists consider the role of elites to be crucial in managing and settling conflict. Lijphart assumes that an understanding of the perils of political fragmentation enables elites to work together for the maintenance of the system. To do so, elites must enjoy a sufficient degree of autonomy within their communities to make compromises and concessions without losing the support of their own group members. The most explicit statement of this point is made by Nordlinger (1972),

[19] See, for example, Daalder (1974) and McRae (1974).

who argues that successful conflict regulation is largely dependent upon the purposeful behaviour of political elites. The 'structured predominance of elites,' which he believes is a necessary condition for conflict regulation, can be achieved when nonelites are apolitically quiescent, or they subscribe to a set of politically acquiescent or deferential attitudes towards authorities.

Proponents of consociation, among others its creator Lijphart, have been attacked by critics from a variety of backgrounds.[20] The most heated debates are related to the abovementioned propositions. First, critics of consociation argue that it cannot be advocated as a strategy for conflict regulation. By freezing and reinforcing ethnic differences, it does not eliminate, but rather fosters sources of conflict. Instead, political integration across cleavages should be the goal. Second, those who condemn consociational ideas detect a nondemocratic quality in its practices; it is elitist, excludes competition, and does not allow mass participation in politics. The third objection to consociation is that the role of the elite is overestimated or wrongly assumed. Elites do not accommodate cleavages; if they do, that is because cleavages are not significant. The consociational model is based on an incorrect premise that elites are willing to avoid conflict; rather, they may exploit cleavages for their own purposes. Further, critics accuse consociationalists of ignoring intraelite competition, and the risk of outbidding and outflanking. Elites, it is argued, do not have the leeway in their behaviour that consociationalists assume.

To consider whether or not these criticisms are valid is beyond the scope of the analysis here.[21] For the purpose of this study, it is important to consider what the elite-oriented characteristics of consociation suggest for an analysis of management of ethnic differences under authoritarianism.[22] However, it is perhaps necessary to make the point of the author clear as regards the first

[20] For criticisms of consociation from different perspectives, see Barry (1975a, 1975b), Horowitz (1985), Lustick (1979, 1997), and Sisk (1996).
[21] For a detailed vindication of consociation and suggestions for its further development, see O'Leary (2005).
[22] This is not to say that consociation is undemocratic in and of itself or that it can function only in authoritarian states.

criticism; it is the premise of this study that, like consociationalists, ethnic identity cannot be easily eliminated in the short or medium term, and thus needs to be managed. To be sure, integration is one of the possible and effective means of regulating ethnic conflict, but it takes many years. This approach does not mean to essentialise ethnic identity. As O'Leary (2005: 8) rightly points out, '[t]o say that they [collective identities—N.O.] are durable is not to say that they are either primordial or immutable.'

1.3.2 Control

Despite criticisms of the consociational model as undemocratic, consociational analysis has been directed almost exclusively at democratic regimes. There exist, however, many undemocratic, non-consociational and multiethnic societies that manage to sustain political stability. To analyse such cases, Lustick (1979) has proposed an alternative approach—'control,' through which a superordinate group effectively constrains the political actions and opportunities of another group(s).

Lustick compares the models of consociation and control in seven ways: the criterion that governs the authoritative allocation of resources; linkages between the groups; the significance of bargaining; the role of the official regime; the type of normative justification for the continuation of the political order; the character of the central strategic problem that faces elites of each group; and the visual metaphor (Table 1.1.) While control should conceptually be distinguished from consociation, the two strategies may be found in combination in multiethnic societies. Over a period of time, control may be replaced by consociation, or vice versa, within a given state.

Table 1.1. Comparison between Consociation and Control Models

	Consociation	Control
The criterion that governs the authoritative allocation of resources	The common denominator of the interests of groups	The interests of the superordinate group
Linkages between groups	Political or material exchanges: negotiations, bargains, trades, and compromises	Penetrative: the superordinate group extracts what it needs from the subordinate group (property, political support, labour, and/or information) and delivers what it sees fit
The significance of hard bargaining	The successful operation of consociation	The breakdown of control
The role of the official regime	An 'umpire.' To translate the compromises into appropriate legislation and effective administrative procedure, and enforce these rules without discriminating	The legal and administrative instrument of the superordinate group. The bureaucratic apparatus of the state, staffed overwhelmingly by personnel from the superordinate group, uses what discretion is available in the interpretation and implementation of official regulations to benefit the superordinate group
Type of normative justification for the continuation of the political order	Common welfare of all groups, and warnings of the chaotic consequences of consociational breakdown	A group-specific ideology; specific to the history and interests of the superordinate group
The character of the central strategic problem that faces elites	Symmetrical for each group: the integrity of the system and internal group discipline	Asymmetric: for superordinate elites the problem is to devise cost-effective techniques for manipulating the subordinate group; for subordinate elites—to devise responses to the policies of superordinate groups, and to evaluate opportunities for bargaining or resistance which may appear
Visual metaphor	A balanced scale	A puppeteer manipulating his stringed puppet

Source: Lustick (1979: 330-332).

Lustick maintains that an elaboration of control serves two purposes. First, it provides analysts of stable, heterogeneous societies with an opportunity to explain the absence of effective politicisation of ethnic or other cleavages without questioning their genuineness. Second, it makes it possible to deal with divided but non-conflictual societies that fit neither the model of consociational democracy nor are severely oppressed by force; there are many variants between these two poles. The second point is based on his belief that repression in and of itself is unlikely to serve as the basis for a stable pattern of intergroup relations. Thus, '[t]here are likely to be many different kinds of control systems; they may involve different mixes of coercive and noncoercive techniques' (Lustick 1979: 333-334).[23]

McGarry and O'Leary (1993: 23-26) further elaborated the concept of control.[24] They maintain that their usage of 'hegemonic control' (their term) is slightly different from Lustick's. According to this approach, hegemonic control, defined as 'coercive and/or co-optive rule which successfully manages to make unworkable an ethnic challenge to the state order,' has been 'the most common mode through which multi-ethnic societies have been stabilised in world history.' Control need not have rested, although it often did, on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community; what was necessary was control of the relevant coercive apparatuses.

Although control appears less feasible in democracies that permit or even facilitate ethnic mobilisation than in authoritarian regimes, it can, as McGarry and O'Leary argue, be practised in formally liberal democratic states. Like white-rule

[23] Lustick himself applied this model to explain the political 'quiescence' of Israeli Arabs. He argued that Israel's system of control is made up of three intertwined and mutually reinforcing components: segmentation (isolation of the Arab minority from the Jewish community and its internal fragmentation), dependence of the Arab population on the Jewish economy for their livelihood, and cooptation of Arab elites (Lustick 1980). While the first two components—segmentation and dependence—have little relevance to the relationship between Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev's cooptation techniques have much in common with the mechanism of cooptation detailed in Lustick's study.

[24] See also O'Leary and McGarry (1995: 270-274).

South Africa under apartheid, a group or a coalition of groups may exercise control over other groups by denying them citizenship, while applying the prevailing democratic rules to their own community. But McGarry and O'Leary point out that control can also occur in states in which the entire adult population is equally provided with citizenship; democracy in its most primitive sense is understood as majority rule, which in divided societies might lead to consolidation of domination by a numerical majority over a minority. Indeed, O'Leary and McGarry (1996) themselves have applied the control model to a democratic case—Northern Ireland (1920-72).

In Kazakhstan, minorities are deprived of full access to power neither by procedural democracy nor by being denied citizenship. This study explores the ways in which non-Kazakhs' right to political participation is limited under this authoritarian regime, and identifies formal and informal techniques applied to ethnically based contestation. Through the case study of Kazakhstan, it also suggests that authoritarian control may include overarching elite cooperation, a pivotal element of consociationalism. Elite cooperation in Kazakhstan serves two purposes: it prevents politicisation of ethnic issues and mass mobilisation along ethnic lines by co-opting ethnic elites, while providing a certain legitimacy to the regime through the appearance of ethnic representation.

1.3.3 Applying the Control Model to Kazakhstan

Building upon the arguments in the extant literature on the concept of control described above, this study understands control as a strategy that renders ethnic contestation difficult or impossible by coercive and/or noncoercive means in a state (or region) in which state power is monopolised or dominated by a particular ethnic group (or coalition of groups). The study highlights Kazakhstan's control strategy geared towards demobilising ethnicity as a political force in the context of a regime that grew increasingly authoritarian as the 1990s progressed.

For Kazakhstan, this study considers the following devices to be important:

constitutional and legal control, demographic control, territorial restructuring, and elite co-optation. Legal control officially aims to prevent conflict or disturbances by prohibiting the formation and activities of ethnically radical movements. In fact, however, constitutional and legal provisions are created and often arbitrarily applied in order to make ethnic challenges difficult or impossible. Legal control includes eliminating or jailing opposition leaders, obstructing their standing for election to the legislature, outlawing or refusing/annulling official registration of ethnic organisations, and placing restrictions on their activities.

With respect to demographic and territorial instruments of control, O'Leary (2001: 40-41) identifies two popular strategies: population redistribution and 'gerrymandering.' Demographic control includes two forms: 'encouraging settlers to migrate into the homelands of groups targeted for control, and encouraging the out-migration of the group targeted for control,' while gerrymandering takes the form of 'restructuring internal electoral or provincial borders to weaken or disorganize the targeted group(s).' In post-Soviet Kazakhstan, the number of non-Kazakhs has sharply decreased, but the relationships between state policy and their out-migration are difficult to establish. What is clear is that the regime has been keen to increase the share of ethnic Kazakhs in the total population. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kazakhs have arrived in the republic from abroad thanks to a government programme encouraging their in-migration. In addition, large-scale territorial restructuring was enforced in the second half of the 1990s. As a result, the Nazarbaev administration has managed to eliminate northern *oblast*s (provinces) in which the ethnic Russian population predominated by unifying *oblast*s and transferring the capital northward. Meanwhile, the impact of demographic control on non-Slavic minorities is much smaller.

In the extant literature on control, elite co-optation has not been paid due attention. This study offers a detailed analysis of the mechanism by which the Kazakhstani state has effectively prevented populations from mobilising across ethnic lines by co-opting the leaders of ethnic movements. Here, the key role is

played by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK), the president's consultative body that combines pro-regime ethnic organisations under its umbrella. With the official aim of guaranteeing interethnic accord, the Assembly's undeclared mission is control of ethnic movements though affiliated members. Reasons why leaders of ethnic organisations join the APK are not limited to their willingness to avoid conflict; there are political and economic incentives for them to maintain the system. By supporting the current regime and contributing to its efforts to advertise apparent ethnic representation at home and abroad, minority elites are permitted limited but certain access to power and economic resources.

The co-opted ethnic elites are mobilised to add a façade of power-sharing to Kazakhstan's control system.[25] An effort is made to stage a cross-group elite coalition to stress the ostensibly equal status among ethnic groups. In addition, while ethnic parties never enjoyed strong support among the population, and since 2002 political parties based on ethnicity have been banned by the Law on Political Parties, pro-president parties appealed to the multiethnic electorate by deliberately including representatives of ethnic minorities, a practice that O'Leary (2005: 16-17) calls informal 'descriptive' consociationalism. Although this staged coalition under authoritarian regime should be distinguished from power sharing under democracy, 'consociational' practices found in Kazakhstan provide minority leaders with certain opportunities for political participation and bargaining. This is not to say, however, that co-optive control under authoritarianism is the most effective or appropriate way of managing ethnic divisions in Kazakhstan. The aim of this study is to offer an explanation for political stability in the state, not to render an ethical judgement.

In the consociational literature, external factors are examined to determine whether or not they serve as conditions conducive to successful elite

[25] Interestingly, V. D. Kurganskaia and V. Iu. Dunaev, two of the leading specialists on ethnic issues in Kazakhstan who have been working closely with the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, argue that Kazakhstan can be regarded as a 'favourable field' for the application of consociational democracy model (Kurganskaia and Dunaev 2002: 64).

accommodation within a state (O'Leary 2005: 30-31). Lijphart has identified two features that facilitate consociation: a relatively low foreign policy load and shared threats, both of which, according to Lijphart, derived from the small size of a state. However, these factors can be found independent of state size; it is not necessarily the case that a light foreign policy load makes internal consolidation easier. And for the threats to be shared, as Lijphart himself points out, alignment of local communities with external powers should be avoided. In seeking to explore the ways in which cross-border ethnic cleavage introduce an additional agent, i.e. a kin state, to consociational arrangements, Wolff (2003: chapter 7, and 237-240) shows how the Republic of Ireland was officially incorporated into the consociational settlement of Northern Ireland.

Similarly, for an examination of control in a state that is home to minorities comprised of the co-ethnics of neighbouring states, external factors should be taken into account. If minorities secure strong backing from their kin state in opposing the regime of the host state, it would be difficult to impose control. The next section investigates the ways in which this study's case-studies of transborder minorities can provide fresh insight into our understanding of the impact of external environment on political stability in the case of Kazakhstan.

1.4 Transborder Ethnic Community: A Source of Conflict?

In the early years of Kazakhstan's independence, speculation about a serious conflict between the Kazakhs and the Russians was intense. The latter's predominance—a large population and geographic concentration in the northern regions of the country adjacent to Russia, was viewed as fertile ground for Russian claims to autonomy, or even secession and unification with the Russian Federation. As noted above, in the early- and mid-1990s, an alarmist view—that Russians might rebel against Kazakhstan's nationalising regime and organise a

separatist/irredentist movement, which would likely find support from Russia—was particularly widespread.

Brubaker (1996) has analysed the issue of the Russians in the former USSR through the concept of the 'triadic nexus,' that is, the relationship between host states (former Soviet national republics), minorities (the Russians in these republics), and their 'external' homeland (the Russian Federation). Minorities, he argues, must contend with two mutually antagonistic nationalisms—the nationalising nationalisms of the states in which they live, and the 'homeland' nationalisms of the states to which they belong by ethno-cultural affinity, though not by legal citizenship. As minorities become alienated within the nationalising host states, external homelands assert states' right—and even obligations—to protect the interests of ethnic kin in other states. The host states reject such claims as an infringement upon their sovereignty, and, in turn, intensify nationalising projects. Thus, nationalisms of host state, minority, and kin state are interlocking and interactive, and their relationship is (though not everywhere and always) conflictual. The triadic nexus model also suggests that ethnic minorities with strong indigenous identities are unlikely to be assimilated or leave their settlements: rather, it is highly likely (although not immutably the case) that they will demand some form of autonomy within the host state, separation from the state that governs the territory in which they reside, and/or unification with the kin state.

Brubaker's triadic model, an attempt to provide a common analytical framework for the study of conflicting nationalisms after the dissolution of multinational 'empires' in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, both in interwar and post-Communist period, vividly conceptualises the strained relationship between the three actors that came into being after the disintegration of the Soviet State. But in retrospect, Brubaker's argument appears to have too readily presupposed strong ties based on a common ethnic identity between

minorities and their post-Soviet kin states.[26] Analysing the foreign policy of Russia and other Soviet successor states, Charles King and Neil Melvin rightly suggest: 'The fiery language of nation builders and would-be nation expanders notwithstanding, the constraints on a state's ability to make a co-ethnic community a target of foreign policy are very strong indeed' (King and Melvin 1999: 116).

While drawing insights from this triadic nexus model,[27] this study aims to provide a more complex picture of the relationship between host state, minority, and ethnic homeland. Post-Soviet Kazakhstan offers a variety of examples for the study of such triangles. Among ethnic communities straddling Kazakhstan's borderlands, considerable attention has been paid to the Russians, leaving other minorities almost forgotten in scholarly accounts. In addition to the Russians, this study examines the Uighurs and Uzbeks, two groups that have been largely neglected in previous accounts of ethnopolitics in Kazakhstan. Although not residing in settlements contiguous to their homelands, for comparative purposes this study also examines a deported people—the Koreans. Through comparative analysis of ethnic groups with distinct characteristics, the study highlights the varied nature of *the triadic nexuses* in Kazakhstan. By doing so, it moves beyond the debate on whether or not a transborder minority seeks unification of its settlements with its homeland, or whether a kin state might meddle in the affairs of a host state over the issue of its co-ethnics.

The geographic distribution of the four groups analysed in this study is as

[26] Although Brubaker admits that homeland and minority nationalisms are not necessarily harmoniously aligned (1996: 6), he implies that this is an exception rather than the rule.

[27] For a review of criticisms of Brubaker's triadic nexus model, see Smith (2002). Smith himself contends that this model neglects the role of international organisations such as the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. Based on the case of Estonia, this argument appears to be less relevant to Kazakhstan. Indeed, the Nazarbaev leadership has been anxious about how it is evaluated by the West and the OSCE in particular, in seeking to secure legitimation and also prestige in the international community. Nevertheless, the influence of the Organisation on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian member states has been considerably weaker than that in Central and Eastern Europe.

follows.[28] The Russian population, second largest after the Kazakhs, is concentrated in Kazakhstan's northern and north-eastern regions adjacent to Russia, but many Russians reside in other regions as well, primarily in urban areas. The Uzbeks and Uighurs have formed compact settlements in the south and southeast of the republic respectively, the regions close to their ethnic homelands. Like the Kazakhs, both groups are Turkic speaking, traditionally Muslim communities, and have a strong claim to be considered indigenous in their settlements.[29] The Russians, Uzbeks, and Uighurs are the three largest ethnic communities straddling Kazakhstan and its neighbours. The Koreans, deported from the Russian Far East under Stalin's regime, are highly urbanised and unevenly dispersed across the territory of Kazakhstan.

Table 1.2. Ethnic Composition of Kazakhstan, 1979, 1989 and 1999

	1979		1989		1999		1989 as % of 1979	1999 as % of 1989
	Number of people	% of total	Number of people	% of total	Number of people	% of total		
Kazakhs	5,293,377	36.0	6,496,858	40.1	7,985,039	53.4	22.7	22.9
Russians	5,991,205	40.8	6,062,019	37.4	4,479,620	30.0	1.2	-26.1
Ukrainians	897,964	6.1	875,691	5.4	547,054	3.7	-2.5	-37.5
Germans	900,207	6.1	946,855	5.8	353,441	2.4	5.2	-62.7
Uzbeks	263,295	1.8	331,042	2.0	370,663	2.5	25.7	12.0
Tatars	312,626	2.1	320,747	2.0	248,954	1.7	2.6	-22.4
Uighurs	147,943	1.0	181,526	1.1	210,365	1.4	22.7	15.9
Belarus	181,491	1.2	177,938	1.1	111,927	0.7	-2.0	-37.1
Koreans	91,984	0.6	100,739	0.6	99,665	0.7	9.5	-1.1
Other	608,219	4.1	705,739	4.4	546,398	3.7	16.0	-22.6
Total	14,688,311	100.0	16,199,154	100.0	14,953,126	100.0	10.3	-7.7

Source: Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike (2000: 6-8).

Note: For 1979 and 1989, the figures from the 1999 census results are used.

[28] More detailed demographic and linguistic backgrounds are given in Chapter Three.

[29] With the Uighurs, this indigenous identity is observed among 'local' Uighurs, that is, those who were born in Kazakhstan and whose families have lived there since the beginning of the twentieth century. For details, see the subsequent chapter.

Table 1.2 shows ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's population over the last three decades. In 1999, the Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Koreans were the fourth, seventh, and ninth largest groups of the republic respectively. Although the Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars and Belarusians outnumbered the Koreans, this study excludes these groups from its analysis for the following reasons. First, in the peripheries of the former USSR, the boundary between East Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) is blurred due to linguistic and cultural Russification and an extremely high number of mixed marriages; in many cases, the differences among these groups was limited to the designated 'nationality' (*natsional'nost'*) on the Soviet internal passport (this issue is closely examined in Chapter Two). This is reflected in the absence of Ukrainian or Belarussian political movements independent of Russian or 'Slavic' ones.[30] The Tatars who have an ethnic homeland (Tatarstan) within the territory of the Russian Federation share the triadic structure, at least on the level of international politics, with ethnic Russians, as Russia claims to be a kin state for all nationalities with historical ties to its territory.[31] The German population that had reached nearly one million at the end of the 1980s has greatly diminished owing to their mass exodus to Germany. With 'exit' being their most prevalent behaviour, the Germans are not suited to this analysis that focuses on minority's strategy for survival in the host state.[32]

The cases examined here are quite diverse: the Russians and Uzbeks have a former Soviet republic as their kin state (typical examples of Brubaker's triad model); the Uighurs have no 'their own' state (their ethnic homeland, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province, is one of the administrative units of the People's

[30] The Ukrainian and Belarusian cultural centres under the aegis of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan limit their activities to the linguistic and cultural spheres, both officially and in practice.

[31] This is not to suggest that all Tatars in the 'near abroad' view the entire Russian Federation as their historic homeland.

[32] It is worth examining why Germans are more inclined to move to the historic homeland than other minorities who also have kin states abroad. Diener (2004) addressed this question by comparing Germans and Koreans in Kazakhstan. For a critical review of his book, see Oka (2007).

Republic of China[33]); the Koreans have two kin states due to the division of their historic homeland. While in Soviet times, the Uighurs and Koreans were already diasporas in the sense that they had ethnic homelands outside of the state in which they resided, it was only after Soviet collapse that the Russians and Uzbeks were separated from their ethnic homelands by international borders. What insights can these diverse cases provide for our understanding of post-Soviet inter-ethnic stability in Kazakhstan? This study examines these cases from three perspectives.

First, it examines kin state policy toward co-ethnics. In the cases of Russia and Uzbekistan, it examines the role ethnicity plays in those states' foreign policy, and bilateral relations with Kazakhstan. The Russian and Uzbek minorities in Central Asia have often been regarded as those with potential secessionist claims, which, if supported by their kin states, might lead to the destabilisation of the region. In fact, as Melvin (1998), King and Melvin (1999), and Fumagalli (2007b) have shown, Moscow and Tashkent exercised restraint in playing the diaspora card. This study provides additional empirical evidence and analysis of both states' compatriot policy (or, in the case of Uzbekistan, the lack of such policy), and investigates the ways in which the presence of transborder ethnic communities interacted with political issues of border delimitation between Kazakhstan and the two neighbouring states after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The case of the Koreans differs from those of the Russians and Uzbeks because the Koreans were a deported people whose historic homeland is situated far from Kazakhstan. Still, South Korea's diaspora policy is comparable to that of Russia and Uzbekistan because, like these latter, Korea's policy was subject to external constraints—the hostility of host states to meddling in their internal affairs.

Second, through the examination of the case of the Uighurs, the study aims to shed light on challenges faced by a transborder ethnic group with no kin state. The

[33] Strictly speaking, the triad model cannot be applied to the Uighurs who do not have a kin state. In this study, however, the existence or lack of a kin state is considered as an independent variable that influences the relationship between host state and minority.

hardship of the Uighurs lies not only in their 'stateless' status; they are objects of surveillance by both China and Kazakhstan, two states that are apprehensive that the Uighurs' renewed links across the border may pose a threat to security. The analysis of the Uighurs in Kazakhstan shows how the labelling of 'terrorists' who allegedly plot armed struggles for the independence of Xinjiang reduces the room for choice for the Uighurs.

Third, the study investigates the ways in which an ethnic homeland controls the options available to co-ethnics abroad. How do kin state foreign policy, policies on citizenship and immigration, and/or more broadly, the economic and political situation within kin states affect minority strategy for survival? This study examines one host state (Kazakhstan) and explores variation in terms of historic homelands. While the Russians left for Russia en masse, all others—Uzbeks with a kin state just across the border, Koreans who have a remote but relatively prosperous kin state, and stateless Uighurs—have overwhelmingly chosen to stay in Kazakhstan. One of the decisive factors that brought about this variation in responses to independence was the political, economic status of the kin state and its policy. More importantly, this study examines the role of the kin state (or a state that controls a minority's historic homeland) in enabling or even facilitating control over ethnic minorities by the Kazakhstan government.

1.5 Methodology, Delimitations, and Definitions of the Study

This study covers the period from Kazakhstan's independence in 1991 though 2005, by which time co-optation of ethnic movements had largely been completed and anti-government organisations had been eliminated or marginalised.[34]

[34] The concluding chapter reviews post-2005 political processes in Kazakhstan, a period that has exhibited even clearer signs of minority elite co-optation and strengthening of authoritarianism.

The main method of inquiry employed in the study is intensive, individual interviewing. In-depth interviews with open-ended questions were conducted with ethnic movement leaders in several regions of Kazakhstan, but most frequently in Almaty (for details, see below). Such a qualitative approach is most appropriate for this study as 'the goal of research is to explore people's subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences' (Devine 2002: 199). The author's aim is to elicit leaders' accounts of their actions, interpretations of events, opinions and beliefs. In order to facilitate a discussion of politically and personally sensitive issues—informal negotiations with the authorities, rivalry and/or conflict between leaders of the same ethnic community, for example—interviews need to be flexible so that the discussion flows naturally and allows the informants to freely elaborate their views. A predetermined questionnaire does not serve such a purpose.

The primary target group for the interviews was the leaders and activists of the Russian, Uzbek, Uighur, and Korean ethnic movements and allied cultural and religious organisations in Kazakhstan. Rather than aiming to obtain a mass response from each ethnic group, this study focuses on those who were directly involved in political and cultural activities. To provide a representative sample of opinions within each ethnic community, interviewees were chosen from a variety of political and cultural organisations of different orientations: pro-government organisations, those that were officially registered but oppositional, and those that were banned by the authorities. Additional interviewees included officials working for the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, representatives of the local administrations, and academics, leading experts and journalists.

The interviews were undertaken in the city of Almaty—the cultural and financial centre of the republic and the centre of activities of republican-level ethnic organisations, the capital Astana, as well as in compact settlements of each ethnic community, over the course of research trips that took place between 2000 and 2005. Several representative regions were selected. For the Uzbeks the

interviews were conducted in the South Kazakhstan *oblast*; for the Uighurs—Almaty and the Almaty *oblast*, and for the Koreans—Almaty and Kyzylorda *oblast*s. As regards the Russians, the author interviewed the heads of several organisations in Almaty and Astana; to obtain information about the regions, secondary sources were used. The interviews were held in the Russian language. This is reasonable with the Russians and also with the Koreans whose first language is, with rare exceptions, Russian. With Uzbek and Uighur interviewees, the author did not experience any difficulties in communication as virtually all interview subjects spoke Russian as fluently as their native languages.[35]

Although the interviews were not highly structured, overall, the topics covered three areas. The first group of questions concerned the objectives, and formal and informal activities of each ethnic group's political and cultural organisations. To that end, the interviewer asked about the history of ethnic movements; interviewees' attitudes towards and the treatment they received from the authorities; the strategies employed to promote the interests of the community they claim to represent—through lobbying or by supporting particular candidates in the elections for parliamentary deputies, for example; and their views on other movement leaders within the same ethnic group. The second set of questions aimed to ascertain the attitudes among the elites of each ethnic group towards their ethnic homelands (in the case of Uighurs, towards that state that contains the territories of their historic homeland). Interviews also focused on the extent to which the elites identified with their ethnic kin, and what relationship they wished to build with their historical homelands. The third area of questions was related to the challenges each ethnic community faced, and the ways in which the ethnic

[35] Interviews were conducted by the author on a face-to-face basis. A dictaphone was used only when permission was granted. (A majority of interviewees did not want to be taped; among those who agreed to have their interview recorded, some preferred that the dictaphone was switched off when certain sensitive topics were discussed.) The writing-up of the interview took place during the interviews and immediately afterwards to ensure that as much information as possible was captured.

movement activists perceived and sought to tackle them. Whenever relevant in the course of the interview, questions regarding problems in the spheres of language, education, employment (in particular, in the public sector) were asked.

Additional information was collected from direct observations at meetings, conferences, and cultural events organised by the different ethnic movements. Such materials allow for an assessment of the activities of particular communities, their PR strategies, internal struggles, and the support they enjoy in the ethnic community. The study also draws upon a variety of textual sources, notably the publications of various ethnic movements (including those of Kazakh nationalist movements); Kazakhstani government policy documents and legislation, documents and publications of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, the publication *Who's Who in Kazakhstan*, results of opinion surveys, national censuses and official statistics; newspapers and journals. Additional documentary materials were drawn from the Internet, unpublished materials provided by interviewees, leaflets and posters of candidates standing for election for the national and regional parliaments. One limitation of this study is that sources in the Uzbek and Uighur languages, among others, newspapers, were not used due to the author's lack of knowledge of these languages.

Applying King's terminology, in this study an ethnic homeland is defined as 'a piece of territory having a fundamental symbolic connection with the identity of a given ethnic group' (1998: 12); a kin state—'an internationally recognized state … that can be perceived as having a special political interest in the affairs of ethnic communities abroad that are linked by history, culture, or tradition with the kin state' (King 1998: 12). For an ethnic community who has such a state, a kin state is synonymous with an ethnic homeland.[36] In Russian, an 'historic homeland' (*istoricheskaia rodina*) is commonly used to designate both a kin state

[36] It is possible that an ethnic homeland in a given minority's understanding does not correspond to a territory of a state or an administrative unit within a state. For the sake of convenience, for the minorities addressed in this study, an ethnic homeland is understood as identical with a kin state (Russia, Uzbekistan, North and South Korea) or with an administrative unit (the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Province).

and an ethnic homeland. The 'kin state,' 'ethnic/historic homeland,' and 'host state' are used for lack of better terms; in particular, using of the label 'host state' does not imply that minorities are not full members of the state and merely guests in a foreign land.

Among the other terms frequently used in this study, the meaning of 'titular' (*titul'nyi* in Russian) perhaps needs to be clarified here. In the former Soviet Union, this adverb was and still is used to designate an ethnic community after which an ethnically defined administrative unit (union republic, autonomous republic, etc.) was named. Thus, the titular nation (*titul'naia natsiia*) in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (Kazakhstan)[37] was Kazakhs. 'Titular' is also used as a norm (for example, 'titulars' in Uzbekistan mean the Uzbeks).

This study does not claim to provide comprehensive and all-inclusive explanations for political stability in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. As noted above, it focuses on a state strategy for managing ethnic divisions. Therefore, some aspects are not discussed here. Among others, the study is limited with respect to the possible link between interethnic relations and economic factors. So far, it appears that the improvement of the economic situation in Kazakhstan since the late 1990s and subsequent remarkable development primarily due to oil revenue has contributed to social stability in general. However, economic prosperity in itself does not necessarily diminish the risk of conflict between different groups. Interethnic tension is likely to be triggered if economic wealth is not redistributed to fulfill the expectations of each group.[38] To address this question, another study

[37] Kazakhstan was officially named the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic from 1936 until October 1991. Shortly before independence, Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet made a decision to change the name of the republic into 'the Republic of Kazakhstan.'

[38] Relative deprivation theory suggests that it is not absolute differences between groups that cause grievances, but a sense that one is being deprived of something to which one is entitled that is crucial (Walker and Smith: 2002). In present day Kazakhstan, we can observe ethnic diversity in regions and urban/rural populations as well as in employment structure, but there is no significant difference in earnings between Kazakhs and Russians living in the same region (see, for example, *Materialy issledovatel'skoi deiatel'nosti 'KOMKON-2 Evraziia'* 2002: 159-198). Further research is necessary to determine whether this lack of congruence of ethnic divisions and economic disparity served to restrain the radicalisation of ethnic demands, or if a feeling of relative

would be necessary. Still, this study notes that the ruling elite in Kazakhstan has sought to integrate minority elites within an economic order in order to ensure control; the Nazarbaev regime has successfully won support from minority leaders by allowing them to benefit from economic growth.

1.6 The Structure of the Study

The study is organised into seven chapters. The following chapter offers an overview of Kazakhstan's historical background to explain how a multiethnic population arose through a combination of voluntary, state-sponsored, and forced migrations, as well as through changes to the borders of this republic. Through a detailed examination of the ethnic identities of different minorities, namely the Russians, Uzbeks, Uighurs, and Koreans, it highlights minority perceptions of the respective ethnic homelands and minority claims to indigenous status (or the lack of such claims) in their settlements within Kazakhstan. In Section Two, the chapter focuses on the late Soviet period that saw increased demands for sovereignty of republics and the emergence of ethnic movements, crucial developments that provided a starting point of ethnopolitics after independence.

Chapter Three outlines four critical policy areas designed to support Kazakh ethnic domination, in post-Soviet Kazakhstan: history, population, language, and power. These areas reflect efforts to redress Soviet legacies by upgrading the cultural, linguistic, demographic, and political status of the Kazakhs, which, in the eyes of Kazakhs, had been unjustly lowered during the years of Soviet domination. For the Kazakh-dominated political elites, 'Kazakhisation' or ethnic

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deprivation—possibly on both sides—exists. Meanwhile, Uyama (2000: 36) hypothesises that ethnic Russians were rarely involved in conflict because indigenous Central Asians did not view them as economic rivals; a certain ethnic division of labour existed between Russians and local Central Asians. In the late Soviet era, competition over employment, business, and/or scarce resources (land, water, etc.) between Central Asians themselves or between them and those of Caucasian origin often resulted in interethnic violence.

nation-building was a means by which to gain control of a fragile newly independent state and to legitimise their own rule. This chapter also discusses the challenges faced by non-Kazakhs in a nationalising state, and elaborates the linguistic, demographic, and migration trends for each group.

Chapter Four considers the coercive methods employed by the Kazakhstani authorities to avert ethnic mobilisation in the context of moves to strengthen the authoritarian character of Nazarbaev's rule. After a concise examination of the political processes of the post-independence period, it analyses the constitutional and legal provisions that were—often arbitrarily—used to impose restrictions on the formation and activities of ethnic organisations. Next, the chapter examines concrete examples of government repression of ethnic movements, highlighting those minority activities considered most undesirable by the regime.

Chapter Five highlights the means and mechanisms of elite co-optation. It begins with an examination of the functions of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, a presidential consultative body that worked to render ethnic movements politically innocuous. The second section focuses on elections, and the ways in which the electoral process worked to consolidate a range of ethnic communities. It also examines the ways in which the president and pro-regime parties proactively sought to depoliticise ethnicity in the elections and thereby to avoid ethnic voting. The section also discusses the role ethnic elites played in generating cross-ethnic support for the Nazarbaev regime.

Chapter Six examines the extra-state factors operating behind Kazakhstan's successful control over minority ethnic movements. The chapter examines the relationship between kin state and co-ethnics living in Kazakhstan on the one hand, and kin state (or, in the case of the Uighurs, a state that rules a minority's homeland) and the government of Kazakhstan on the other, and explores the ways in which these relationships govern the political options available to minorities in Kazakhstan. It also reviews post-independence border delimitation between Kazakhstan and its neighbouring states as well as mechanisms of border control

between the states, and examines the ways in which territorial and security issues between host and kin states are related to ethnic communities residing on both sides of the border. In the case of the Koreans who have two kin states, the chapter highlights the rivalry between North and South Korea.

Chapter Seven concludes the study by reviewing how the Kazakhstani state tackled the nationalities question in the one and a half decades following independence. The concluding chapter highlights the study's analysis of control as exercised by the Nazarbaev regime, and the diversity of host state-kin state as well as minority-homeland relationships found in Kazakhstan. It then considers the future prospects for ethnic stability in the republic.