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第 1 章

自由貿易支持世論と政権支持についての先行研究調査と仮説構築

間　寧

要約：
本稿は、貿易自由化をどのような国あるいは人が支持するのかについての先行研究をまとめ、特に開発途上国に絞った研究設計を構築した。貿易自由化世論についての分析モデルは現在のところ 3 つあるが、それらは必ずしも相互に整合していない。その大きな理由は、モデルの前提が輸入または輸出のどちらかに偏向していることである。しかしそれぞれのモデルに関わる問題点、特にヘクシャー・オリーン定理について指摘されている問題点を修正すると、3 つのモデルの間の整合性が高まることがわかった。そして統合モデルを構築し、試作的分析を行った。
キーワード：
自由貿易、世論、開発途上国、労働生産性、スキルプレミアム

Introduction

Previous research on the variation of preferences for free trade in developing countries applied two contrasting models that had been tested for developed countries. On the one hand, the Heckscher Ohlin and Stolper Samuelson (HO-SS) model posits that countries export (import) goods produced from abundant (scarce) factors of production; this model allows predicting that unskilled workers in developing countries support free trade whereas skilled workers and managers oppose it. On the one hand, the skill premium model argues that trade openness favors skilled labor because it increases the demand for skilled (rather than unskilled) labor inputs. According to this model, skilled workers are more supportive of free trade than unskilled workers but there is no reason unskilled workers oppose free trade. The empirical evidence seems to favor the skill premium model over the HO-SS model. Both models, however, have an excessive focus on exports, according to the consumption-based model.

We reconcile the three models by bringing the capital perspective back into the HO-SS based argument. First, skilled workers (and managers) in developing countries benefit from imports of capital (including intermediate) goods. Capital imports enhance their skill premia (and labor productivity) more than unskilled workers' skill premia. Second, greater imports of relatively capital intensive goods also increase consumer choice and price competition. Third, the benefit of importing capital intensive goods for skilled labor and consumers is larger in countries with low labor productivity than high labor productivity; although the benefit of exporting labor intensive goods for unskilled can be larger than for skilled labor, the import beneficiaries are more numerous than the

export beneficiaries. The relative capital/labor endowment is best captured by labor productivity.

Bridging the export and import perspectives, we hypothesize that public support for free trade is high in countries with low labor productivity (capital/labor ratio), even though the support is stronger among skilled workers or higher-income consumers than unskilled workers or lower income consumers. We also test other variables that have not been included in previous research such as the perception of corruption and threat. The globalization literature showed that globalization reduces corruption and enhances governance; conversely, people who are concerned with corruption might expect free trade to reduce it. There is also evidence that people who feel threatened oppose globalization; in a similar context, people who believe that free trade excessively benefits economically strong countries may oppose free trade.

Using the two-level dataset for 30 developing countries, we examine the country- and individual- level determinants of public support for free trade. The results show, first, that countries with low labor productivity display stronger support than those with high labor productivity; the skill premium model holds for most of the countries but the size of the skill premium effect depends on the percentage of the population with tertiary education completed: the larger the tertiary education population, the stronger the skill premium effect. The modified HO-SS model is thus compatible with the skill premium model. Second, at the individual level, the recognition of the effectiveness of bribery increases support for free trade if unemployment is regarded as a serious problem. Third, people with negative attitudes toward China' growing economy tend to oppose free trade.

Conceptualization

There are three approaches to individual preferences for free trade: the Heckscher Ohlin and Stolper Samuelson (HO-SS) model, the skill premium model, and the consumption model. The first two models are built on the effect of export and the last model derives from the benefit of imports.

The Heckscher Ohlin and Stolper Samuelson model

The Heckscher Ohlin and Stolper Samuelson (HO-SS) model posits that countries export (import) goods produced from abundant (scarce) factors of production. This model led some scholars to predict that unskilled workers in developing countries support free trade whereas skilled workers and managers oppose it. Empirical support comes largely from developed countries (Gabel and Palmer 1995, Gabel 1998a, Gabel 1998b, Brinegar and Jolly 2005, Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996, Anderson and Reichert 2009). For developing countries, skilled labor (measured by education or occupation type) also has a mostly positive, not negative, effect on free trade preferences (Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Hicks, Milner, and Tingley 2014, Baker 2005, 2009, 2003).

There are three major reasons for the mismatch between the theory and empirical findings for developing countries. First, theoretically, the HO-SS model is based on the two-goods two-factors model in which countries trade labor-intensive goods with capital intensive goods (two goods) that are produced using labor and capital (two factors), assuming that labor and capital do not move between countries (borders). Under such circumstances, export of goods produced from abundant factors, either labor

or capital, increases the (relative) prices of those factors and thus equalizes factor prices between countries. The above mentioned research that distinguished between skilled and unskilled labor in effect changed the two-goods and two-factors model to the two-goods (unskilled labor-intensive goods and skilled-labor and capital intensive goods) and three-factors (unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital) model, which theoretically cannot determine whether an increase in the price of the skilled-labor and capital intensive goods increase the wage of skilled labor.[1]

Second, apart from public opinion studies, even in the international trade literature, the HO-SS model did not perform well empirically. Countries did not necessarily specialize in the exports that are produced from their abundant factors: the United States is labor abundant if labor is measured by what one person produces per year with a given level of technology as Leontief (1953) suggested earlier. To reconcile the theory with the reality, Trefler (1993) demonstrated that the HO-SS model can predict factor price equalization between two trading partners if factor abundance is adjusted using international productivity differences. For instance, the gap between the U.S. wage and the Mexican wage disappears if the equation reflects the labor productivity difference between the two countries. Put another way, international differences in productivity drive trade and public support for it.

Third, in the more realistic outsourcing (intermediate inputs) version of the HO-SS model, Feenstra (2004, 99-136) assumed (1) that three goods (unskilled labor intensive intermediate inputs, skilled labor intensive intermediate inputs, and (capital intensive) final products) are produced using three factors (unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital) with intensity that varies within industries and (2) that capital moves between countries (borders) to allow the outsourcing of the production of (less skill intensive)

intermediate inputs; and then showed that the shift in production between countries increases the relative demand for and thus the real wage of skilled labor in both the home country and the foreign country. Although the relative wage of unskilled workers declines in both countries, their real wages do not necessarily fall because the prices of final products fall (Feenstra and Hanson 1996). These findings imply that in developing countries too, skilled labor has more reason to welcome free trade than unskilled labor.[2]

The skill premium model

The skill premium model claims that trade openness bolsters demand for skilled labor, which is used to produce exports, and thus widens wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor (Feenstra and Hanson 1996, Wood 1997). While there is growing evidence more recently for the skill premium model and wage inequality (Meschi and Vivarelli 2009, Ha 2012, Franco and Gerussi 2013, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Harrison, McLaren, and McMillan 2011), it comes primarily from middle-income countries, not from the lower-income countries (Meschi and Vivarelli 2009, Franco and Gerussi 2013). The finding that the skill premium model is better suited to higher-income, or capital abundant developing countries than to lower-income, or labor abundant developing countries is consistent with the outsourcing model developed by Feenstra (2004, 99-136).

Applied to public opinion research, this model enables to predict that skilled workers are more supportive of free trade than unskilled workers are. The puzzling evidence for the HO-SS model that skilled workers are more pro-trade than unskilled workers in both developed and developing countries fits the skill premium model instead. Among Latin American countries, the skill premium effect on pro-trade

attitudes is stronger in more developed than less developed countries (Baker 2003), a pattern that mirrors the aforementioned evidence on wage inequality.

The consumer model

The consumption based model builds on the common sense insight that everyone is a consumer but not necessarily a worker in the export industry (Baker 2003, 2005). At the country-level, public opinion prefers free trade if the absolute value size of the manufacturing sector is small (Baker 2003), tradable goods are expensive, or labor skill is in short supply (Baker 2005) because consumers in those countries stand to gain from greater import. At the individual level, education (or skill premium), entrepreneurs, farmers, and the middle class are associated with support for free trade; income has a convex effect because the middle income group theoretically benefits most from import liberalization (Baker 2003). Also, growing consumer benefits generated by free trade unites social classes and weakens the class cleavage, which explains why the poor are only slightly less pro-trade than the rich in Latin America (Baker 2009, 11-15).

The integrated model

We reconcile the three models by bringing the capital perspective back into the HO-SS based argument. First, skilled workers (and managers) in developing countries benefit from imports of capital (including intermediate) goods. Capital imports enhance their skill premia (and labor productivity) more than unskilled workers' skill premia. Second, greater imports of relatively capital intensive goods also increase consumer choice and price competition. Third, the benefit of importing capital intensive goods for skilled labor and consumers is larger in countries with low labor productivity than high labor

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Other correlates

There are other correlates that entice pro-trade attitudes in developed or developing countries. Among economic variables, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found for a sample of developed and developing countries that both high income and upper social class identity increase support for free trade suggesting that high spending power or luxurious life style generates demand for free trade. Fixed income earners are supposed to benefit from price reductions through trade liberalization: the percentage of pensioners in the administrative district was positively associated with vote for free trade in Costa Rica (Urbatsch 2013). The percentage of manufacturing workers in the administrative district had a positive effect on vote for free trade (Urbatsch 2013). Export sector workers favor free trade and import sector workers resist it in the United States (Fordham and Kleinberg 2012). An individual in a comparative disadvantage sector is more likely to oppose free trade than one in a non-traded sector (Mayda and Rodrik 2005).

Other variables that depart from the economic models. Strong attachments to the nation or the community as well as ethnocentrism (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Kaltenthaler and Miller 2013) increases exclusionary attitudes (Mayda and Rodrik

2005) and thus weakens support for free trade. Threat perception that trade liberalization erodes social and cultural values (Margalit 2012) or social status hierarchy (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2012) discourages support for free trade.

The effect of education may be more complex than the skill premium model that the more educated (and thus skilled workers) are more pro-trade than the less educated (or unskilled workers). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) showed that collage education, not other levels of formal education, induces pro-trade attitudes apparently through exposure to economic knowledge; controlling for value attachments or tolerance did not affect their results. Trade barriers generates rents as well as incentives to bribe public officials (Lalountas, Manolas, and Vavouras 2011, 638). To speculate, people who are concerned with corruption may believe that trade liberalization can reduce corruption although the corruption reducing effect is observed for only middle- or high- income countries (de Jong and Bogmans 2011).

Regime type affects the pattern of export goods and labor skill required as well as the extent of trade liberalization. According to Lin and Fu (2016), the skill premium model could be applied to democracies (instead of autocracies) because of the intensiveness of intermediate (instead of primary) goods in export. Chang and Wu (2016) demonstrated that preferential trade agreements help authoritarian regimes to reduce income inequality (and thus to avoid regime breakdown); they argue that the poor, the supplier of labor that abounds in authoritarian regime, benefits most from free trade with developed countries. In contrast, Milner and Kubota (2005) argue that political leaders in undemocratic regimes are not keen for trade liberalization because their support stems from the selectorate, not the electorate.

Research Design

Three models of public support for free trade compete because they are dominated by either export or import perspectives. It is possible, however, to reconcile the three models by synthesizing both perspectives. We argue that benefits from and preference for trade are greater in countries with low labor productivity, not intensity. This section presents our strategy of the multilevel analysis for 34 developing countries.

Data and the Sample

Individual-level data used for 43 (including 34 developing) countries in this study were gathered from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 2014, by Pew Research Center.[3] The sampling method is probability sampling with weights. Country-level data were collected form the World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank and the International Labor Office.

Dependent Variables

The binary dependent variable is respondent support for free trade expressed in response to the following question:

> What do you think about the growing trade and business ties between (survey country) and other countries – do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?

The pro-trade attitudes takes a value of 1 if the response is “Very good” or “Somewhat good”; it takes a value of 0 if the response is “Somewhat bad”, “Very bad”, “Don’t know” or “Refused” in accordance with Mayda and Rodrik (2005). The anti-trade attitudes dummy was also tested that defined Very good”, “Somewhat good”, Don’t

know” or “Refused” as 0 but the results were very similar with those for the pro-trade attitudes.

Independent Variables

For individual level variables, gender was coded as zero for men and one for women. Age was measured by actual age. The education level was measured as years in formal education. Answers of 31 years or more were coded as 30 years because those observations are very few and very large values were judged as unrealistic. Employment status was captured by a set of dummy variables consisting of in paid work, unemployed and looking for a job, in education (not paid for by employer), apprentice or trainee, permanently sick or disabled, retired, doing housework, and looking after the home. No responses were treated as missing values. Household income was measured by several income range dummies. Because the number of income ranges varies by country, we used the household income variable for country-level estimation but not for multilevel estimation. No responses and “Do not know” answers were recoded as the no response dummy because of their sizable numbers for some countries. Social class perception was measured by an eleven point scale ranging from 0 to 10 in response to the question:

> Here is a ladder representing the "ladder of life." Let's suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time? (SHOW CARD)

Incumbent support is a dummy variable, which is the same as the dependent variable explained in the Appendix. Threat perception regarding China’s economic power was

measured by a set of three dummy variables (1 = Good, 2 = “Don’t know” or “Refused”, 3 = “Bad”) foro the question: “Overall do you think that China’s growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country ?” To gauze the perception of corruption prevalence was perception, the following question was used:

> I am going to read you a list of things that might be important for getting ahead in life. On a scale of 0 to 10, in your opinion, how important is it [INSERT ITEM = to give bribes] to get ahead in life, where 0 means not important at all and 10 means very important?

Concerns about unemployment in the country was asked by the question: “Do you think (INSERT = a lack of employment opportunities) is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all in our country?” The responses were coded as a dummy variable (1 = “A very big problem” or “A moderately big problem” and 0 = “A small problem” or “Not a problem at all”.

Among the country level variables, labor productivity (ILO) is calculated using data on GDP (in constant 2011 international dollars in PPP) derived from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. To compute labor productivity as GDP per worker, ILO estimates for total employment are used. The absolute size of the manufacturing sector size (World Bank) was used to capture the country’s need for manufacturing goods imports in accordance with the consumption model (Baker 2003). The price level of total imports (Penn World Table) is also supposed to reflect the need for free trade and more imports (Baker 2005).

Estimation Results

The preliminary results of country-level estimation are presented in Table 2. The

coefficient for education in the logit model with the pro-trade attitude as the dependent variable and with gender and age as the other independent variables in accordance with the basic factor endowments model by Mayda and Rodrik (2005). The results reveal that for only three developing countries, i.e., Thailand, Egypt, and Turkey, less educated (and thus unskilled) individuals support free trade more strongly than more educated (skilled) ones. The fact that education (or labor skill) enhances pro-trade attitudes in most of the developing countries calls into question the claim that free trade favors and appeals to unskilled labor. It is possible to speculate that skilled labor is less supportive of free trade in countries abundant in unskilled labor than in countries abundant in skilled labor, however, even in unskilled labor abundant countries skilled labor is supportive of free trade than unskilled labor. We advance our analysis to the next stage by introducing country-level variables.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Appendix: Vote Choice and Government Approval

The economic voting model posits that individuals vote for or against the government when economic conditions are good or bad, respectively. Comprehensive literature reviews reveal that, for individual voters, (1) national economic conditions are more important determinants of government support than personal or household economic conditions, and (2) a retrospective evaluation (i.e., over the *past* 12 months) generally has a greater impact on incumbent support than a prospective evaluation (i.e., over the *next* 12 months) (Nannestad and Paldam 1994, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013).

The two most common dependent variables for economic voting models vote choice and government approval. Vote choice includes a vote for any party, invalid vote, or abstention. Government approval is measured by ordinal or continuous measurement such as very bad, bad, good very good; or from 1 to 10. Individuals who would abstain or cast an invalid vote or abstain can express their level of government approval. The abstention (and invalid vote) category in vote choice thus creates a discrepancy between vote choice and government approval. The question of turnout decision has recently been addressed in the economic voting literature (Arceneaux 2003, Weschle 2014, Tillman 2008). In particular, Tillman (2008) and Weschle (2014) integrated party choice and turnout models to show that voter reaction to poor economic conditions differs by party loyalty and policy positions. That is, voters who usually support the government party or its policy choose to abstain, whereas citizens who normally abstain are more likely to turn out to vote for opposition parties.

Research Design

In this section, for a preliminary analysis we use a simple economic voting frame to examine whether the vote choice model with an abstention category yields results consistent with the government approval model. Data are from the nationwide Türkiye'nin Nabzı survey (N = 2,000) conducted in December 2017 by Metropoll using a probability sampling design.

Dependent Variables

First, we have adopted a multinomial dependent variable for vote choice among three categories: a vote for the AKP ("incumbent"), a vote for any opposition party ("opposition") and abstention or being undecided ("indecision"). Second, government approval was used as the alternative dependent variable. The five-point dependent variable is government support expressed in response to the following question:

> As I read a list of groups and organizations, for each, please tell me what kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in (survey country). Is the influence of our national government very good, somewhat good, neither good or bad, somewhat bad, or very bad in (survey country)?

The original five response categories were collapsed into three: "Good", "Neither good nor bad", "Bad". "Don't know" and "Refused" answers were treated as missing values. Spearman's rho (rank-sum correlation coefficient) for the vote choice variable and government approval variable was 0.461 (N = 1798). Vote choice and government approval are far from correspondent but the question is whether they respond similarly to economic evaluation.

Independent Variables

Respondent evaluations of the national economy over the last 12 months and the last

five years were measured on a five-point scale (1 = very negative; 2 = negative; 3 = neither positive nor negative; 4 = positive; 5 = very positive). The question was "How do you view the country's economic condition in the last 12 months/five years?" " Don't know" and "Refused" were treated as missing values.

For sociodemographic variables, gender was coded as zero for men and one for women. Age was measured by actual age. The education level was measured as a seven category variable: illiterate, just literate, primary school graduate, intermediate school graduate, high school graduate, university/college graduate, master/doctorate degree. Employment status consists of company owners, managers, manual workers, clerks/sales persons, public servants, professionals (doctors and engineers, etc.), unemployed, retired, students, housewives, self-employed (accountants and layers, etc.). No responses were treated as missing values.

Religiosity was coded as 1 = "Never religious", 2 = "A little religious", 3 = "Religious", 4 = "religious", and "Very religious" from the responses to the question: "Without regard to the frequency of prayer, how religious do you think you are?" "Don't know" and "Refused" were treated as missing values.

The monthly household income was measured at nine levels: 0 - 500 TL, 501 - 1000 TL, 1001 - 1500 TL, 1501 - 2000 TL, 2001 - 2500 TL, 2501- 3000 TL, 3001- 3500 TL, 3501 – 4000, and TL 4001 TL or above. No responses and "Do not know" answers were recoded as missing values.

Estimation Results

The estimation results of two multinomial logit models are presented in Table 3. Diverging from the convention, the estimates for each model are shown in two parallel

columns instead of one column to avoid too long a table. It also helps to contrast the pattern of incumbent support/approval with that of indecision/unequivocal for the same independent variables. Model 1 predicts the vote for the AKP and indecision with the vote for any opposition party as the reference category. Model 2 predicts government approval and unequivocal evaluation with government disapproval as the reference category. Overall, the results indicate that the vote choice model (Model 1) and the government approval model (Model 2) yield very similar results for key variables of economic voting. Both economic evaluation for the last five years and last 12 months are significant determinants of the incumbent support and government approval. On the other hand, indecision or equivocal evaluation is affected by short-term economic evaluation but not by long-term evaluation: voters prefer to remain undecided (in vote or approval) rather than to vote for the opposition or disapprove the government when their short-term economic evaluation is positive regardless of their long-term evaluation. In other words, voters are more likely to support the opposition or disapprove the government if their long-term or short-term economic evaluation is negative; on the other hand, undecided voters can switch to the opposition only if their short-term, not long-term, economic situation is bad. Sociodemographic variables also display similar results for the AKP/Approval category; for the undecided/equivocal category, their sings are consistent except for income but their statistical significance varies.

[Insert Table 3 here]

Notes

[1] It depends on the intensiveness (or share) of skilled labor and capital in the skilled labor and capital intensive goods relative to their intensiveness in the unskilled labor products. As Baker (2005, 925) also points out, previous studies on public opinion focused on the divisions within labor (skilled and unskilled) but neglected the capital-labor divide that marks the HO-SS theory.

[2] In general, there is strong evidence that trade liberalization boosts economic growth. Wacziarg and Welch (2008) showed for 141 countries that trade liberalization raised growth rates by 1.5 percentage points. More specifically, not only exports but also imports contribute to economic growth. (Awokuse 2007, Çetintaş and Barişik 2009, Hye, Wizarat, and Lau 2013, Mazumdar 2001, Mishra 2012). The import led growth model argues that import boosts long-term economic growth by providing intermediate goods and foreign technology for domestic firms (Awokuse 2007, 390).

There is skepticism, however, to what extent free trade encourages the absorption of unskilled labor in the export sector. Rodrik (2016, 2-3) argued that developing countries are becoming service economies before they have achieved industrialization. This premature deindustrialization poses a serious hindrance to long-term economic growth because the manufacturing industry can absorb unskilled labor and can produce tradable goods, which are unconstrained by domestic demand.

[3] The datasets are available at http://www.pewglobal.org/datasets/

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Tables

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Source
Support for free trade	36,607	0.855	0.352	0	1	Pew
Gender	38,908	0.510	0.500	0	1	Pew
Age	38,908	39.707	15.756	18	99	Pew
Social class	38,908	6.176	2.157	0	10	Pew
Years in education	37,843	10.087	4.702	0	30	Pew
In paid work	38,908	0.520	0.500	0	1	Pew
Unemployed and looking for a job	38,908	0.110	0.313	0	1	Pew
In education (not paid for by employer)	38,908	0.061	0.240	0	1	Pew
Apprentice or trainee	38,908	0.009	0.096	0	1	Pew
Permanently sick or disabled	38,908	0.007	0.086	0	1	Pew
Retired	38,908	0.078	0.268	0	1	Pew
Doing housework, looking after the home	38,908	0.213	0.410	0	1	Pew
China_1	38,908	0.539	0.498	0	1	Pew
China_2	38,908	0.183	0.387	0	1	Pew
China_3	38,908	0.278	0.448	0	1	Pew
Incumbent support	30,332	0.620	0.485	0	1	Pew
Labor productivity, logged	38,908	10.003	0.777	8.253	11.449	ILO
Manufacturing sector size, logged	37,947	25.217	1.881	21.673	28.986	World Bank
Price level of imports	38,908	0.689	0.039	0.599	0.757	Penn World Table

Table 2. The Coefficient for Education in the Logit Model by Country

Country	Coefficient: Education
Vietnam	0.260955
Peru	0.137605
Nicaragua	0.106196
Chile	0.105519
Pakistan	0.10497
Israel	0.09817
Mexico	0.094605
Indonesia	0.093347
Spain	0.092338
Ukraine	0.091452
Poland	0.090541
Colombia	0.089594
Philippines	0.089584
India	0.081153
Russia	0.078322
El Salvador	0.071861
Argentina	0.066736
China	0.066049
Tanzania	0.059677
Germany	0.057489
United Kingdom	0.049126
Venezuela	0.048361
Italy	0.048199
Senegal	0.044656
Japan	0.042905
Uganda	0.041627
United States	0.039188
Brazil	0.038272
Malaysia	0.035855
South Korea	0.035494

South Africa	0.035111
Lebanon	0.030087
France	0.02663
Nigeria	0.026287
Tunisia	0.024322
Kenya	0.02296
Greece	0.021546
Bangladesh	0.010425
Jordan	0.009883
Ghana	0.004174
Thailand	-0.00087
Egypt	-0.0065
Turkey	-0.00775

Note: The coefficient for education in the logit model with the pro-trade attitude as the dependent variable and with gender and age as the other independent variables.

Table 3. Determinants of incumbent support

	AKP/Approval		Undecided/Equivocal	
	AKP	Approval	Undecided	Equivocal
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Economic evaluation last five years	0.628**	1.239***	0.113	0.341
	(0.272)	(0.256)	(0.186)	(0.209)
Economic evaluation last 12 months	0.633**	0.402*	0.415**	0.465**
	(0.278)	(0.232)	(0.182)	(0.193)
Previous incumbent support	5.694***	2.756***	1.932***	1.625***
	(0.348)	(0.286)	(0.304)	(0.234)
Gender	0.0480	0.430*	0.157	0.182
	(0.276)	(0.248)	(0.192)	(0.182)
Age	-0.0377***	-0.0187**	-0.0230***	-0.00984
	(0.0117)	(0.00877)	(0.00753)	(0.00666)
Education	-0.342***	-0.205*	-0.134*	-0.0861
	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.0773)	(0.0742)
Religiosity	0.508***	0.710***	0.236**	0.166
	(0.167)	(0.194)	(0.115)	(0.108)
Monthly household income	0.0110	-0.0365	-0.0157	0.0817**
	(0.0699)	(0.0538)	(0.0389)	(0.0379)
_cons	-4.900***	-7.037***	-1.687**	-3.314***
	(1.009)	(1.226)	(0.666)	(0.704)
N	1625	1625	1625	1625

Notes: Model 1 predicts the vote for the AKP and indecision with the vote for any opposition party as the reference category. Model 2 predicts government approval and unequivocal evaluation with government disapproval as the reference category.