

# Misthinking Globalisation

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# Conventional view of globalisation

- Autarky to free trade, slowly.
- Several ‘waves’, but single process.



# 1870–1990: Globalisation $\leftrightarrow$ Trade costs




# 1870–1990: Globalisation ↔ Trade costs

*1.Falling transport costs*

*2.Rising tariffs*


*3.Falling tariffs & transport costs*



Source: Gravity model based estimates of trade costs (Jacks, Meissner, Novy 2011).



# Globalisation changed post-1990



1990  
↑




# What changed globalisation?


- Follow the clues ...



# Global GDP shares, 1960-2012




# People in poverty (under \$2/day)



1990  
↑



# People in poverty (under \$2/day)




## Post 1993

- Hi-middle poverty plummets.
  - 650 million fewer poor!
- Others' poverty keeps rising.


1990  
↑



# Global manufacturing shares, 1970-2010




# Nature of trade: Vertical specialisation



Source: Amador and Cabral (2009).




# Nature of trade changed: Intra-industry trade (IIT)



# Trade & investment policies

## Developing nations



# What changed globalisation?



# Clues

Clue #1: The change is:

- Historic in size,
- Global in reach,
- Unevenly spread geographically




Clue #2: The change is:


- Related to manufacturing & trade in intermediates.

Clue #3: Transformed developing nations' views of trade & investment.






# Buzzwords in lieu of analysis



# Elephant = international movement of firm-specific know-how.





# We need a new narrative for globalisation


Globalisation as 2 processes, not 1



# Globalisation: 3 cascading constraints



# Distance still matters



**Lets make  
better  
*mistakes*  
**tomorrow****



# Misthinking industrialisation:

## Spence growth commission (2008)

Economy	Period of +7% growth	GDP/pop at start	GDP/pop in 2005
Botswana	1960–2005	210	3,800
Brazil	1950–1980	960	4,000
China	1961–2005	105	1,400
Hong Kong, China*	1960–1997	3,100	29,900
Indonesia	1966–1997	200	900
Japan*	1950–1983	3,500	39,600
Korea, Rep. of*	1960–2001	1,100	13,200
Malaysia	1967–1997	790	4,400
Malta*	1963–1994	1,100	9,600
Oman	1960–1999	950	9,000
Singapore*	1967–2002	2,200	25,400
Taiwan, China*	1965–2002	1,500	16,400
Thailand	1960–1997	330	2,400



# Misthinking globalisation = misthinking economics

- 1<sup>st</sup> unbundling thinking:

$$Y_{Jpn} = A_{Jpn} F[L_{Jpn}, K_{Jpn}]$$

- 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling thinking:
  - Globalisation changes technology in some developing nations.
  - Know-how flows directly in ‘global value chains’ & indirectly via intermediates.




# Economics of 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling

- 2 ways of recombination hi-tech & low-wages:
  - Direct: North know-how moves to South labour
    - (offshoring).
  - Indirect: North know-how moves to South in components.
    - (trade in parts & components).

NB: Comparative advantage becomes a multi-country concept.




# 1<sup>st</sup> unbundling:




# 1<sup>st</sup> unbundling: Trade costs fall →


North industrialises; South de-industrialises



# 2<sup>nd</sup> UB → Direct recombination of North tech with South labour



# Trade in parts can switch comparative advantage



# Basic economic difference

- 1<sup>st</sup> unbundling globalisation:
  - Exploit comparative advantage by producing more at home & exporting.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling globalisation:
  - “Sources of comparative advantage” move internationally.



# Rethinking impact of globalisation

- The death of production functions?

$$Y_{Jpn} = A_{Jpn} F[L_{Jpn}, K_{Jpn}]$$

- Globalisation works with a finer degree of resolution.
  - Need IO work to track its impact.
- Old, bold approaches need more detail.
- Open up the blackbox of production functions.



# Key difference for policy

- 1<sup>st</sup> unbundling = UB
  - Slow, predictable, controllable (tariff cuts).
  - By sector and skill-group.
- 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling = 2UB
  - Sudden, individual, unpredictable.
  - Globalisation with a ‘finer degree of resolution’.



# GVC revolution:

## Policy rethinks necessary

1. Social & education policy.
2. Industrial policy.
3. Urban policy.
4. Trade policy & Global trade governance.




# #5: Development policy

- Traditional industrialisation = build a supply chain (e.g. Korea).
- After 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling, industrialisation = join a supply chain (e.g. Thailand).
- Some key points:
  - Industrialisation is easier but less significant.
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling killed import substitution.
    - North tech + South labour unbeatable.



# Development paths changed

Holmes-  
Lopez-  
Gonzales  
curve



# END


- Thank you for listening.
- Please continue developing Int'l IO tables and the like.
  - World of 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling needs finer ganularity!
- Unpaid avert: please visit:  
[www.VoxEU.org](http://www.VoxEU.org)  
“Research-based policy analysis and commentary by leading economists”




# Extra slides for Q&A




# 1UB




# 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling: Industrialisation easier, but less meaningful



# Supply-chain trade by industry



# I2P trade: Bilateral intermediate imports as % of global flows, 2009



Factory Europe

Factory Asia

Facto  
NorA



# 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling:

## Differences for policymaking

- Misthinking globalisation = misthinking policy.

### 2<sup>nd</sup> unbundling:

1. Less predictable.
  - Globalisation changes national comparative advantage.
2. More sudden.
  - Not controlled by tariff cutting.
3. More individual.
  - Not by sectors or skill-groups.

