

Comment on the Papers:

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk,"The Outlook for Regional Foreign Policy under a New Democratic Government."and

E. Leistner,"The Transformation of Regional Economic Organizations in Southern Africa."

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Thank you Mr. Chairman;

Thank you very much for presenting your paper concerning prospects of South African regional policy under a new government. I think that it was very tough to work on issues that contain uncertainty in a changing situation. There are not any clear scenarios in the post-cold war world. I think that this factor of *uncertainty* is a big constraint on the work including the character of prospects. Despite this difficulty, your paper showed us a framework in which we can consider a variety of issues in the context of South and southern Africa in the foreseeable future, which is, from my point of view, very valuable.

My comment is composed of four points. First, it is the point of domestic coalition in a newly formed democratic South Africa, which will be critically important in considering the policy-making process, one of the main focus of your paper. Second, it is the point of priorities of policies that was graphically shown in page 36 of your paper. Third, it is the point of political regional cooperation or the issue of regional security in the post-apartheid era. Lastly, it is the point of regional cooperation not at the level of the government, but at the level of non-governmental organisations, and its relation with the governmental regional cooperation, which was not treated in these papers.

My first comment is concerning a domestic politics, especially that of political coalitions in the new South African government. Your paper takes the stands that the result of a non-racial election in April 1994 is crucial in order to consider the policy-making process in the new government. I agree with you. It is also quite likely that a new Government of National Unity (GNU) is likely to be *dominated or frustrated* by the constitutional requirement of *consensus-seeking* in the decision-making. I think this is a common dilemma in a democratic government. An authoritarian state, which is relatively more autonomous from societal constraints in decision-making, makes a decision more easily than democratic one. Also as pointed out in the first paper, what sort of ruling coalition will be formed is very important in the process of decision-making process. Therefore, it is valid that you emphasize the importance of the result of the election and ascertain the internal formation of the new government to predict South African regional policies more correctly.

Related to this issue of internal constraints on the formation of regional policy in the new government, one of the political actors to which you did not refer so clearly in your paper but do in Dr. Leistner's paper,

namely the trade union, also seems to influence decision-making formally, or at least informally. Leistner pointed out, in his paper, that unions are worried about the implications of closer intra-regional ties and fear so-called "social-dumping" that an integrated regional market would induce South African firms to transfer their production to low-wage neighboring countries. This seems to be the opposite direction to which another important political actor, namely the organised business is heading. The business seems to see Africa including southern Africa a big market of their product and expansion of export to this region is necessary to their vision of export-led growth. In this context, relatively strong union's position in South African economy, therefore, will be another constraint on forming regional as well as domestic policies in a democratic South African political system. Here I would like to raise a question: What sort of stance and policy towards unions do you think the new government is likely take, if you have any idea?

My second comment is concerning the priorities for the GNU in the following order, which you raise in the first paper: stability, legitimacy, growth, and redistribution. I think that this is another point for discussion. I think this issue is closely related to another issue of the regional level, namely whether South Africa led-, or centred- development or more balanced regional economic development, which ANC seems to seek, will be preferred. Let me first refer to the debate concerning the impact of political violence around the April election before going to that of priorities. It is true that there is a possibility of political violence, which seems to have become a sort of political culture in South Africa, before and after the election from the IFP and AVF. In the case of such a violence, it will be difficult for the newly elected ANC-dominated government to effectively manage even domestic politics. However, it is not so much clear how much this domestic political situation will affect the incentive and the process of new government's regional policy formulation.

I understand that there are mainly two approaches to consider the future of post-apartheid southern Africa, especially the issue of regional integration. The first is that due to the deep internal contradictions resulting from long period of racist development, South Africa will be too busy trying to sort out its own problems and thus be unable to play much of a role on the wider region of southern Africa. The second is that the new post-apartheid state will be weak, but nevertheless contends that economic forces will drive the region towards greater integration due to the gains to be made through the involvement, which is the logic of the business. The

second one's theses basically say that even if the governments are too weak to move towards greater integration, the process of integration will be carried forward by formal and informal business. Concerning this issue of regional integration, from my point of view, the second thesis seems to be more likely. Therefore, I am not sure how severe the impact of political violence on the policy-making procedure especially related to the region.

In economic terms, however, it is quite likely that the region is more and more closely tied partly by the bilateral negotiations between South Africa and a specific neighbor rather than multilateral ones, especially in the area of trade. In this context, what we should not neglect is that even though rhetorically the ANC is opposed to the notions and concepts of South Africa being a regional power, South Africa is a power. In other words, the relationship between South Africa and neighbors is inevitably *asymmetrical*. Therefore, what matters will be how the new South African government will formulate procedures and rules to relate itself to the region. Using a phrase of Mbeki, it is necessary to establish *an agreed system of regional cooperation*, which is well managed. This is really an issue how South Africa is to be involved in the formation of regional cooperation organisation, which was argued extensively in Leistner's paper.

However, for the purpose of regional cooperation, there seems to be a contradiction between your priorities emphasising growth rather than redistribution or justice in the new ANC-dominated government and ANC's current stand emphasizing on social justice and economic equality stated in a document called The Framework for Macroeconomic Policy. If the former option is adopted, say, the revival of CONSAS (the Constellation of Southern African States) in a new guise, it is quite likely that the regional inequality will be widened. I would like to raise questions: How do you explain this contradiction? And how ANC will solve this contradiction?

I am turning to the third point. I agree that the main focus of the new South African foreign policy will be economic issues. However, we should not neglect the political issue of regional security that was not treated so much in the papers, especially when we consider South Africa's relation with SADC, whose Treaty (The Treaty of Winhoek) includes the new element of "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security" inherited from the Front-line states. It is because the disappearance of formal structures of institutionalised racism does not necessarily mean the end of any kind of conflicts in the region nor eliminate causes of conflicts. This does neither mean that the people of

southern Africa will achieve dignity, justice, and basic human rights. These are still important issues taken seriously in respective countries and have potentials of conflicts to become a regional wide security problem. Even though it is not likely that a sort of destabilisation policy in the 1980s will be adopted again in a foreseeable future, the region will not be stable because of rather domestic political problems. As is often mentioned, the states in the region are not enough strong and domestic conflicts possibly are not contained within borders. There is also a potential for internal violence caused by a variety of reasons including ethnic or economic ones, and most likely the issues of *refugees* and *migrant labour*, to escalate into conflict among countries. Therefore, as Mbeki pointed out, "a common regional security system" is an important part of the new government's foreign policy, which is not separable from economic one, because regional stability is considered to be one of the most important elements to attract foreign aid and investment. I do not know if SADC joined by South Africa will become a main body of conflict management in the region. Seemingly South Africa is interested in joining SADC from political rather than economic viewpoint, as you shows. If you have any idea in more detail on this issue, it will be helpful to get it.

The last point I will raise is the issue of regional cooperation at the level of non-governmental organisation, which was not treated in these papers at all. Maybe this issue is beyond the agenda of this workshop, which is rather macro-level policy oriented, but we cannot neglect NGOs in their contribution to the socio-economic development and regional cooperation at the level of grassroots, or at the micro-level. As Arne Tostensen pointed out recently, one of the reasons of weakness of regional cooperation at the level of the governments, namely SADCC and PTA, was the lack of orientation of these organisations' direction towards the grassroots. Using her phrases, "... regional ventures tend to lack constituencies beyond rather narrow circles of political leaders... Hence, active support from below is not forthcoming; legitimacy is lacking." From my experience, regional wide NGO-networks are emerging to exchange information and knowledge in such areas as agricultural development and women in development. I think that it is quite important to form horizontal cooperation system at the level of government, but it is also very important that this cooperation will be complemented by more flexible network of NGOs in order to form more substantial regional cooperation. For example, I understand that the issue of AIDS epidemic is one of the major challenges southern Africa in the decade ahead. There are studies of social

and economic impact of AIDS in the coming years. They showed us very pessimistic visions. Considering the initiatives from the NGOs to cope with this issue in respective countries, it is natural to conclude that NGO-government cooperation should be expanded to the region. Regional cooperation is never monopolised by the government, although cooperation among government is by far influential than that among NGOs. Therefore, another type of regional cooperation and the setting of institutions for this purpose should be taken into consideration.

Because I am not an economist, I did not make comments much on regional economic issues in detail, which seems to be the central issue. I hope that the audience of the floor will follow and supplement my comment. Thank you.