

## URBANIZATION IN POST-REVOLUTION IRAN

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### I. URBAN POLICY AND URBAN GROWTH SINCE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

**T**HE Islamic Republic of Iran, which was established in 1979 within the process of the Iranian Revolution, put forth the objectives of securing equity and justice (Article 2 of the Iranian Constitution) and achieving “the economic independence of the society” (Article 43) [3]. In order to realize these goals, a five-year development plan (1983/84 through 1987/88) was proposed reflecting upon the four years of confusion following the revolution (hereafter this plan will be referred to as the “initial development plan”), and another plan (1988/89 through 1993/94)<sup>1</sup> was implemented after the Iran-Iraq War (hereafter the “new development plan”).

Both of these plans were forced to deal with how to control the rampant urbanization that had occurred prior to the revolution and what to do about the rapid population growth that was taking place after the revolution. The new development plan expressed grave concern about present annual population growth rates running as high as 3.9 per cent, a figure far above the pre-revolution average of 2.7 per cent recorded between 1966 and 1976. Policy makers were forced to include in the plan provisions promoting birth control, despite strong opposition from the country’s Islamic leaders [4, p.18], and called for controls on urbanization, the major cause, they claimed, of economic dependency and consumerism which marred the economy under the shah.

In order to keep such undesirable urbanization in check and distribute both population and economic activity more evenly and rationally throughout the country, the new development plan set the following four standards [4, pp.14–15]. To begin with, measures to control population growth would have to be adopted in regions where population scale and activity had surpassed the capabilities of their infrastructures and their potential productivity levels—that is, where population growth had brought about economic loss and social imbalance. In Tehran, for ex-

<sup>1</sup> As to the actual years covered by these development plans, the use of the Iranian calendar and its conversion into Western calendar years presents definite problems in accuracy. For example, the Iranian year 1362 should be written as AD 1983/84, but hereafter we designate it as simply 1983.

ample, new production and service ventures, with the exception of modernized strategic industries based on high technology, were prohibited from expanding outside the immediate region. Secondly, regional decentralization was to be promoted by transferring functions presently provided by Tehran, such as contractual and financial services and general hospital care, as well as new functions, such as manufacturing, administration, and medical services, to selected major regional cities. Thirdly, steps were to be taken to strengthen the ability of the country's intermediate cities to absorb surplus population being created in the larger metropolitan areas. Finally, the plan turned to controlling migration to the cities by ensuring balanced development in both urban and rural areas and nurturing the growth of smaller cities, enabling significant reduction in the urban/rural differences in social services being provided to the nation.

It was in this way that post-revolution Iran adopted a development strategy centering around the three main tactics of controlling the expansion of Tehran, redistributing various functions to major regional cities, and promoting the growth of smaller cities in rural areas. The present paper will take up the problems pertaining to the urbanization ingredient of the new development plan by investigating if smaller regional cities have in fact during the post-revolutionary period been absorbing population surpluses created in Tehran; and if so, to what scale such population absorption is functioning.

#### A. *Urban Policy of the New Development Plan*

The post-revolution Iranian economy is characterized by two central themes: stagnation and promotion of interregional equalization measures.

Economic growth rates under the initial development plan climbed no higher than 1.2 per cent per annum; and while the new development plan aimed at a rate of 8.1 per cent, with current expenditures on the increase and investment down due to insufficient capital, economic growth stagnated. The share of fixed capital formation in the GDP (factor cost) came to only 20.9 per cent during the confusion that ensued immediately after the revolution (1980–83), compared to 26.6 per cent in pre-revolution times (1977). The same figure came to 19.3 per cent under the initial development plan, then dropped to 13.5 per cent after the Iran-Iraq War. In 1988, the figure reached an all-time low of 12.7 per cent, but has recently made a recovery to 13.8 per cent. What this all means, however, is that investment for development has declined since the revolution.

A regional equalization policy was implemented in order to check the pace of urbanization. One measure was to alter regional distribution of the development capital budget. The allocation to Markazi ("central") Province (after the revolution this was divided into Tehran Province and Markazi Province), which averaged 7.6 per cent of the budget during 1976–77, was reduced to 5.5 per cent in 1982 and averaged 6.8 per cent during 1983–86. On the other hand, nine relatively underde-

veloped provinces were given allocation increases from 29.8 per cent during 1976–77 to 32.5 per cent during 1983–86 [1, pp. 218–19].

Another equalization measure involved changes in regional allocations for housing, which had become an urgent urban problem before the revolution and took on serious proportions afterwards demanding immediate solutions. The new development plan included measures to rebuild housing destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War and called for the resumption of housing construction that could satisfy the current demand. The goal set was the construction of 2,285,000 dwellings over a five-year period (457,000 per year) and surpassed the goal of the initial development plan by 27 per cent.

According to the 1986 census, during the ten-year period 1977–86 a total of 362 million new dwellings were completed: 149 million in the rural areas and 213 million in the urban areas. On the average, therefore, some 360,000 homes were built annually, 210,000 of them in the cities [13, 1368 edition, p. 204]. According to the records kept by the Central Bank, 125,000 homes were built annually in urban areas under the initial development plan, while 102,000 were completed annually under the new development plan.

The supply of housing in Tehran was controlled under the interregional equalization measures, as the number of construction permits issued dropped from 15,000 in 1979 (13.2 per cent of all urban construction permits) to 13,000 the following year. While the absolute amounts surpassed the 11,000 permits issued during the construction boom of 1977, the percentage figures were lower [2, pp. 128–29]. The dwelling construction that had been started before the revolution was earmarked for quick completion afterwards as one way to deal with the housing crisis. As a result, during 1979 and 1980 37,700 (26 per cent of the national total) and 43,300 (26.5 per cent) dwellings were completed; however, during the Iran-Iraq War and the truce period following it, only 6,700 new dwellings (6.7 per cent) were built.

The average floor space of the dwellings completed in Tehran dropped from an average of 581 square meters prior to the revolution (1973–78; 2.7 times greater than the national average) to 209 square meters (1.2 times the national average) just afterwards. Since 1983, the figure has risen to 2.1 times the national average. In order to deal with the increasing number of families requiring housing, an equalization measure was implemented to supply smaller scale dwellings in Tehran. Floor space, the numbers of dwellings supplied and at what ratios indicate well post-revolution interregional equalization measures and a stagnating economy.

## B. *Urban Growth after the Revolution*

### 1. *Urbanization and urban scale*

Post-revolution urbanization in Iran shows characteristic features not found generally in the patterns of other Third World countries and regions. The 1986 census

defined "urban area" as all places with municipal governments. Up until that time, the term urban was applied to areas with populations of at least 5,000 people, or the central area of a *shahrestan* (sub-province) regardless of population size. Nevertheless, this change of definition did little to alter the notion of what an Iranian city actually was.

The urban population growth rate rose from 4.9 per cent during 1966–77 to 5.4 per cent during 1976–86, indicating that the revolution was not very effective in controlling urbanization. From the figures on city-by-city urban scale shown in Table I, we can observe some efforts to both control and promote urbanization.

Prior to the revolution, Tehran accounted for around 25 per cent of Iran's urban population; and while population density there increased after the revolution, as of 1986 its share of the country's urban population 22.4 per cent, a 6-point decrease from the 1976 figure. During 1976–86 Tehran's population grew by only 2.9 per cent annually, a much lower rate than the national urban growth of 5.4 per cent per annum. The four large cities of Mashhad, Shiraz, Esfahan, and Tabriz increased their combined share of the country's urban population from 14.8 per cent in 1976 to 16.1 per cent in 1986, indicating increasing urban population rates accompanying post-revolution efforts to put more emphasis on regional society and economy.

In 1966 there were only five cities (other than Tehran) with populations of 250,000 or more, the above-mentioned four large cities and the oil-refining center of Abadan. By 1976 that number had grown to seven, including two new oil-refining centers, Ahwaz and Bakhtaran. In 1986 there were fifteen such urban areas, despite the destruction of Abadan during the Iran-Iraq War.

Extracting from Table I, the urban population of the eleven most important regional cities (i.e., cities other than Tehran, Mashhad, Shiraz, Esfahan, and Tabriz with populations of 250,000 or more) accounted for 2.8 per cent of Iran's urban population in 1966, 5.7 per cent in 1976, and 14.4 per cent in 1986. This share increased to a level similar to the four large cities after the revolution.

The number of intermediate cities with population between 100,000 and 249,999 has grown to twenty-five; however, we find only a slight increase in their combined share from 13.5 to 14.0 per cent during 1976–86. The number of smaller cities (population of 50,000 to 99,999) more than doubled from twenty-two to forty-six during 1976–86. In contrast to an actual decline in the urban population shared by these cities from 10.9 per cent in 1966 to 9.6 per cent in 1976, the figure rose to 11.8 per cent after the revolution, at which time they were considered "consolidated small cities" under the interregional equalization measures implemented.

Small cities with populations between 25,000 and 49,999 experienced declines in their urban population share beginning in 1966; and cities with populations of less than 25,000 declined very quickly. These continued losses suffered by small cities with populations of less than 50,000 do not jibe very well with the interregional equalization measures carried out after the revolution.

TABLE I  
URBANIZATION IN IRAN, 1966, 1976, AND 1986

	1966	1976	1986
<b>A. Number of cities</b>			
Total	249	452	496
250,000 and more:	6	8	16
Tehran	1	1	1
Four largest cities outside Tehran	4	4	4
100,000–249,999	8	15	25
50,000–99,999	15	22	46
25,000–49,999	30	45	67
Less than 25,000:	190	362	342
10,000–24,999		106	145
5,000–9,999		122	113
Less than 5,000		134	84
<b>B. Urban population (1,000)</b>			
Total	9,794	15,924	26,845
250,000 or more:	4,500 (5.66)	7,802 (6.19)	14,222
Tehran	2,720 (5.23)	4,530 (2.89)	6,022
Other than Tehran	1,780 (6.28)	3,272 (9.62)	8,200
Four largest cities outside Tehran	1,507 (4.35)	2,353 (6.20)	4,310
100,000–249,999	1,167 (6.31)	2,153 (5.72)	3,757
50,000–99,999	1,068 (3.67)	1,532 (7.49)	3,155
25,000–49,999	1,081 (3.60)	1,540 (4.19)	2,320
Less than 25,000:	1,899 (4.32)	2,897 (1.58)	3,391
10,000–24,999		1,610	2,300
5,000–9,999		869	833
Less than 5,000		418	258
<b>C. Percentage of total urban population</b>			
250,000 or more:	45.9	49.0	53.0
Tehran	27.8	28.4	22.4
Other than Tehran	18.2	20.5	30.5
Four largest cities outside Tehran	15.4	14.8	16.1
100,000–249,999	11.9	13.5	14.0
50,000–99,999	10.9	9.6	11.8
25,000–49,999	11.0	9.7	8.6
Less than 25,000:	19.4	18.2	12.6
10,000–24,999		10.1	8.6
5,000–9,999		5.5	3.1
Less than 5,000		2.6	1.0

Sources: [10, p. 13], 1966 and 1976 censuses, and [13, 1365 (1986/87) edition, p. 55].

Note: The figures in parentheses are growth rates during 1966–76 and 1976–86.

Despite the post-revolution call for checks on urbanization and the strengthening of regional cities, Iran's urban population has continued to grow rapidly. The cities that have replaced Tehran in absorbing this growth can be divided into four groups. The first group contains small cities with populations between 50,000 and 99,999, whose number has quickly increased and whose urban population share has risen after the revolution. The second group contains intermediate cities of populations between 100,000 and 249,999, whose numbers greatly increased but whose urban population share grew only slightly. The third group contains central regional cities with population of 250,000 or more, whose urban population shares increased. The fourth group constitutes Mashhad, Shiraz, Esfahan, and Tabriz, whose urban population share grew only slightly after the revolution.


## 2. *The changing face of Iranian cities*

Regional cities with populations of 100,000 or more experienced different rates of population growth before and after the revolution. Figure 1 was constructed by plotting growth rates for the major cities in four quadrants based on an horizontal axis of 1966–76 averages and a vertical axis of 1976–86 averages. By making the overall 4.9 per cent pre-revolution urban population average increase and the 5.4 per cent figure for the post-revolution era the points at which the axes intersect, we come up with an upper-right quadrant (type-I) containing cities that grew through both eras at rates higher than the national averages. Consequently, the lower-right quadrant (type-II) contains cities that grew at rates higher than the pre-revolution average, but stagnated during the post-revolution period. The lower-left quadrant (type-III) contains cities that grew at rates below the national average during both eras, while the upper-left quadrant (type-IV) contains cities that grew below the pre-revolution average, but exceeded the post-revolution figure.

(1) We find Tehran in the type-II quadrant together with its suburban area of Karaj. Looking at population movement figures shown in Table II, Tehran's stable population fell below the national average of 70 per cent by five points; and the immigrants tending to hail more from other cities than from the rural areas. The table also shows a large amount of housing renters in Tehran, some 24 per cent of the population, 7 points above the national average.

(2) Of Iran's four next largest cities, Mashhad in the northeast and Shiraz in the south appear in the type-I population growth quadrant, growing at 8.2 per cent and 7.1 percent during both eras. Mashhad was completely removed from the Iran-Iraq fighting and Shiraz is said to have suffered only minor damage. Both cities have been the location of new factory construction and display stable populations equivalent to Tehran, and the number of renters comes to 21 per cent of their populations. To the contrary, the textile and steel manufacturing city of Esfahan and the industrialized city of Tabriz in the northwest appear in the type-III quadrant and are cities with lots of population movement and low numbers of renters. Some 17 per

Fig. 1. Four Types of Population Growth Patterns in Iran's Major Cities Marking the Pre- and Post-Revolution Periods, 1966-76, 1976-86



Source: Table II.

Notes: Large dots indicate the four largest cities outside Tehran. Underlines indicates cities with renter populations of 20 per cent or more.

<sup>a</sup> Cities with large stable populations.

<sup>b</sup> Cities with large migrant populations of urban origin.

<sup>c</sup> Cities with large migrant populations of rural origin.

TABLE II

POPULATION IN IRAN'S MAJOR CITIES, 1966, 1976, 1986

	1966 (1,000)	1976 (1,000)	1986 (1,000)	Annual Growth Rate		Origin (1986)		Unemployed over the Age of Ten (%)	Renters (%)	Per Capita Government Expenditures (Rial)
				1966-76 (%)	1976-86 (%)	Existing (%)	Rural (%)			
Capital										
Tehran	2,720	4,530	6,022	5.23	2.89	65.0	21.9	11.2	24.6	5,297
Four largest cities outside Tehran										
Mashhad	410	668	1,466	5.01	8.18	65.6	13.6	11.6	22.6	4,666
Esfahan	424	662	1,001	4.55	4.23	76.3	13.4	8.2	13.7	4,968
Tabriz	403	598	994	4.01	5.22	73.9	6.6	17.2	10.0	3,635
Shiraz	270	426	848	4.67	7.13	68.3	20.8	9.4	21.1	
Central regional cities										
Ahwaz	206	333	590	4.91	5.87	65.6	26.5	6.2	19.7	
Bakhtaran	188	291	566	4.46	6.89	68.6	11.1	19.4	25.0	3,679
Qom	134	247	551	6.29	8.34	62.5	12.6	18.7	17.3	2,875
Orumiyeh	111	164	305	4.03	6.37	71.9	10.8	15.3	18.5	5,808
Rasht	144	189	294	2.79	4.52	77.4	11.1	10.6	25.1	
Zahedan	40	94	289	8.96	11.90	58.4	9.3	18.3	24.9	2,918
Ardabil	84	148	284	5.87	6.73	62.4	10.7	26.0	7.8	4,064
Karaj	44	210	277	16.86	2.79	44.5	33.8	20.0	21.1	6,655
Hamadan	124	166	274	2.93	5.16	74.0	7.5	17.6	17.1	5,784
Arak	72	117	268	4.97	8.67	62.4	10.7	26.0	16.2	3,057
Kerman	85	141	255	5.12	6.11	71.1	13.7	13.2	17.3	
Regional intermediate cities										
Qazvin	88	139	249	4.69	5.98	73.4	9.7	15.5	23.5	5,808
Yazd	93	135	234	3.76	5.66	80.0	8.2	8.1	12.6	3,925
Islam Shahr	59	100	215	5.51	7.94	61.3	5.6	32.6	19.1	1,775
Zanjan	60	105	208	5.82	7.09	73.8	6.9	18.4	15.0	4,273
Khorramabad	55	96	204	5.80	7.84	61.5	6.1	31.8	27.5	
Sanandaj	35	88	200	9.77	9.57	65.7	22.0	8.9	22.4	
Bandar-e Abbas	71	101	185	3.55	6.19	79.4	9.0	10.8	14.0	
Borjerd									17.8	2,495



TABLE II (Continued)

	1966 (1,000)	1976 (1,000)	1986 (1,000)	Annual Growth Rate		Origin (1986)		Unemployed over the Age of Ten (%)	Renters (%)	Per Capita Government Expenditures (Rial)	
				1966-76		Existing					
				(%)	1976-86 (%)	(%)	Rural (%)				
Dezful	84	121	142	3.68	1.60	85.2	9.9	4.3	5.2	11.8	5,774
Sari	45	71	141	4.74	7.11	66.1	13.4	19.6	6.0	19.2	7,637
Kashan	58	85	139	3.80	5.09	86.9	7.0	4.9	4.1	8.6	
Gorgan	51	88	139	5.57	4.71	72.7	12.2	12.7	6.0	23.1	
Savzevar	42	70	130	5.07	6.42	65.7	5.2	28.7	4.5	18.6	
Najafabad	43	75	129	5.67	5.57	75.0	9.4	13.9	3.8	7.6	3,296
Bandar-e Bushehr	24	59	121	9.61	7.44						
Amol	41	69	119	5.42	5.62	74.9	4.1	20.6	4.9	15.1	4,164
Rajai Shahr		8.3	118	30.35		31.6	48.0	19.1	6.3	19.7	4,290
Babol	50	68	116	3.14	5.47	87.8	4.9	6.1	5.2	16.8	4,102
Khoy	48	70	116	3.97	5.12	79.7	5.5	14.1	6.4	15.0	4,251
Neyshabur	33	60	110	5.93	6.37	73.5	6.6	18.6	5.0	13.2	4,226
Qaem Shahr		63	110	5.68		78.6	12.0	8.8	8.5	15.8	3,775
Malayer	28	47	106	5.18	8.44	67.2	8.6	23.2	8.0	15.0	6,645
Masjed Soleyman	64	77	105	1.80	3.14	85.1	4.5	9.5	12.1	13.0	2,958
Khomeini Shahr	47	45	105	-0.43	8.69	90.7	6.0	1.1	4.2	4.4	
Maragheh	54	45	103	-1.79	8.59	77.5	5.3	16.5	4.4	14.7	5,956
War-damaged city											
Abadan	273	294		0.75							
Urban population	9,794	15,855	26,845	4.93	5.41						
Rural population	15,994	17,854	22,349								
Unclear			251								
Total	25,789	33,709	49,445			70.1	12.2	15.7	6.1	17.1	
Averages											

Sources: For 1966 figures: [14]. For 1976 figures: [13, 1360 (1981/82) edition, pp. 62-68]. For 1986 figures: [13, 1368 (1989/90) edition, p. 39]. For origin, unemployment, and renter figures: [11, pp. 18-32, pp. 49-64]. For per capita expenditure figures: [5, pp. 22-48].  
 Note: The classification of cities was made by the author. Place names in the table that were changed after the revolution are as follows: Bakhtaran—formerly Kermanshahan; Islam Shahr—formerly Qasababadshahi in Rey Shahrstan; Khomeini Shahr—newly established in Eshfahan Province; Rajai Shahr—formerly Guherdasht in Karaj Shahrstan.

cent of Tabriz' population has come from rural areas.

(3) Of the eleven central regional cities, Zahedan, an administrative city near the Pakistan border, appears as a type-I city that has grown most rapidly (11.9 per cent) during the post-revolution period. Its stable population is low at 58 per cent, and its in-migrants have come mainly from the rural areas and from across the border (13 per cent). Cities like Qom and Arak, which are located on the central highway linking Tehran to the Persian Gulf, are also classified as type-I areas, growing at rates of 8.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively during the post-revolution era. Qom is a religious city that is industrializing, while Arak is a more modernized, industrial city. Ardabil in the northwest and centrally located Kerman, as well as petrochemical center of Ahwaz in the south, appear as type-I cities with lower rates of growth. Ardabil has many residents that have migrated from rural areas, and, like the similarly agrarian-related Arak, has a low renter population of just 7 per cent.

Orumiye in the northwest and Bakhtaran in the west appear as type-IV cities that stagnated before the revolution, then grew at rates of 6.4 per cent and 6.9 per cent after the revolution. The city of Rasht near the Caspian Sea and Hamadan in the west are examples of type-III cities within this central regional city group. Rasht's stagnation has been marked by little in-migration, a 25 per cent renter population, and unemployment rates as high as 10 per cent.

(4) The regional intermediate cities with populations between 100,000 and 249,999 that grew at high rates during the post-revolution era can be divided into three categories. The first category contains cities that were given more and more special functions after the revolution. Islam Shahr in the suburbs of Tehran, which grew by 15.8 per cent per annum, Rajai Shahr and Khomeini Shahr are examples of this type, whose economic roles have yet to be defined.

Category 2 contains regional industrial centers: for example, the type-I cities of Zanjan near Tehran, which grew at 7.9 per cent per annum, Khorramabad on the central highway which grew at 7.1 per cent, and Sanandaj, which grew at 7.8 per cent. Zanjan and Sanandaj are characterized by low stable populations of 61 per cent and large amounts of migrants from rural areas (exceeding 30 per cent). The predominately Kurdish town of Sanandaj has had unemployment rates of 10 per cent. Khorramabad has a large stable population with many renters (27 per cent) and a high unemployment rate of 8 per cent.

Category 3 contains administrative cities with import-related economies. Bandar-e Abbas, a port city in the southeast, is a type-I urban area that has grown by 8.6 per cent since the revolution, as is Zahedan, also located in the southeast far from the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War, which increased its importing activities after experiencing material procurement deficiencies after the revolution. Zahedan's stable population is low at 66 per cent, very few of its migrants have come from urban areas, there are not many renters, and the city has enjoyed pros-

perity with unemployment rates around the national average. Such conditions also characterize the port city of Bandar-e Bushehr.

Regional intermediate cities that did not grow as spectacularly can also be divided into three categories. First, there are cities located in the Caspian Sea region. Despite the high post-revolution population increase enjoyed by Sari, the cities of Amol and Babol grew at the national average. The latter two cities had large stable populations: 21 per cent of Amol's population hailed from rural areas, while Babol boasted an 88 per cent stable population. Gorgan in the northeast is a type-II city suffering from stagnation after the revolution.

Secondly, there are centrally located Borjerd, the traditional weaving centers of Yazd and Kashan, and Khoy in the northwest, all of which grew at the national average after the revolution and falling on the borderline between types III and IV. These four cities have stagnated with stable populations of 80 per cent or more and a small amount of renters. The newly industrializing city of Qazvin also falls in this category.

Thirdly, there are the petrochemical centers in the south that have stagnated since the revolution: for example, Masjed Soleyman, Abadan—the giant oil-refining area destroyed in the Iran-Iraq War, and Dezful in Khuzestan Province.

## II. POPULATION MOVEMENT INTO TEHRAN

### A. *Movement Patterns*

Although it was still impossible to control urbanization after the revolution, population growth in Tehran was held in check. In 1986 the population of the capital was 6,022,000. By 1980 the city limits had expanded to 515 square kilometers, bringing the population density to 10,587 persons per kilometer [6, p. 20], a figure less than the pre-revolution density of 18,000 for each of the city's 214 square kilometers. In 1986, the figure was again rising at 11,729, a 10.8 per cent increase from 1980. The percentage of families living in one-room dwellings, one of the best statistics for getting an idea of the conditions in which a city's poorer classes find themselves, dropped from 24.1 per cent in 1980 to 15.3 per cent in 1986. Compare these figures to the pre-revolution percentages of 39.9 per cent (1966) and 31.5 per cent (1976).

Post-revolution density figures for Tehran differed from district (*mantaghe*) to district. Since figures have not come to light for 1976, we must estimate them from data on percentage of families living in one-room dwellings. For Districts 7 and 12 in southern Tehran, the city's poorer section, we find 50.1 per cent and 46.6 per cent of the families living in single rooms; the figure came to 42.3 per cent for the southwest section, easily exceeding the capital average of 31.5 per cent. From "Old Tehran" north there are fewer one-room family dwellings and better quality housing.

According to the data for 1980, the population density of the city's twenty districts remained high in the southwestern (e.g., District 17 = 50,490 persons per square kilometers) and the western (e.g., District 10 = 47,720 persons per square kilometers) districts, while the figures for the northern section of wealthier districts were much lower (e.g., District 9 = 10,850 persons per square kilometers). In 1986 the figures for Districts 17 and 10 dropped slightly to 48,220 and 43,250 respectively, while District 8 in the northern section also decreased somewhat. On the other hand, the density of District 9 increased to 11,890. With respect to the poorer southern districts, the density of District 19 in the southwest grew to 65,490, a 66 per cent increase over the 1980 figure, making it the most densely populated district in Tehran; and the density of the southernmost District 20 was measured at 9,630, a 24 per cent increase from 1980. Here we see a post-revolution tendency for the city's poorer inhabitants to concentrate in the southern districts and periphery.

Tehran Shahrestan (sub-province), which includes a small rural area, is more or less equivalent to Tehran proper with a population of 6,058,000 [12, p.15]. The post-revolution migration patterns to be discussed are based on this slightly larger area than Tehran proper.

During 1976–86 a total of 5.82 million Iranians, or 11.6 per cent of the total population, moved from one place to another (see Table III): 2.94 million men and 2.88 million women were involved in this population movement. According to the 1976 census, a total of 1.71 million people (1.06 million men and 650,000 women), or 6.1 per cent of the total population, changed their place of residence during the five-year period 1971–76. In terms of a ten-year period, the amount of migrants would come to about 12.3 per cent of the total population. These figures lead us to conclude that (1) population movement after the revolution was less intense than before, and (2) the number of men moving alone decreased after the revolution. During the first ten years of the post-revolution era, 69.5 per cent of the country's migrants moved to the city. Of those who moved to the city, 8.5 per cent moved to Tehran (Table III). During 1971–76, 80 per cent of migrants moved to the city (21 per cent to Tehran), meaning that (3) even though the flow of population after the revolution was mainly to the city, movement into rural areas increased by 10.5 per cent, and (4) this increased movement into rural areas was exceeded by a 12.5 per cent reduction in movement to Tehran. Incidentally, movement to other cities increased by 2 points from 59 per cent before the revolution to 61 per cent afterwards.

In terms of provinces, during 1976–86 a total of 4,893,000 people moved between what have been identified clearly as exit and entry provinces. The 1,206,000 who moved to Tehran during that period accounted for 24.6 per cent of all migrants [10, pp. 79–80]. The trends of movement into the countryside and to Tehran can be seen in Figure 2, which classifies population movement trends in each province by destination before and after the revolution into four types.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The similar attempt for the 1976 census was made in [15, pp. 5–15].

TABLE III  
POPULATION MIGRATION AND DESTINATION BY PROVINCE AND SEX DURING THE PRE- AND POST-REVOLUTION PERIODS, 1971-76 AND 1976-86

	1976-86 Destinations				1971-76 Destinations				Migration Pattern (Female)		Employed Population Rate, 1986		
	Urban (%)		Rural (%)		Urban (%)		Rural (%)		1976-86	1971-76		Agriculture (%)	Manufacturing (%)
	Total (1,000)	Migration Pattern	Tehran (%)	Migration Pattern	Total (1,000)	Migration Pattern	Tehran (%)	Migration Pattern					
Male Totals	2,938	69.9	30.1	8.0	1,063	79.4	20.6	21.3			29.2	12.4	
Tehran	362	65.4	34.6	5.9	D	76.7	23.3	10.6	D		5.1	21.2	
Markazi	55	86.9	13.1	20.3	A	83.8	16.2	31.4	A	D	37.4	13.6	
Gilan	72	72.8	27.2	17.1	A	77.1	22.9	24.4	B	A	40.7	10.7	
Mazandaran	102	68.9	31.1	10.3	B	79.6	20.4	29.8	A	B	40.8	8.8	
East Azarbayejan	233	83.1	16.9	21.6	A	77.1	22.9	18.2	A	A	35.2	12.0	
West Azarbayejan	102	74.8	25.2	6.0	C	34	77.0	23.0	D	C	40.2	6.4	
Bakhtaran	116	73.5	26.5	4.6	C	77.0	23.0	24.1	C	C	28.3	5.8	
Khuzestan	379	72.2	27.8	4.5	C	85.6	14.4	12.7	C	C	24.8	8.3	
Fars	103	72.4	27.6	3.8	C	81.8	18.2	17.3	C	C	29.0	7.1	
Kerman	56	63.0	37.0	3.1	D	77.1	22.9	14.8	D	D	37.5	10.0	
Khorasan	217	72.3	27.7	5.6	C	78.6	21.4	22.8	B	D	35.4	11.9	
Esfahan	102	68.2	31.8	9.7	B	84.0	16.0	26.2	C	D	21.4	21.9	
Sistan and Baluchestan	47	63.8	36.2	1.8	D	75.5	24.5	8.2	D	D	45.1	3.6	
Kordestan	93	75.7	24.3	4.4	C	82.0	18.0	20.8	C	C	47.3	4.3	
Hamadan	78	79.5	20.5	14.5	A	79.9	20.1	38.8	A	C	39.6	7.7	
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiyari	20	77.4	22.6	2.4	C	84.6	15.4	10.4	C	A	37.6	6.4	
Lorestan	75	75.9	24.1	6.3	C	81.0	19.0	24.2	A	C	41.0	6.3	
Ilam	31	76.5	23.5	3.6	C	80.4	19.6	18.8	C	D	42.4	2.8	
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad	21	62.7	37.3	0.7	D	78.4	21.6	5.4	D	C	46.7	1.5	
Bushehr	28	67.1	32.9	2.5	D	86.4	13.6	14.6	D	C	18.5	4.4	
Zanjan	86	75.4	24.6	13.8	A	83.1	16.9	33.6	A	A	43.0	14.9	
Semnan	16	77.6	22.4	16.4	A	83.8	16.2	39.2	A	A	27.1	9.3	
Yazd	16	72.2	27.8	8.8	A	79.0	21.0	29.3	A	B	19.5	18.0	


TABLE III (Continued)

	1976-86 Destinations				1971-76 Destinations				Migration Pattern (Female)		Employed Population Rate, 1986	
	Total (1,000)		Migration Pattern		Total (1,000)		Migration Pattern		1976-86	1971-76		
	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Tehran (%)	Migra- tion Pattern	Urban (%)	Rural (%)	Tehran (%)	Migra- tion Pattern	Agricul- ture (%)	Manufac- turing (%)		
Hormozgan	22	58.0	42.0	4.0	D	9.2	78.1	21.9	15.6	D	27.6	4.4
Foreign countries	398	52.5	47.5	7.2		82	77.7	22.3	34.5			
Unclear	111	75.6	24.4	7.5		10	75.7	24.3	36.3			
Female Totals	2,882	69.0	31.0	8.9		650	80.9	19.1	20.4		26.6	21.6
Grand Totals	5,821	69.5	30.5	8.5		1,713	80.0	20.0	21.0		29.0	13.2

Source: [8, pp. 13, 56] [10, pp. 51, 76].

Note: Underlined migration patterns indicate changes from one period to the next.

Fig. 2. Male Migrants to Tehran from Other Provinces and National Migration Patterns during the Pre- and Post-Revolution Periods, 1971-76, 1976-86



Sources: Table III and IV.

Note: The numeral data indicate absolute migratory flows into Tehran (units of 1,000 persons) from the former to the latter period. A relative figure (in 1971-76 terms) can be reached by doubling the 1976-86 data. The four large arrows indicate large-outflow provinces during 1971-76.

The Tehran-regional city type (A) includes provinces with more migrants to these destinations than the national average. The Tehran-rural area type (B) includes provinces with more migrants to Tehran and the countryside than the national averages. The regional city type (C) includes provinces sending more mi-

grants to this destination than the national average, but less than the national average to the countryside or Tehran.<sup>3</sup> The regional city-rural area type (D) includes provinces sending migrants to these destinations in greater numbers than the national averages.

Due to differences according to sex, we will investigate only the movement of men in twenty-one provinces (i.e., we will exclude Tehran and Markazi Provinces which were the Central Province in 1976) after the revolution.

The Tehran-regional city type (A) includes six provinces, five of which can be similarly classified before the revolution: Yazd Province was transformed from a Tehran-rural area type (B) after the revolution. East Azarbayejan Province is a classic A-type with a large flow of migrants to Tehran even in pre-revolution days. After the revolution this province accounted for 50,500 male migrants to Tehran (21.1 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran) via Zanzan Province, greatly exceeding its pre-revolution figure of 28,300 (12.5 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran) (Table IV). The industrial population of the province stands at the average for twenty-three provinces, and its agrarian population is above the national average (Table III). Tabriz, one of the largest four Iranian cities after Tehran with a type-III population pattern, is located in this province. Neighboring Zanzan Province, which lies between East Azarbayejan and Tehran, also experienced an increase in the number of its males migrants moving to the capital during the two periods from 2.3 to 5.0 per cent.<sup>4</sup> Zanzan has an industrial population at the national average and a larger than average agrarian population.

Some 4.7 per cent and 5.0 per cent of the total male migrants to Tehran moved from Hamadan Province during the two periods. The industrial population share from Hamadan, which has a type-III population pattern, is 8 per cent, lower than the national average. The flow of migrants from Gilan Province, located to the north of Hamadan, ebbed only slightly to Tehran (from 6.2 per cent to 5.1 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran). Gilan is a predominately agrarian region with the type-III city of Rasht and a above average industrial population. A similar type is Semnan Province. Yazd Province, which was transformed from a B-type migration pattern, sent a fewer number of its male migrants to Tehran (1.2 per cent to 0.6 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran), but was still above the national average.

Two provinces conform to the Tehran-rural type (B). Centrally located Esfahan Province was transformed from a Tehran-regional city type (A) before the revolution. The number of male migrants moving to Tehran remains large, despite a reduction from 26.2 per cent to 9.7 per cent, but there has been a significant increase in the number of Esfahan migrants to rural areas from 16.0 per cent to 31.8 per cent,

<sup>3</sup> Migration to regional cities was calculated from percentages of flow into urban areas contained in Table III.

<sup>4</sup> These are shares of Tehran's migrant population occupied by each province as presented in Table IV.



TABLE IV  
MIGRATION TO TEHRAN ACCORDING TO SEX AND PROVINCE DURING THE PRE- AND  
POST-REVOLUTION PERIODS, 1971-76 AND 1976-86

Province	1976-86 <sup>a</sup>			1971-76 <sup>b</sup>			(100 persons)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Total	2,389 (100.0)	2,569 (100.0)	4,958	2,261 (100.0)	1,326 (100.0)	3,588			
Tehran	215 (9.0)	270 (10.5)	485						
Markazi	110 (4.6)	138 (5.4)	248	255 (11.3)	165 (12.4)	420			
Gilan	122 (5.1)	167 (6.5)	289	140 (6.2)	104 (7.8)	244			
Mazandaran	105 (4.4)	129 (5.0)	234	160 (7.1)	88 (6.7)	248			
East Azarbajejan	505 (21.1)	542 (21.1)	1,046	283 (12.5)	177 (13.4)	460			
West Azarbajejan	61 (2.5)	63 (2.5)	124	69 (3.0)	29 (2.2)	98			
Bakhtaran	53 (2.2)	59 (2.3)	113	82 (3.6)	36 (2.7)	118			
Khuzestan	171 (7.2)	178 (6.9)	349	98 (4.3)	67 (5.1)	165			
Fars	39 (1.6)	44 (1.7)	83	85 (3.8)	40 (3.0)	125			
Kerman	17 (0.7)	19 (0.7)	36	36 (1.6)	14 (1.1)	50			
Khorasan	122 (5.1)	130 (5.1)	252	188 (8.3)	90 (6.8)	278			
Esfahan	99 (4.1)	128 (5.0)	227	123 (5.4)	69 (5.2)	191			
Sistan and Baluchestan	8.3 (0.3)	8.3 (0.3)	16.6	18.7 (0.8)	7.7 (0.6)	26.4			
Kordestan	40 (1.7)	36 (1.4)	77	42 (1.8)	12 (0.9)	54			
Hamadan	112 (4.7)	129 (5.0)	242	112 (5.0)	63 (4.8)	176			
Chaharmahal and Bakhtiyari	4.8 (0.2)	5.0 (0.2)	9.8	9.6 (0.4)	2.7 (0.2)	12.4			
Lorestan	47 (2.0)	50 (2.0)	97	57 (2.5)	25 (1.9)	82			
Ilam	11.2 (0.5)	10.8 (0.4)	21.9	8.0 (0.4)	3.2 (0.2)	11.2			
Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad	1.4 (0.1)	0.9 (0.0)	2.2	2.1 (0.1)	0.8 (0.1)	2.9			
Bushehr	7.0 (0.3)	6.4 (0.2)	13.4	11.9 (0.5)	4.2 (0.3)	16.1			
Zanjan	119 (5.0)	130 (5.1)	248	51 (2.3)	28 (2.1)	79			
Semnan	26 (1.1)	38 (1.5)	64	69 (3.0)	46 (3.5)	115			
Yazd	14 (0.6)	20 (0.8)	34	28 (1.2)	16 (1.2)	43			
Hormozgan	8.7 (0.4)	8.3 (0.3)	17.0	14.3 (0.6)	7.0 (0.5)	21.3			
Foreign	286 (12.0)	170 (6.6)	456	284 (12.6)	209 (15.7)	493			
Unclear	84 (3.5)	89 (3.5)	173	36 (1.6)	22 (1.6)	58			

Sources: [7, p. 56] and [12, p. 26].

Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.

<sup>a</sup> Figures for Tehran Shahrestan.

<sup>b</sup> Figures for Tehran city proper.

which is the cause of the transformation to a B classification. Esfahan, a traditional weaving center, has the lowest industrial population of any regional province at 22 per cent, and Esfahan City, one of the four largest urban areas outside Tehran, has a type-III population growth pattern characterized by increasing movement into rural areas.

The other B-type migration province is Mazandaran, the number of whose male

migrants moving to Tehran remains large despite a reduction from 7.1 per cent to 4.4 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran. However, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants to rural areas from 22.9 per cent to 31.1 per cent. It is a predominately agrarian province with 41 per cent of its population involved in the agricultural sector; and the two agrarian cities of Amol and Babol are located there. Despite the fact that both of these B-type cities lie adjacent to Tehran, their post-revolution migration patterns are characterized by increasing movement into rural areas.

The regional city type (C) provinces increased from four to nine after the revolution. Six of them represented transformation into C-types. Khorasan Province, located in the northeast, was transformed from a pre-revolution B-type. Mashhad is one of the four largest cities outside Tehran with an increasing population, and male migration to the province's urban areas has increased from 55.8 to 66.7 per cent of the total flowing across its boundaries. In spite of being remotely located with industrial and agrarian populations similar to Mazandran Province, the difference lies in the existence of Mashhad, a type-I population growth city. Along the same lines, there is Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshahan) Province, a remotely located region that has experienced reduced migration to Tehran (3.6 per cent to 2.2 per cent of the total migrants to Tehran) and possesses a type-IV population growth area in Bakhtaran City.

West Azarbayejan is one province that has been transformed into a regional city-rural area type (D). The movement of its male population headed for Tehran has slowed from 3.0 per cent to 2.5 per cent, while the number moving to regional cities has increased from 58.9 to 68.8 per cent. It has the highest agrarian population of 40 per cent and surprisingly low industrial population of 6 per cent. There is the type-IV population growth city of Orumiye to which a great deal of migration has occurred since the revolution.

Lorestan Province is a D-type that was transformed from an A-type. It has a large agrarian population, has experienced reduced to flow to Tehran after the revolution, and has the type-IV city of Borjerd.

There are a total of five provinces that have not changed from their pre-revolution C-type pattern. The first is Khuzestan, a large portion of whose male population has migrated to oil-related production centers in the south, in addition to relatively large flows to Tehran (4.3 and 7.2 per cent). The second is Fars, a province with the type-IV city of Shiraz. The share occupied by Fars in Tehran's migrant population has dropped from 3.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent, while the flow of its migrants has increased to regional cities from 64.5 per cent to 68.6 per cent and slowed to Tehran from 17.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent. While its agrarian population stands at the national average, its industrial population comes to only 8.3 per cent. Finally, there is the small province of Chaharmahal and Bakhtiyari, which accounted for only 0.2 per cent and 0.4 per cent of Tehran's migrant population, and

the predominately Kurdish province of Kordestan, which accounted for 1.8 per cent and 1.7 per cent of Tehran in-migrants and has remained a C-type province through both periods. Kordestan has a large agrarian population of 45.1 per cent and a type-I population growth center in Sanandaj.

There are five provinces that can be classified as D-type areas, mainly southern border regions whose migrant populations concentrate in local cities and rural areas. They are Sistan, Baluchestan, Hormozgan, and Bushehr Provinces, along with Kerman Province, which is located in the central desert.

During 1976–86 the flow of female migrants into Tehran exceeded the number of males, as the male/female ratio fell below 1 for most of the provinces. The flow of females to Tehran follows generally the same patterns as male migrants to the capital; however, in the case of Gilan Province on Tehran's northern border, a B-type province accounting for 7.8 and 6.5 per cent of Tehran's migrant population, its male population tends towards Tehran, while its female population tends to migrate more to the rural areas.

#### B. *The Evolution of Tehran's Occupational Structure*

The post-revolution era marked by rapid reductions in Tehran's in-migrants is directly related to similar reductions in its percentage share of the country's employed. In 1986 the number of employed persons living in the capital came to 1,435,000, or 12.8 per cent of the national total (see Table V). Of this amount persons employed in manufacturing dropped to 19.4 per cent from 22 per cent in 1976. However, due to the fact that manufacturing populations throughout the nation decreased at larger rates after the revolution, Tehran's share of the country's manufacturing jobs actually increased by 1.7 points. Also, we notice the further growth of service-related employees to 45 per cent of the city's workforce over the 41 per cent figure for 1976. However, due to large increases all over the country after the revolution in the service sector, which is 80 per cent dominated by public service, Tehran's share of these positions actually dropped from 32.5 per cent in 1976 to 20.3 per cent ten years later.

In term of labor relations, the number of employers dropped to 4.0 per cent of the total population. Tehran's share of employers also declined from 36.3 per cent before the revolution to 17.2 per cent in 1986, due to new business starts occurring all over the country. This increase in the number of employers operating outside Tehran stemmed from opportunities arising in the agricultural sector, the weakest area in Tehran's employment picture. Employment in Tehran's private sector also declined after the revolution in both numbers and importance (18.4 per cent), and its share of the country's total declined to 13.4 per cent. Conversely, the number of government workers has increased since 1976 to 190,000, occupying a record 48.4 per cent of the city's workforce, up significantly from the 1976 figure of 39.2 per cent. However, Tehran's share of the country's total number of civil servants

TABLE V  
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF TEHRAN, 1966, 1976, 1986

Sectors		Employed Population of Tehran		Employed Population of Iran	
		Actual (1,000)	Percentage	Actual (1,000)	Tehran Share (%)
All	1966	755	100.0	6,858	11.0
	1976	1,289	100.0	8,789	14.7
	1986	1,435	100.0	11,211	12.8
Agriculture, fishing	1966	8	1.0	3,169	0.2
	1976	12	0.9	2,978	0.4
	1986	13	0.9	3,277	0.4
Mining	1966	0.4	0.1	26	1.5
	1976	13	1.0	94	13.6
	1986	1	0.1	31	3.3
Manufacturing	1966	199	26.4	1,268	15.7
	1976	283	22.0	1,662	17.0
	1986	279	19.4	1,492	18.7
Electricity, gas	1966	17	2.2	53	31.9
	1976	16	1.3	61	26.7
	1986	15	1.0	89	16.8
Construction	1966	67	8.9	510	13.2
	1976	110	8.6	1,177	9.4
	1986	86	6.0	1,247	6.9
Commerce	1966	137	18.2	552	24.9
	1976	184	14.3	666	27.6
	1986	199	13.9	898	22.2
Transportation	1966	59	7.9	224	26.5
	1976	110	8.5	434	25.3
	1986	129	9.0	624	20.7
Services	1966	244	32.4	930	26.3
	1976	534	41.4	1,641	32.5
	1986	645	45.0	3,179	20.3
Unclear	1966	23	3.0	128	17.7
	1976	27	2.1	76	35.3
	1986	67	4.7	377	17.8

Sources: 1966, 1976 censuses, [12, p. 80] and [9, p. 50].

dropped from 29.8 per cent before the revolution to 20.1 per cent in 1986.

The data on per resident expenditures made by cities is an important indicator of how the post-revolution Iranian government attempted to guarantee balanced growth between the city and countryside and strengthen the economies of regional cities. The figure for Tehran came to about 5,300 rial (see Table II), as opposed to

4,980 rial of revenue per resident. The cities that exceeded this figure came to eight of a possible twenty-eight: that is, the type-IV growth pattern cities of Orumiyeh, Qazvin, Sari, and Malaghe; the type-III pattern cities of Hamadan and Dezful; the type-I pattern city of Malayer; and the type-II pattern city of Karaj. This situation does not allow us to conclude that serious efforts were made to strengthen the economic structures of regional cities, at least at the fiscal level.

The fact the Tehran shows a high per resident expenditure figure does not mean that its citizens are receiving quality services. In 1986, 75 per cent of city budget was taken up by expenditures for government salaries, a figure that greatly exceeded the national average of 54 per cent [5, pp. 3, 24]. On the other hand, Tehran's managerial costs (utilities charges, services, and consumption) came to 8.3 per cent, or just about the national average, while its investment costs (land purchases, construction, equipment purchases, loans, etc.) occupied only 11.7 per cent of the budget, less than half of the national average of 28.2 per cent. For example, in contrast to 8 to 10 per cent of the budgets of Qom and Zahedan going to equipment purchases, Tehran spent nothing. Marked differences have appeared in how Tehran, which is trying to downsize, and regional cities who are attempting to urbanize spend their money. Given the huge percentage spent by Tehran for salaries, its high per capita expenditure figure is no indication of the quality of service taxpayers and citizens are getting in return.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The changes that occurred in Tehran's employment structure—i.e., a decrease in manufacturing employment accompanied by an increase in government employment—were accompanied by Iran's economic decline after the revolution and a policy geared towards nationalizing industry. Furthermore, the decline in the share occupied by Tehran's employed residents nationally as the result of the government's regional diffusion policies combined with a decline in in-migration by almost one-half as the result of the Iran-Iraq War, are the major restrictive factors on the capital's previously high population growth rates. Here we find a sharp contrast to the lively urban growth that is taking place in other parts of the country. The fact that there are now more women moving from place to place than men indicates definite restrictions on migration for the purpose of employment by declining job opportunities in Tehran.

First, the population movement into Tehran has been limited to an area adjoining Tehran (with the exception of flows from East Azarbayejan), as movement into the capital declines. Secondly, population movement into rural areas is on the rise, as regions like Esfahan Province have been transformed from Tehran-regional city (A) migration patterns to Tehran-rural area (B) patterns in reaction to type-II and type-III regional cities in a state of stagnation. Bushehr Province has for the same

reasons been transformed from a regional city migration (C) pattern to a regional city-rural area (D) pattern. Thirdly, urbanization has helped strengthen regional cities, leading to an increase in C-type patterns, as in the case of Bakhtaran and Khorasan Provinces, which were transformed from B-type patterns, and Lorestan Province, which was transformed from an A-type pattern.

These changes in migration patterns have led to increases in rural population desired by the government and checks on population flow into Tehran in the midst of economic decline. In its attempt to strengthen the economies of regional cities, the revolutionary government concentrated on central regional cities and urban areas with populations between 50,000 and 99,999. Iran's experimental urbanization policy, which has aimed at decentralization during the 1990s, is not only a rare case among the other Middle East countries which, like most Third World nations, are experiencing growth in both their urban and rural areas, but also has been implemented with huge sacrifices caused by revolution, war, and economic decline.

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