to recognize the "substantial" nature of those relations and consciousness that actually exist among the people who live and work in village society. It therefore follows that how "change" is measured will differ depending on the approach. The dispute that arises in the volume between Srinivasan and Appadurai has reinforced the fact that approach and methodology are mutually determining entities: that is to say, it is very difficult for anyone to share similar methodologies, while at the same time following different approaches to the subject matter.

III

The above problem points obviously lend themselves to no easy solutions, since it is self-evident that in both micro- and macro-level surveying there are specific areas which cannot be measured unless one or the other methodology is exclusively employed. As far as this reviewer is concerned, therefore, rather than reducing the methodological differences to the level of their "essential natures," a détente of sorts should be established, in which we all recognize each other's methodological limitations, but still try to inspect and verify each other's results. Harris is a good example of this and has shown the necessity of bringing both macro and micro surveying together into the same arena and analyzing tendencies in terms of both sets of data. In addition, the kind of research Breman did in trying to fill the gaps between micro and macro data for a rural society of predetermined size also offers excellent possibilities.

By dealing head on with the little discussed problem of methodology, Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists has also brought into perspective many aspects of social and economic change characteristic of the Indian agrarian village. Due to its broad ranging theoretical implications the volume has significance to offer social science readers even if they are not involved directly in the study of India.

(Fumiko Oshikawa)


The present selection is one more addition to the growing body of research literature on the foreign-policy-making process in the Republic of South Africa and its diplomatic history. South Africa's Foreign Policy now stands along side the work on policy making done by E. S. Munger and D. Geldenhuys, the G. Cockram monograph focussing on the situation during the premiership of John Vorster, and of course of the predecessor

to the present selection, J. Barber’s diplomatic history covering the years between 1945 and 1970.4

The authors argue in general that the major aim of South Africa’s foreign policy is to continue white-minority rule in the midst of the apartheid regime. In order to realize this aim, all of the successive governments that have ruled the country over the years have left foreign policy making up an “oligarchic-bureaucratic” organization made up of “a small group of senior ministers and officials” (p. 3).

Turning to the analytical framework contained in the book, the authors point to a series of cycles consisting of the appearance of a challenge, followed by a response and the restoration of confidence, only to see the appearance of a renewed challenge. The cycle-generating challenges occur on the domestic, regional (i.e., southern African), and international level.

Based on the above analytical framework, the authors proceed to divide South Africa’s post–World War II diplomatic history into six stages, consisting of four major challenge/response/confidence restoring cycles.

The first foreign policy challenge arose during the United Nations censure of South Africa’s discriminatory policy toward Indians and a rising fervor of nationalism among the country’s African population just after World War II. Concerning this challenge, then prime minister Jan Smuts, unable to respond effectively, urged the formation of a National Party-led regime. The policy instituted by the succession of National Party governments that followed aided in suppressing African nationalism and restoring confidence to the white minority.

Challenge number two occurred in 1960 on the occasion of the Macmillan “Wind of Change” speech and a rekindling of African nationalism in the wake of the Sharpeville incident, which occurred that same year. In response, the government moved to suppress and outlaw the nationalist movement, while seceding from the British Commonwealth after the Sharpeville incident was denounced by the other member countries. Confronted with increasing world isolation, the South African white minority drew up its ranks, established an internal security organization, and instituted policies to strengthen both the country’s economic position and its apartheid system.

The third challenge came in 1975 when the southern African Portuguese territories of Mozambique and Angola began moving for independence after the Lisbon coup d’état of the preceding year. These events were followed in 1976 by internal strife marked by the Soweto rising. The response was again to strengthen the country’s internal security forces and suppress the rising, in addition to granting “independence” to the homelands. There were also revisions made in the constitution to draw the Coloured and Indian communities into the white minority camp. With respect to the southern African regional challenge, white confidence was restored when the failure of the government’s Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) plan was followed by destabilization measures taken throughout the region.

The fourth and final challenge appeared in 1984, when more constitutional revisions brought about the introduction of a tricameral parliament, presenting an opportunity for anti-government activities on the part of the African population. On the other hand, a reactionary white backlash rose up out of fear that the new parliamentary organization would destroy the apartheid system. Moreover, the government’s declaration of a national emergency to suppress anti-government demonstrations was met with international censure and a strengthening of economic sanctions. The government

found itself unable to restore white confidence, due to its contradictory response to the situation in again strengthening internal security, while at the time relaxing apartheid measures. How confidence will be restored to the white minority is the issue taken up in the authors' concluding remarks to the volume.

Based on this six stage/four crisis viewpoint, the authors analyze in Part I South Africa's relations with its neighboring countries, in addition to the United Nations and the countries of the West between 1945 and 1960. Part II then analyzes the period between 1960 and 1965, when Prime Minister John Vorster, in an attempt to halt his country's increasing world-isolation, put forth an "outward-looking policy," in order to strengthen and improve relations with the other countries of southern Africa. However, the core of the book is concerned with stages four, five, and six dealt with in Parts IV through VI.

Faced with the challenges represented by the Soweto rising at home and growing isolationism and socialism in neighboring Mozambique and Angola, Prime Minister P.W. Botha, who took the reins of government in 1978, embarked on a plan to stop what he called the spread of communism in the region and instituted a state mobilization system under a "twelve-point plan." To put the plan into effect the State Security Council was set up with Botha himself as chairman and a membership consisting of such figures as the minister of defense, the foreign affairs minister, and the director of the national intelligence service. From that time on, South Africa's foreign policy was decided exclusively by this body. When the CONSAS plan met with strong opposition from the other states in the region and had to be abandoned in 1979, South Africa embarked on a series of measures to destabilize the region throughout the 1980s. While the detrimental effects of these measures have already been outlined by countries on the receiving end, D. Geldenhuys is probably the first to provide us with an account of these measures from the standpoint of the policymakers who instituted them.

Overall, the analytical framework and periodization scheme use by the authors have been successful in dealing with the subject on a level that goes beyond personalizing policy decisions and identifying them with the subjective attributes of each successive prime minister. For this reason the author's arguments are very convincing. However, at least two points deserve comment. First, although the book points out the domestic, regional, and international settings as the sites for the occurrence of challenges, it would seem that domestic incidents would not become challenges to foreign policy unless they were made the target of international or regional criticism. Therefore, it would probably be more appropriate to divide where foreign policy challenges into three more complex sites, domestic-regional, domestic-international, and domestic-regional-international.

Secondly, the book has tended to ignore for the most part the economic factors in South Africa's foreign-policy decision making. For example, in the "outward-looking policy" of the 1960s and also in the 1979 CONSAS plan, there certainly must have been a strong desire on the part of South Africa's business community to expand its enterprises and markets within the region. In any case, despite these minor problems, South Africa's Foreign Policy is no doubt the new standard textbook for students of diplomatic history in the region.

(Kôji Hayashi)