its peak around 1968. There has also been substantial change in income distribution over time in other Asian countries. Taking this all together, we feel that the authors' model probably slightly underestimates the amount of actual change in income distribution.

Next, we will discuss the mechanics of the model in the generation of size distribution of income. The model's basic approach is to generate factor income distribution and to convert it to size distribution. Income recipients are divided into fifteen occupational groups and their average income is generated by the model. Then, the size distribution of income for each group is assumed to have a log normal form and the parameters of each group are calculated. The aggregation of these distributions as determined by the above method yields the overall distribution. Three factors determine overall distribution: (1) the number of income recipients in each group; (2) the average income of each group; and (3) the income distribution within each group. The authors' model generates the changes of (1) and (2) internally, but it is not clear how to evaluate the variations of (3). In terms of Japan's income distribution analysis, the factor which has played the largest role in determining over time changes in size distribution is not (1) or (2), but rather (3). Thus the fact that income distribution in this model tends to be inelastic to government intervention can be seen to originate in the native of assumptions in the model. Moreover, the fact that the information used to determine the parameters was taken from the 1960s when income distribution was comparatively stable can be said to exaggerate this apparent tendency.

IV

Although the problems pointed out above should not be overlooked when examining the authors' conclusions, they do little to detract from the value of the authors' work. The incisive analytical point of view taken throughout the book and the authors' numerous suggestions are very instructive. It would take a review several times longer than this one to properly emphasize all the book's strong points.

The importance of this work is that now there is a successful example of a full-scale planning model that has overcome the limitations of a developing country's data and that provides a framework to deal with income distribution. The publication of this book should give encouragement not only to economists researching the Korean economy but also to other developing economists.

(Toshiyuki Mizoguchi and Do Hyung Kim)


I

This book is a research volume concerning the Naxalite movement in India.

The “Naxalite movement” is ordinarily used as a designation for the various re-
volutionary movements which took place in rural villages in various parts of India—especially in the states of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh—during the five-year period between 1967 and 1972. The word “Naxalite” itself derives from the Naxalbari region of Darjeeling District in West Bengal. The revolutionary movement in question was begun by tribal agricultural laborers and leaders of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in this region. The revolutionists there held to a belief in the ideas of Mao Tse-tung and formed a new Maoist party, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). The Maoist movement in India thus came to be called the “Naxalite movement.”

Three books on the Naxalite movement had appeared in print prior to Dr. Mohanty’s work. The first to appear was Mohan Ram’s Maoism in India, published at a time (1971) when the Naxalite movement was still quite active. Comprehensive information on the movement was not yet available, and the book performed an instructive role. The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist Experiment by Sankar Ghosh and The Naxalite Movement by Biblab Dasgupta were published at about the same time in 1974 and both include descriptions of new developments in the movement into 1972. Both works, end with the circumstances surrounding the death in July 1972 of Charu Mazumdar, the top leader in the CPI (M-L). In recent years it has been widely believed that the Naxalite movement ended in that year.

By contrast, Dr. Mohanty holds that the Naxalite movement has since that time continued to exist. He divides the movement into three periods as follows: a period of political coordination between 1967 and 1969; a period of CPI (M-L)’s small squad actions between 1969 and 1971; and a long-term period of stagnation after 1972. His book is particularly valuable because it covers developments in the Naxalite movement after 1972, a period not covered in the other works and a period for which information is otherwise hard to come by.

The fact that Dr. Mohanty was able to publish the results of his research on the Naxalite movement is not unrelated to the political changes in India which have accompanied the fall of the Indira Gandhi administration as a result of the sixth general election in March 1977, the lifting of the “declaration of the State of internal emergency,” and the accusations leveled against Indira’s hardline policies by the newly arisen administration led by the Janata Party. Freedoms of speech and the press have been reinstated, and Indira Gandhi’s abuses of power have been turned into important social issues. In the process, the methods used by the former administration to suppress Naxalite supporters have been brought to light, with the result that printed and other information regarding the Naxalite movement has become far more accessible than before. It cannot be denied that the above circumstances are in large part responsible for the publication of the present volume.

Dr. Mohanty, born in 1942, received his doctorate in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, U.S.A. He is at present reader in Chinese politics in the Department of Chinese and Japanese Studies, University of Delhi, where he has been teaching since 1969. In 1973 he was a visiting scholar at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Far Eastern Studies, and in 1974 he was a visiting researcher at the University of California. In relation to his specialty of Chinese politics, he has written a large number of articles on China and Maoism.
Dr. Mohanty considers that the Naxalite movement has up to now in many ways been incorrectly or indistinctly perceived. He strongly maintains that in order to give a proper evaluation to the movement it is necessary to analyze the various types of decisions made within the movement, as well as the specific ways in which modes of thought and situational factors related to the movement have developed. In pursuing such an analysis Dr. Mohanty offers a theoretical framework in which the revolutionary movement is considered to have four dimensions: namely, (1) environment, (2) ideology, (3) organization, and (4) strategy. Dr. Mohanty describes these four dimensions, the conceptual framework for which was suggested to him through study of the writings of Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese revolution, as being related to one another in the following fashion: “a successful strategy has to be a dialectical blend of ideological and environmental considerations” (p. 2); while it is organization that has the role of channelizing specific strategy formulations. With this theoretical framework, Dr. Mohanty proceeds to give a concrete analysis of the Naxalite movement.

He first analyzes the environment from which the rural uprisings have sprung, showing that in both Naxalbari (West Bengal) and Srikakulam (Andhra Pradesh) there exists a severe tension between the lower class peasants on the one hand and wealthy farmers, landlords, and merchants on the other. He points out that the political activities of the revolutionaries have succeeded in making the poor peasants aware of what they have come to see as legitimate demands, and shows that in both regions it is local leaders who had from an earlier time enjoyed long-time popularity among the masses who have held authority throughout the course of the movement.

In addition to these two regions, there are a large number of others where Maoists have inspired revolutionary activities. Among the more noteworthy are Mushahari (Bihar), Debra-Gopiballavapur (West Bengal), Ganjam-Koraput (Orissa), and Lakhimpur-Kheri (Uttar Pradesh). In each of these regions conditions in the rural areas are to a greater or lesser extent similar to those in Naxalbari and Srikakulam. The latter two regions, the first located in the “industrial state” of West Bengal and the second in the overwhelmingly rural state of Andhra Pradesh, have, as a result of their political experiences, come to be regarded as representative of all those regions in various parts of the country where Maoist movements had developed.

In the field of ideology, the revolutionaries during the initial stage of the movement were quite active in promoting their own interpretations to explain what they considered to be India’s neocolonial and semi-feudal character. But when China then provided sanction to the Indian Maoists’ program, the latter gave up their own efforts at independent and creative analysis of the Indian situation and fell into a period of ideological stagnation. For the most part, little was stressed in the way of ideology except for study of the “Red Book.” The Indian Maoists in looking forward to the time when a people’s democratic revolution would be carried out, made no effort to distinguish among various situations which would be likely to entail major policy conflicts. Likewise there was no discussion of the dissimilarities in agriculture in different regions of the country. Thus it is concluded that, “the ideological stagnation
that followed the Telengana revolt [in the 1940s] was repeated after the Naxalbari revolt” (p. 89).

As for problems of organization, the movement began with efforts to bring together activists from the CPI (M), who professed a belief in Maoism, but more emphasis came to be placed on revolutionary action than on organizational procedure. Due to a combination of ideological inertia and harsh police repression, the organization of the Maoists remained immature. Prior to the formation of the new Maoist party, the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), which included a large number of India’s Maoists, had failed to reach sufficient agreement on matters of organization, with the result that the formation of the CPI (M–L) was pushed forward by the Mazumdar group from West Bengal. The Mazumdar group did not put much emphasis on organization problems but was concerned mainly with armed struggle. Severe government repression put obstacles in the way of conferences and communications, and tended to result in concentrating more power in the hands of Mazumdar. An effective party organization could never be adequately established.

In accord with Indian Maoist theory, strategy has been focused on three main points: “(a) complete rejection of electoral politics; (b) immediate resort to armed struggle; and (c) building up an underground party organization” (p. 141). On these three points Indian Maoists have all agreed, but their views have diverged as to concrete methods for armed struggle or for building an underground party. Criticism of the CPI (M–L) strategy of a secret underground organization and armed struggle by small-scale guerrilla bands has been voiced especially by the Andhra Maoists led by Nagi Reddy who has laid emphasis on mass struggle, and also by Parimal Das Guputa who has advocated coordinated action with such mass organizations as labor and peasants’ unions. The ebbing away of the CPI (M–L)’s performance is thus a result of the underdevelopment of the party’s organization and of the ideological inertia which set in very soon after the period of the party’s initial upward rise.

Dr. Mohanty sees the Naxalite movement as being significant, first of all, in that “the Maoists succeeded to the extent that the guardians of the system felt threatened. Till then the legitimacy of the Indian constitutional system was taken for granted. These revolutionaries reopened the issue” (p. 219).

Secondly, the movement clearly illustrated “a contradiction between parliamentary struggle and revolutionary struggle within the Indian communist movement . . . In spite of the strategic errors and setbacks, this experience exemplified the difference between the peaceful path and the revolutionary path to socialism” (p. 219).

Among the effects which the movement has brought to bear on Indian society are, first of all, the fact that in the eyes of many people violent means have come to appear to be “a ‘legitimate’ mode of social change” (p. 220). Also, the movement has induced “mass activism in politics. Indian politics has become the game of leaders and ‘link-men,’ the ‘vote-bankers’ and the ‘local elite.’ Moreover, political decision-making is concentrated in urban centres. The Maoist movement tried to reverse this trend” (p. 221).

“The future of this revolutionary movement will mainly depend on its organisational and ideological work in the next decade” (p. 221). “The prospects for revolutionary
politics continue to exist as long as the situation does not change fundamentally” (p. 222).

III

Seen as a whole, Dr. Mohanty’s book on the Naxalite movement is more comprehensive in its research than the three aforementioned volumes which also deal with the movement. The structure of his presentation is excellent, and various relevant facts are described in most careful detail. His evaluation of the Naxalite movement coincides for the most part with that of the present writer.¹

As already seen, a distinguishing feature of the book is that it analyzes the Naxalite movement in terms of the four dimensions of environment, ideology, organization, and strategy; and from such an analysis it attributes the decline of the CPI (M–L) to ideological inertia and organizational underdevelopment. But, as a corollary, the book also considers that, since from the point of view of environment there has been no fundamental change in Indian society, there will be a prospect for a revolutionary party if such a party can succeed in creative development along ideological and strategic lines and if it can successfully organize itself. Sankar Ghosh and Mohan Ram agree on this point. Biblab Dasgupta, in his aforementioned work, considers that since the Naxalite movement imported its ideological line from China, it was not in consonance with Indian conditions and its failure was thus, so to speak, a natural thing.

Dr. Mohanty, using the Chinese model as a standard, evaluates the Naxalite movement from the point of view of this standard and seems to believe that while the movement has up to now failed because it has been unable to meet this standard, it can have a future if the standard is fulfilled. It strikes us as the sort of analysis that should not surprise us as coming from one with a detailed knowledge of Chinese political history.

However, the present book does not take up the fundamental question whether the task of establishing base areas and building up within them a people’s army remains unaccomplished or revolutionary land reform by a people’s army might after all be unapplicable to Indian conditions. The book’s analysis of environment takes up only those regions which contributed to the rise of the Naxalite movement, without making a whole-country analysis of Indian society, economics, or the structure of political power. As a result the book seems to evade the fundamental question. I would venture to say that without coming to grips with the task of elucidating these questions one cannot truly advance beyond the scope of the interpretations of the Naxalite movement which have appeared heretofore.

Because the present book’s analysis is carried out in keeping with the methodology of the “four dimensions” as described above, from a viewpoint of trying to give due consideration to developmental stages peculiar to India, there would seem to be certain lacunae in the author’s field of vision when seeking to explain the Naxalite movement. For example, almost no mention is made of how the movement may have been related

to the general economic crisis and the serious food crisis of 1965–66. At the time of
the genesis of the movement, India, having experienced twenty years after inde-
pendence, was facing a sort of turning point with respect to its entire society and
economy. At such a juncture all the various political group within the country
were alike engaged in trying to cope in some way with the reality at hand; and one
of the responses to this reality was what has come to be known as the "Naxalite
movement." While the Naxalite movement very certainly presented its challenge to
the problem-ridden structure of Indian society, it may also be said to have been a
product of the time—a time which was also witnessing the escalation of violence in
Vietnam. (Mitsuru Takahashi)