

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN: THE LANDLORDS VS. THE INDUSTRIALISTS

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Introduction

IN this paper, it will be demonstrated that the present political crisis in Pakistan is the result of contradictions generated by the prevailing capitalist economy in the country, which in turn effected the two dominant classes—the landlords and the businessmen-industrialists. Furthermore, it will be shown that in an underdeveloped country, rhetoric socialism¹ not only raises expectations of the underprivileged in the society, but also makes dominant classes apprehensive, who in fact tried to overthrow the government, by creating chaos, primarily in the urban areas by enlisting the support of the unemployed and ill-paid workers, when their interests were threatened by the dominant landlord class.

A. *Historical Background*

Very soon, Pakistan will be celebrating its thirty years of existence. There are three distinct periods of economic development in this short history of the country. The first decade was more or less a period of consolidation. During the second decade, there was relatively rapid industrial growth with foreign loans, low wages, and high profits for the ruthless “robber barons” [9]. In the midst of the third decade, one can notice a process of deindustrialization, with uncertain future.

It was during the second decade that a powerful businessmen-industrialist class emerged, along with an interest group of highly politicized army officers and civil servants. While in the first decade the landlord class was predominant, the super-rich industrialists became a strong lobby in the government [12, p. 156] during the second decade.

B. *Emergence of the Pakistan People's Party*

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was brought in as a young promising lawyer (thirty-two

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¹ Pakistan People's Party, *Foundation and Policy*, Lahore (1968) stated, “Islam is our religion, socialism is our economy, democracy is our politics.” This was turned into a popular slogan of Islamic socialism, etc.

years of age at the time) in the first Ayub's martial law cabinet of October 1958. He came from a privileged and well known family of Sind. His father, Shahnawaz Bhutto was a big landlord in the region. Z. A. Bhutto served the military dictator well, and by the time (August 1966) he was ousted from the cabinet, he had elevated himself to the post of foreign minister through intrigues and "counter coups" within the inner cabinet.²

Ayub Khan's industrial policy was based on a classical recipe of inegalitarian society in which a small group of industrialists grow at the expense of the majority of the people. The rationale was that rich motivated factory owners would save more for reinvestment when compared with the underpaid workers and poor peasants who immediately would spend any raise in wages.³ In the process, two groups of people were affected considerably: disenchanted landlords who suffered relatively to the industrialists, in the first place; and secondly, a new petty bourgeoisie, mainly professionals and a fairly large middle peasant, who raised their expectations under the Green Revolution of the Punjab, also joined this class [2]. There were also a few radicals who suffered under Ayub's regime, and they called the masses for revolt against the ruling class.

It was in this background that Bhutto formed a new alliance of landlords, petty bourgeoisie, and young radicals and formed the Pakistan People's Party. With his usual emotional speeches, in which he spoke of holy war for thousand years;⁴ he also turned against super-rich industrial monopolists, who had created mass poverty, through high profits and below subsistence wages for the workers.⁵ Bhutto's people's party swept the 1970 elections with the slogan of Islamic socialism and ruled the country, after the civil war and separation of East Bengal from the union since December 1971.

C. *The Industrialists React*

With the autocratic rule of Bhutto and emergence of the landlords as the main privileged group, the industrialists reacted and tried to protest whenever possible from the beginning—language riots in the urban centers of Sind being one of the examples.⁶ With the announcement of the general election in January 1977, the industrialists backed the nine-party opposition party, grouped into the Pakistan

² It is a well-known fact that Bhutto played senior ministers one against the other, and gradually became the most trusted minister by Ayub Khan, who elevated him to the post of foreign minister, after the death of Mohammed Ali Bogra, a veteran politician from East Bengal.

³ W. A. Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955). This book had a great impact on liberal economics in 1950s.

⁴ Bhutto's famous speech in the United Nations in 1965, during the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

⁵ Richard Nations, "The Economic Structure of Pakistan and Bangladesh," in *Explosion in a Subcontinent: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Ceylon*, ed. Robin Blackburn (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975). Also see Jamil Rashid, "Businessmen's Paradise," *Outlook*, April 7, 1973. The weekly *Outlook* was banned by Bhutto's regime.

⁶ There were constant demands to take action against certain religious sects in Pakistan. It usually gained momentum in urban areas where unemployed and deprived sectors of the population were easily exploited by mere slogans.

National Alliance, to build mass support base against the rise of a new super-rich agro-industrialists, and petty bourgeoisie of 1960s who amassed great wealth with the help of party machinery.⁷ The circle thus seemed to be complete, and a new petty bourgeoisie came to the scene, supporting the alliance for taking over power.

It will be shown that certain economic forces created the contradictions which led to the post-election crisis. There were two undercurrents in the whole movement: Bhutto's economic policy led to the process of deindustrialization on the one hand, and it created a pro-government lobby of landlords who benefited from the so-called land reforms, and credits from the government-managed financial institutions, on the other. There was an increased unemployment in urban areas, high inflation, and increasingly large migration of landless peasants to small towns, under the pressure of aggressive commercial-oriented, agro-based industrialists.

D. *Deindustrialization*

Table I interprets clearly that investment in the private sector, which produced the major items of industrial goods, declined continuously. During 1973-75, there was in fact no new investment; rather, the expenditure was incurred basically to maintain the existing fixed investment.

Another indication of deindustrialization was the continuous decline of production in the major industrial items, i.e., textiles (see Table II). If there was a slight spur in 1972-73, it was to meet the international market for semi-processed goods. It should be noted that textile products contributed to nearly 30 per cent of the total industrial production in the country.

Two points should be considered from Table II. This trend, if continued long (1975/76 figures are not yet available after proper adjustment), there would be closing down of smaller units, leading to greater unemployment in the sphere of skilled labor. Secondly, for efficient production only larger units would survive,

TABLE I
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN NON-PUBLIC SECTOR, 1970/75
(Rs. 10 million in current prices)

Year	Investment
1970-71	122.4
1971-72	101.6
1972-73	70.8
1973-74	64.5
1974-75	98.2*

Source: [7, p. 44].

* Although there was an increase in investment funds, approximately 25 per cent inflation of that year should be taken into account.

⁷ The people's party supposedly nationalized a number of industries and commercial banks, and this provided a good avenue for party members either to get high positions in the management or receive advances for nonexistence projects.

TABLE II
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IN PAKISTAN OF THE MAJOR TEXTILE
PRODUCTS, 1971-74

	1971	1972	1973	1974
Cotton yarn (million lbs)	740	829	837	774
Cotton cloth (million yds)	751	704	708	665
Silk & rayon (million yds)	10	7.8	9.5	8.9
Paper board* (1,000 tons)	20	20	21	14

Sources: [7] [10].

* Paper board is included because it is a major item used in the industrial goods, pertaining to the textile products.

TABLE III
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN PAKISTAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1970-76
(Constant Factor Cost 1959/60)

Sectors	(Percentage of the total 100%)					
	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76
Agriculture	37.74	38.51	36.47	35.98	34.16	33.83
Manufacturing	16.31	15.35	15.69	15.81	15.23	14.72
Large scale	12.66	11.65	12.14	12.35	11.77	11.33
Small scale	3.65	3.70	3.55	3.46	3.46	3.40
Services (main administrative)	41.39	41.88	43.04	43.22	44.47	44.72

Source: [7, p. 9].

thus causing reemergence of monopolies. According to the government utterances, monopolies were checked under nationalization programs introduced since 1972.

From Table III, it can be seen that Pakistan is witnessing an unusual phenomenon. While agricultural sector, which generally declines with the industrialization in the country, is declining, along with the lower industrial output. The only sector which has been thriving is the services sector, pertaining mainly to the administrative services. As a result, the masses are further impoverished with lower industrial employment, reduction in agricultural output on per capita basis, and high indirect taxes for a top-heavy bureaucratic machinery. During 1975/76 there was an increase of 40 per cent in the indirect taxes over the preceding year. At the same time, there was an increase in the currency in circulation (an indication of deficit financing) between 1972-76 to the extent of over 50 per cent for 46 per cent of the population of the former United Pakistan. With this overall reduced activities in agriculture and industry, Pakistan had also been increasingly relying on foreign resources, mainly from oil-rich Muslim countries to meet the annual development plans.

E. Price Rise and Its Impact on National Income

Inflationary situation can also be looked into from the point of reduced consumer goods. There is an evidence of doubling of prices, with reduced production in the period 1972-75. The next two tables, Table IV and Table V,

TABLE IV
PRICE RISE IN PAKISTAN, 1972-75

	(1969/70=100)			
	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975 (July)
Consumer prices (1971/72=111.20)	121.4	157.8	200.0	218.2
Wholesale prices	179.7	229.1	288.9	315.9
Sensitive price indicator*	—	160.0	197.3	216.9

Sources: [7] [10].

* Sensitive indicator includes seventy essential items of daily use.

TABLE V
PER CAPITA INCOME IN PAKISTAN, 1969-75
(Constant Factor Cost 1959/90)

Year	Per Capita Income (Rs.)	Growth Rate (%)
1969/70	542	—
1970/71*	525	-3.1
1971/72	517	-1.5
1972/73	539	+4.3
1973/74	552	+2.4
1974/75	553	+0.2

Source: [7, p. 12].

* The year of civil war in the country.

TABLE VI
WHOLESALE PRICE OF BASIC FOOD ITEMS IN PAKISTAN, 1970-75

		(Rs./maund—82 lbs.)	
Food item	City	1970/71	1975 (Peak Level)*
Wheat (fair quality)	Karachi	21.23	52.47
	Lyallpur†	18.97	46.29
	Peshawar	18.57	53.00
Rice (medium type)	Karachi	22.95	47.00
Gur (non-refined sugar)‡	Lahore	18.82	118.88

Sources: [7], various issues of [8].

Note: For consumer retail prices, 15 to 20 should be added to the whole-sale rate for distribution cost.

* Peak month is taken as the representative price, considering the error factor in the government reporting. During 1976 price have further increased, but not yet tabulated for accuracy.

† Lyallpur is a market center of agricultural heartland or Pakistani Punjab and wheat prices are usually lower in this district than other parts of the country.

‡ Gur is the main sweetening for the majority of Pakistanis. White refined sugar is used only by a high income group, mainly concentrated in urban areas of Pakistan.

demonstrate the plight of the majority of people in Pakistan. Between 1970 and 1975 there was an increase of only Rs.11 (approx. U.S.\$1) in the per capita income or an average of 2 per cent. Although 1959/60 is taken as a base year, it should be noted that price rise was the phenomenon of 1970s and taking 1970 as the base year, it would not give a different picture for per capita income figures.

An evidence of deterioration in the living standard of ordinary people was the price rise of basic food diet. There were three food items, widely used by rural/urban population of Pakistan—wheat, rice, and gur (non-refined sugar). Table VI gives price level on the conservative side, as these figures are available from government resources, which usually try to show either price stability or increasing at slower pace than in the market place.

F. *Public Investment*

The first pronouncement of the civilian government in December 1971, after thirteen years of military rule, was to take control of the management of key industries, financial institutions, and nonmissionary educational institutions.

In January 1972, the government took over control of thirty-one industrial units in eleven basic categories; iron and steel, heavy engineering, heavy electrical, basic metals, assembly and manufacturing of motor vehicles, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, cement, public utilities, electricity, gas and oil. Three months later, in March, the management and control of thirty-two life insurance companies was taken over under a presidential order. Within a matter of two years, effective from January 1, 1974, Pakistan scheduled banks, which were the major constituents of the banking sector, were nationalized under the Banks (Nationalization) Act. In every instance, it was made clear that nationalized industries would be compensated. However, the government was to appoint its own board of directors. No permanent parliamentary committee was set up to scrutinize the investment expenditure and revenues of these taken-over units. It was made quite clear that Pakistan was committed to a mixed economy rather than total socialization [6].

G. *Contradictions of Mixed Economy in an Underdeveloped Country*

According to Oscar Lange, "a socialist government really intent upon socialism has to decide to carry out its socialization program at one stroke, or to give it up altogether. The very coming into power of such a government must cause a financial panic and economic collapse. Therefore, the socialist government must either guarantee the immunity of private property and private enterprise in order to enable the capitalist economy to function normally, in doing which it gives up its socialist aims, or it must go through resolutely with its socialization program at maximum speed. Any hesitation, any vacillation and indecision would provoke the inevitable economic catastrophe. Socialism is not an economic policy for the timid" [4, pp. 40-41].

The partial nationalization with the promise of fair compensation, brought its own contradictions in an underdeveloped country like Pakistan. On the one hand, these industries' impending takeover, changed their books overnight. With in-

flated price of fixed assets and stocks, they showed the losses incurred during the previous financial years, and thus an inability to pay dividends.⁸ It was already agreed that compensation was to be paid on the fair market value. Even this problem of bookkeeping could be tackled by scrutiny by government accountants, but the real problem arose in future developments. With the scarce resources in manpower, the government had to rely either on the old management with the added burden of loyalty to the party in power, or the political party functionaries who had very little experience in the running of any business organizations. Neither of these groups had any commitment to socialism.

With the takeover of the basic industries and complete control of financial institutions (saving sector), the decision making was passed into the hands of the chairman and top functionaries of a political party which was organized overnight at the fall of the military regime,⁹ which was still dominated by big landlords and upcoming businessmen cum industrialists with entrenched interest. On life insurance nationalization and later on of banks, the ruling party said, "this measure aimed at removing the interlocking of life insurance with private ownership of major industrial groups. . ." [6]. As the real issue was the transfer of savings to the industries in the form of investment, this function was now taken over by the government, especially with banking deposits which formed a major source of investment funds.

H. *The Landlord Class*

In order to understand the political power of this class, the following relevant factors would be analyzed:

- (1) The land tenure system, and the political power;
- (2) The myth of land reforms; and
- (3) The reemergence of landed class as a political force under Bhutto regime.

1. *The land tenure system*

The landlord class which was created by the British as the bastion of support for their imperial rule in the Indian subcontinent, ultimately became the supporter and the main instrument for the creation of Pakistan [1]. Lord William Bentinck reportedly said:

If security was wanting against extensive popular tumult or revolution, I should say that the Permanent Settlement, though a failure in many other respects, and in most important essentials, has this great advantage at least, of having created a vast body of rich landed proprietors deeply interested in the continuance of the British Dominion and having complete command over the mass of the people.¹⁰

⁸ Some of the big industries were not paying any dividends for many years, but at the time of takeover they turned historical costs into current prices, and thus gaining a regular premium on bonds on inflated cost.

⁹ The first military regime under Ayub Khan was put under pressure by its own prodigal son, Z. A. Bhutto, who had to resign from the cabinet against his wishes.

¹⁰ Lord William Bentinck, quoted in R. Palme Dutt, *India Today* (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1947).

Until 1958, the landlords were in full control of Pakistani politics. If there were any changes in the government, it was merely a rearrangement of alliances among the family members of the landlord class. When the landlord-dominated Muslim League was threatened with an influx of professionals or a few rich industrialists who emerged after the Korean boom of the early 1950s, the landlords formed a new political party overnight—the Republican Party—which was a classical group created specifically to preserve the landed interest in Pakistan.

The military takeover was a triumph for upcoming industrialists and bureaucracy. During the thirteen years of army rule in Pakistan, the political power of landlords was considerably pruned. Under the thrust of Green Revolution, their traditional power was also in question, and a new kulak class—middle peasants—emerged with the full support of the Ayub regime [3]. Paradoxically, these very people turned against their benefactor in order to takeover power with a view to gaining more. It was the influence and support of these people which helped Bhutto to get rural vote. When the people's party talked of "peasant interest" invariably it was championing the cause of the middle peasants and disenchanted landlords.

2. *The myth of land reforms*

Soon after the military coup, the first land reform was announced. The new rulers knew well that in order to survive they could not totally eliminate the landed interest. As a result, the 1959 reforms did nothing except to acquire a small portion of fallow land which was a liability for the landlords, in any case. The ceiling was put at 500 irrigated or 1,000 unirrigated acres of land with a maximum 36,000 produce index units.¹¹ Even this ceiling was raised with the aid of a number of "exceptions" provided under the legislation: 150 acres could be reserved for gardens, 18,000 units could be bequeathed and 6,000 units could be granted to dependent women. The stud farms, hunting grounds, educational and religious institutions were specifically excluded from the purview of the reform.

As a consequence, out of the total area of 48.6 million acres under farm land, the government resumed approximately 2 million acres, half of which consisted of wastes, hills, and river beds. Only 5,000 big landlords filed their declarations, and it was estimated that 67 per cent of the acquired property was returned to the landlord in some form or another. It was widely accepted that "ultimately the Ayub reforms proved to be a hoax" [11, Jan. 14, 1977].

Bhutto also announced land reforms in 1972 with the same speed, as Ayub did thirteen years ago. It is quite explicit from Tables VII and VIII that land acreage under cultivation hardly increased between 1960 and 1972. A big landlord turned socialist announced that under his reforms, landlords would lose their stronghold in the countryside. The ceiling of individual holdings was lowered to 12,000 produce index units, or 150 irrigated/300 unirrigated acres. From 1972 agricultural census, it is also evident that landlords with large areas utilized

¹¹ See documents pertaining to the land reforms in Pakistan (1959).

TABLE VII
LAND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN

Size of Holdings (Acres)	Number of Owners	Per Cent of Total Owners	Area Owned (Acres)	Per Cent of Total Areas
500 and over	6,061	0.12	7,490,933	15.40
100-500	57,287	1.13	7,671,537	15.75
25-100	286,470	5.66	10,616,308	21.85
5-25	1,452,421	28.65	15,438,138	31.75
Under 5	3,266,137	64.44	7,425,614	15.25
Total	5,068,376	100.00	48,642,530	100.00

Source: *Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan*, Lahore (1959).

TABLE VIII
LAND DISTRIBUTION AS SHOWN IN 1972 CENSUS OF PAKISTAN

Size of Holdings (Acres)	Number of Farms Reported	Area (Acres)
Under 1	156,462	77,139
1-12.50	2,359,810	14,430,363
12.50-50.00	1,078,074	22,276,282
100.00 and over	53,968	11,800,859

Sources: Various issues of [8] [11].

Note: Total farms reported was 3,761,688—this meant that less than 3 per cent of the farms (owners) owned 25 per cent of the farmland.

TABLE IX
LAND UTILIZATION IN PAKISTAN
1972 AGRICULTURAL CENSUS

Size of Farm (Acres)	Level of Utilization (%)
Under 1	92
1-2.5	91
2.5-5	92
5-7.5	93
7.5-12.5	93
12.5-50	84
50-150	71
Over 150	46

Sources: Various issues of [11].

relatively smaller proportion of their cultivable land (see Table IX). Those who owned over 150 acres used only 46 per cent of the acreage for cultivation.

Unfortunately, the report of 1972 census has not been made public. The Table VIII is devised from scattered publications of the government, used to publicize some of the features of the land reform legislation under Bhutto. It should be noted that by 1972 there was hardly any addition to the land under cultivation,

in spite of the fact that roughly 25 per cent of the land acreage was classified as cultivable. The government relied on private owners to increase the acreage under cultivation and no efforts were made to widen the land use from the waste land, either under private ownership or under government control.

Another important aspect of land distribution was the way big and small farms were utilized. If big landlords did not utilize their land fully and were compensated for that land, it was a net gain to them, while the government had to spend money on uplifting the fallow land or to distribute it among those who did not have enough finance to invest in that land.

The 1972 land reforms produced no better results than Ayub's so-called land reforms of 1959. Bhutto's reforms also gave exceptions, especially for the commercial farmers—such as retention of land up to 2,000 produce index units for the owners who employed modern techniques of cultivation. By March 31, 1976, only 1.1 million acres were resumed from 2,172 declarants. Basically, this reform was an assertion of power of landlords, utilizing modern techniques, requiring investment funds from the savings of the people.

Between 1972 and 1977 there were a number of changes introduced in the land reform legislation. Nearly all of them were to strengthen the growing economic power of the landlords who had been increasingly relying on government funds for modernizing agriculture. Last December, income tax was introduced, land revenue system was abolished, and Sardari system was abolished through a prime ministerial order.¹² Early this year, prior to elections, another piece of law was introduced whereby maximum ceiling was further lowered to 100 and 200 acres for irrigated and unirrigated land respectively. Although the actual results were not yet available, the indications were there that political power of rising commercial farmers increased considerably.

Under the new ceiling, compensation was allowed for any takeover of land. Apart from a major concession, this provided funds to the landlords to use land more intensively. Landless peasantry grew; because the pressure increased on very small farmers either to sell their land to the middle farmers or arrange funds to buy tractors and fertilizers in competition with the richer farmers. It has already been shown that large farms did not utilize land fully, and so under the so-called land reforms, landlords were paid money for the utilized portion of land. Income tax on agricultural profits also has two consequences:

(a) The expense account was allowed under graduated tax system, quite generously, and so the landlords easily raised their production cost through submitting exemptions, which were not allowed under the old land revenue system. To quote an ex-landlord prime minister of Pakistan:

If you would look at my accounts, you would be convinced that production of wheat per maund costs us much more than the price government pays us.¹³

¹² Baluchistan is one of the four provinces of Pakistan, where Bhutto's people's party did not win any seats in 1970 elections. On his frequent visits, after direct federal rule imposed, he announced a number of things without any sanction of law or parliamentary procedures. These pronouncements were accepted as laws passed by the parliament.

¹³ Feroz Khan Noon in 1954 on the question of income tax introduction in the Punjab.

(b) Although income tax was there on statute books for quite a long time, without effectiveness, the new legislation reduced maximum tax rate from 60 per cent to 50 per cent. This helped those who earned Rs.100,000 or more in a positive way. This also led to further concentration of economic power in the hands of richest landlords. The middle peasant bought more land from poorer farmers, thus throwing them into labor market.

Thus, it can be deduced that land reforms meant consolidation of the landlord class under the Bhutto regime, which generated conflicts between them and the manufacturing industrialists of urban areas.

3. *Reemergence of landlord power*

As the control of financial institutions was vested in the government,¹⁴ the ruling class got more opportunities for the utilization of more funds. There was in fact a diversion of surplus funds towards agriculture. While there was a curtailment of finance for the big businessmen-industrialists, more and more resources were diverted towards landowning class. (Table X)

The 1977 election was the true indication of reemergence of the landlord class. Many of the landlords who were defeated by the Pakistan People's Party in 1970 joined the party and received party tickets at the expense of petty bourgeoisie, professionals, and a few radicals who were purged during the five-year period of his regime. It can be seen from the fee schedule for obtaining party ticket—for a National Assembly ticket. The Pakistan People's Party demanded Rs.1,000 nonrefundable deposit for a National Assembly ticket and Rs.500 for a Provincial Assembly ticket. In 1970, the Pakistan People's Party found it difficult to get party nominees; after five years of rule, there were four applications for one possible seat on the average.¹⁵ Nearly all the expenses were borne by the candidates and the party executives were economically well stabilized

TABLE X
PURPOSE-WISE ADVANCES FOR AGRICULTURE TO PAKISTAN FARMERS, 1971-76

Purpose	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76 (Mar. '76)
1. Seasonal inputs	106.0	135.3	472.5	1,234.6	933.8	517.19
2. Draught animals	23.9	36.0	98.9	330.6	187.8	98.5
3. Dairy farming	11.8	15.8	50.3	252.0	37.4	4.7
4. Poultry farming	2.5	8.1	7.9	21.3	19.8	5.7
5. Marine fisheries	2.5	0.5	8.3	52.3	39.7	34.9
6. Tubewells	187.4	184.1	264.2	513.3	862.7	365.5
7. Tractors and attachments	551.6	374.1	436.5	803.0	1,395.4	2,204.0
8. Others	41.2	46.1	352.4	948.6	486.5	236.7

Source: [7, p. 27].

¹⁴ The Pakistani banks were nationalized in name only, because generous compensation is being paid on current market value of shares. But the real value of takeover has been, the control of financial resources by Bhutto's people's party.

¹⁵ Various issues of [11].

with nonrefundable fees. In 1970, Bhutto fought five constituencies and was elected in four, but in 1977 he fixed his constituency in such a way that the prime minister was declared uncontested.¹⁶ The shift towards landowning class was complete when it was found that any non-landowner in rural areas found it impossible to be elected even if sympathetic to the Pakistan People's Party. A case study of Sind constituency is a good example of landlord power in the Provincial Assembly election which was not contested by the opposition party [11, Apr. 8, 1977]. It was found that a peasant candidate who was fairly popular in the area lost. The peasant leader was chased by the police on the day of filing the nomination papers; after appeal, when he was legally nominated, the landowner made every possible effort to terrorize the voter and returning officers and the peasant candidate was defeated with a wide margin.

I. *Conclusion*

As a conclusion to this study of prevailing crisis in Pakistan, it is so appropriate to quote Karl Marx in his "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte":

This contradictory task of the man explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping about which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then another and arrays all of them uniformly against him, whose practical uncertainty forms a highly comical contrast to the imperious, categorical style of the government decrees, a style which is faithfully copied from the Uncle. [5, p. 485]

Bonaparte would like to appear as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another. Just as at the time of the Fronde it was said of the Duke of Guise that he was the most obligeant man in France because he had turned all his estates into his partisans' obligations to him, so Bonaparte would fain be the most obligeant man in France and turn all the property, all the labour of France into a personal obligation to himself. [5, p. 486]

In sum, it can be stated that the capitalistic mode of production which has an in-built bias towards the generation of conflicts among the various classes in general and among the powerful classes in particular exhibited all the contradictions in Pakistan during the last three decade. During Bhutto's rule, the conflicts between the landowning and the businessmen-industrialist classes became acute and the present crisis is obviously an upshot of that internecine conflicts among the two major classes in Pakistan. Its parallel may be found in Bonapartist state where the state machineries aggravated class conflict by playing one class against the other and superimposing its control over all of them at one stage or the other.

¹⁶ It was considerably publicized that an opposition nominee was to run against Bhutto in Larkana constituency, but the nominated candidate was abducted before the closing date for filing papers. Bhutto repeatedly emphasized that he was elected uncontested and there was no fraud or rigging in his own case, though some of his ministers might have involved in malpractices without his permission.

Postscript

On July 5, 1977, the military took over the administration from Z. A. Bhutto, and imposed martial law throughout the country. The military rulers have promised that they would return the country to a civilian rule, after holding general elections in October 1977. This remains to be seen, if elections would be held. However, the nature of crisis has not changed, and the two dominating classes in Pakistan are still confronting each other, in order to take over the helm of administration—whoever is successful, the country will face continued upheavals, detrimental to the lower rural-urban classes. (August 5, 1977)

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