

ELITES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN

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A. *Elites and Political Development in Pakistan*

AN ANALYSIS of the political structure of Pakistan can be approached from a number of perspectives, but it is from an approach to elitism that the greatest insights into this complex cultural and historical system can be gained. Such an approach encompasses the most significant political, social, and economic factors relevant to the state's political development.

The primary focus here is upon distinct elite groups extant in Pakistan, their institutional derivation, and, most importantly, the competition and conflict among them that has so completely dominated political development. It is particularly these latter circumstances that have characterized Pakistani politics from independence in 1947 until the civil war of 1971.


Pakistan's political structure was that of the elite-mass type that Pareto theorized as the basis of power in society. In Pakistan the pattern was clear with governing elites operating centrally as direct "power holders of the body politic" [28, p. 13], the nongoverning elites wielded extensive institutionalized influence, and non-elites were effectively isolated from exerting any real impact on the political system.

Pakistan's power structure was also relatively pluralistic with no single elite able to maintain supreme control. Colonialism, ethnic heterogeneity, industrialization, Islam, and historical precedents all contributed to the evolution of a number of competing elites that made it impossible for a single group to absolutely control the political power grid.

Depending upon the time and general political situation, one or another of these elites was able to exert more power than the others and function as the governing elite. However, it was a position that required continued defense from other influential nongoverning elites, and with the lack of a meaningful constitution or a really unifying national ideology the governing elites simply propounded a system that would assure their hold on political power. This was naturally inimical to the growth of the democratic model that the country was supposed to have been founded on. Figure 1 is an illustration of the elite power structure in Pakistan.

The structure of political power in Pakistan can best be analyzed in terms of the model wherein power is translated into action and exchanged within an integral system of elites existing together. It was a structure primarily concerned with the circulation of power within its own boundaries. The central field encompassed the political sphere of interaction between six elite groups: military elites (ME), bureaucratic elites (BE), religious elites (RE), landowning elites

Fig. 1. Model of Power Structure in Pakistan



(LE), industrial elites (IE), and professional elites (PE). The most central area of the field was the power junction occupied by the governing elite; the remainder was given over to nongoverning elites. Political activity was almost completely the reserve of the elites, and if middle sectors and masses became involved it was only as one or another elite group politically mobilized them in an attempt to consolidate control of the power junction or an attempt to wrest control from the elite already occupying the position. Those groups external to the central field were denied any real input of their own for political development of the state.

For a micro-level analysis of how elite groups related to each other and exerted influence it is necessary to categorize them according to the period to which their political and historical origins can be traced. At certain points specific types had common origins, although in the postcolonial stage there was conflict when interests were threatened. Thus the LE and RE issue from a traditional period and are classified as traditional elites. The ME and BE

TABLE I

ELITE FACTIONS IN PAKISTAN, 1947-71

Political Resources	Political Elites
Traditional institutions	Landowning Elites Religious Elites
Colonial institutions	Pakistan Armed Forces Civil Service of Pakistan
Emergent institutions	Industrial Elites Professional Elites

stemmed from colonial elite origins and the IE and PE from emergent elite origins in the postindependence period (see Table I).

B. *The Traditional Elites*

The traditional elites evolved during the period preceding the appearance of British colonialists on the Asian subcontinent, their institutionalized power was based in the autocratic power of Muslim rulers. As the processes of Westernization and modernization altered the regional ethos, traditional power was challenged by British imperialism, and the continued struggle for political power ensued.

Under the British colonial administration, RE power was curtailed, but with the emergence of the charismatic leadership exerted by M. A. Jinnah, the rise of the Muslim League and the creation of Pakistan, RE political power again assumed formidable proportions. Generally, however, their power was manifested through influence rather than direct authority. For instance, Liaquat Ali Khan stated the government's position regarding Islam in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which recognized Allah as sovereign authority of the universe and that Muslims would be allowed to order their lives in according with rules set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah [7, p. 143]. This satisfied the Deoband school of Ulemas, but those of the Jamait-i-Islami regarded it as a despicable capitulation to Westernized political doctrines. The latter also feared the political influence of a rival sect, the Ahmadis, and unleashed a wave of political violence in 1953 which resulted in the imposition of martial law for the first time in the Punjab [36, p. 243]. The ME controlled the situation and the RE were viewed by other elite groups with extreme caution. Although Maudoodi's Islamic political doctrines were considered out of date and "reactionary" [39, p. 68], the government granted the RE the following concessions in the Constitution of 1956: the state would be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; the head of state would be a Muslim; no anti-Quranic laws would be enacted; and that gambling, drinking, and prostitution would be eliminated [39, pp. 369-70].

In 1958 when the ME first assumed control of the power junction they realized that, to have a colonially based, modern army, it was "impossible to maintain a medieval based religious state" [1, p. 370], and Ayub Khan proceeded to gradually strengthen the secularized nature of the government by giving a

modernized interpretation of Islam through the Central Institute of Islamic Research. The RE, however, never compromised its position and continued to harass the government after the ban on political parties was lifted in 1962. Its indirect influence was never effectively curtailed.

The LE had originated in the medieval era but their traditional position as a landed aristocracy was reinforced by colonial rule [46, p. 170]. This gave them political strength in addition to power already based upon wealth, land, and, quite significantly, direct control of the peasantry occupying their lands. When Pakistan was created, they were already deeply entrenched in its political system, and as time progressed improved their influence in politics. For example, between 1947 and 1958, 68 per cent of the legislative members were landlords, while between 1962 and 1969, 58 per cent were LE [31, p. 227].

The primary background of the LE was feudalistic even though some were relatively well educated. Political modernization was resisted for the LE was most concerned with its vested interests and regionalized ethnic pursuits, which modernization challenged. Parliamentary democracy was a useful tool only as long as it allowed the maximization their power and prestige. In other situations such as allowing greater political participation by East Bengalis in the LE-dominated Muslim League they refused, eventually causing the party to be defeated in the 1954 elections in East Bengal, and reduced to an organization of regional status.

In 1958 the ME sought to limit their "powerful influence in the politics of Pakistan" by banning all political parties, imposing land reforms (1959), and through use of the basic democracy plan designed to politically mobilize the rural middle sector [10, p. 331]. Although the land reforms served to partially restrict them, their base of power was not greatly effected since few landholdings were yielded to the state [43, pp. 282-83]. The basic democracy scheme allowed people of the rural middle sector access to the central field from 1959 to 1962, but as the LE withdrew into the background they continued to maintain their power through middle sector political figures acting as front men. In the next election, the LE returned to directly control political power. By 1965 the rural middle sector had partially disappeared, and the LE had become "the most powerful force in the country" [10, p. 333].

Even though these elites constituted a powerful force they never realized their full political potential. They were continually hampered by a lack of unity, organization, and common purpose, and, instead, allowed themselves to be distracted by personal, regionalized aims that precluded the development of solidarity within their own ranks. In general, however, their domination in the earlier period of postindependence weakened the base on which political development of Pakistan could proceed along democratic lines.

C. *The Colonial Elites*

The colonial elites, consisting of military and bureaucratic groups, emerged as direct extensions of colonialist rule in the Asian subcontinent. Their origins were in the powerful bureaucratic structures of British India, i.e., the Indian

civil service and the British Indian army. These groups were organized and commanded by the British, and over an extended period of time native personnel became so thoroughly related to their internal norms that much of their ethnic identities were altered. Men of both branches were decidedly apolitical and functional precisely in their professional colonial roles. With the creation of Pakistan the services were simply relabelled (civil service of Pakistan, Pakistan army) but only for a limited period did they continue to operate in terms of the previous structure. Both rapidly developed into politicized groups.

With the departure of the British in 1947 and the death of Jinnah, the BE of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) took charge of the power junction. Even though the CSP comprised but 0.7 per cent of the total administrative bureaucracy it continued "to work as the real elitist group" [8, p. 11]. Also as the nation's "social base" was weak due to regionalized parties that lacked real "grass roots" influence [4, p. 152], there was no check on the BE's growing political identity. Politician-bureaucrats such as Ghulam Mohammad (1951-55), Chaudhri Mohammad Ali (1955-56), and Iskander Mirza (1955-58) all personally supported and governmentally reinforced control of the power junction.

As the remaining elites began to develop their own political identities, conflict with the CSP was inevitable, since rival elite groups were forced to confront the organizational ability and professional unity of the BE. This was particularly true in the case of the LE who were interested in maintaining a traditional feudalistic state that the bureaucratic elites wished to promulgate. With its highly secularized approach [7, p. 300] and its precise definition of the separation of religion and politics [7, pp. 300-301], it was also in continual conflict with the RE who were dedicated to the reestablishment of Pakistan as a medieval, Islamic system. Even though it was occasionally necessary to cooperate with other elite groups the relationship was only transitory, yielding again to maintaining control of the power junction.

The BE played a significant role in alienating East Bengal (now Bangladesh), since most CSP officers stationed there were West Pakistanis who frequently employed punitive police tactics to suppress East Bengali political participation. Bureaucrats like Ghulam Mohammad grossly misused their power by dismissing the National Assembly or imposing "Governors Rule" in East Bengal under Iskander Mirza [19, p. 63]. He was also the architect of the One Unit Plan (1955) by which West Pakistan was consolidated in one political unit to challenge the power of East Bengal. Eventually, this contributed to the feeling among Bengalis that East Pakistan was nothing but "a colony" of West Pakistan.¹

In the same way that the CSP grossly mishandled the political situation in East Bengal, so too did it function in governmental affairs. It had abandoned an apolitical role and became immersed in regional, ethnic politics and concern for its own political perpetuation. The ultimate effect of this process had been to severely weaken the nation and frustrate the political development of stable,

¹ See *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, II*, No. 1 (February 24, 1948), pp. 6-7. Quoted in K. B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 64.

responsive political institutions. In 1958 the military seized control of the government upon judging that the CSP bureaucrats could no longer effectively function as governing elites.²

Pakistan tried to base itself on the concept of parliamentary democracy, yet actually political power was carried out through a system of institutional elitism that did not provide for the orderly succession of power. This resulted in a number of competing elites openly challenging the extant authority structure in postindependence Pakistan. In 1948 military elites made their first attempt to wrest control of the government from Liaquat Ali Khan, but failed due to a lack of sufficient support from the officer corps. In 1954 General Ayub Khan was invited to assume control by Governor General Ghulam Mohammad but decided instead to temporarily assume the post of minister of defence [6, p. 53]. Finally, perceiving the failure of a bureaucratically maintained government, the military took control during the 1958 coup.

Two significant factors contributed to the redefinition of the military elites' formerly apolitical role. Firstly, a collapse in the general political order, and, second, the belief that there were serious external threats to the country's security.

Violence over the designation of a national language, ethnic conflicts, even border smuggling frequently required army intervention to the point that martial law was required as in Lahore in 1953. Civilian government officials seemed to lack the capacity to deal with these frequent internal problems, and with the development of the Indian army and political confrontations between India and Pakistan the military elite felt insecure with its fate entrusted to a civilian bureaucracy that could not successfully maintain the requirements of parliamentary democracy. After taking direct political control, they saw themselves as the only viable alternative to political ruination, and contrived numerous methods to continue and legitimize their rule [38, p. 318].

After assuming power in 1958 the military nullified the Constitution of 1956, suppressed all political parties, dismissed or compulsorily retired many members of the civilian bureaucratic elites [15, p. 74] and, generally, restricted the politicization of other elites. After pressing their own Constitution on the nation in 1962 they continued to consolidate their political position, and under Ayub Khan's rule expanded this power in a direction toward greater economic development, rather than nation building. The result was that the military government frustrated democratic growth and was "responsible for strengthening secessionist forces within the province" [33, p. 7].

After ten years of military rule, Z. A. Bhutto successfully mobilized the masses to force Ayub Khan to resign his post. However, he did so only in favor of another general, Yahya Khan. In 1969 the latter stated that the military was not interested in retaining power for itself but actually wished to return to civilian

² In an address to CSP probationers Lt. General K. M. Sheikh said, "We are convinced that the C.S.P. must share some of the blame for the political mischief which has brought Pakistan to the edge of disaster." Quoted in S. J. Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan—A Reevaluation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1949), p. 247.

control [35]. This stand proved fallacious as the military elite attempted to disallow Mujibur Rahman's political victory in the elections of 1970 because they wished to "perpetuate themselves and towards that end they were working."³ The ultimate result of their struggle to retain sole control over the power junction was the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh.

D. *The Emergent Elites*

With the creation of Pakistan as a state reflecting a number of characteristics similar to those of Western, industrial models, a climate was created suited to the development of two emerging elites, the industrial and the professional. The British fostered a legacy of parliamentary democracy, albeit a rather narrow one, and a Western judicial system requiring new roles and the development of different skills. A professional sector, primarily composed of lawyers, was needed to implement the new system. Even by 1947 such professionals had begun to assume the status of a "powerful elite group" [9, pp. 248-49].

As professional elites' lawyers became the strongest exponents of parliamentary democracy and were generally committed to functioning as "custodians of westernized secular legal system" [44, p. 136], they were convinced that the development of a constitutional system depended upon the skills of the legal profession [9, p. 260].

Professional elites in East Bengal developed much greater solidarity and influence than their West Pakistani counterparts, for the rival elite factions did not have as favorable a sociocultural base upon which to challenge their power. In West Pakistan the extensive power of opposing elites posed severe restrictions upon their growth. Finally, the political domination of both provinces by the landlord-dominated Muslim League was broken by the East Bengali professional elites as they led the United Front Party to victory over the Muslim League in the 1954 elections. After that point, the East Bengali PE constituted the most powerful force in East Bengal until it gained independence in 1971.

Even though not a well-organized or unified elite group as a whole, the professional elite had long campaigned against what they considered as infringements on their fundamental political rights as Pakistanis. If the professionals' interests were collectively threatened they were capable of mobilizing massive public opinion, such as in seeking the repeal of the military elite 1962 Constitution by organizing popular mass rallies.⁴

Judges (like Justice M. R. Kayani) and bar associations became "uncommonly vigorous in taking a stand on political issues" [9, p. 28]. In 1965 they extended

³ General Yahya's advisors were Lt. Gen. S. G. M. Pirzada, Maj. Gen. Ghulam Umar, and Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan. Gen. Hamid Khan shared interests with Yahya Khan which Muqem calls the "after sunset activities" of wine and women. In fact he was so involved in these activities that he reportedly spent less than six hours a day in his office. All decision making was probably done by his advisors. See [33, pp. 27-30].

⁴ See R. S. Wheeler, *The Politics of Pakistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 293. The PE preferred the Constitution of 1956 to that of 1962, because the former was considered a safeguard of the fundamental rights of the citizens more than the latter.

help to the Combined Opposition Party organized to oust Ayub Khan in the elections of that year [12], and exerted sufficient power to defeat Ayub.

It became obvious, then, that the military's attitude towards the professionals would be antagonistic. In order to ensure governmental control over potential rivals, Ayub Khan had resorted to the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order of 1959 (EBDO) an instrument of arbitrary repression.⁵ It disqualified the political activities of opposing elite factions but was especially repressive on PE political influence [40, p. 375]. Such direct limitations certainly restricted the political activity and development of the professional elite as did the less direct effect of personal competition for attractive political appointments. Governmental posts were tantalizing prizes, tempting some lawyers into becoming instruments for the governing elites. However, generally they functioned as important checks on elitist political policies. Even though beset by problems of unity and organization, their demands for the sanctity of the rule of law rather than by men did much to forestall the entrenchment of military rule.

As the second emergent elite, the industrialists were a new breed of entrepreneurs and the strongest exponents of industrialization and its related cultural values. During the first decade of Pakistan's existence, there was a lack of common purpose, organization, and leadership, and it required a number of years before industrialist influence as a distinct entity became extensive. Internal competition and individuated objectives rendered them relatively ineffectual; the bureaucratic elites found them easier to control than the other elites, and as they were in the process of encouraging private enterprise and industrial development [24, p. 7], the government used them more and more. Though they manipulated the government, there was great benefit from the symbiotic economic relationship thus developed.

In the second decade, the military elites began to depend upon the industrial elites to the point that Ayub Khan's regime was labelled a "businessman's government" [43, p. 284]. As they established greater governmental ties the industrial elites' political influence significantly expanded. They assumed control of newspapers, hoarded wealth in foreign banks,⁶ intermarried with families of bureaucratic, military, and landowning elites, and began to finance political parties. The expanded role and power of the business executive afforded him parity with other elites and "the previous humility of the petty trader vis-à-vis government officials began to give way to the arrogance of the industrial magnate" [37, pp. 140-41].⁷

⁵ The EBDO was passed by the National Assembly in April 1963 by a narrow majority of seventy-one votes to sixty-two against, which proved that it was not too popular with assembly members.

⁶ Papanek noted that "businessmen, and especially industrialist, had become wealthier, more powerful, and sophisticated. Now that they owned newspapers and financed political groups, their support was increasingly valuable in political life" [37, p. 140].

⁷ According to another author, the ME's policy of economic development helped to consolidate the power of the "new, able group of industrial entrepreneurs" through private enterprise. See, T. Maniruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 39, Nos. 1 and 2 (1966), pp. 89-91.

In the elections of 1962, industrial elite members "outnumbered all others in the National Assembly" [34, p. 335] except for the traditionally powerful landlords. Direct political power allowed them greater latitude in manipulating economic policy development for their own interests. As a consequence, the majority of Pakistani's wealth gradually concentrated in the hands of only twenty families.⁸ The collusion with military elites increased as their politicization increased. For instance, Ayub Khan and his family became powerful industrialists as many of the cabinet members reaped huge profits from business investments [42, p. 105] [16, pp. 305-6].

One of the most serious impacts of the industrialists rise to power was on the economic system of East Bengal. The Third Five-Year Plan had promised to eliminate the disparity in the economic development between East and West Pakistan [27, p. 75] where 90 per cent of the trade was controlled by industrial elites [26, p. 170]. Though Ayub had assured the Bengalis that such domination would cease [11], after admitting in 1961 that such a disparity did exist [41, p. 125], he failed to control its equalization because the industrial elites of West Pakistan were not committed to the development of the East. Even Yahya Khan promised to remove "disparities between the provinces,"⁹ but economic exploitation continued, leading to the complete alienation of political groups and of various strata in Bengali society [24, p. 89].

E. *The Crisis of Legitimacy*

What was the impact of elite conflict on the Pakistan's political development? It led to a dual crisis of legitimacy in the new state: one was among the conflicting elites over their "right" to govern the new state; the other was, the crisis challenging the very existence of a nationally integrated state.

S. P. Huntington defines a praetorian system as one where "social forces" confront "each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders" are "recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict" and "equally important among the groups no agreement exists as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for resolving conflicts" [22, p. 196]. In the praetorian state only the strongest survive.

As a praetorian state [38, pp. 305-24], Pakistan was characterized by a number of significant political variables. There was a low degree of social cohesion reinforcing political symbols at the national levels with which the elites could not identify. Each group had developed its own definition of the state which was projected as the only correct national perspective. In reality such definitions and related goals were only reflections of each elite's vested interests rather than the needs of a cohesive nation. Thus the ME was solely interested in rendering Pakistan a "praetorian state," the BE an "administrative state," the LE a "feudal

⁸ Mahbubul Haq in a speech delivered at the Second Management Convention held in Karachi. Quoted in *Business Recorder*, April 25, 1968.

⁹ Legal Framework Order, 1970. Quoted in S. G. M. Badruddin, *Election Handbook, 1970* (Karachi: Publishing and Marketing Associates, 1970), p. 128.

state," the IE "bourgeoisie state," the PE a "democratic state," and the RE an "Islamic state." The net result of these diverse self-fulfilling political strategies was that the political elites and the state suffered from inadequate institutionalization of infrastructures such as political parties. To worsen the situation, the elites were alienated from the masses, leaving the political culture fragmented, not integrated.

In the praetorian system, as mentioned earlier, only the strong survive. Each elite therefore used any means available to maximize its power. This made them particularly vulnerable to imperialist powers in so far as the latter assisted the elites to consolidate their position through the inflow of foreign economic and military aid. The stronger elites such as the BE made overtures for such aid as early as 1950 when the government invited American investment and economic assistance.¹⁰ The Americans entered Pakistan with economic aid and an "advisory" program under the aegis of the Ford Foundation and Harvard University. The former influenced the governing elites by "creating and strengthening institutions needed to train manpower and develop knowledge and approaches required for economic and social programs" [13, p. 1]. The latter supplied American advisors to the Planning Commission (then known as the Planning Board) to plan economic policies, prepare a five-year plan, and train personnel [13, p. 2]. As a result of these measures, Pakistan was considered to be "well on the way to becoming a success story in the field of economic development" due to the "rapid increase and relatively high level of foreign assistance" [32, p. 63]. At this point in time Pakistan had become so dependent on foreign aid that its economic development was determined by aid donors [5, p. 34].

The ME also began thinking in terms of forming military alliances with the United States as early as 1951 [25] [3] [29, pp. 255-73], which eventually became a reality in 1954.¹¹ In 1958 when the ME took over control of the government, General Ayub Khan was able to say that "the political identification of the country with the West was complete" [6, p. 116]. External assistance, therefore, not only maximized the power of this elite but also of the IE and BE. They all occupied strategic positions at the power junction and allocated foreign aid in such a way that in economic terms it led to a "development disaster" [21, p. 367].

The growth of capitalist economic doctrines had favored the provinces of the Punjab and to some extent Sind (provinces to which these elites belonged) and reduced the province of East Bengal (which contained the majority of the population prior to 1971) to a "client colony" [17, pp. 130-44]. The feelings of despair and helplessness against these imperialist-aided elites led to a dangerous cleavage in the political system.

¹⁰ See Sayeed Hassan, *Pakistan: The Story behind Its Economic Development* (New York: Vantage Press, 1971), pp. 91-93. The influence of bureaucrats like Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali is evident here.

¹¹ A Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States was signed in May 1954. In September 1954, Pakistan joined SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) in February 1955.

The Punjabis had gained most from the economic development¹² and believed themselves to be "the elite of the country" with the right to "impose their value system on the remainder of Pakistan" [30, p. 206]. The central-peripheral development policies of the Punjabis heightened the ethnic consciousness of other groups, particularly the East Bengalis, who felt that they had been denied economic and political participation. Bengali leaders like the late Mujibur Rahman and his Awami Party soon mobilized their people on an ethnic nationalistic basis and led the struggle against the Punjabis and the Punjabi army to create Bangladesh in 1971. What had started as a crisis of legitimacy among political elites in a praetorian state, ended in the creation of a new state.

F. *Charisma and Ideology*

In the post-1971 period, political power remains in the hands of Z. A. Bhutto, a landed aristocrat, who launched his political campaign in 1969 against General Ayub Khan's regime. With support from the PE, LE, and RE, he brought about the fall of the Ayub regime and also forced his successor General Yahya Khan to relinquish power after military action failed to suppress the creation of Bangladesh.

Bhutto's leadership has, however, struck a different note in Pakistan's political development. The legitimacy of his political position has not been questioned because he was elected to power by the people in 1970. During his four years in office, he has curbed the Bonapartist tendencies in the ME and has politically decentralized BE power. His success in maintaining the confidence of the masses has been based on two factors: ideology and charisma. Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), promised the transformation of Pakistan into a socialist state through radical changes in socioeconomic order. The country was to be freed from the influence of neocolonialism [14, p. 12]. Through the promotion of an egalitarian democracy and a republican form of government responsible to the elected legislature, a classless society was envisioned. Commitments to adult suffrage, freedom of civil liberties, and nationalization of industries were made, and the workers and peasants were assured of social justice and a fair standard of living. The party slogan of "Roti, Kapra, Makan" ("Food, clothing, and shelter") enhanced party support among the masses.

After attaining political power, Bhutto focused first on economic issues and nationalized some large industries (iron, steel, motor car assembly plants, life insurance, banking, heavy engineering, machine tools, etc.) but left textiles and mineral wealth in private ownership. The concentration of wealth in the hands of the industrial elite families was not circumscribed.¹³ The expectations of the urban industrial masses were not adequately fulfilled and labor unrest characterized the industrial areas. In the rural areas, large landholders still retained their hold on a landless, helpless peasantry.

¹² The Punjabis are the largest ethnic group as well as the most powerful because they are deeply entrenched in the military, and well established in the bureaucracy, industry, and landed aristocracy.

¹³ For an account on these families, see, L. J. White, *Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

As the past governments had conflicted with the RE, Bhutto implemented his socialist programs in a manner which sought to separate "religion from politics" [23, p. 170] [20, pp. 241-58]. He labelled his ideological program "Islamic socialism" and later gained the whole-hearted support of the RE by declaring the rival Ahmadiyahs sect non-Muslim.

The strength of the PPP had been based on Bhutto's strong charismatic leadership which cut across ethnic boundaries, and this charisma still remains his strongest prop as leader of the masses. An analogy can be found in the old Muslim League party whose strength emanated from Jinnah's leadership rather than from the organization. After Jinnah died the party became splintered and lost its significance. The danger of such a crisis faces the PPP. The difference between the two leaders lies in the fact that while the charisma of Jinnah increased during his lifetime and was sanctified at his death, Bhutto's charisma seems to be fading. His influence was instrumental in affording the nation a stabilizing force so essential for Pakistan's readjustment after 1971. But charisma can be a transitory phenomenon if it is not capable of institutionalizing stable political institutions and an orderly succession of power. Such leaders often tend to become trapped in their own charisma and view themselves as indispensable to the existence and future destiny of the country [45, pp. 225-35].

Internal party conflict is also weakening Bhutto's charismatic hold on collective leadership. Ideological conflicts among bourgeoisie and feudal elites do not pose as strong a threat as polarization along ethnic lines. Some feudal Punjabi elites have started anti-Bhutto propaganda and are spreading the idea that Bhutto, a Sindhi, is acting against Punjabi interests [18]. Such ethnic political strategies are designed to weaken the electoral support for Bhutto in the province which was largely responsible for his election in 1970.

Bhutto has managed to survive these crises for five years and by using his power he can ensure his victory in the elections he has promised for the future. Such means might justify the ends but it will not set a good precedent for the country or its legitimacy crisis in the long run. In the past, leaders have used the resources of the country for personal material and political gain without sacrificing anything for the country. The PPP is heading in a direction which indicates the transformation of Pakistan into a one-party state and not a socialist state.

Such trends are also visible among Pakistan's neighbors, India and Iran, and Bhutto might be tempted to succumb too. The assassination of Mujibur Rahman, leader of the one-party state of Bangladesh could, however, be a timely lesson for Bhutto. His political policies are claimed to be "symbiotically linked trends towards fascism and separatism" [2, pp. 10-14]. As he is becoming more involved with safeguarding his political position he is less receptive to the idea of power sharing. In a praetorian state this does not forebode well for the institutionalization of civilian rule.

By denying political participation to others and accusing them of separatist tendencies the Bhutto regime may well sow the seeds of separatism itself. Separatist movements are active in Sind (the Sindhudesh movement), the North-

west Frontier (Paktoonistan movement), and in Baluchistan (the Greater Baluchistan movement). Since Bhutto is a Sindhi, he is accused of taking care of the "Sindhudeshis," while in the Northwest Frontier the National Awami Party has been banned and ethnic political leaders imprisoned. In Baluchistan, the military has been used on several occasions to restore "law and order," and the Punjabis are also beginning to threaten Bhutto's political position. Pakistan, once again faces political turmoil. The tragedy is that the cause lies within the polity and not outside it, and as such it is within the power of the ruling elites to control the separatist trends in the interests of maintaining the viability of the state.

Conclusion

At this stage it can be said that if Bhutto does not check his "fixation with power," "his blindness to political processes" [2, p. 13] and apply the lessons learnt from the creation of Bangladesh, he may be responsible for leading the country to the brink of another civil war. Such a situation will probably be bloodier than that of 1971, and the crisis of legitimacy will result in the disintegration of the country into splintered sovereign Muslim states. The viability of the Pakistani state does not depend on geographical boundaries but on the desire of ethnic political elites for political unification. The strategic, political, economic, and ideological strength of the state lies in its unity.

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