STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF THE HAKKAS: RECONSIDERED

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I. THE STUDIES ON THE HAKKAS AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the mid-nineteenth century, landing in the treaty port of Canton and in the so-called Hongkong concession, British subjects found an assemblage of Chinese people who were quite different from the native Cantonese people, in language as well as in customs. Cantonese, who called themselves Buntis, or “the originally domiciled people,” used to brand the odd assemblage as Hakkas or “the guest people.”

Between these two peoples was an atmosphere of repulsion and antagonism. The antagonism exploded at last in the western quarter of Kuangtung Province and inflamed the twelve-year conflagration of the “strife between the Buntis and the Hakkas” from 1856 (the sixth year of Hsien-fêng) to 1867 (the seventh year of T'ung-ch'ih). The conflagration resulted in casualties of half a million from both sides.¹

The earlier half of the Buntis-Hakkas strife, from 1856 to 1860, which was an all-out armed confrontation between these two forces, coincides with the duration of the War of the Vessel Arrow.

At the critical moment of desperate resistance by Chinese people in Canton against military invasion of the allied forces of Britain and France, the Chinese suffered total confrontation among themselves, even to the point of armed struggle, through the Buntis-Hakkas antagonism.

Europeans, who came to Canton as intruders, were the first to perceive the antagonism within the Chinese people. Research on the Hakkas from the European point of view, therefore, began as efforts to distinguish Hakkas from the native Buntis-strain Cantonese. Namely, if we are to recompose this process according to the “Outset of the Hakka Problem,” the first chapter of Professor Lo Hsiang-lin’s Hakka Yenchiu Taolun [7], in the aforementioned historical perspective, it goes as follows.

To begin with, W. F. Mayers reported this strife in the western quarter of Kuangtung in the year after the cessation of the Buntis-Hakkas strife, that is,

¹ See [7]. Dr. Lo, however, does not refer to the historical correlation between the strife in the western quarter of Kuangtung and the entry of the forces of Britain and France.
1868. About the same time, E. J. Eitel, Ch. Peton, and others made their respective researches on the Hakka public. In the periodical China Recorder published in Shanghai, an American by the name of G. Campbell proposed a theory that the Hakka dialect, with marked differences from the Cantonese one, maintained the old pronunciation used in ancient Honan in the Middle Field. His work has been considered to be a classic in this field. Campbell explored Mei-hsien or Mei Prefecture which has been surmised as the center of the South China Hakka, consulted historical works by men of letters among the Hakkas, and regarded the Hakka-group as “a stemma of the direct descendants of pure Chinese” who migrated southward from Kuang-chou or Kuang County in Honan. He rejected any possibility of their being of mixed blood between Han Chinese and such minority races as the Yao People. The Chinese character Yao implies, with the left-hand radical for animals and the brute, racial prejudice. In other words, despising the minority races in the mountainous areas to the northeast, northwest, and to the north of Canton as brutal beings, he insisted on Hakkas’ “purity” of Chinese blood, despite their antagonism toward the Bunts-strain Han people in Kuangtung. Far from being “halfbred,” they were assumed to be not only superior to minority races, but originally—as they were presumed to be descendants of the ancient dynasties in the Middle Field—more historied even than the native Cantonese.

There followed a band of successors after Campbell who unanimously stated that the origin of the Hakkas could be traced to the ancient Chinese in the Middle Field. In order to make their presentation more convincing, they strove to prove that the Hakka dialect kept the ancient pronunciation of the Middle

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3 G. Campbell, “Origin and Migration of the Hakkas,” China Recorder, Vol. 18 (1912). Unfortunately, I have had no opportunity to read the original text. According to Mr. Lo, there is a Chinese version translated by Mr. Chong Lu-chi of Mei-hsien Hakka origin in the third issue of the quarterly Kaying, Vol. 1 (1923), but I have not read this translation, either. One version I could resort to was, “Mei-kuo G. Campbell chu, Hakka Yüan-liu chi Ch’ien-i” [Origin and migration of the Hakkas—written by an American, George Campbell] translated by Li Pi-chhen in Perak K’e-shu Kung-hui K’ai-mu T’ê-k’an [The special issue celebrating the inauguration of the Perak Public Association of the Hakka] (Perak: Perak Public Association of the Hakka, 1951), and I must express my gratitude to Prof. Seiji Imahori who showed me a copy of the issue. Incidentally, this is the only article which gives us the name of the author as “Campbell.” All other references to the person are spelt “Campbell.” Considering priority among these references, I conclude that “Campbell” must have been a misspelling in copying.

4 The work by Campbell finishes with these words: “The Hakkas are surely a branch of the people of the Middle Field, and quite a characteristic, robust, and outstanding one, at that. The fact that their progenitors, although compelled to migrate, came from the Middle Field can be ascertained by following evidences: their respect for their own stock; their high morale as warriors; their deserving self-reliance. Mark my words, the Hakkas are sure to intensify their influence in due course of development and to exalt the people of China.” Readers are warned that these are not the repetition of his own sentences but translation back into English from Chinese version.
Field. As a result, they edited Hakka-English and Hakka-French dictionaries from the end of the last century and by 1910 almost all of these had been compiled.5

Let us proceed to the phase of the latter half of the strife. First of all, we should recollect the chronology of the period, from 1860 to 1867. It began with the recollection of Peking by the Anglo-French forces and the signing of the Treaty of Peking. Under the command of British officer Gordon (subsequently general), the “Invincible Army” which had been raised by an American “General” Ward, set about operations to annihilate the army of T’aiip’ing T’ienkuo in 1862. Shi Ta-k’ai of the T’aiip’ing Army was defeated in Ssuch’uan in April 1863. Hung Hsiu-ch’üan committed suicide in May 1864. Li Hsiu-ch’êng was beheaded in August of the same year, and T’aiip’ing T’ienkuo was finally subverted. That is, the Hakkas, who gathered themselves in vain chase of their ideal of the founding of T’aiip’ing T’ienkuo [3, pp. 321–34], were compelled to take refuge in every direction including abroad [9].

If we scrutinize the researches on Hakkas by Americans, British, and Frenchmen which took their basic shape from the 1860s to 1910 or thereabout, in the context of this chronology, we cannot miss the essence of the “researches.” And, consider carefully these lines of Campbell himself, translated back into English from Chinese version:

Most of the Hakkas remained loyal to the Ming dynasty. When they migrated to Kuanghsi Province and entrenched themselves there giving countenance to the last emperor of Ming, they amounted to quite a host of people. Also, concerning the Hsinhai Revolution in recent times, I believe that almost all the thousands of or even tens of thousands of soldiers of the Revolutionary Army came from Hakka families. They were offspring ten or more generations removed of the Hakka people who had migrated to Kuanghsi. Furthermore, many warriors of the T’aiip’ing Army, too, were Hakkas who dwelt in Kuanghsi.

After exerting themselves to subdue the revolutionary movement of T’aiip’ing T’ienkuo, Europeans as the intruders into China, smugly observed that the Hakkas—who had been the leading force of the movement, and therefore the losers of the cause—were getting bogged down in a death-struggle against the Buntis in post-T’aiip’ing Kuangtung. During the War of the Arrow, or the Second Opium War, in fear of united resistance by the Chinese people, the intruders found it very advantageous to foster and even to abet the antagonism between the Buntis and the Hakkas as the strife underwent its latter half. The

Europeans seduced the Hakka people into accepting racial integration presupposing the superiority of the Han Chinese. They praised the already collapsed Hakkas as one of the "pure and genuine Han peoples," and put the Chinese resistance in disunity, which had been merging the Chinese into an entity. Furthermore, they aggravated the hostility among the Han peoples and minority races in the highlands, with the theory of the Hakkas' being nothing but pure Han people. In brief, they divided the energy of their victims.

In the forefront of the invasion, were the researches on the Hakkas by Europeans and Americans, superficially with an abundant flow of praise, but in fact, ruthlessly creating the ideological atmosphere of colonial subjugation. Historically, this is the quintessence of these researches from the second half of the last century to the beginning of this century.

Is it too harsh to say that Professor Lo Hsiang-lin and other Chinese who studied the Hakkas, after all, incurred their own suffering by averting their eyes from that quintessence?

Japanese scholars, too, were far from innocent [8]. Japanese historians on the Orient and on China added to the researches and studies on the Hakkas nothing but a translation abounding in misinterpretations of the work by Professor Lo, though I admit by itself it is an undeniably laborious one. Did not these Japanese, by not facing up to, nor telling the truth on researches on the Hakka by Europeans, humiliate themselves and allow the Chinese people to sustain foreign domination?

My studies on the Hakka begin with this compunction.

II. VARIOUS VIEWS ON ORIGIN, DESCENT, AND MIGRATION OF THE HAKKAS

Even if they were meant to be good in the beginning, bound by their historical framework, the researches on the Hakkas by Europeans and Americans eventually cleared the way for the imperialistic colonization. Moreover, with their flattering admiration for the Hakkas, these studies appealed to the pride of the Hakka intellectual class and encouraged Hakka-nationalism. Studies on the history of the Hakkas spread among the intellectual class in the first half of this century, and tended to the realization of the Hakkas' identity as the rightful successors of the classic culture in the Middle Field.

Against the infestation of barbarians, they carried out recalcitrant activities with their Celestial orthodoxy as a backbone, which was strengthened by historical lessons in the chronicles of many dynasties. They hurled their whole energy of defiance against Japan, then breaching her way into China from the northeast quarter. Thus far, Hakka people contributed immensely to the anti-Japan movement of the Chinese people. After the defeat of Japan, however, they gradually came to regard the Chinese Communist party as barbarians, and strove to conserve the Celestial orthodoxy of the Kuomingtang (the Nationalist party) in the midst of the Civil War with Chinese Communist party.
If this inclination had been exploited by the foreign powers, there would have been grave danger of revival of the segregate-divide-and-rule policy in new circumstances. The policy was exactly what the imperialistic states invoked in the first stage of their encroachment on Asia.

Now, with due caution for that danger, let us get a glimpse of various views on the origin of the Hakkas.

Referring to Mr. Chang Tsung-ling’s precis [1, pp. 301–9], we find that Huntington and Campbell were among the earliest to mention the three-wave migration theory on the southward journey of Chinese from the Middle Field. According to the Huntington-Campbell hypotheses, the three waves went thus: The first wave, which was caused by a serious famine in the fourth century and the so-called disunity of the Five Barbaric Races crossed Shanhsi, Honan, and Anhui to eventually end up in Chianghsi and Chêchiang provinces, and in the northern part of Fuchien Province. The second wave began with the Rebellion of Huang Ch'ao which shook the T'ang dynasty to the root. A group of five thousand or so in this wave moved to the western mountains in Fuchien in the primary year of Kuangch'i, and settled there for four hundred years to generate one of the main strains of Hakkas. The third wave took place in the years from the Southward Exodus of Sung—from the northern capital K'ai-fêng to Hangchou on the south bank of the river Yangtzu—to the conquest of the whole Chinese sphere by the Mongolian dynasty, Yüan. A conspicuous rallying point, then, was the zone from west Fuchien to Kaying-chou in north Kuang-tung. Also to Kaying-chou came the migrants from Chianghsi Province, to join in settlements. Thus, the Hakkas in Kaying in the twenty-eighth year of Taokuang (1848), that is, on the eve of uprising of T'ai-p'ing, increased in population to 270,000 people. It is interesting to note that the “Five Branches from Kaying,” in the parlance of public halls and other facilities of Hakkas in the present day Southeast Asia, are migrants from the five districts of Kayingchou, namely, Meihsien, Hsinning, Wuhua, Chiao-ling, and Ping-yüan.7

Mr. Ho Yin, coming after the theory of the three waves, observes as follows:8

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6 G. Campbell, the work cited before—and as mentioned then—translated into Chinese. The same translation by Li Pi-chen of the same text can be found in K'o-shu Nien-K'an Yin-hsi Chi-nien Hao [The special issue for the silver celebration of the annals of the Hakk Association] (Singapore: Hakka Association, 1956). H. Huntington, “North versus South in China,” the eleventh chapter of his Character of Races.

7 These Five Branches from Kaying were united and founded public associations for fellow-countrymen from Kaying in various places in Southeast Asia. Information on these outgrowths can be gained, for example, from: Moy Kong Kung Hui, Kampar, ed., Malayia-Hsinchiap'o Ka-shu Hui-khu Lienho-hui T'ê-k'an [Special issue of the Federation of Kaying Chu Association in Malaysia and Singapore] (1970); Singapore Yinho Hui Kuan, ed., Hsinchiap'o Yinho Hui-kuan 141 Chou-nien Chi-nien Tê-k'an [Special issue for the 141st anniversary of Singapore Yinho Association] (1965); Singapore Association of Fellow-countrymen from Kaying, ed., Ka-chiao Tung-hsiang Chang-cheng [The codes of the association].

The distinct feature of the first wave, the migration accompanied the disunity of the Five Barbaric Races and the Southward Recession of the Tung Ch'in dynasty, was that the wave split itself into two tributaries, one went to the southeast maritime provinces, down to Chêchiang and Fuchien, and the other advanced through Chianghsi to Kuangtung. Quoting Hakka pêntsû [Hakkas dictionary] by Yang Kong-huan, as Campbell did, he emphasizes the following two points: first, those who had been well established in Kuang-chou (Honan), and in Huang-chou (Hopei), among the Hakka people, regarded themselves as descendants of Huang-tî—the mythological Yellow Emperor—and they started their migration in accordance with the Southward Recession of Tung Chìn, secondly, the districts and counties of their temporal abodes coincide with the so-called military stationed counties.

Now, comes the second wave, described by Mr. Ho: In the duration from the Rebellion of Huang Ch'ao to the end of Wu-tai or the Five Dynasties (the second wave), people from the Middle Field again headed south and moved into the mountainous areas in Kuangtung. As they had remained solitary and had not inter-married with the outer world, they were mistaken for barbarian aboriginals of the mountains.

Thus, he insists on the genuineness of the Hakkas as a Han people. He brings it to our notice that the distinction between the "former transplanted" and the "latterly transplanted" was drawn in the third wave, namely, in the course of the Southward Exodus led by Kaotsung of Sung: The formerly transplanted (Hakkas) in the south of Chianghsî, for example, are those who shifted themselves in the first two waves. In comparison, the latterly transplanted people in Ch'êng-hsiang and Mei-hsien are supposed to be those who moved through Chiangnán (the area south of the river Yangtzu), from Nanking to T'îng-chhou and Kan-chhou up to Mei-hsien during the Southward Exodus.

With a similar tripartite migration theory, Mr. Fan Yî dissents from the others cited above about the grasp of the first wave. According to him, the first wave dates back as far as the Ch'in dynasty. With the annexation of the whole of China by Ch'in, garrisons were stationed on Tayu-ling and Mei-ling in the north of Kuangtung, and subsequent to the downfall of the Ch'in dynasty, many officers and mandarines who had been settled there became the progenitors of the Hakka strains. Without this assumption, he thinks it beyond explanation that they had such a historical culture in the northern valley of the river Pei in Kuangtung. He sees this sort of cultural contribution as quite similar to the one by Chang Chiu-li—a famous premier in the T'ang dynasty—

9 Fan Yî, K'o-tsu Wên-hua chihh Lai-yüan yü Fa-chan [Sources and development of the culture of the Hakkas], originally appeared in Yehchiata Hua-ch'êlôo Kung-hui Ch'uânghsiao Wu-shihh nien Chi-nien Tê-kan [Special issue for the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of the Djakarta Huachiao Association], and subsequently included in Chang Tsi-min, ed., K'o-tsu Wên-hsien Sui-chîhn, pp. 11–18. I had an opportunity to inspect K'o-tsu Wên-hsien Sui-chîhn at the Central Library of Cambridge University, and it turned out that Mr. Kuo Shou-hua's brief summarization, which I had read and we are to examine later, of the theories of Messrs. Ho Yin and Fan Yî was really accurate.
who as a transient from Chü-chiang, offered the culture of the Middle Field
to Kuangtung from northeast quarters.

The conception of the surviving retainers of Ch'in as ancestors of the Hakka
people can assist in producing a new image of the Hakkas, if archaeological
support comes along.

With regard to the third wave—the Southward Exodus of Sung—however,
I cannot concede to his interpretation of the vase-shaped-coins excavated in
all parts of Mei-hsien over. They are certainly coins that were in circulation
under the reigns of Hui-tsung and Ch'in-tsung, but he goes on to say that this
is enough proof of the origin of the Mei-hsien Hakkas being in the Middle
Field. This, however, I am afraid, is too sweeping a simplification of the theory
that the Hakkas originally resided in the Middle Field.

Let me proceed to draw an outline of the quint-partition theories. The
framework of these theories were fixed by D. Ball and E. J. Eitel, at the end
of the last century, such as follows: As the first wave, Han peoples in Shantung,
oppressed by the Ch'in dynasty, migrated into Honan, Anhui, Chianghsi, and
other provinces, in the third century B.C. The second wave is the migration
to the southeast mountains and the boundary area that adjoins with Fuchien,
in the Tsin dynasty. In the third wave, the Hakkas made their abodes in high-
lands in Fuchien and the bordering zone between Chianghsi and Kuangtung,
under the fading domination of T'ang. The uprising and allegiance to the
Southern Sung dynasty caused the Hakkas to be driven into Kuangtung, forming
the fourth wave. Then came the fifth wave. Those who had settled in Fuchien
were dislodged in the tumultuous latter half of the Ming dynasty by the battle
for Kuangtung, into Kaying-chou, in particular, to constitute the nucleus of the
Hakka people. Also in this wave, were people who had migrated from other
places in the bordering zone between Chianghsi and Kuangtung to the northwest
regions of Fuchien, various countries in Kuangtung, Hainan Island, Taiwan, and
so forth. After the establishment of the Ch'in dynasty, the migration had gone
as far as to the west and the southwest regions of Kuangtung.10

One thing we must notice about this theory is the grip of the first wave. The
date goes back further in time than in Mr. Fan Yi's view, and it was not the
survivors-vassalage of Ch'in who made up the first wave, but a portion of Han
peoples in Shantung Region who took refuge in Honan, Anhui, and Chianghsi
from the political coercion of Ch'in. The destination of this migration is sup-
posed to have been the central area of Wu in the Ch'un-ch'iu period.

It was Mr. Lo Hsiang-lin who brought such quint-partition theories into a
comprehensive whole, and Mr. Kuo Shou-hua effected it some revision. To deal
with their theories, we need no more than a rough sketch of Mr. Lo's theory
[6] [7], for it is quite well known: In the first wave (A.D. 317–879), incurred
by the disturbances between Tung-Chin and the Five Barbaric Races, migration
was from the Middle Field to the areas in south Hupei and south Honan, the

10 The reference by Mr. Liu Yi-pin, which I am to mention later, gives us a fair glimpse
of this theory of quint-partition.
banks of the river Yangtzu in Anhui and the valley of the river Kan in Chianghsi.

As the second wave (A.D. 880–1120), avoiding the Rebellion of Huang Ch'ao, they transplanted themselves from Anhui, Honan, and Chianghsi to recesses of the southern Anhui, the southeastern Chianghsi, the southeastern Fuchien, and the northeastern Kuangtung.

The third wave (A.D. 1127–1644) was initiated by the Southward Exodus of Sung and the invasion of Yüan. In this wave, they were dislodged from the dwellings of the second stage of their migration to the northern and the eastern quarters of Kuangtung.

The fourth wave (A.D. 1645–1867), caused by the encroachment of Ch'ing, displaced the Hakka people from the residences they had set in the second and the third stages to the central and the coastal regions in Kuangtung, Ssu-ch'uan, Kueanghsi, Hunan, Taiwan, and Hui-li in the southern Kuichou.

The fifth wave (A.D. 1867–) owes much to the Buntis-Hakkas strife in the western quarter of Kuangtung, which exploded in the years of T'ongchi, and to the T'ai-p'ing Revolution. There were removals from various places (mentioned above), to the southern quarter of Kuangtung, Hainan Island, and so on. Emigration to Southeast Asia became prominent in the last two waves.

His theory is supported by maps and archives (such as chronicles of clans) which were made accessible through his own research. From these materials, he displays the scheme of the Hakka migration with these words: Although Hakka people obstinately resisted invasions of the northern barbarians as well as they could, they were gradually expelled toward southern provinces and as far south as the Southern Ocean, and to Indochina and the Indonesian Islands.

His theory has been regarded as a classic in the study of the origins and migration of the Hakkas.

Mr. Kuo Shou-hua, utilizing Mr. Lo's theory as a springboard, proceeds to point out the necessity of scrutiny of the causes of migration. As a temporary summarization, he indicates, (1) garrisons on the Five Peaks dispatched by Ch'in Shihuang-ti, (2) chronic floods and droughts, (3) expeditions to subjugate barbarous races in the east and in the south by successive dynasties, and (4) dispatch and exile of mandarins and officers to the southeastern and the southwestern provinces in successive dynasties [4].

Hitherto, there was no distinction drawn between migration before and after the formation of the word "Hakka." There is an elaborate work which calls for notice of this fact, and attempts to elucidate when and how the Hakka people came about, in name as well as in fact. The work is Han-tsu yü Hakka by Mr. Liu Yi-pin [5, pp. 1–110].

Briefly examining the genealogy of the Han peoples ethnographically, he perceives the Hakkas to have been born as a stemma of the Han people. In concluding so, he adopts the idea of "ethno-stemmata" which was proposed by Mr. Lo Hsiang-lin and has been widely accepted since. As an ethno-stemma with its own language, customs and conventional ways of living, showing marked
differences to other various ethno-stemma, he conjectures the formative period of this stemma to be the ages from Wu-tai to Sung.

From then on, the Hakkas underwent three main migrational waves. So, he considers the migrations before Sung as those of the "progenitors of the Hakka." And the period when these progenitors consolidated themselves to become distinguishable were the ages from T'ang to the end of T'ang. The history of migration can be summarized thus: At first, the progenitors of the Hakka gradually took shape among the so-called vagrants in Ssu-chou and Yu-chou within the Han peoples who exiled themselves southwards after the Tung-Chin dynasty. The first stage in the progenitors' migration centered around the settlement in the region of P'o-yang Lake, after the disunity of the Five Barbaric Races.

The second stage appears to have been the removal to the highlands where the boundary lines among Fuchien, Kuangtung, and Chianghsi meet, after the Rebellion of Huang Ch'ao. For a while after this removal, the state of namelessness of the Hakkas-to-be continued.

Settled there and remaining solitary for the period of upheavals through Wu-tai Shih-kuo (the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms), they gradually formed an independent ethno-stemma different from all the other Han peoples. By the transitional period between Sung and Yüan, the name "Hakka" seems to have been fixed. The first migrational wave after the establishment of the word "Hakka," left the mountainous area where Fuchien, Kuangtung, and Chianghsi provinces meet, and headed farther south in the ages from the end of Sung and beginning of Yüan to midway through Ming. The second wave occurred under the domination of Ch'ing. The Hakka people again went into exile from northern Kuangtung. They took up their new abodes in central Kuangtung, eastern and central regions of Kuanghsi and Ssuch'uan, and as far away as Taiwan.

The third wave was caused by the Buntis-Hakkas strife in the western quarter of Kuangtung and also by the T'aip'ing movement. There was migration from the central and the eastern regions of Kuangtung to the counties of Kao-chou, Lei-chou, Ch'in-chou, Lien-chou, and Hainan Island.

As can be seen from the precis above, the setting of the periods in migration is almost identical with that of Mr. Lo Hsiang-lin. In the explicit distinction between the Hakkas and their progenitors, however, lie the merits of the intensive work by Mr. Liu Yi-pin. They can be itemized as follows: Firstly, he brings out the history of the Hakkas in relief, with emphasis on the formation of the ethno-stemma of Hakka in the highlands where the three provinces meet, in the period of Wu-tai Shih-kuo. Both the place and the date attracted Mr. Lo Hsiang-lin's attention earlier. But like the distinction of an infant from an embryo, the reference was made from a completely new angle.

Secondly, he examines the epoch from the progenitors to the Hakkas in the political perspective of the time. The progenitors of the Hakkas in the mountains formed the independent ethno-stemma without subjecting themselves to
any dynasty in the period of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms.

Discussions on the origin and migration of the Hakkas from the end of the last century, at last found an authoritative grounding, in the form of the works by Messrs. Lo Hsiang-lin and Liu Yi-pin. On the history of migration, in particular, it is almost certain that the demarcation line was the period of Wu-tai Shih-kuo. Before the line were the ages of the progenitors of Hakka taking shape, after the line were the ages of the Hakka people establishing themselves and migrating.

Since the fixation of the Hakka-stemma, whenever China fell under the sway of the pagan dynasties, there had to be mutinies against these alien races from the north. at every opportunity of resistance. And there, always, were the Hakkas at the forefront. When the causes were lost, they went into exile towards the south in three main waves as the surviving retainers of the authentic dynasties in the Celestial Empire. These, too, are points we can virtually take for granted.

Problems, however, arise hereafter. To begin with, let me confine myself to the strata after the emergence of the Hakkas as an entity. They are said to have struggled along as the confirmed loyalists of the authentic dynasties in the Celestial Empire. Not to mention that the Hakkas were not the sole retainers remaining faithful to Chinese authenticity, for the time being, I cannot resist the question: In what historical context were they involved, with regard to the people who recalcitrated and rose even against these reigns of the authentic dynasties?

Studies on this particular aspect are yet to be set out, either from the side of the peoples’ history including the peasants’ movements, or from the side of the history of the Hakkas. If you do not dig deeply into this particular question, there can be no future in researches or inquiries into the root of the ideology of the so-called Hakka-nationalism.

I will gladly bear the blame of putting aside the empirical researches, and trying to grasp the controversial phase first.

Another problem concerns the justification of this viewpoint expressed above. To unfold it, will require a new chapter.

III. A VIEWPOINT ON THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE HAKKAS AND THE CONCEPT OF “HUA-REN”

Let me pick out and comment on some crucial points—crucial, of course, as perceived from my own point of view—in an introductory work by Mr. Huai Tzu [2, pp. 62–65].

In the beginning, I must explain that my interest in studies on these points was aroused from some compunction as a Japanese. With relation to the problem of the authenticity in the “Celestial Empire” we discussed at the end of the last chapter, the direction of my interest can be expressed along the propositions
made by Dr. Tai Kuo-hui: ¹¹ The starting point is the confrontation with an unmistakable fact of contemporary history, that is, conversion of "Hua-ch'iao" (literally means "Chinese transients") into "Hua-ren."

There must have been strong endeavors for conversion of their way of thinking, and I realize the endeavors as a process from "Lao-yeh Kui-kên" (although as leaves we may fall down to alien soil here, someday we shall return home: China), to "Lao-ti Shêng-kên" (although as seeds we fall down to alien soil here, someday there will be roots to be struck).

Seen as results, "Lao-yeh Kui-kên" and "Lao-ti Shêng-kên" indicate two ways of living very different from each other. But in actual lives, they are not separable. These two ways of living are there in a spectrum of conversion. The subject who presides over the conversion remains one and the same. There may be, in fact, reformation, but there is no discontinuity. Those who fall down as seeds are those who have been falling as leaves, and those who are to strike roots are those who have tried in vain to return home.

So, we must attempt to find the substance of this subjective entity. If you permit my philological expression, a clue lies in a Chinese character. Stated either as "Hua-ch'i'ao" or as "Hua-ren," it is "Hua" that dominates the successive conversion from "ch'i'ao" to "ren." Therefore the question boils down thus: What is "Hua"?

"Hua" is by no means Chung-kuo or the Central Kingdom as a mere concept of nationality. It rather defies definition, but I venture to say: it is the "culture" in the sense of lives, thoughts, customs, and conventions forged into a whole, that is, exactly the concept "culture" in the dimension of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." And in the process of conversion of the Chinese abroad into peoples of Chinese stock in various countries, the "Hua" itself—as the subject which escapes seemingly intact, the "Hua" in both "Hua-ch'i'ao" and "Hua-ren"—undergoes a cultural transfiguration.

If you are to say, "Hua, in the sense of a cultural concept," you cannot pass by the suggestion by Prof. Yoshihiko Ogura, who informs us that states in the history of China were nothing other than a cultural concept [10].

Prof. Ogura sees the principle of domination of states—the state itself differs from the concept of modern national states in Europe, which can be broken into nationality, the domain and administrative organization—existed by the exertion of "hua" with "wen," which can be approximately translated into English as sublimation with culture. I reserve my consent, though, on his conclusion in which he strives to explain the pre-modern Chinese states not with the concept "state" but with the concept of "territorial states."

The point I would like to discuss is a fact that the essence in the policy of states has been "wenhua" or the sublimate function of culture. As a logical corollary to this, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution cannot help growing into the revolution against the state; that is, only a cultural revolution which involves all of lives, thoughts, customs, and conventions can be the revolution of the policy of China.

To where, then, is the state of China going to go?

China began to advance along her own way, independent of the USSR, when she chose the course toward socialized (cooperative) agriculture. Later development in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution made her intention quite clear that it lies in the direction of promoting the people's commune movement. In the course of events, China ordered the chairman of state out of the scene, and she shows no will at all to appoint his successor. She even alludes that the post of the head of state itself is unnecessary. It is safe, then, to assume that the state of China is diverged from the state in the traditional European sense.

Of course, this is the logical result if you argue that this development is in strict accordance with the ideal of the communist parties. All of the Communists with self-respect manifest that their goal is extinction of states and domination and substantiation of the ideal of the communist society. And it is eminently plausible to say that the development in recent China has been uninterrupted revolution aiming at intensification of the leadership of the CCP, at confirmation of the proletarian dictatorship and thus one step nearer to the manifested goal. Actually, it must be so, and nothing further enlightening can be said.

However, there remains the question of the definition of the "state" in China, namely, whether the quantity signified by the word "state" coincides exactly with the word in contexts in contemporary Japanese or with the concept "state" in the political science of the modern ages? If there is any remnant, that part will surely arouse the question, "Quo vadis, the state of China?"12

Has the history of China, then, been a history of states? To be sure, historical volumes and archives abound, and most of them are administrative archives, or authorized histories written and compiled by authoritative chroniclers appointed by successive dynasties. So, if you look at the history through these materials, the history of China can be nothing but a history of states. In this context, successive chronicles became entangled with the distinction between rebel and authentic ruler.

And there goes the ages-old cliché, "he who succeeds becomes emperor; he who fails is a bandit." Thus, only the history of rises and falls of dynasties can be taken to be the history of China in wholeness. However, historical

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12 Readers are referred to a symposium, "Jyū-zen-taikai o megutte: seiji-hōkoku to tō-kiyaku kaitei no mondai-ten o saguru" [On the Tenth Congress of the CCP: to probe into problems in the political report and the revision of the party constitution], Chūgoku-gō, November 1973.
visions which direct their attention to vicissitudes of dynasties are obstinately reintroduced.

Even the most accomplished scholars who unfold their refined scientific analyses founded on historical materialism, when faced with the demarcation of ages, cannot but depend on the dynastic periods such as T'ang, Sung, the end of Ming and beginning of Ch'ing, and so on. After the certification of the period, they would then indulge themselves in profound discussion.

If you ask them, "What does the tenth century mean to China?" their answer would be something like, "It is a period of reformation between T'ang and Sung," at first. Then and only then, they inquire into boundless dispute on the problem, "In what sense is the tenth century a period of reformation?" They set to the subject of Wu-tai only as a turning point between T'ang and Sung. Wu-tai is, after all, Wu-tai after the end of T'ang.

In formal logic, historical time goes on from T'ang to Wu-tai, neither stagnating nor being interrupted. All the continuous historical pulse is—as soon as the subversion of T'ang is confirmed—felt in the annals of Hou Liang who succeeded T'ang, and is chronologized as such. An irrevocable single-track flow of time fills up the vast space of human activities.

They never even bother to doubt the fathomability of any activity anywhere in the totalized chronology of authentic dynasties. What on earth can they say, however, if there was a social group which assumed an impetus not subject to T'ang, nor belonging to Hou Liang in Wu-tai, nor dependent on any of the Ten States around the Five Dynasties?

There, indeed, existed such a social group. That was the group of the progenitors of Hakka in the tenth century, which gathered up in the mountainous areas in South China.

They were a group of people who trained themselves in the midst of stern circumstances in the tenth century. They flocked together in a triangular area where the three provinces, Fuchien, Chianghsi, and Kuangtung meet. The area was surrounded by the four states, namely, Ch'u, Nan T'ang, Min, and Nan Han among the Ten States of those days. The inhabitants there, however, were neither dependent on nor tributary to any of them, and did not assume the "polity of a state" within themselves. They migrated to and at least temporarily made their abode in this highland region around Jui-chin which embraces Ning-hua and Shi-pi in the northeast, Ch'ang-t'ing or T'ing-chou in the east, Kan-chou in the west and Kaying-chou including Mei-hsien in the south. They were united not by any authoritarian mechanism, but by a social band of reciprocal help or concord and association, and maintained independence and autonomous development against the surrounding authoritarian states. Then, eventually, there emerged the later Hakka group from that area like a fresh mountain spring.

One cannot miss the fact that the highland region around Jui-chin asserts itself conspicuously as the rallying point in the history of revolutions in modern China. When I studied the regime of the T'ang dynasty, I already pointed out
the importance of this place. It was observed that an embryo of a social group had been maturing in this region, in defiance of then prevailing powers of various states as early as from the tenth century. As mentioned before, it is, Mr. Huai Tzu who discussed concisely the problem from the viewpoint of the history of the Hakka. Mr. Huai also makes it clear that these areas, where the Hakka used to live together, were going to provide strongholds for the anti-Yüan activities under the command of Wen T’ien-hsiang, afterwards.

Furthermore, throughout the revolutionary struggles such as anti-Ch’ing mutinies, the uprising of Ta’i-p’ing T’ienkuo and the Hsinhai Revolution, the Hakka settlements had functioned as a huge fortress. The course of the Long March begins at no other place but Jui-chin and Chingkang Mountains—the center of a whirlwind also in the tenth century—and proceeds up to Sush’uan, strangely enough in coincidence with the distribution of the Hakka people.

On the whole, it cannot be a wild speculation to assume that there is a principle of unification in social structure among the Hakka settlements which is quite different from the principle of the ordinary power structure of states, and that the principle exerts its vigorous defiance in case of collision with strong authoritarian regimes. Education of the quintessence of social formation within

13 M. Nakagawa, “Tō-matsu Ryō-sho Kanan no Kyakko to Hakka Roshi” [The guest people and Hakka Lu family in South China in the tenth century], Shakai-keizai-shigaku, Vol. 33, No. 5 (1967). This treatise ends with these sentences: “Among the households of the Hakka, emerges a sort of ruling class promoted by the native squires who exert the socioeconomic regulative power over the households of the Hakka. The Lu Clan of Hakka, we have seen in this treatise, is an example of this tendency. Many families of Hakka stock aggrandize themselves among the Hakka at large, with their sometimes historied and sometimes pseudo-historied chronicles of clans as identification of an elite class. And presumably they claim their superiority even over native squires who are prosperous but of humble extraction. Furthermore, if their claims are suitable for the political demands of the squirearchy, they may be boosted to the level of chieftains of ‘brigands.’ Such new situations as stated above gradually became apparent in the mountainous areas in South China in the period of the end of Tang and beginning of Hou Liang.”—It was observed that Hakka exalting themselves among the Hakka-households, had laid heavy stress on the chronicles of clans which ascertained their pedigree. Is this not a proof of the fact that the Hakka are a kind of lineage group? In this regard, we must examine once more the relationship, vis-à-vis interracial marriage, between the Hakka as a separate lineage group and the minority aboriginal races in the highlands in South China which maintained tribal societies. The task of this reexamination cannot do without ethnological or anthropological researches. “Han Peoples and the Hakka” by Mr. Liu Yi-pin will again provide ample materials for research in that direction. These researches will probably set forward completely new hypotheses on the problem of the origin of the Hakka which I may have brought to your notice but which I could not help but prove unexplained. I hope to seize an opportunity to proceed to the esoteric phases of the problem as early as possible.

14 See [S] and “Seikōzan no Hakka” [Hakka people in Chingkang Mountains], Aji-chō geppō, September 1973. With regard to the presentation in these papers, the scope for study of geographical-pathology widens concerning the maladies of the Hakka, Chinese in South China, and Huach’iao and Han-ren who emigrated from South China. But, I must put off detailed description on this subject, too. In the meantime, the readers are referred to my essay, “Kanan no biin-gan” [On nasopharyngaeal cancer in South China], Kodaira gakuhō (Hitotsubashi University), No. 68 (January 1974).
the Hakka will surely surpass the framework of a case study on a "peculiar" strain of Pang, and will be intermingled with the cardinal problem of the polity of states.

The theme, naturally, will be immediately entangled with the controversial points for years in academic circles, namely, whether there are village communities in China or not, and if there are, in what kind of relationship they are with clan-communities. Up to now, studies in the social history of China referred to the history of the Hakka only incidentally. It is no wonder that the history of the Hakka itself has been an enigma. I see no exaggeration in saying that the direction of study must be exactly the other way round. In other words, because the history of the Hakka is left unexplored, there are many unsolvable riddles in the histories of societies and nations in China. There is a huge "Hakka pie" there, with a bite to take from it.

The range of applicability of studies in this field is by no means bounded within China. For one thing, the Hakka's way of social construction, which is incapable of description by adherents of any ordinary theory on polity, may be prominent among the Hua-ren societies in Southeast Asia. For another thing, there seems to be a certain regulative power in principles of the Hakka, which operates not only on the Hua-ren societies but on economic structure and through it on every stratum in the societies of the Southeast Asian nations—Singapore and Malaysia, in particular, where the Hakka are really influential.

There remain many works to be done on these subjects mentioned above, such as empirical research and positive attestation. These problems will have to remain undiscussed in this paper, but I hope to develop them, together with problems on the origin of the Hakka people, at the earliest opportunity.

REFERENCES