

# AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF KENYA AND TANZANIA

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## INTRODUCTION

**A**FRICAN SOCIALISM was once a popular slogan among the new African countries south of Sahara, almost as if it were a basic tenet of development. Many African countries in the 1960s, however, failed to pursue African socialism during the actual process of development. The decade was once called the "African decade" in view of the decolonization of the continent, but it turned out to be a decade of political crisis for many African countries. The fall of K. Nkrumah, a strong advocate of African socialism, brought the "end of illusion" to the ideology of African socialism in Ghana. Repeated military intervention in many African countries cast a shadow on the usefulness of African socialism for nation-building. At the same time, the intellectual interest of African socialism, as at the Daker Conference on African Socialism for example, appears to have ended in frustration: "words, words, words, but without any real meaning, without anything tangible or concrete to give us any idea of what it really intended" [38, p. 51].

African socialism, however, appears to have been understood differently in each country, and its implementation in economic development of specific countries has naturally shown considerable variation among the countries that adopted African socialism as a political manifesto. Kenya and Tanzania at one time advocated African socialism, but the term was used differently. Therefore, the two countries have shown a clear diversity in their respective development: Kenya more capitalistic Tanzania more socialistic. In reality, no ideology can function free from historical constraint. The diversion appearing in post-independence economic development should have been greatly influenced by the historical constraints respective to each of them.

The objective of this paper is not the discussion of African socialism as ideology, but an examination of its application to more concrete and specific government policies designed to develop the agricultural sector. The two countries share the common feature that an overwhelmingly large part of the population still lives in rural areas, dependent on farm income. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that contemplated agricultural development policies should have a direct impact on the majority of the people. Land is the basic means of production in peasant agriculture, and land policies must be regarded as crucial to agricultural development strategies. Accordingly, we shall deal with the land policies contemplated in Tanzania and Kenya. A note is needed on Tanzania since she evolved from

Tanganyika to Tanzania. In this paper, we use "Tanganyika" when it is relevant in her national entity, and later "Tanzania."

In the following part of this paper, we first discuss Kenya's agricultural development strategy with emphasis on historical constraints prior to independence. The second section is a discussion of the evolution of Tanzania's current agricultural development strategy. Finally, implications of current agricultural development policies in Kenya and Tanzania will be discussed in the light of the rapidly increasing population, hence the rapidly increasing demand for basic food in the two countries.

## I

The boundary of Kenya and Tanzania was arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers, and there is a tremendous mixture of tribes within the national territories. The tribes are different in language and customs. More importantly, the relative strength of individual tribes has been determined not only by the size of tribal population but also by the extent of involvement in market economy. The loyalty of individual tribal members is often stronger to the tribe than to the nation as a whole, and this is often true even for urbanized and educated Africans. It is said that "in tribal society the individuals or families within a tribe were 'rich' or 'poor' according to whether the whole tribe was 'rich' or 'poor.' If the tribe prospered all the members of the tribe shared in its prosperity" [34, p. 9]. Now this prosperity is no longer measured by traditional forms of wealth such as cattle, but rather by an access to modern economic opportunities, which have been generated through the expansion of the market economy in the country. As Walter Elkan said, however, "economic development seems invariably to have benefited people very unequally. . . . At its simplest this is because development has to begin *somewhere* and it takes time before it can possibly pervade the whole economy" [11, p. 15]. In multi-tribal countries like Kenya and Tanzania, "somewhere" appears to almost mean "some tribes," and consequently, an emergent regional variation in the extent of economic development naturally bears political implications. African socialism in Kenya cannot be understood unless we trace back the origin of the emergent regional imbalance of economic development in Kenya.

African socialism derives its theoretical foundation from the traditional system of land tenure; that is, communal ownership of land. In this system, a man may have inheritable rights of user in his arable lands, but "this does not mean that a man had individual ownership in his fields or even the individual right to misuse them. 'Ownership' resided not in the man alone but also in his ancestors" [12, p. 284]. "There was, moreover, in the system, a certain egalitarianism, a conception that the various members of the society accept a fair share in what belongs to the whole; and this feature is evident not only in the communal grazing but also in the distribution of land. Some land would grow good maize and other land only sugar cane or rice, and often the dispersion of an individual holding over a wide area was due to the attempt to give each member a share of each type of soil" [12, p. 285]. This system of land tenure was thought to provide the ideological base; for there is no more important means of production than land in a subsistence-oriented

agrarian society. Thus, President Nyerere of Tanzania says, "To us in Africa, land was always recognized as belonging to the community. Each individual within our society had a right to the use of land. . . . But the African's right to land was simply the right to use it; he had no other right to it, nor did it occur to him to try and claim one" [34, p. 7]. A similar view is found in many writings of Tom Mboya, architect of African socialism in Kenya [30, p. 83]. However, when he introduced to the parliament the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya," he put more emphasis on how land is used than how it is owned. According to him, the "unifying principle . . . of traditional property is that land and other productive assets, *no matter who owned or managed them*, were expected to be used, and used for the general welfare" [22, p. 14, italics added]. In fact, the diversion appeared in the development of Kenya and Tanzania, regardless of what was thought to be African socialism, began in the difference of land policies.

Traditional communal ownership of land had been affected in Kenya through the creation of so-called white highlands by European settlers, and there was an uneven impact on tribal economies in the country. A vast amount of land was set aside as Crown Land in 1902, and this land continued to expand until 1939 [6, p. 60]. The most fertile Crown Land was located in central Kenya, and was allocated to in-coming European, mostly British, settlers, who established a number of large farms. The Africans living in the central part of Kenya were pushed out into African reserves where they were allowed to live only on small cultivation. The creation of African reserves was a deadly blow to the tradition of communal land ownership since it was possible only with the conditions of unlimited supply of land. With rapid increases in African population in the reserves, they faced the serious problem of aggravated land shortage whereas in the past they could open up new land in those areas which the European settlers had moved to [50, p. 12].

The Africans who suffered most were the tribes living near Mt. Kenya, namely the Kikuyu who alone accounted for nearly one-fifth of the total African population [12, p. 458]. At the same time, the Kikuyu could see the advantage to be gained from new ideas and advanced technologies because of their proximity to the white highlands, the capital and the European settlers' way of living. Accordingly, they accepted change more quickly and more completely than any other tribe in the country. One change taking place was a shift from communal land ownership to private ownership. But this change did not occur evenly among the Kikuyu; some gained more than others, and this group gradually emerged as a wealthier and more socially influential group of Kikuyu. The Mau Mau revolt in the early 1950s, had two aspects in its struggle for land; one against the European settlers who grabbed Kikuyu land, the other against the landed Kikuyu. Meanwhile, the Mau Mau revolt signified the importance of the Kikuyu in the entire African struggle for decolonization, the Kikuyu emerged as the politically, agriculturally, and commercially dominant people of Kenya at the time of independence [29, p. 8].

The colonial government had to design a particular policy to cope with the aggravated land shortage of the Kikuyu. The crux of the new agricultural development policy for African peasants was in the nature of land-saving farming tech-

niques, and the removal of the traditional land tenure system was considered a prerequisite for its accomplishment. The East African Royal Commission of 1953-55 stated:

Land policy must be directed towards the removal of those conditions which will prevent the available land from being effectively utilized, and equally towards the creation of conditions which will facilitate the application of technical knowledge, labour and capital in proportions suitable over the long period to the generation of maximum income.

In our view it is essential for the productive use of land and the growth of a healthy and profitable agriculture that the choice of the manner in which land is used should be exercised freely by the recognized entity. What may be called individual rights of land tenure must replace the tribal controls which now exist. [12, p. 394]

On the basis of this view, the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 was formulated in order to put the idea into action. The plan consisted mainly of land consolidation of fragmented plots, registration of ownership in exchange with issue of land titles, and introduction of better farming techniques to those who obtained land titles. In his view, Swynnerton stressed the usefulness of land titles as a security against credits which may be open to the owner of land [42, p. 9]. It seems that many Africans welcomed the Swynnerton Plan. For example, Tom Mboya who advocated African socialism in Kenya praised the Swynnerton Plan in his first speech to the Kenya Legislative Council in 1957, saying that "I think the Swynnerton Plan should have been introduced many years ago" [31, p. 17]. The fact that the implementation of the plan concentrated on the Kikuyu country brought about unparalleled agricultural growth for the Kikuyu, creating a number of wealthy, landed Kikuyu people.

It is crucial, however, that other tribes in Kenya were not ready to see, and accept the economic gains assured by change in the land tenure system. The Luo in Nyanza Province, one of the four major tribes in Kenya, retained the traditional system of land tenure. According to Tom Mboya,

Land titles are bound to come, and in some cases as Kenya's Central Region revolutionized the tenure system, they have come in great number. But it would be mistaken to adopt this as the standard system for all parts of Kenya, or for all Africa. Among other agricultural tribes, like the Meru or Abaluhya or Luo, it would be difficult to introduce land titles universally without destroying the sense of value which the communal system provides. [30, p. 170]

It is because of the tribal variations in land tenure systems that African socialism in Kenya had to place more importance on the issue of how to use land than to who owns it. Nationalization of land, even of unoccupied land, was not thought as a part of Kenya's African socialism. "Such a measure is difficult to enforce as long as tribal rights and loyalties can be effectively asserted against national rights and loyalties. Tribal claims to land are likely to be broken down only gradually, as African countries progress towards true nationhood" [52, p. 76]. In the reality of Kenya's political structure, in which two dominant tribes preferred different approaches to the issue of land tenure, and in which vital conflicts emerged between Europeans and Africans, some political arrangements had to be worked out at the

time of independence. Vente argues that African socialism in Kenya lacks clear-cut and operational definitions on many key issues of socialism. But, "this very lack of clear-cut and operational definitions and the ambiguity of political statements," he continues to say "are the only way to come to a working arrangement and to a harmonisation of interest clashes—both of utmost importance in the African context of newly emerging societies" [51, p. 34].

In August 1962, a convention was held at Nairobi to discuss "the Kenya We Want." Its objective was to project a realistic picture of the actual state of economic and social affairs existing in Kenya at the eve of independence, and to stimulate constructive thinking in terms of the kind of Kenya the people would want after the achievement of independence [23, p. 1]. The participants included Tom Mboya and other leading politicians from all three communities, the Africans, Asians, and Europeans. For the development of agricultural sector, four basic measures were recommended:

- (a) Every effort must be made to encourage land consolidation on a voluntary basis in all areas where it is desirable. This is fundamental, and must receive the highest priority;
- (b) Strengthening the agricultural extension services;
- (c) The marketing of produce should be carried out through the medium of co-operative societies; and
- (d) Loan provisions for farmers. [23, p. 15]

As we shall see later, those measures are astonishingly similar to the recommendations given to Tanganyika by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Also, it should be stressed that they are, in essence, a continuation of the Swynnerton Plan for Kenya after independence.

Meanwhile, the extent of the problems of landlessness among the Africans had become increasingly acute, particularly among the Kikuyu. Two reasons must be mentioned. First, land consolidation and registration displaced poorer peasants from their communal rights of access to land, making them landless peasants. As Sorrensen observed, the main beneficiaries from the land consolidation and registration were rural elites such as school teachers, traders, government officials, and politicians [40, p. 223]. Secondly, the European settlers felt great uncertainty about their future in the high tide of the African independence movement. Some of them closed down their farms, laying off a large number of African farm laborers who became landless peasant in the areas where land had already consolidated and registered.

In addition, the European-owned large farms were the mainstay of Kenya's economy at that time. Out of £52.5 million the value of marketed agricultural production in 1963, £40.9 million were derived from the large farm sector. The Africans' demand for the transfer of European-owned land to them had to be fulfilled in this context. "If . . . such transfer are made to untrained, inexperienced people, they may go bankrupt, making Africanization a temporary rather than a lasting phenomena. Moreover as such transfers would reduce the rate of growth, more opportunities for Africanization might be destroyed than could be created" [22, p. 28]. A political solution to this situation had to be worked out between

Kenya and the British governments. The British Government offered a massive loan to Kenya by which compensations for the land to be transferred were assured to European settlers. The British loan had a number of important implications. First, the value of land could be kept high because of the assurance of compensation. Secondly, a gradual phasing of the transfer made many settlers prolong their stay, thus avoiding the disruption of a mass exodus. Thirdly, Africans were promised that the large farms would be reallocated to them under gradual implementation of the Million Acre Settlement Scheme [28].

The Million Acre Settlement Scheme had these objectives:

1. to end the division between African peasant farmers on the small plots and European farmers on large prosperous holdings;
2. to relieve land hunger in African areas;
3. to ameliorate the unemployment situation by making farm life more attractive and profitable;
4. to provide land to African tenant farmers dispossessed during consolidation of African land;
5. to assist in creating a stable land market in Kenya, avoid forcing Europeans frightened by the turmoil of the Mau Mau Rebellion and the struggle for independence to sell at substantial losses, and thereby persuade enough Europeans to stay to prevent drastic shortfalls in production during the land reform;
6. to further modern techniques of production of subsistence and cash crops to African farmers through broadening agricultural extension services;
7. to increase marketable production by the African farmers enough to permit to pay off any loans on land and development made to him under the land reform programme while leaving him a large net income and hence a higher standard of living. [17, pp. 8-9]

A share of the small farm sector in the total marketed agricultural production of Kenya expanded very rapidly in the first half of the 1960s, reaching over 50 per cent in 1967. The value of marketed agricultural production derived from the small farm sector rose from £ 11.6 million in 1963 to £ 54.8 million in 1972 [24, p. 65] [27, p. 56]. The Million Acre Scheme should have been the prime vehicle for this remarkable expansion of the small farm sector in Kenya. By the end of 1970 about 1,063,000 acres were allocated to 34,000 African farmers, and various factors of the social infrastructure were developed in the settlements largely on the basis of a *harambee* ("self-help") effort: for example, 7,500 trading plots and 160 primary schools. The total cost of the schemes was approximately £25 million or about £19 per acre [17, p. 21].

In spite of remarkable achievements in the Million Acre Settlement Scheme, a number of problems emerged in the process of implementation. Among others, two problems signify the emergence of class structure in rural Kenya. One is the very nature of tribal interest. "The purchased land has had to be apportioned among tribes in accordance with established zones of influence (of each tribes), and this has meant in many cases the allocation of additional land to people who had relatively little need for it and little incentive to cultivate it intensively. The paramount national interest constituted by the utilization of this land reform measure for maximizing employment on the land and relieving population pressure thus had

to be partially sacrificed to practical politics" [52, p. 76]. Another problem came from the very nature of the conception of advanced technology held by the government officials in charge. The peasants moved into the settlement schemes were not allowed to bring their oxen and implements with them. Instead, the government set aside a special fund to encourage the establishment of private tractor contractors on the settlements.

A private tractor contractor tends to demand cash payment for his service, but not all farmers in the settlements could afford to pay cash. Thus, it was natural that only relatively wealthy farmers got their land plowed at the time of critical need, leaving others unable to cultivate their land at anything above subsistence levels. Some crops like maize are very sensitive in their yields to timely planting. Accordingly, a wealthier farmer who could afford to hire a tractor service at planting time can harvest enough crops to pay the contractor in the next season, while once a poor farmer failed in timely planting, his harvest would be much smaller than what he could have by planting on time. With other factors combined, it appears that relative impoverishment of the poorer parts of the settlement scheme has taken place in Kenya. This is seen in the problem of slow repayments of loans issued to the farmers in the settlements. "While there was a substantial improvement in the rate of repayment between 1963 and 1969 (from 45 per cent to 79 per cent), in subsequent years the rate of loan repayment has fallen back to around 50 per cent and it is still the major problem in an otherwise apparently rosy picture of settlement development" [14, p. 3].

Land consolidation and registration have made significant progress in certain regions. The land available for small-holder registration in Central Province was registered entirely by farmers at the end of 1972, and the rate of registration in Western Province reached 74 per cent of available land. However, only 27 per cent of the land was registered in Nyanza Province [25, p. 5]. It is important to stress that land title is the most important security against loans. Consequently, there has been a tendency for a larger proportion of available loan funds to go into those provinces where land consolidation and registration have made greater progress. This has contributed to the widening of regional differentials in agricultural development in Kenya.

Agricultural extension services have been given a central place in the development of the small farm sector. However, the bias towards more "progressive" and/or wealthier farmers in rural communities raises an ironic question: does extension create poverty in Kenya? A study of the Tetu Special Rural Development Program in Central Province revealed that extension agents seem to approach and pass extension advice to only the top 10 per cent of farmers in the rural areas, less progressive farmers were rarely approached by the extension agents [1]. The provision of credits to farmers is strongly influenced by the opinions of loan applicants by extension agents. More credit provisions tended to go wealthier farmers, and poorer farmers were passed over. Here again land title played an important role. By 1962 all farms in Tetu had been consolidated to form a one-parcel farm. During the last ten years, however, accumulation of land into relatively

wealthier farms has clearly taken place in Tetu: 40 per cent of the "most progressive" farmers owned more than two parcels of land in 1972 [1, p. 32].

The rapid accumulation of wealth in the hands of the progressives increased the gap between rich and poor, in that the poor becomes relatively poorer. When the fathers of two present-day Tetu farmers may have equal status as elders in the community, the two farmers may now be very different in status, the one having a car and a son in university, while the other may feel left behind, frustrated and failure.

Thus, the introduction of new agricultural technology and lopsided distribution of extension services seem to increase the poverty of large numbers of rural people and . . . accelerate the rate at which rural people feel impelled to sell out and leave the rural area in search for employment in cities. [1, p. 32]

The agricultural development strategies based on land consolidation and registration, settlement schemes, and extension services have brought an agricultural boom in Kenya. The small farm sector demonstrated its growth potential by a rapid rise in the value of marketed produce from this sector. Beneath Kenya's boom in the agricultural sector, however, "there is a danger that the short-run success will divert attention from the long-run problem" [18, p. k-21]. It is the land policy which occupies the most crucial part of the long-run problem. The Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African socialism in Kenya stated: "What is urgently needed is development, not merely land transfer," and "there is also urgent need for a land tenure policy to ensure that projected agricultural development is not concentrated in the hands of the few. Having regard for some of the problems of transition, a working party might be established to consider the need and practicality of establishing a ceiling on individual ownership of property" [22, pp. 37-38]. The 1972 ILO report on employment policy in Kenya strongly urged the Government of Kenya to give higher priority to more equitable redistribution of land to create more productive employment and incomes in rural areas [19, p. 152], while the Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1973 on employment strategies failed to pay sufficient attention on this vital issue on the ground of its practicality [26].

## II

Tanzania is also comprised of a large number of different tribes. However, relatively economically advanced tribes like the Chagga and Haya were minorities in the tribal population structure. At the same time their tribal territories were not only far from the capital but also geographically separated: the Chagga around Mt. Kilimanjaro and the Haya west of Lake Victoria. Majority tribes like the Sukuma and the Nyamwezi were less involved in the market economy and their tribal territories were not fully established until recently. In fact as late as the 1930s the Sukuma still migrated into neighboring tribal land. Unlike Kenya where no language except English can be used for tribal communication, Tanzanian tribes were all familiar with Kiswahiri in addition to their tribal languages. In general, therefore, Tanzanian tribes cannot be classified according to some single criterion of social advance, divided into clusters as is possible with the Kenyan [13, p. 637].

It would be useful to discuss some aspects of population dynamics in Tanzania before independence since they appear to be closely related to the tribal land tenure



system. The territorial expansion of the Sukuma into the Zinza tribal area is a case in point. Geita District in Tanzania was populated primarily by the Zinza about forty years ago, but within one generation the Sukuma tribesmen migrated to the area becoming the dominant people in that district. How was this possible? The Zinza had traditionally maintained a strict division of labor between the sexes, leaving the production of food crops entirely to women. Those men who worked on land were looked down, called Warongo as opposed to the pure Zinza. In this situation, the Sukuma migrants were welcomed by the Zinza women because the Sukuma worked as tenants to the women relieving them from hard labor of food production. With an unlimited supply of land, the Sukuma could open up their own land without any serious conflict with Zinza property. Following the Sukuma, the Haya tribesmen also migrated into the area as farm laborers for the Zinza and Sukuma, while the Haya could also acquire their own land by clearing bush. In less than half a century, the population structure in the area changed to Sukuma dominance and it appears now that tribal antagonism exists between the Zinza, Sukuma, and Haya [33, pp. 33-34, 39].

The land policy of the colonial government in Tanganyika was to introduce a land tenure system similar to that advocated by the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya. At a meeting of the Legislative Council in 1958, Chairman Nyerere of the Tanganyika African National Union opposed the introduction of a freehold system into Tanganyika. His position was that the traditional system of shifting cultivation is not conducive to agricultural development, but the introduction of private ownership of land will not remove the practice of shifting cultivation. He stated that "if people are given land to use as their property . . . it will not be difficult to predict who, in fifty years time, will be the landlords and the tenants" [35, p. 55]. In fact, he argued that the leasehold system should be as effective as the freehold system in developing agriculture in Tanganyika.

At the time of independence, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development sent a mission to advise on overall development strategies in Tanganyika. The mission report stressed the importance of adopting the Kenyan strategy, including the establishment of a freehold system in African villages. It was thought by the mission that the most favorable economic results would be from continued development along the lines of the Swynnerton Plan, and the following four measures were recommended:

1. Replacement of customary tenure by a system under which everyone so entitled obtains a consolidated holding of economic size;
2. Provision to the farmers of farm plans . . . ;
3. Close supervision and advice, continued over a long period to enable the farmers to understand the farm plans . . . ;
4. Provision of loans to the farmers . . . . [11, p. 505]

The measures recommended are astonishingly similar to those adopted by the Kenyans on the eve of independence. The mission, however, noticed in Tanganyika plenty of fertile land which had not yet been fully utilized, and it put emphasis on making best use of unoccupied land. Thus, the mission recommended concentrated effort on settlement schemes in new areas rather than merely trying to

reorganize farming in areas already densely populated. According to the mission, "quicker progress is likely to be made towards the desired ends of improved use by planned settlement of empty areas rather than through exclusive concentration on improvement of methods in settled areas" [20, p. 506]. Also, we must take into account the characteristics of African villages in Tanganyika. Most of the Tanganyikan rural population—11 out of 12 million—live in scattered settlements. It is necessary "to group scattered peasants into residential clusters to facilitate the introduction of modern agricultural techniques as well as social services" [37, p. 177].

The then Tanganyikan Government responded to those recommendations with a set of mixed policies. With land, it maintained the view expressed by President Nyerere in 1958. The measures of implementing the policy of converting freehold to leasehold system were proposed in 1962, and enacted in three acts in 1963: the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act, the Land (Settlement of Disputes) Act, and the Rights of Occupancy (Development Conditions) Act. It should be noted that the legal framework apparently indicated the direction of national development along with socialistic ideology, leading to the proclamation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 [44] [53].

We ought to ask, in this connection, why Tanganyika was able to adopt a leasehold system for national land policy whereas Kenya adopted a freehold system. In the first place, population pressure on land in Tanganyika was generally not as acute as in Kenya [44, p. 36]. Secondly, those areas where land shortage was acute were occupied by minority tribes like the Chagga and Haya in Tanganyika, whilst land shortage occurred in Kenya in the Kikuyu tribal area, the largest in the country. Thirdly, villages in Tanganyika were not made of residential clusters as a group, but widely scattered single-family farms. In this situation, there were very few wealthy farmers entrenched in Tanganyika. Therefore, a national debate on land policy to establish a leasehold system might not have caused any serious concern among ordinary peasants in Tanganyika. Fourthly, in Kenya a struggle for political hegemony between the Luo-based Kenya Peoples Union and the Kikuyu-based Kenya African National Union had reached nearly crisis proportions, but Tanganyika had one political party from the beginning, the Tanganyika African National Union, which was growing rapidly even in rural areas. The importance of TANU under the leadership of President Nyerere should have played a decisive role in determining national land policy. Finally, the European-African conflict was less acute in Tanganyika. While the owners of large farms in Kenya were predominantly British-origin, the main estate owners in Tanganyika were Greek, British, and Asian. "It is possible that the differences in national origin . . . hindered estate owners from attaining the degree of unity and influence on the Colonial Administration exercised by the Kenyan settlers" [37, p. 54]. This point might also be valid in deciding national land policy.

Regarding the recommendation of a new settlement scheme from the IBRD mission, President Nyerere endorsed it and encouraged its implementation. The strategy was called officially "the Transformation Approach," and adopted in the Five-Year Plan for 1964-69. In his speech to the Parliament, Nyerere states:

Almost all the help which the government can give in the way of tractors, improved houses and rural water supplies will be concentrated on those new Village Settlement Schemes. Volunteers coming to these new areas will be becoming modern farmers in every sense. New Settlement Schemes will be established all over the country, as fast as the shortage of capital allows, for they are expensive things. . . . We expect by 1980 to have about one million people living and working under these new conditions. [43, p. x]

The transformation approach ended in failure. As President Nyerere himself admitted, "this policy was too expensive in money and mistaken in its estimates of economic and psychological results" [45, p. xiv]. According to Rene Dumont, the traditional government campaign to encourage the use of oxen for cultivation "was abruptly stopped following the enormous orders of tractor" [8, p. 11]. The large subsidies given to the farmers at the beginning of the settlement schemes only made them dependent on these countless, continued subsidies. More importantly, the highly modernized concept of rural development created sharp differences between the economic opportunities enjoyed by a fortunate few spoon-fed by government aid, and the opportunities available to the majority of farmers. Also, the implementation of the transformation approach required skilled manpower in administration, but this sort of manpower was in extremely short supply in Tanganyika. It was in this situation that the country looked for a new strategy of agricultural development.

The new development strategy was called "ujamaa village development." In its simplest, it was an application of "the traditional extended family system with its emphasis on co-operation" with an objective "to farm the village land collectively with modern techniques of production, and share the proceeds according to the work contributed" [45, p. 26]. The *ujamaa* village development strategy was first announced by President Nyerere in his famous Arusha Declaration, and adopted officially in the Second Development Plan for 1969-74. In practice a number of variations can be observed but typically there are four important elements. First, the farmers can continue to cultivate their private plots, and in this sense it is different from total communalization of land. Secondly, each *ujamaa* village is expected to open up communal plots in which the members of the village put their labor and share the proceeds. This often leads to an organization of producers' and consumers' co-operatives in the village. Thirdly, extension services are to be geared to the village as a whole: a shift from a "selective" to a "frontal" approach, aiming at an establishment of an atmosphere in which "the whole society will be mobilized to pursue the goals of socialist production and living" [45, p. 27]. Finally, in making this shift, the importance of correct ideology and organization was emphasized, rather than just material inputs made by the government. It is because of this emphasis that TANU's branches in each village are expected to play a crucial role in the political mobilization of the village members.

In spite of the TANU's penetration into the rural areas, it might be too much to expect party and government policy to accurately reflect the socioeconomic conditions of the peasant community. Rene Dumont points out that "rural society in Tanzania is still very *hierarchical*. The democratic principle, in the cooperatives for example, is scarcely respected except in appearance; it is not accepted in reality

or in fact, nor in the depth of people's minds" [8, p. 36]. Considering the complexity of a land tenure system in the midst of change, the land policy contemplated in a series of laws in 1963 appears too simple to deal with the specific problems of land tenure, for example the shrinking communal grazing land and the increasing difficulty in obtaining family land, no matter how its ownership is defined. It seems ironical that the political campaigns by TANU brought a level of political conscientiousness to a large number of rural inhabitants, while they also awakened the villagers' concern on many basic issues like "to whom my land belongs."

Since January 1969, the *ujamaa* villages have been Tanzania's prime mover in agricultural development. It is said that 15 per cent of all Tanzanians were living in *ujamaa* villages by 1973, although the percentages of participation differ significantly in different places. For example, in the Kilimanjaro and Shinyanga Regions only 1 per cent of the population was living in *ujamaa* villages while 64 per cent of the population in Mtwara Region participated in *ujamaa* villages [47, p. 72].

This wide regional variation is largely related to the difference in prevailing customary land tenure systems and to the availability of new land in different areas for the *ujamaa* campaign. The number of *ujamaa* villagers has increased significantly since 1970, probably due to the adoption of the frontal approach "in which whole areas of Districts are enrolled in *ujamaa* villages in a series of major campaigns" [36, p. 21]. More importantly, sometime between August and November 1973 a major decision was made for compulsory enrollment of all Tanzanians in *ujamaa* villages within the next three years. The various Regional and District operations have been combined in the new "Operation Tanzania" [36, p. 21].

It is now apparent that the Government of Tanzania firmly committed itself to the strategy of *ujamaa* village development not only to expand agricultural production but more to develop rural areas as a whole. Peter Temu, a former director of the Bureau of Economic Research at the University of Dar es Salaam, now a principal officer in charge of plan implementation in the planning ministry, wrote recently that the *ujamaa* village policy is no longer viewed as merely one possible path, but "rightly or wrongly it is seen as the only way to development" [47, p. 71]. The sense of mission and commitment should have been inspired by an ideology of African socialism. Nevertheless, an element of compulsion seems to have emerged in the implementation of *ujamaa* village development, and it is this element of compulsion which might endanger all merits of the *ujamaa* idea. Why did the Government of Tanzania formulate this "Operation Tanzania" policy? Are the peasants in Tanzania prepared to comply with the government policy? Depending on the answers to those questions the *ujamaa* idea enjoy unprecedented new success or may prove itself unworkable. Admittedly, these questions are very difficult to answer; the most we can do is point out some examples for analysis.

President Nyerere stresses that there is no one simple blueprint for development. "Principles of action can be set out, but the application of these principles must take into account the different geographical and geological conditions in different areas, and also the local variations in the basically similar traditional structure" [34, p. 121]. He admits that existing land tenure practices are not necessarily identical all over the country. In the Kilimanjaro Region, for example, individual land holding

is almost universal [34, p. 121], while in other regions communal ownership is dominant. In the traditional Bukoba settlements in the West Lake Region communally owned land coexists with individually owned land which may be sold or given away to family members or even to outsiders: "its disposal is entirely dependent upon the discretion of the owner" [3, p. 18]. The land available for starting a new *ujamaa* village also differs considerably in different parts of the country. Because of those variations in land tenure systems the implementation of *ujamaa* policy calls for a great deal of flexibility and caution.

In addition, "the cornerstone of the *ujamaa* policy is the great emphasis it lays on the practical advance preparation before the formulation of an *ujamaa* village" [41, p. 182]. This advance preparation must ensure the presence of seven factors: (a) good local leadership, (b) adequate land with good potential for development or expansion, (c) adequate water for human or animal use, (d) knowledge of agricultural or other technical practices by which production can be increased, (e) availability of necessary resources for implementing the techniques, (f) markets for the disposal of surplus production, and (g) a planned program for the productive reinvestment of surplus produced [41, p. 182]. In short, a *ujamaa* village cannot be built by political exhortation alone. If the expansion of *ujamaa* development is pushed too hastily and forcibly, there is a real danger that the system as a whole may become too bureaucratized and that the prerequisites for *ujamaa* development may be lost.

Local community leadership in Tanzania appears to be based on the TANU party system. In a situation where party members are responsible for ideological campaigns and political mobilization in rural communities, there is a likelihood that the party members will become a sort of rural elite, regardless of their democratic attitude to fellow villagers. The democratization of the TANU hierarchy and of relationships between the party and the people have not undergone the violent re-emphasis of the Cultural Revolution in China, and Tanzania can ill afford such a period of political turbulence. In this situation, therefore, it may be natural that TANU, along with the government bureaucracy, will actually stand against the implementation of the *ujamaa* policy on the ground of persuasion. In its real scene:

Though *ujamaa* was to be implemented by the peasants themselves, it was also a government (and the TANU) policy and as such the responsibility of government staff (and the TANU members) whose success and capability were to be judged in terms of their achievements in implementing *ujamaa*. [36, p. 10]

Thus Dumont warns about this possible development in Tanzanian socialistic nation-building. He foresees the possibility of exploitation in a broadly defined sense.

In these conditions many other groups of exploiters appear, sometimes more formidable than the classic types. The timid official; the bureaucratic leadership of the co-operative which is not very efficient or very honest; the settlers who used State loans to have his work done by paid workers; the cultivator in a block farm who does not pay back money advanced to him. . . . These and many others are exploiters of a new and serious kind. [8, p. 56]

Many research works on *ujamaa* have recently revealed that these new types of exploiters are emerging in Tanzania. Although it has been stressed that people are

persuaded to join *ujamaa* villages and never compelled, some government officers and members of TANU relied actually on a sort of force when they organized *ujamaa* village. Farmers living in Rugazi Ujamaa Village, for example, were simply told that they had to join the *ujamaa* scheme, and many of them were forced or intimidated. To make matters worse, the leaders of the *ujamaa* village were not participating in cooperative farming themselves, but rather were consolidating their own plots and farming them with hired labor [32, p. 6]. We can find out many other similar cases as reported by L. Cliffe [4, pp. 13–14]. In some cases, farmers conspired against the principle of *ujamaa* policy by resorting to “Ujamaa through sign-painting,” that is a mere change of the name of settlement schemes but nothing else. Upper Kitete Ujamaa Village falls into this category. It should be regarded as natural that a *ujamaa* village can draw more input materials from the government than other villages. At times, therefore, material inputs and incentives were used to induce farmers to join a *ujamaa* village, and often a promise given to them was not fully kept, causing frustration. At other times, rich farmers organized themselves into a *ujamaa* cooperative only to get access to more land in the name of *ujamaa* expansion [36, pp. 15–20].

A more fundamental problem appearing in *ujamaa* villages is that village members often neglect the obligation of communal work supposedly the real basis of this system. Joint production and equitable distribution of produce are the essential characteristics of *ujamaa* villages, but the members of *ujamaa* villages often do not participate in the communal work. J. Boesen found in his study of Ngara District in the West Lake Region that the level of participation in communal work was very low, and that the absentees were mostly those farmers who have land outside the *ujamaa* village [2, p. 36]. His final opinion was thus that the *ujamaa* village he studied was not successful, although he cautiously added at the same time that it cannot be deemed as a failure of *ujamaa* as a whole [3, p. 61]. K. Hayashi also found similar facts in his study at Nytwari Ujamaa Village in another region [15, p. 103].

It may be too early to judge the relative success or failure of the *ujamaa* development program in Tanzania, but it is one of the most ambitious and comprehensive rural development programs ever attempted in developing countries [7, p. 34]. Since the official proclamation of the *ujamaa* policy, Tanzanian policy-makers have learnt and identified the problems in the implementation of *ujamaa* policy, and have thought of a few solutions and remedial measures. For example, President Nyerere dismissed those officials who resorted to force or intimidation in pursuit of the implementation of the *ujamaa* campaign, and in doing so, he made it clear that persuasion alone can bring the peasants to socialistic goals of development. On the other hand, the implementation of the *ujamaa* policy has increasingly added a nature of compulsory participation.

It appears to us that the *ujamaa* strategy, although sound in its ideological framework, may need to be re-examined in view of an emergent farmer conservatism. Once L. Cliffe studied the farmers' reaction against the colonial agricultural development policies during German rule in Tanganyika, and concluded that the apathy and indifference shown by the African farmers to the colonial policies were a

healthy and sound scepticism of bad plans. He says, "One moral I would draw from this study of the past is that peasant 'conservatism' is often a healthy scepticism of bad plans, and that, therefore, rural development, and above all socialist rural development, necessitates effective mass participation" [5, p. 23]. Does peasant conservatism confine itself only to capitalistic and colonial development policies? It may well be argued that the peasant conservatism in the market-oriented production of agriculture not in subsistence agriculture may take a path of apathy and indifference to the ideology of *ujamaa*. Does the conservatism shown by many farmers in Tanzania reveal their "healthy scepticism" of *ujamaa* policy? Or can we attribute it to embryonic class formation in rural Tanzania, as Cliffe argued?

### III

In the previous sections, I briefly discussed the evolutionary process of the agricultural development strategies in Kenya and Tanzania from the colonial period to the post-independence years. It became apparent that at the time of independence the two countries were "expected" to adopt a similar line of development strategy mainly designed by "foreign experts." Nevertheless, their response to recommendations given by IBRD took different forms and directions from which a different nature of problems have emerged, in particular the issues of land policies. Needless to say, land is the basic means of production in peasant agriculture, on which an overwhelmingly large part of the population depends their livelihood in the two countries. In this sense, it has been crucial for the development of national economy to establish, and to implement, a land policy which will ensure two goals simultaneously: rapid growth of agricultural production and equitable distribution of that growth among the peasants. In this section, I shall further examine the patterns of development strategy for the agricultural sector in both countries.

Table I shows the planned central government expenditures on agricultural development during 1969 and 1974, a period in which the current development plans of Kenya and Tanzania coincide. First, a relative importance of the agricultural sector in the national economy of the two countries can be seen by a comparison of the sector's share in GDP. Tanzania had a GDP of 8,232 million shillings in 1970, of which the agricultural sector contributed 5,033 million shillings, 61 per cent of the GDP in Tanzania in 1970 being derived from the agricultural sector. In the same year, Kenya's GDP was 10,437 million shillings to which the agricultural sector contributed 30 per cent, or 3,491 million shillings. Therefore, the agricultural sector is far more important in Tanzania than in Kenya. Around the middle of the 1960s subsistence production was assumed to be 22 per cent of GDP in Kenya and 29 per cent of GDP in Tanzania. Estimated rates of growth of this subsistence production for 1960-67 were 5.9 per cent per year in Kenya and 1.9 per cent per year in Tanzania [49, p. 25]. It is not unrealistic to assume that Kenya has kept its higher rate of growth of the subsistence sector during the later half of the 1960s, transforming it into more market-oriented production. During 1965 and 1970 Kenya expanded the value of marketed agricultural production by 48 per cent,

while Tanzania increased it only by 28 per cent in the same period [25, p. 38] [46, p. 8].

TABLE I  
STRUCTURE OF PLANNED CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON AGRICULTURAL  
DEVELOPMENT, 1969-74, TANZANIA AND KENYA  
(Selected major items, in million shillings)

Items	Tanzania	Kenya
<b>Group I</b>		
Credit for small-scale farmers	60	55
Livestock development	106	91
Research	60	64
Training	50	44
Irrigation and rural water supplies	191	170
Subtotal	467	427
<b>Group II</b>		
State farms, govt. owned ranches	309	12
Land adjudication	—	126
Private large-scale farm development	—	59
Settlement schemes	8	111
Socialist villages and self-help schemes	145	9
Subtotal	462	308
<b>Group III</b>		
Feeder roads	98	292
Total	1,027	1,036
GDP in 1970	8,232	10,437
Of which: the agricultural sector	5,033	3,461

Sources: [16, p. 41] [25, p. 3] [46, p. 6].

A total of planned expenditure by the central governments for agricultural development is almost the same in the two countries at about 1,000 million shillings. Furthermore, the planned expenditures on technical and monetary inputs as itemized in Group I appear to be similar; 467 million shillings in Tanzania and 427 million shillings in Kenya. Because Tanzania has a much larger rural population than Kenya, per farm inputs in Tanzania should be smaller than those in Kenya. A decisive difference in Group II is related to land development and tenure policies. While Kenya allocated most funds to the settlement scheme and related land adjudication, Tanzania planned to spend a vast amount on state farms, the government-owned ranches and *ujamaa* village development. The fact that Kenya allocated as much as 292 million shillings, as compared to 98 million shillings by Tanzania, on the investment on feeder road construction indicates the difference in the extent of market-oriented production in the two countries. Thus, planned expenditures of the central governments signify the nature of development strategies adopted by the two countries.

Whatever ideological stand one may take a country must be able to successfully achieve an expansion of food production for a rapidly increasing population. Ten



years or so after independence, Kenya and Tanzania are clearly distinct in that Kenya has become more capitalistic while Tanzania is more socialistic. Both countries, however, face the same problems of rapid population increase. Their populations will increase by approximately 4 million during the 1970s, and will double in about a quarter of a century [48, p. xxxviii]. In addition, urbanization will take place at a much higher rate than the increase in total population. Therefore, the issue of whether sufficient food can be produced for an ever-growing population should be a crucial test for the different ideological stands [21, p. 26].

TABLE II  
ESTIMATES OF POPULATION: 1960-80

		(In 1,000)		
		1960	1970	1980
Kenya:	Rural	7,555	9,784	12,954
	Urban	560	1,114	2,155
	Total	8,115	10,898	15,109
Tanzania:	Rural	9,814	12,329	15,799
	Urban	514	907	1,676
	Total	10,328	13,236	17,475

Source: [48, p. xxxviii].

The three year average for 1970-72 of net domestic imports classified as "food and live animals" was 196 million shillings for Kenya and 147 million shillings for Tanzania. However, "cereals and cereal preparations" occupied 40 per cent of imports to Tanzania as opposed to 21 per cent for Kenya [9, p. 48] [10, p. 48]. This would suggest that Tanzania is still far from self-sufficient in basic cereal production. It is thus extremely important for Tanzanian socialism whether it can provide incentives to its farmers to get rid of subsistence-oriented agricultural production. In other words, the validity of the *ujamaa* approach rests on how effectively it can meet an increasing demand for food by the rapidly increasing population. Although systematic and substantial proof should be provided by further research, an excessive emphasis on *ujamaa* seems to have temporarily disrupted the rural market economy in Tanzania. It is ironical that in much of Tanzania including small rural towns an urban retail store has nothing to sell except dust-covered tinned Chinese food such as bamboo-shoots when people line up for maize and rice. It is also ironic to see officials of *ujamaa* co-operative societies run around in automobiles while members delivering their produce have to wait days, weeks, and often months for payment. It will take time before all Tanzanians understand the real spirit of *ujamaa* as understood by President Nyerere, but "how long" will be decisive in view of the mounting pressure of population in the country.

The problem in Kenya, on the other hand, seems to be whether or not its land policy can tap the potential of the small farm sector by re-orienting it towards more equitable distribution of land before land hunger becomes explosive among the poorer levels in rural communities. The Government of Kenya appears to have

rejected a strategy of creating productive employment through the redistribution of land for political practicality. All issues related to land policies should involve much wider and more complex problems than conventional economic analysis can handle. However, it is in this context of complexity that A. Shurie's statement touches on the crux of the matter. He says, "The conclusion that the character of growth cannot be altered unless the political milieu is thoroughly transformed is not a counsel of despair. It does not imply that the developing world must sit back for years and wait for distant political changes. In many countries the leadership can initiate the transformation now" [39, pp. 350-51]. Regardless what ideological stand Kenya and Tanzania may take, leadership will be contested in the very near future by the masses hungry for land, and employment.

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