

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION ON STATE SCIENCE: A CHALLENGE TO MODERN STATES

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE DYNAMIC COURSE of Chinese politics since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution seems to have hidden within it some substance which defies facile comprehension of the whole political process. Just what was the real political driving force behind the Great Cultural Revolution? Also, to what extent was the Great Cultural Revolution able to achieve its initial goals?

Among factors contributing to difficulty in understanding such a problem, a generally limited availability of information can first be cited. One might ask himself, for instance, what really were the feelings with which people received Chairman Mao Tse-tung's initial statement (August 5, 1966), "Bombard the Headquarters—My Big-Character Poster"? [3, p. 13]. One might also ask what precisely was at the issue in the so-called Wuhan Incident of July 1967, in which then Politburo member Hsieh Fu-chih and then Cultural Revolution Small Group member Wang Li and others were held prisoner during their stay in Wuhan by Wuhan district commander Ch'ên Tsai-tao and others. Since there does not exist an established route through which one can obtain comprehensive information on above political developments there are a great number of difficulties standing in the way of clarifying such situation. It would seem worthwhile to note, however, that such lack of information was not necessarily intentional. Throughout the course of the Great Cultural Revolution, in fact, there was a stream of reports from China concerning the changing political scene, although the amount of this flow varied with times. Foreign correspondents in Peking continued to send out dispatches on the contents of the wall posters throughout the Cultural Revolution.

Even during the midst of the turmoil, a considerable number of foreigners were allowed to travel through China either by invitation or by permission. According to reports, the Chinese people made enthusiastic efforts to have these foreigners understand what they were in the process of doing. Thus the process of the Cultural Revolution was not carried out in a condition completely sealed-off from outside. It can be said that the general lack of information with regard to the Great Cultural Revolution was not all that different in nature from similar absence that is, to a greater or lesser degree, characteristic of almost any incident in history. Therefore, we should make every effort to approach the essence of this great historical event in spite of such accompanying limitations.

It is at the same time possible to attribute the difficulty in understanding the Cultural Revolution to the political system of China, that is, to a one-party dictatorship. Needless to say, when there exists no opposition party, all disputes take the form of intraparty struggles, becoming less visible to outside eyes. It therefore takes the passage of considerable period of time before light is shed on such struggles, and sometimes it happens that part of the truth about such incidents ends up buried forever in the obscure pages of history. A little reflection, however, tells us that this difficulty that is concomitant of one-party dictatorship is by no means peculiar to China, for it is a well-known fact that the course of Soviet politics has set a precedent as a classical example of this form of dictatorship. And there are continuing efforts to elucidate the dynamics of such politics, when concerning the Soviet Union referred to as "Kremlinology." Furthermore, if we direct our attention to the matter of political power struggles, the obscurity as such is an inevitable part of just about any political system.

There are of course ways to overcome such difficulties, by making a simple interpretation of the Great Cultural Revolution from one standpoint. One of such methods is to attribute everything from the motives behind the Great Cultural Revolution to the results thereof to Mao Tse-tung's will for power. In this way, a cause-and-effect relationship is established, all accountable to Mao's volition. In fact, as far as the process of the Cultural Revolution is concerned, there is no doubt that Mao Tse-tung's will had played a major role. It was Mao Tse-tung's will that got this revolution going, and the revolution itself proceeded amidst hearty cheers of "Long live Chairman Mao" from the populace. What happened was the overthrow of the Peking Party Committee controlled by so-called "ruling faction" together with Liu Shao-chi faction in the backstage "on the road to capitalism."

It is indeed impossible to talk about a revolution without considering the question of power. However, ascribing everything simply to Mao Tse-tung's determination for power would be to miss the truth. With Mao Tse-tung's strong will as a premise, a question must be asked just what he attempted to accomplish through the Cultural Revolution.

Having approached the problem this way, it still seems that there exists a special difficulty standing in the way of understanding the Great Cultural Revolution. This is neither the difficulty arising from a simple lack of information nor the perplexity caused by one-party dictatorship. Coming straight to the point, it is a problem associated with interpreting the meaning of such slogans as "rebellion is justified" and "better troops and simpler administration"¹ which at the first glance seem contradictory. Has there ever been a case in history in which the leading and sole party of a socialist state tried to start a movement

¹ Mao Tse-tung first used the phrase in September 1942, in an article entitled "A Most Important Policy." A note accompanying the article in 1965 English edition of *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* reads: "The phrase 'better troops and simpler administration' is now widely used and is no longer confined to military matters. It suggests readjustment in organizations and their membership, and simplification of the administration and work procedure" [2, p. 102].

to "rebel" against or destroy its organization? What really is the meaning of such movement? For the construction of a great and strong socialist country is it not necessary above all that there be a concentration and carefully planned centralization of power? If so, what is the meaning of the slogan "better troops and simpler administration," which supposedly aims at a simple government? The real difficulty encountering those who try to understand the Great Cultural Revolution lies herein, in digesting these paradoxical concepts.

Reverting to the original questions, what were then the political motives behind the Great Cultural Revolution, and to what extent were the goals of that revolution achieved? Here the political dynamics of the Great Cultural Revolution and the developments thereafter may be either viewed in "micro" or "macro" terms. I should like to examine the Cultural Revolution particularly in terms of the actual evolution of Chinese society after the Liberation. This is an attempt to view the future course of socialist construction in China, and the change in the state power structure and the political leadership in an extremely macro manner.

II. UNITY OF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND COMMUNE MANAGEMENT

What is Chinese society like in its specific reality after having passed through the Great Cultural Revolution? As has already been made clear in a number of studies, the Great Leap Forward of 1958 can be identified as the basic domestic factor behind the vehement change in China throughout the 1960s. The Great Leap Forward more than anything else gave a glimpse of this country's own special type of socialist construction in its most rough-hewn form, and because it was rough-hewn, there followed the very frustration of this movement, the distress during the "period of adjustment," and the evocation of the Cultural Revolution. In this sense, it is necessary to think of the Great Cultural Revolution as forming a set with the Great Leap Forward. It is clear that the specific reforms in agriculture, industry, education, and science and technology that were sought after on the national scale during the Cultural Revolution had their origin in the policies of the Great Leap Forward.

Of course, the fact still remains that the two were separated by a decade of ferment and had no direct-line connection. One must acknowledge that between the two there existed the distance which lies between a roughly worked prototype and the processed product. Nonetheless, one still feels that the two had something basically in common as regards their direction. Basic framework of China's current political form as well as the fundamental concept, "unity of government administration and commune management" have their origin in the people's commune which emerged during the Great Leap Forward.

Nowadays the term "people's commune" enjoys considerable popularity. Still, this term has probably stirred up more debate in the past than almost any other. When it first appeared, there were countless heated debates the world over, including Japan, as to what the term really meant. It is a well-known fact that

Khrushchev bluntly criticized this system, and this, together with other factors, helped to touch off the Sino-Soviet dispute. From the United States came the extremely ideological attack that the people's commune would make China a slave state. Either way, this new form of social organization no doubt dazzled the world as "fresh as the morning sun, above the broad horizon of East Asia" [4, p. 490].

The people's commune is a social organization that surpassed qualitatively the agricultural cooperatives of up to then. It is a "basic unit of the socialist social structure" and also the "basic organization of the socialist state power" in China [4, p. 492]. Whereas the agricultural cooperative was an economic organization concentrating mainly on agricultural production, the people's commune is a social organization that ties together industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and military affairs. With the people's commune, government administration and the affairs of the commune are joined as one by having the head of *hsiang* ("village"), the smallest administrative unit of the government, also act as head of the commune. In this way there emerged a new concept of social organization which the Chinese call "unity of government administration and commune management." Of course, it was not a simple affair to carry out the drastic reform. There were a lot of groping in the dark and at times setbacks. Efforts have been made by trial and error to determine the optimum scale of the commune, to tackle the arduous problem of discrepancies among communes, and to define the "three-level system of ownership"—by the production team, the production brigade, and the people's commune. In fact, these efforts have been carried over to the present day.

I should now like to dwell briefly on one point in particular which would seem to be of basic importance in confirming where the problem lies. It is the question, what is the "unity of government administration and commune management," and what does it mean in terms of China's political structure?

One must first take note of the fact that this is the "unity of government administration and commune management" (*chêngshê hoyi*) with "unity" (*hoyi*) meaning "oneness" and not "integration," as should become apparent in the following pages. When the people's commune first emerged and it became known that a commune and a *hsiang* were to be headed by the same person, there were two completely opposed interpretations thereof. First, it was thought of as the final step toward the centralization of power, made effective by assumption of the commune chief position by the head of the smallest and terminal government unit. It was also interpreted that the commune, which is the basic unit of society, has taken over the governing function of the state, thus attempting to absorb the "state" within itself. Of course, the way in which the commune functions in practice depends on the actual political and social situation. For this reason any interpretation of the administrative setup must be, in a long-run, verified in the context of the real situation.

Looking at the direction evinced in the very establishment of the people's commune, it would seem that both of above interpretations overlooked a fundamental nature of the people's commune. Whether the event is understood in

terms of centralization or decentralization, the administrative power of the state and the power of the commune are perceived as being essentially heterogeneous and opposite. In China, however, "unity" (*hoyi*) is a notion meaning the recovery of the identity of things which were originally one. As is made evident in Wang Yang-ming's concept of "unity of knowledge and conduct," this notion is clearly different from that of *t'ungyi*, meaning integration of opposite or different. In other words, whereas *t'ungyi* is a concept implying the unification of things which are originally heterogeneous, the idea of *hoyi* is one of recovery of the oneness or the identity of things which at the outstart is an indivisible whole. The fact that in China the people's commune has always been understood in terms of *chêngshê hoyi* and never referred to as *chêngshê t'ungyi* constitutes a significant hint as to the nature of the commune. To put it differently, the term "unity" neither implies merging of the authority of the commune with state power nor the absorption of government authority by the commune. The Chinese regard the power of the people's commune, which arises from the fundamental rights of the people living in the commune, to be the very governing authority befalling upon the commune and the people. It is probably in this sense that the commune has been termed the "basic organization of the socialist state power."

As already been pointed out, the structure and activities of the commune is subject to various influences of the actual situation. Certainly, our description of the people's commune so far goes no further than being an abstract concept. Without understanding this concept, however, it would be difficult, for instance, to appreciate why the Chinese have translated *jênmin kungshê* as the "people's commune," which has highly significant political meaning.

We must now pose a question, what is meant by the phrase "the people's commune is the basic organization of the state power"? Still further, what is the power that arises from the commune? In the people's commune encompassing all phases of the people's living in the region, from agriculture and industry to education and military affairs, the people will, in principle, be equal members of the commune, equally participating in the affairs of the commune.

The people's commune in China is not, however, a "Shangrila," where perfection prevails in static, eternal continuity. The organization exists in midst of changes, in a dynamic process of socialist construction. The people's commune is and will be constantly forced to adopt itself to changing political environment, through the course of which contradictions inherent in the types of social organization would develop from time to time. Of the prime importance to future of the state is to be able to deal with such contradictions in the right manner.

At the time that the communes began to develop to their full-fledged form covering a broad range of activities concerning just about all areas of the life of the populace, ex-landlords and comparatively rich farmers often made their ways into leadership positions in the management of the communes. These masters of the old agricultural society had an advantage over the ordinary populace in the cultural and educational backgrounds that they carried over from the old society. This trend was strengthened still further with a succession of natural disasters and setbacks in the policies of the people's communes. In no time this gave rise

to creation of a privileged, managerial stratum as well as to the kind of corruption and degeneration that almost inevitably accompanies such situation. The result was the contradiction between the equality of the commune members on the surface and their real inequality. What the so-called "four purge" movement, which began in 1963, pointed out was the corruption that was born of this contradictory situation.

As stated earlier, the power of the people's commune theoretically descends from the people living therein. For realization of this basic notion the people's commune must be managed not on the basis of superficial "equality" but rather in the interest of poor and lower-middle farmers. Accordingly an association of poor and lower-middle class peasants was established within each commune to resolve the already noted contradiction, and to place the commune movement in the right direction. In addition the association also supplied much needed internal energy to drive the commune movement forward.

Departing from the fundamental concept of the people's commune, on which I have seemingly dwelled too far, I would like to discuss the role the Communist Party of China had played through a decade of turmoil in the commune movement. A thought will also be given on what the relationship would be like in future between the party and the commune movement.

III. BETTER TROOPS AND SIMPLER ADMINISTRATION

Throughout the Great Leap Forward and the "period of adjustment" the Chinese Communist Party took firm leadership in all activities of the country including that of the people's communes. This is evident in the "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes," which stated, "In running a people's commune well the fundamental question is to strengthen the leading role of the Party" [4, p. 501]. Still, the people's commune probably created a lot of complex problems concerning the party leadership. The people's commune is not only a social organization governing the life of populace but also a basic unit of the state power structure. This if an element of corruption, or deviation from the essential nature of the commune is allowed in, it is likely to stay unchecked. The situation in which the party organization allowed the advances of the old landlord and rich farmers into the managerial ranks can be said to be an indication of the problem involved. The people's commune movement, under the influence of ex-landlords and rich farmers, took undesirable turn, especially with the harsh condition of three consecutive years of natural disaster. Furthermore, international political environment became severe especially with the exacerbation of Sino-Soviet antagonism around 1960. Under such conditions it is by no means surprising that each of three basic units of China's social structure—the commune, the production brigade, and the production team—acted in a self-centered way in search of its own *modus vivendi*. Considering its position of leadership in constructing socialism, the Communist Party should have clearly checked the spreading decadence, represented by the trend toward "do-as-you-please type freedom" and *tankanfeng* or the attitude of working privately. The Central Committee of

the party should have foreseen the situation and seen to it that its own policies were carried out thoroughly. Instead what actually emerged in the "adjustment period" was the opposite policy of liberalization, depicted by the "three freedom and one contract" policy (more private occupation of land, more free markets, more private enterprises, and farm production by contract with individual farmers), and a shrinking of the function of the people's commune. The people's commune, which was supposed to be the comprehensive organization covering all phases of people's living, began to lose its function as regards industrial, commercial and educational activities through frequent consolidation, and degradation in size. Likewise, the basic unit of management shifted downward from the commune to the production team, and the commune showed a marked tendency to become simply the basic organization for agricultural production. The degeneration of the people's commune movement, indicated by above-given symptoms, led to mounting concerns within the party against the maladministration by the "ruling faction."

I do not intend to go into the "Liu Shao-chi line" itself or the actual course that the Great Cultural Revolution followed. Nor should it be necessary to do so. The essence of the Cultural Revolution primarily rests in the relationship between the party and the nature of the people's commune.

Above all, the Cultural Revolution was a struggle to wrest power from the "ruling faction," concurrently rectifying the party by so doing. For this purpose it was indispensable that the masses outside the party rise up and lend hand to oust the ruling faction. This is why the revolutionary committees based on the "three-in-one" principle appeared upon the scene.

Nevertheless, a note must be taken that the campaign for party rectification through the Cultural Revolution was certainly not just aimed at purifying the party and ridding it of tainted elements, or revising the party organization. Another important purpose of the campaign was a reconsideration of the Communist Party's role in Chinese society and of the terms governing the party's existence. The Constitution of the Communist Party adopted by the Ninth National Congress of CCP in April 1969 stated, in Chapter 1: "The Communist Party of China . . . is *the core of leadership* of the Chinese people" (italics added) [5]. Chapter 2, Article 2 of the same Constitution stipulates that "an applicant [for the party membership] must be . . . examined by Party branch, which must seek the opinion of the broad masses inside and outside the Party" [5]. These statements prescribe a process in which the party itself is thrust back into the masses, into society. What can be seen here is a stipulation that the party be the "core" of leadership of the people's activities, and an attempt to have this core arise from amidst the people.

Of course, all parties must seek the support of the people. The Chinese Communist Party has repeatedly stressed the principle of "mass-line" and the importance of people's support in the evolution of its political movements. One danger that exists is that the party organization may turn itself into a mere power structure and the party be equated to the state. This certainly is one demonic feature of the type of political system. To avert the danger of the party estranging

from the masses, the Chinese Communist Party took the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" during the Great Cultural Revolution.

As well known "better troops and simpler administration" has been a basic policy stressed more than any other in reconstruction of the Chinese Communist Party. A policy adopted by the Ninth National Congress of CCP reads, "Eliminate duplication in the administrative structure, follow the policy of 'better troops and simpler administration' and organize itself into a revolutionalized leading group which maintains close ties with the masses" [6]. There have been numerous reports of action along this line. It will not be necessary to give a detailed account of actual examples of such action in the people's communes throughout China. Let it suffice to say that Lingpao County in Honan Province was designated a model case with regard to the policy. Also at the Luchiao People's Commune in the outskirts of Shanghai, the commune administrative committee then having twelve organizational units was reorganized and simplified into the commune revolutionary committee with only three organizational units. Likewise, the number of committee members was reduced from thirty to eleven in the course of change.

However, the basic point of debate with regard to the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" probably does not lie in the reorganization and consolidation of administrative structure and simplification of office work, but rather in contraction of administration itself, that is, in transferring substantial part of government administration to the masses. The famous "Tachai formula" gives a hint as to just how it can be done.

In the Tachai People's Commune, it is reported, the labor grading system which, up to the time of reform, classified various labor into over ten categories, was simplified to include only four grades. Similarly, daily reporting of labor points was altogether abolished and, substituted by yearly evaluation to be determined by open discussion among the populace. Needless to say, actual implementation of such simplification varies according to each region and to each commune. In any event, the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" means in essence a simplification by shifting of the administration work itself to lower levels, and implicit in this is a transfer of the administrative power to base levels, to the populace. This works as a guarantee that the party will not turn into a bureaucratic power structure. The policy is at the same time a key for the vivacious combination of leadership by the party with the spontaneity of the masses.

It would seem that the consolidation of the Communist Party through the Great Cultural Revolution is in good conformity with the political principle that we have already discussed—that of "unity of government administration and commune management." It is clear that the party and the revolutionary committee are two separate things. While one is a totally united organization guaranteeing the dictatorship of the proletariat, the other is an organization of regional revolutionary representation. The party leadership applies not only to the people's commune but to all activities of China at various levels. It seems to me, however, that what has appeared through the Great Cultural Revolution is a movement to

root the party thoroughly in the masses. Behind the Cultural Revolution was an intention to make a thorough switch in the flow of political initiatives—initiatives coming from the masses and not from the top. What the party is trying to attain might be said best relates to laying the direction for the future course of Chinese society. What is intended here above all is the unfolding of a movement generated from the lives of the general populace and especially poor and lower-middle farmers, and the termination of a practice to merely follow instructions from upper party organs.

Of course, we cannot understand the complex and dynamic political situation just in terms of such abstract concept alone. For instance, there is the outstanding role the Liberation Army played in the Great Cultural Revolution. In the bewildering political situation in which the party itself was being dismantled, Mao Tse-tung could actually rely upon only the Liberation Army. It is thus difficult to predict what specific role the Liberation Army will play in future. Admitting this difficulty in making forecast of the future development, what I am trying to determine is the direction of politics the Chinese are following and the meaning of such direction. If the people's commune stands for "unity of government administration and commune management" and if such has been confirmed through the Great Cultural Revolution, would it not then suggest the future course of Chinese politics?

IV. NEW TYPE OF STATE

The most concrete morphological change in Chinese society that has become evident in the course of the Great Cultural Revolution is that related with the "unity of government administration and commune management." Examples of such change are the running of primary and middle schools by production brigades and people's communes, the revival of commune industries, and establishment of the "cooperative medical care system" in which "barefooted doctors" play the central role. These revolutionary trends can be said to show what a comprehensive social organization covering "industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and military affairs" should be like. This being the case, then, there is another fundamental question, what is the relationship between the people's commune and the state?

Traditionally the state has been conceived in terms of its function as a structure embracing the whole life of the people in its territory. Putting aside the almost innumerable issues concerning the "theory of the state," such as, for instance, the essential character of the state, the form of government, and class antagonism, it can at least be said that the state guarantees the unity of the life of the people living within its boundaries or that it is a unified system for guaranteeing the same. In present-day society, the function as well as the organization of the state is becoming greater and greater.

Is it not true, however, that the people's commune has the characteristics which are at least potentially different from that of a traditional state organization? Concepts such as "unity of government administration and commune manage-

ment" and "better troops and simpler administration" clearly run counter to the course of evolution of modern states.

In a word, it seems to me that these concepts include a meaning constituting a challenge to giant states. The use of such an expression might seem strange for China, with a vast territory and a population of 700 million, now making its appearance on the international stage as the third great power, after the United States and the Soviet Union. But what I am getting at here is not the size or strength of a nation, but a problem of gigantic and overgrown bureaucratic structure. It should not be necessary to discuss here the special features of modern states. The hypertrophy of the administrative structure, the trend toward enormous and complex ruling mechanism, and extreme centralization of power are all already being experienced in countries of all geographical sizes and all ideologies. In this sense, this is a problem that should be understood in terms of the relationship between the government structure and each human being within the state.

Already, Chinese society is beginning to show some new signs. In the field of economics, commune industries are tied with an agricultural base. We cannot go into this matter in detail, but what is seen there is not a separation of agriculture and industry, and one-sided promotion of industry and urbanization in the process of modernization, but rather an attempt to relate agriculture and industry organically, to cause circulation of products for truly mutual benefits [7]. Expressing it in general terms, it seems to me that this attempt has on its basis a fundamental goal of New China, "abolition of the three great differences"—between cities and farm villages, industry and agriculture, and physical labor and mental labor. Accordingly the Chinese industrial development is something entirely new that is consciously opposed to the "modernization," that tended to make acute these three differentials.

There is yet another problem that we must consider here. As we have already seen, the commune is a basic unit of the state power. Then is there not going to be a conflict arising between the commune as the basic unit of administrative power and the state as the unifying organ of administrative powers? The establishment of the people's commune, as the name symbolizes, has been a movement backed up by a Marxist ideal. Probably as long as the situation continues in which the poor and the lower-middle peasants in the commune have not yet been fully liberated, it will be necessary to continue promoting the commune movement with the aim of realizing this ideal. In this sense, then, the future of the movement depends on how long this ideal is maintained. For the realization of any ideal, on the other hand, that ideal must be backed up by actual historical conditions. Does Chinese society possess such conditions to carry forward the commune movement in future?

The traditional character of Chinese society has generally been described in terms of the "divergence between state and society" or the "divergence between politics and society." Certainly "political society" and "ordinary society" have been divorced from one another, and it would not be an overstatement to say that "bureaucratic society" and "agricultural, industrial, and commercial society"

have constituted almost entirely different layers in traditional Chinese society. Many theories on Chinese society have been advanced, considerable number of which to explain these characteristics. And these theories on traditional Chinese society clearly had in mind the features of "modern states" as a frame of reference in comparing and pointing out the differences or the special characters of Chinese society. Most probably, these theories have unconsciously assumed that China would follow the course of Western world in which modern states were formed by integrating "society" by the "state."

In actuality, however, the Chinese revolution has by no means shown a direction of political integration of "society" by the "state." As the history of the event indicates, the Chinese revolution was achieved through "politicization" of society, or more precisely, by bringing a thorough dose of politics to ordinary society, and particularly to farming society, which until then had been isolated from political society. The establishment of base areas in the course of revolution meant such a state of affairs, and the People's Republic of China was established by integrating such base areas. In this sense the formation of the new Chinese state has been clearly different from that of other states. Lin Piao once stated in his thesis appearing in *Hungch'i* that the New China has its prototype in the liberated areas [1]. Lin Piao's statement manifests the essence of the Chinese revolution and the formation of the Chinese state. In this light, the formation of the People's Republic of China is quite distinct from that of the Soviet Union as well. The Chinese revolution was not achieved by seizing already unified political power. Neither was it the case that the revolution was spread through the country and the revolutionary power structure consolidated by acquiring control of such state power. In China the class struggle did not go on at the central level of power. Quite contrary, a thorough political struggle was carried out at the level of ordinary society. The class struggle took place in a minutely compartmentalized fashion in the basic cells of the social tissue.

Of course one should avoid making imprudent comparisons of the Chinese and Soviet revolutions, for between the two there exists a difference with regard to innumerable important historical conditions and social factors. However, if we limit ourselves to the special character of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution, it should be possible to say that the nature of the basic units of power, that is, base areas, liberated areas, and the people's communes at the base level of Chinese society, unfolds a form of existence of society that is more indigenous and more stable. It seems to me that the degree of unity and strength in China is not measured simply by the qualities of the central government. China's real strength seems to exist in fusion of minutely fractionalized power distributed throughout the basic units of Chinese society.

V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps I have gone too far in grasping China's political form in its orientation alone or have paid too much attention to just its directionality. The problem of the giant state is one that has almost inevitably been brought about above all by

such factors as advancement of science and technology, increasingly complex and intricate social life, and the highly technical nature of civilization. When confronted with such modern reality, do state structure and political form of the People's Republic of China have any choice but to be inevitably caught up in the torrent of this change? Do not the state planning and its implementation also require the expansion of state structure? Furthermore, is it not true that the people's commune can find its basis of existence only in agricultural society?

The answers to these questions will not be forthcoming until the actual future course of events becomes evident. In this sense, then, it is impossible to make a firm prediction here. However, the very reason I have presented this discussion notwithstanding this future uncertainty is that I have considered that China chose very consciously a unique course of development of society with firm intention of averting undesirable effects of "modernization" or "industrialization," especially those associated with hypertrophous state administrative structure. In view of the difficulty in reshuffling an established structure, the following statement seems very suggestive: "If the Great Cultural Revolution had been delayed by another ten years, a new choice as to the industrial system would have been extremely difficult" [7].

Emerging New China will require strenuous efforts made all the way from the central level to the local level and from planning to implementation for adhering as much as possible to the principle of "better troops and simpler administration." And by "relegating" power, efforts will be made to elicit initiatives of the people in all regions and sectors. What these efforts seek is certainly not the unity of government in appearance but rather in substance. These will be efforts to root the government unity in the internal structure of China, thereby giving an important challenge to a currently accepted concept of modern society.

At the beginning of this discussion, I set out to consider the meaning of the dynamic political situation in China beginning with the Great Cultural Revolution and continuing into the subsequent course of events. I also attributed the real difficulty standing in the way of understanding the Great Cultural Revolution to the paradoxical arrangement of such concepts as "rebellion is justified" and "better troops and simpler administration." And by attributing the paradox to the unique course of formation of the People's Republic of China, we have at least furnished a clue as to the meaning of the Chinese political developments which emerged through the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps I have treated far too insufficiently the concrete aspects of such specific organizations as the Communist Party, the Liberation Army, and the revolutionary committees. Still, it seems to me, looking back on the past half century of Chinese history, that what is important is an understanding of China not in terms of structure, but above all in terms of movement, that is, not in terms of system, but rather in terms of motion.

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