

THE NATURE OF THE "THREAT OF CHINA"

—A Japanese View—

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A China with nuclear capabilities is one of the big problems in international politics in East Asia. Some of the politicians in Japan feel the threat, and are trying to cope with it by closer ties with the United States. The "threat," however, must be analyzed from the aspects of both China's capabilities and her intentions. By analyzing China's past behavior, the writer deduces that China's main objective seems to be the "liberation of Taiwan," and not mere expansionism or simple security. On the basis of this understanding, the writer concludes that the "threat" comes from the Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan and from ideological or psychological warfare. It is concluded, therefore, that closer ties with the U.S. is not good for the peace and security of Asia. Better communications, the solution of the Taiwan problem and better domestic policies, it is suggested, are essential for this purpose.

I. WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING THE "THREAT OF CHINA"

There is the following passage in the Joint Communique issued by American President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Satō in November, 1967.

"They noted the fact that Communist China is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the importance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China."

This statement is extremely vague. However, the national security and defense policies which Prime Minister Satō has recently and consistently pursued seem to stand on the understanding that such "threats" do exist, and to aim at strengthening the credibility of America's nuclear umbrella to counter the "threats" from Communist China, through closer ties with America's strategic setup. Such a plan inevitably receives strong resistance from various circles in Japan. As a matter of fact, the recent session of the Diet was called the Security Diet session, or the Defense Diet session, and it is only natural that questions and answers on the security issue are being actively exchanged.

However, despite the fact that the debates in the Diet contain some fruitful discussions, it seems hard to say that the main point of what is meant by "threats from Communist China" has been fully probed and clarified. When methods of national security are discussed, there should be consideration as to from what threats these methods are supposed to defend

Japan. Consequently, if there are to be discussions on methods of ensuring Japan's security, it should be necessary to probe more deeply into what is meant by the "threats from Communist China" mentioned in the U.S.-Japan Joint Communiqué. As for the "threats" referred to here, it seems safe to define these as a situation in which actions which will endanger one or all of such rights as the very physical existence of the Japanese people, their economic prosperity or the determining of their own political system, are actually being taken or there are strong prospects of such actions being taken. Such threats are usually considered as coming from outside. However, they could exist within the country, too. The question here is whether such threats will come from China or not.

There has been a tendency to discuss the threat from China mainly from the aspect of her military capabilities, especially its nuclear capabilities. Viewed from this aspect, the following argument can be traced: Between 1968 and 1970, China will probably become capable of making a nuclear attack against its neighboring nations, including Japan. Also, by around 1972, she will probably come to have the capabilities, although elemental, of making nuclear attacks against the American mainland.¹ Since China has these capabilities, it may come to harbor intentions of actually attacking Japan or America. From this arises the concept of a nuclear deterrent, that is, of preventing the Chinese from coming to have such intentions, by indicating the intention and capabilities of making retaliatory attacks against the China mainland, if China were to make such attacks. When considered in the light of this argument, the "threats of China" do exist, but, since America's nuclear deterrent will be in force, Japan's security will be guaranteed. Thus, the conclusion is that, if America's nuclear deterrent power were to be weakened for some reason or other, Japan would also be confronted with the "threat of China," and that therefore, Japan should cooperate in the strengthening of America's nuclear deterrent power.

The foregoing shows, in simple terms, the concept of trying to counter the "threat of China" with a deterrent power, by understanding the threat from the aspect of China's capabilities. The actual argument is not as simple as this, but this is sufficient for our discussion at this point. In the argument presented here, there are two important premises. One is that when there exists a possibility, it should be coped with as a probability or inevitability. Consequently, such a question as the "intentions" of China as to how it is planning to use its capabilities, or the question of "national objectives" is abstracted. However, the question of "intentions" is not completely disregarded. From this arises the second premise. This is the premise that the Chinese leaders will act rationally. If the Chinese leaders were mad, then the strategy of deterrent would not be applicable to China. If China were to become obsessed by the tenacious idea of destroying Tokyo at all costs, regardless of the price it must pay, after it completes effective

¹ This is an estimate given in a report by The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States which was published in August, 1967.

IRBM's, then it would not be possible to deter it in any way. There does not exist a 100-percent effective ABM system, and furthermore, such a system is not likely to be possible in the future either.

There is an argument that even though China does not have missiles, it has the capability of completely destroying America now that it has come to possess hydrogen bombs. Stuart Alsop has written a fantasy about hydrogen bombs, equipped with delayed action mechanisms and disguised as shipments of shrimp, being shipped to all the major cities in the United States by trucks, and completely wiping out America.² In this fantasy, the Soviet Union is also completely destroyed by nuclear retaliatory power unleashed by the United States, which mistakes the bombs for an attack from the Soviet Union.

Consequently, if the leaders of China were to become mad, then the conclusion may be that there is no way to counter the "threat from China" except by a preventive war. The concept of deterrent strategy, on the other hand, is based on the premise that the leaders of China are rational, and that therefore, even if they were to harbor the intent to attack, they could be induced to change through rational calculations. When viewed in the above way, this concept of a deterrent strategy can be said to be taking "intentions" into account to the extent of trusting the "rationality" of Chinese leaders, while not taking "intentions" into account in considering for what "purpose" China may use its capabilities. This kind of an approach cannot be said to contain a real analysis of the "threat of China," because it is not possible to see whether the "threat" actually exists or not, unless one studies both of a nation's capabilities and what objectives it aims at attaining with its capabilities. In the nuclear age, if capabilities alone are considered, even super-powers will not be able to rest for a moment. It is necessary for them to confirm each other's intentions at all times, through mutual communication.

Sufficient communication does not exist with China. Furthermore, even if there were such communication, it would not be possible to obtain complete information concerning China's "national objectives" and its "intentions" based on them. It is also not possible to discuss objectives and intentions in a vacuum, separated from actual capabilities and power relations. Thus, it is not possible to reject studies made solely from the aspect of capabilities, premised on the other side's rationality, as completely meaningless. However, it would be extremely dangerous if policies were formulated on the basis of such considerations alone. Trying to choose the best from the worst conceivable results may appear extremely rational when viewed from the standpoint of one nation, but when viewed from the standpoint of the common interests of two nations, it will rather lead to irrational results, as indicated by the example of the prisoner's dilemma in the theory of games.

Consequently, in order to analyze more deeply what is meant by the "threat of China," and in order to discuss measures for Japan's security, it

² Although, I used the term fantasy, it is based on statements made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler at a Senate Meeting; See *Reader's Digest*, March, 1968 (an abridged article from the *Saturday Evening Post*).

is necessary to study what objectives China has and how it intends to use its various capabilities.

II. CHINA'S EXTERNAL OBJECTIVES

One of the big reasons why the nature of the "threat of China" has not been fully clarified so far probably lies in the fact that there were few materials on which to judge what China's objectives toward other countries are not with what intentions she is dealing with the outside world.³ This is because China's statements can be interpreted in various ways, and because there was no way to ascertain the true intentions of China. Consequently, there is probably no one who can state with conviction what China's objectives are. Therefore, the only thing that we can do is to try to uncover an interpretation with the highest logical conformity, which will enable the co-ordinated linking together of multiple phenomena, on the basis of as many materials as we can gather together.

The interpretation thus discovered will still be nothing more than one interpretation, one hypothesis. Therefore, it will be necessary to check it constantly against new materials, and to make it compete with other interpretations in terms of logical conformity. The argument to be developed below is proposed as one such interpretation. Through the cumulation of these efforts, I think it will be possible to come closer to the answer to the question of what are the "threats of China."

It is possible to consider one nation's objectives toward the outside world in long-range, medium-range and short-range terms. A long-range objective means a basic principle or ideal which a nation will pursue over a period of several dozen years, or even over a period of several hundred years. A medium-range objective is a target which a nation will pursue for a period of several years to several dozens of years, in order to realize its long-range goal, so long as there is no major change in the objective situation. A short-range objective is a goal which is aimed at directly by a nation in its actual moves, in order to realize the medium-range objectives. Here, we will take up China's medium-range objectives, in connection with the question of the "threat of China." This is because it is its medium-range objectives which are actually determining and controlling China's actions in reality. Of course, there may be a plurality of medium-range objectives. It should be considered that several medium-range goals will be pursued at the same time. If there should arise contradictions or conflicts among the various objectives, then it is considered that the problem of priority will appear to some degree. Through a study of actions actually taken by China in the past, let us try to deduce the medium-range objectives, which are given a high priority by the

³ An experimental study of trying to discern intentions from published materials was done by Prof. Etō of the University of Tokyo and the author. See Shinkichi Etō & Tatsumi Okabe, "Content Analysis of Statements in Regard to Japan Made by the People's Republic of China," *The Developing Economies*, III-1 (March 1965).

Chinese leaders.

Let us list several items which are often pointed out as the medium-range objectives of China toward the outside world.⁴

- I. Overseas expansion
 - (a) Promotion of world revolution
 - (b) Acquiring of territory, resources and markets
- II. National security ("threats from America")
- III. Establishment of its position in international society

Let us next study these items, which are generally pointed out as China's medium-range objectives, in the light of China's actual moves, and see whether they are really being given high priorities by Chinese policy-makers.

Let us start with I-(a), which is the promotion of world revolution. It is clear that Chinese leaders attach very great importance to the promotion of world revolution. For China, lasting peace will be attained only after imperialism has been overthrown and a world revolution realized.⁵ Therefore, it is clear that China regards world revolution as its long-range objective. However, the question which must be considered at this juncture is whether the promotion of world revolution is determining China's actual moves, whether it is a medium-range objective. The Soviet Union has not taken down the signboard of world revolution as a long-range objective. However, its medium-range objectives are peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition, and as far as can be judged from its practical actions, few elements of directly pushing forward revolution are to be seen. China criticizes this attitude of the Soviet Union as revisionism which has succumbed to imperialism, but what is the actual situation in China itself?

Lin Piao's treatise entitled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War"⁶ serves a large number of purposes, but within it is clarified the basic principle of a strategy for a world revolution, as envisaged by the leaders of China. One of them is the famous principle of "the rural areas of the world encircling the cities of the world." This expression is excellent as a catchphrase, and for this reason, it has become very famous. However, its meaning is not necessarily anything particularly new. It is a well-known fact that, ever since the Sino-Soviet controversy, China sees very great significance in the national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which it regards as the "rural areas of the world."

The second principle, I think, is still more important than the first principle. This is the principle of "self-reliance in a revolution." This principle means that it is not possible to win victory in a revolution in a country unless it is carried out by one's own strength, without dependence on outside help,

⁴ See, for example, A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960; R. G. Royd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962; Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966.

⁵ This is one of the main issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological conflicts.

⁶ Published in the *People's Daily*, Peking, September 3, 1965.

and that without "self-reliance" there can be no strengthening or endurance of the revolutionary regime, even if victory were to be won. This principle is a precept to its own people, on the one hand, and at the same time, it may also justify and explain the Chinese Army's policy of non-intervention in the Vietnam war, at least directly. However, when this is viewed as a strategy for world revolution, the reconfirmation of this principle by China comes to have great significance. That is because it shows that as a principle the role which China can play in revolutions in areas outside of China is nothing more than supplementary, and that "the export of revolutions" is not possible.

The third principle is that revolutions in the "rural areas of the world" should be carried out as new democratic revolutions guided by the proletariat. It is thought that this principle was proposed because of the Sino-Soviet controversy. It seems that the revolutionary strategy in the less developed regions under the Soviet Union's policy line of peaceful competition tends to attach importance to the form of "national democratic states" which will shift to socialism without necessarily being led by the proletariat.⁷ China criticizes this way of thinking as revisionary. However, the Soviet Union refuted this by saying that the anti-American united front pursued by China is actually creating alliances between the Chinese Communists and the aristocratic classes in underdeveloped countries.⁸ The Lin Piao's treatise took up this point in the controversy and reconfirmed that a new democratic revolution led by the proletariat is the correct revolutionary line. This is a clear declaration that all actions which are not taken through the proletariat or the vanguard party, no matter how revolutionary they may appear, do not lead to revolution. This point is of special importance when considering the goal of China's Asian policy.

The above three principles can be said to constitute China's strategy for world revolution as indicated in the Lin Piao's treatise. If China considers a world revolution a medium-range objective with a high priority, then China's actual moves must be in conformity with these principles. In actuality, however, there are many actions which are not in conformity with these principles. One outstanding example of this can be seen in China's friendly relations with Pakistan and Cambodia.⁹ Although, externally, these nations are anti-American forces, internally, they are reactionary or conservative, and are suppressing revolutionary forces. Consequently, if China gives primary consideration to revolutions in these countries, it could not take policies which support the governments of Pakistan and Cambodia. Of course, it is

⁷ For this concept see B. Ponomarev, "O Gosudarstve Natsional'noi Demokratii" (On National Democratic State), *Kommunist*, 1961, No. 8.

⁸ "Otkrytoe Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuzu Partiinykh Organizatsiiam, Vsem Kommunistam Sovetskogo Soiuzu" (An Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Party Organizations and All the Communists of the Soviet Union), July, 14 1963.

⁹ The relations between China and Cambodia worsened during 1967, but friendly relations on a somewhat less stable basis were resumed after Chou En-lai sent a letter to Prince Sihanouk.

possible to conceive of an argument that if anti-American forces are strengthened, America, the stronghold of world imperialism, will be weakened, and that this will contribute to a world revolution. In that case, however, world revolution becomes a long-range objective, to be pursued by round-about tactics, and it will have to be considered that there exist other medium-range objectives. Furthermore, the pursuit of a world revolution in such a form can only be considered a secondary policy line, judging from the aforementioned three basic principles concerning a world revolution.

In India and Burma, which have lost their value as anti-American forces, China is supporting anti-government armed struggles.¹⁰ It is very doubtful, however, whether these struggles, which are far removed even from the policy line of the left-wing of the Indian Communist Party,¹¹ can become the main force for pushing forward an Indian revolution. In Japan, too, while it may be natural for China to support and encourage the anti-JCP Three-Faction Alliance of Zengakuren (National Federation of Students Self-Government Associations) today when the Communist Parties of Japan and China are in confrontation, it must be noted that, even at the time of the anti-Security Treaty struggles in 1960 when the Communist Parties of Japan and China were in very friendly relations, China praised the "adventurist activities"¹² of the anti-JCP Zengakuren.¹³ It is also said that one of the causes for the split between the Japan Communist Party and China was China's attempts to force armed struggles on the Japan Communist Party.¹⁴ None of these moves is in conformity with the three principles of the strategy for world revolution which is publicly advocated by China and they cannot be regarded as actions, which promote revolution in the respective areas. There must have been some other medium-range objectives which took precedence over a world revolution.

Let us next study I-(b), that is, the objective of acquiring territory, resources and markets. It is often said that China intends to regain lost territories which once belonged to the Ching Dynasty, and which were subsequently seized and partitioned by "imperialism." It can be said that this view is based on the following evidence:

- (1) Mao Tse-tung lists, in his treatise on the "Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Annam as the dominions of China, which were seized and sequestered by "imperialism."¹⁵

¹⁰ See *People's Daily*, July 5 and 6, 1967.

¹¹ See the statement by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), published on *People's Democracy*, Calcutta, September 10, 1967.

¹² From JCP organ, *Akahata* at that time.

¹³ For this problem, see Tatsumi Okabe, "Ampo kaitei hantai undō to Chūgoku" (Anti-Security Pact Movement and China), *Journal of Law and Politics*, Tokyo Metropolitan University, VIII-2 (March 1968).

¹⁴ "Konnichi no Mō Taku-tō rosen to kokusai kyōsanshugi undō" (The Mao Tse-tung's Policy Line Today and the International Communist Movement), *Akahata*, October 10, 1967.

- (2) A map included in a book entitled "A Brief History of Modern China," which was published in 1954, includes, as "lost territories" the areas mentioned above and also Sakhalin, the Maritime Province, a part of Siberia, Thailand and the Malayan Peninsula.¹⁶
- (3) Mao Tse-tung made the statement in July, 1964, that the Soviet Union had seized too much territory.¹⁷

I cannot afford to study these points, one by one now,¹⁸ but it is not possible to conclude from these facts alone that China believes in "irredentism." The passage referred to in (1) is actually omitted in the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung now in print.¹⁹ As for the "Brief History of Modern China," referred to in (2), the Soviet Union is making a big issue of it,²⁰ but it is nothing more than an unofficial publication, and is not an assertion endorsed by other publications or statements by China. The Mao Tse-tung statement mentioned in (3), too, is one which happened to be made when the Sino-Soviet confrontation was sharply intensifying, and especially at a time when an emotional confrontation, just preceding the dismissal of Khrushchev, had sharpened.²¹ Therefore, it is not possible to attach specially great importance to this statement alone. As a matter of fact, it can be said that there has been nothing in the past actions and words of China which indicated territorial demands, except in the cases of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the adjustment of areas in conflict, such as the Sino-Indian and the Sino-Soviet border regions.

In addition, from the thought of Mao Tse-tung, it is not possible to think that China would attach special importance to the "regaining of lost territories." One of the main pillars of the Mao Tse-tung strategy is the concept of a war of annihilation, and this advocates that "the main goal is the annihilation of the enemy forces, rather than the maintaining or the seizing of regions" (the Ten Major Military Principles).²² Furthermore, Mao Tse-tung's ideology attaches very great importance to the minds of the people. It is the people who are important, not territories. If the grasping

¹⁵ *Mao Tse-tung Hsuan Chi* (Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung), Chin Ch's Chi edition, Vol. 1 (1944), p. 68.

¹⁶ Liu P'ei-hua, *Chungguo Chintai Chien Shi* (A Brief History of Modern China), Peking, 1954.

¹⁷ Mao's comments to delegates of the Japan Socialist Party. See *Sekai shūhō*, August 11, 1964.

¹⁸ For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Shinkichi Etō & Tatsumi Okabe, "Chūgoku nashonarizumu to shūhen chiiki" (Chinese Nationalism and the Peripheral Areas), *Keizai ōrai*, April, 1965.

¹⁹ *Mao Tse-tung Hsuan Chi*, Vol. 2 (1952), p. 622.

²⁰ *Pravda*, September 2, 1964.

²¹ See Tatsumi Okabe, "Chu-So tairitsu to Furushichofu kainin" (Sino-Soviet Conflict and Khrushchev's Dismissal), *Aziya kenkyū* (Asian Studies), XIV-1~2 (April and July, 1967).

²² Mao Tse-tung, "Much'ien Hsingshi he Women te Jenwu" (The Present Situation and Our Tasks), 1947, in *Hsuan Chi*, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 1247-1248.

of the people's minds is the question, then it will be carried out either in the form of pushing forward a world revolution, or in the form of peaceful co-existence and friendly relations with her neighbors. It is possible that territorial demands may exist as a latent national sentiment, but it is not possible to think that it is given a high priority as a foreign policy objective in actual practice.

Demands for resources and markets are considered a problem mainly in connection with China's explosive population. It is quite true that the population problem is an important one, the solving of which must be hastened. And, it is often argued that advance into the granary of Southeast Asia, lying to the south of China, and into the untapped areas of Siberia is being considered as a way for settling this problem. This argument, however, must also be regarded as too hasty a judgment. The best method for obtaining the surplus foodstuffs of Southeast Asia for China is peaceful trade, and not territorial or military threats to these areas. If China were to occupy these areas, it would be far from possible to secure the surplus foodstuffs, especially under the present anti-colonial sentiments. And, is it not the leaders of China, who had long suffered under the rule of alien peoples, who know these prospects best? Rather than advance into the undeveloped areas of Siberia, it is far more advantageous in every respect for China to increase its own per acre agricultural production, by further pushing forward industrialization. And, when these endeavors reach their limit, it will also be much more advantageous and easier for China to come to an agreement peacefully and amicable with the Soviet Union. The same thing can also be said about Japan-China relations.

Consequently, overseas expansion based on economic reasons cannot be considered a medium-range foreign policy objective with a high priority, either.

Next, let us consider national security, listed as II. Any independent nation has deep interests in the security of the country. Especially, when, as in the case of China, it is in confrontation with America and encircled by a network of American military bases, it is natural for it to feel the danger of "aggression" from America and to have a strong desire to cope with it. Considered from the aspect of capabilities, the "threat of America" viewed from China's position must be incomparably greater than the "threat of China" viewed from America's or Japan's position. It can also be said that the "threat of the Soviet Union" must be great, too. Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" can be regarded as an expression of a deep concern for the security of China, under this state of overwhelming inferiority.

Consequently, there can be no doubt that the desire for national security is being given a high priority as a medium-range objective in China's foreign relations. However, if China's objectives in foreign relations are considered solely as defensive in this way, then it will be impossible to explain some of China's actions. One conspicuous example of this is its relations with the Soviet Union. Since it is considered that there are serious threats from America, a split with the Soviet Union would have to be avoided at

any cost, despite the existence of every possible ideological confrontation, if security considerations are given primary importance.²³ Also, in relations with America, if the primary consideration is the question of security, it should naturally have explored more positively means for easing tension even though it may remain guarded, because of distrust for America's intentions. Nevertheless, China rejects this Soviet-type policy toward the United States. Viewed in this way, it is possible to say that, although considerations for security are given a high priority, they still take a subordinate position, compared with some other objectives.

The third point to be considered is China's objective of establishing her position in international society. If China is seeking something more than simple security, then is it this objective of establishing its position in international society? It is true that if China's international status rises, it will be able to create a situation indirectly advantageous for a world revolution by assuming the role of the champion of the suppressed nations. Also, by having a louder voice in settlements of conflicts and in negotiations with America, its security will be further strengthened.

However, when China's actions are carefully studied, it becomes clear that she is not aiming merely at improving her international status. If China had accepted the principle of "two Chinas," it could have secured a seat in the United Nations a long time ago, and she might already have come to carry considerable weight in international society. Furthermore, her policies toward Asian and African nations have not helped increase her prestige, and many of these policies have had the effect of deepening China's isolation. Consequently, the desire to improve her international position seems to have been subordinated to some other objectives.

When viewed in the foregoing way, it seems to me that either one or all of the items which are usually pointed out as China's objectives in foreign relations, that is, overseas expansion (promotion of a world revolution, and expansion for territories, resources and markets), security, and improvement of her international position, fail to explain China's actions fully. It seems that an unknown objective, one which is not limited merely to the national security or the improvement of her international status, but one which does not go as far as overseas expansion, is being given topmost priority among China's medium-range objectives. One cannot state definitely what this unknown objective is. This author personally thinks that the demand for the "liberation of Taiwan" may correspond to this unknown objective.

Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated on various occasions that they will regain Taiwan, its "sacred territory," without fail.²⁴ They are trying to block

²³ The confrontation between Lin Piao and Lo Jui-ching is considered to have been over these questions of security and relations with the Soviet Union. See Tatsumi Okabe, "Chūkyō no senryaku shisō" (Strategic Thoughts of Communist China), *Gaimushō chōsa geppō* (Foreign Ministry Research Bulletin), VIII-3 (March 1967).

²⁴ One of the recent confirmations of this point is the editorial of *People's Daily* of June 27, 1966.

the realization of "two Chinas," resorting to every possible measure. In relations with Japan, too, it is always the Taiwan question over which the Chinese become extremely sensitive.²⁵ It is certain, therefore, that China attaches great importance to the "liberation of Taiwan" and "opposition to two Chinas." On the other hand, however, there are also questions as to how high a priority China gives to this question. This is an impression arising from the fact that ever since 1958, China has generally kept peace in the Taiwan Straits, and also from the feeling that the bombardment against Quemoy, which is still being continued every other day, may be a put-up affair.

Nevertheless, the meaning that Taiwan has for China is extraordinarily important. It is certainly true that, militarily and economically, the value of Taiwan is not worth making the liberation of Taiwan the highest priority medium-range objective. However, that is only a judgment arrived at from an on-looker's sense of value. For the completion of the Chinese Revolution, which has a strong coloring of an anti-imperialist revolution, the liberation of her own "sacred territory," which was first seized by Japanese imperialists, and next "occupied" by "American imperialists," has great importance and considered indispensable. Furthermore, unlike her position with regard to the liberation of Hong Kong, which has also been seized by imperialists, China is in a passive position in Taiwan. Hong Kong can be liberated at any time, once China makes up her mind to do so, and it can be said that it is being left as it is now, because of China's own convenience. China is in an active position in Hong Kong. However, the Korean War broke out just on the eve of the liberation of Taiwan, and because of the U. S. 7th Fleet's intervention in the Taiwan Straits, its liberation has been obstructed. The leaders of China, like all other revolutionaries, dislike being in a passive position, and seek activity.²⁶ It is quite natural, when viewed from the standpoint of the Chinese leaders, for them to enthusiastically seek the "liberation of Taiwan," and endeavor, at least, to regain her active position.

However, so long as there remains the overwhelmingly powerful U.S. 7th Fleet, the "liberation of Taiwan" is impossible. Furthermore, if it is left as it is now, Taiwan may be separated from China forever, by the "plot for two Chinas." For this reason, China is intentionally refraining from seizing Quemoy and the Matsu islands, which are very close to the continent, and which can be seized if so intended; by bombarding them every other day, China is demonstrating the fact that the state of combat has not yet ended. If a boundary line is drawn in the middle of the Taiwan Straits, it will rather be disadvantageous for the future "liberation of Taiwan," because it will help formalize a *fait accompli*. In addition to this, under the slogan of opposition to "two Chinas" in all international organs including sports organizations,

²⁵ One of the main obstacles to developing trades between the two counties is the "Yoshida letter" in which the Japanese Government promised the Nationalist Government in Taiwan not to permit deferred payments in trade with the China Mainland.

²⁶ Mao Tse-tung, "Lun Ch'ichiu Chan" (On Protracted War), in *Hsuan Chi*, Vol. 2 (1952).

China is prepared to suffer even the lowering of her own international prestige and even isolation. If considered from the standpoint of being most afraid of "two Chinas" and an "independent Taiwan," there may even arise a kind of common interest with the Nationalist Government, which is also clinging to the principle that "China is one" and that "Taiwan is a territory of China." Therefore, they hold the view that rather than take hasty action and worsen the situation, "it is better to lend Taiwan to Mr. Chiang Kai-shek for the time being."²⁷ The calm in the Taiwan Straits merely shows that the liberation of Taiwan is not a short-range objective, and does not mean that it has low priority as a medium-range objective.

However, these measures in the Taiwan Straits are no more than negative measures. In order to move a step forward and regain an active position, it is necessary to maintain fluidity, which has been lost in the Taiwan Straits, on a global basis, or at least in Asia. Furthermore, China must turn the United States which, as far as the Taiwan Straits are concerned, is "an iron tiger and a real tiger"²⁸ into a "paper tiger." The national liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America are most fully in accord with this purpose. The situations in Asia, Africa and Latin America are far more fluid than in the "cities of the world." The Vietnam war is the focal point. If America were to be driven into a position where it is kept so busy coping with these fluid situations that it has no time for other things, then America will lose her freedom of action, as if "catching ten fleas with ten fingers."²⁹ In this way, the powerful "American imperialism" will be turned into a "paper tiger." Such a situation will be desirable for both the liberation of Taiwan and for the security of China.

For China, which does not have adequate second strike retaliatory capabilities toward America's overwhelmingly powerful nuclear war potentials, the most frightening situation must be an American preventive war. However, if America were to have a difficult time trying to cope with anti-American struggles arising in various parts of the world, then it will not have room to focus attention on China. Consequently, the support of national liberation struggles is an effective method for ensuring the security of China. On the other hand, however, such situations will intensify international tension as a whole. This will have adverse effects on the security of China. Therefore, if primary consideration is given to security, then she should endeavor to increase communications with the United States, aiming at the easing of tension, as already stated. However, so long as the objective of the liberation of Taiwan is given priority, such contacts with America will not be desirable. For China, America is not only an ideological enemy, being the stronghold

²⁷ This was privately expressed by Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders to delegates from Japan in the early 1960's.

²⁸ Mao's comments at Wuhan in 1958. See the explanatory note to "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," in *Hsuan Chi*, Vol. 4 (1960), p. 1190.

²⁹ The editorial of *People's Daily*, January 21, 1964. Also see Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War."

of imperialism and a threat to her security, through its encirclement of China by a network of military bases. It is also an incontrovertible enemy, which is occupying the territory to which China has an inherent right. Toward such an enemy, the only recourse is struggle. Peaceful co-existence would be tantamount to surrender. It is in this sense that China says that the Taiwan question is a "question of principle."³⁰

It is not only because of ideological conflicts, but probably because of the Taiwan question that China is continuing her confrontation with the Soviet Union, even at the price of sacrificing her security interests. The Soviet Union, which does not have many concrete issues of conflict with America, will find peaceful co-existence with the United States (even if it is unequal co-existence) greatly profitable. This is what China cannot tolerate. China criticizes, furthermore, Khrushchev for trying to sell Eisenhower's plan for "two Chinas" to China on the occasion of the National Foundation Day in 1959.³¹ The Soviet Union's lukewarm attitude at the time of the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1958 was another source of great indignation on the part of China.³² It seems that China now feels that the Soviet Union is not only useless in the attainment of China's objectives, but has rather become an obstacle.

It is from the need to maintain this fluidity in the general situation that China is forcing Asian and African nations to maintain national liberation and anti-American struggles, even by violating the three basic principles for world revolution, mentioned earlier. There is no problem when China's advocacy for national liberation and anti-American struggles is compatible with the interests of the revolution in the given area. However, when the interests of the two come to clash, it seems that the interests of the local revolutions are being sacrificed.³³ In the case of the Vietnam war, it seems that China's interest lies in not ending the war. In the case of anti-American Governments in Asia, too, the degree of their opposition to America is not as strong as expected by China. It is through these circumstances that friction arises even between China and the revolutionary and anti-American forces, leading to the further deepening of China's isolation. It can be said that all these arise from China's giving the highest priority to the liberation of Taiwan and her strong desire to seek out anti-American forces which are capable of creating instability.

In the foregoing, we formulate the hypothesis that the "liberation of

³⁰ It is true that China followed a policy of peaceful co-existence from roughly 1952 to 1957. The definition of the situation by the Chinese leaders at that time, however, was different. They seemed to believe that they could liberate Taiwan peacefully through the pressure of a favorable international opinion engendered by a policy of peaceful co-existence. The change in policy in 1958 was caused by the re-evaluation of the situation.

³¹ A statement by the Government of People's Republic of China on September 1, 1963.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Examples of this are the situations in India, Malaya, and Japan.

Taiwan" and "opposition to two Chinas" are the medium-range objectives which are given the highest priority by Chinese leaders. It can be said that even such basic goals as security and the interests of world revolution are being sacrificed partially, at times, if this is considered necessary for the realization of the foregoing objectives.

This interpretation is, of course, nothing more than a hypothesis. However, when compared with other interpretations, which give priority to the various goals that are usually pointed out, it seems to have a higher degree of logical compatibility. It seems possible to say, at least, that no other goals can be pointed out, at this point, which are being pursued even at the sacrifice of the medium-range goal of the liberation of Taiwan. There is one interpretation which says that China's statements concerning "Taiwan" are being made with the aim of maintaining internal tension. However, it is clear, from the Great Cultural Revolution that China has an abundance of means for maintaining internal tension.

The medium-range objectives and their order of priority, as seen from the sense of value of the Chinese leaders, are considered to be explained in the foregoing, but this sense of value can also change. It is possible to change even under the same leadership, depending on changes in the objective situation, and it can also change with a change in the leadership. This is why the internal moves in China must not be disregarded in observing China's various external objectives.

III. WHAT IS MEANT BY THE "THREAT OF CHINA"?

Let us now study what is meant by "China's treat" to Japan, keeping in mind the various factors mentioned in the foregoing. In doing this, we will assume that the various objectives and operational codes,³⁴ which have been surmised from its past actions, will remain unchanged for some time to come. During 1967, there appeared temporarily some trends which were not necessarily in accord with these objectives and operational codes (the so-called "rebellion-has-reasons diplomacy"), but these trends disappeared very soon. China's foreign policy, under the leadership of Chou En-lai, can be regarded as generally maintaining the same characteristics as in the past. The various objectives and operational codes, which managed to survive even the great upheaval of the Great Cultural Revolution, can be assumed to survive in the future, for a considerable period of time to come. It can also be considered safe to assume that the objective situation, that is, the power relations, will continue to change at the present pace. In other words, America's superiority will continue for a considerable time to come, but eventually, it is thought that a state of mutual deterrence will appear among the U.S., the Soviet Union and China.³⁵

³⁴ This may be paraphrased to read "characteristics in behavior patterns." See Shin-kichi Etō & Tatsumi Okabe, "Characteristics of Communist China's Diplomacy," *Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan*, IV-3 (December 1966).

On the basis of the foregoing premises, we will consider first what significance China's nuclear devices will have. As long as America continues to "occupy" Taiwan, confrontation with America will be the supreme order for China. A "peaceful co-existence-type" reconciliation with America is inconceivable unless the objective situation changes (the liberation of Taiwan), or the goals of the Chinese leaders change. However, so long as America maintains overwhelming superiority in nuclear war potential, China's security will be constantly exposed to "threats." The Soviet Union does not support China's goal of "the liberation of Taiwan," and desires to strengthen its own security in the direction of co-operating with the U.S. Consequently, China cannot trust it as an ally. Under such circumstances, if it is to deter America's attacks, using the capabilities she now has, there is no other way but to make America understand that invading American forces will be swallowed up in the great sea of a "people's war," as stated by Lin Piao.⁸⁶

However, this "deterrent" will not necessarily be effective toward nuclear attacks coming from the sky, although it may be effective against aggression from land. It is for this reason that China is developing her own nuclear war potential so that she can deter America's nuclear attacks with her own ability. It is safe to say that China's nuclear devices signify first of all a deterrent against America. This deterrent power will not exist until China completes its invulnerable second strike capabilities which can reach the American mainland. Until that time, China's degree of safety will lessen, in that its nuclear devices will increase the danger of inviting America's preventive attacks. Consequently, China, in the process of nuclear development, has no choice but to become all the more cautious. In this sense, it is quite natural that China should declare, every time it conducts a nuclear test, that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not merely a matter of morality.

Even assuming that China's nuclear deterrent ability is further developed and a state of mutual deterrence is created, China, in the same way, not be able to use its nuclear weapons. In this case, however, not only will China's using of nuclear weapons be deterred, but America's use of nuclear war potential will also be restrained. Therefore, China need not be as afraid of America's nuclear attacks as before, and it will become able to take limited military action with conventional arms in the Taiwan Straits. In this sense, China's nuclear deterrent will be of help for China's two objectives of ensuring security and of liberating Taiwan. In both cases, the meaning of the nuclear capabilities lies in not using and not permitting the use of nuclear devices.

There is a view that before China's nuclear weapons become capable of reaching the American mainland the nations around China will be exposed to its threats. This is what is called the "hostage" strategy.⁸⁷ In other words,

⁸⁵ See Michio Rōyama, "Kaku senryaku no igi to Nihon no shōrai" (The Meaning of Nuclear Strategy and the Future of Japan), *Chūō Kōron*, March, 1968.

⁸⁶ See Okabe, "Chūkyō no senryaku shisō."

⁸⁷ See the testimony by Alice L. Hsieh at the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States in 1967 (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 15, 1968).

China, in pursuing some objective of its own, will threaten her neighboring nations with nuclear weapons, and by using them as "hostages," make America refrain from intervening.

However, there seems to be a considerable amount of criticism against this view, even from the standpoint of deterrent strategy. This is because there is little credibility in such threats, even under the conditions of mutual deterrence, let alone at a time when America holds one-sided superiority. For nuclear threats to be effective, there must be a high degree of possibility that nuclear weapons may be used, or in other words, the threat must have high credibility. However, under any conceivable situations, there seem to be very few conditions under which high credibility could be given to China's nuclear threats. If this is true, then there is little possibility of nearby nations becoming "hostages."

Let us assume, however, that a situation under which China's nuclear threats come to have credibility is created for some reason or other. In such a case, will it be in the interest of China to threaten her neighboring nations? The leaders of the countries bordering on China are mostly anti-Communist, although there are differences in degree. If China were to threaten them with its nuclear devices, they will either align themselves more closely with America in order to cope with such threats, or embark on the course of maintaining their own nuclear armaments. This will be disadvantageous for China's security. It will also only have adverse effects on the strengthening of anti-American forces and on alienating the neighboring countries from America, in order to attain the liberation of Taiwan. Even assuming that there may be leaders of neighboring countries who will yield to China on the surface, relations based on threats cannot be long-enduring relations which China can trust. As seen in the preceding paragraphs, if China is considered to have no territorial demands, except in the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong, and if China can gain biggest economic profits under peaceful relations, this kind of nuclear threats, even if possible, would be meaningless.

If the objects of China's threats are the general masses of the neighboring countries rather than their leaders, the results of the threats would be still more disadvantageous for China. It can be said that threatening with nuclear weapons, which would bring disastrous damages to both friends and enemies equally, is the most unprofitable method for winning the minds of the people, a goal to which China attaches the greatest importance. National liberation and anti-American struggles supported by China are not struggles which can be carried out under China's nuclear threats.

At this point, however, it can be said that the situation in Japan is something of an exception. Among the countries near China, Japan has several special characteristics. One is that the Japanese people are extremely nervous about nuclear weapons. Second, Japan is the most democratic of any of the other neighboring countries, and for this reason, public opinion has a much more stronger influence on Japan's foreign policy. Third, a considerable part of this public opinion is critical of America's Asian policy, and also there is

in some sectors, a feeling of guilt toward China,³⁸ although this feeling is gradually waning.

If China were to use nuclear threats on Japan, there is the strong possibility that it will produce one or the other of the following two results. One is that the Japanese people would receive a big shock, and as a result, strengthen their anti-Chinese attitudes and try to escape the threats by aligning herself still more closely with America. This is a result which is naturally undesirable for China. However, as a second possibility, there is the possibility of the general masses' attributing China's threats to American military bases in Japan and the anti-Chinese attitude of the pro-American Government, and of their engaging in fierce anti-Government and anti-American struggles.³⁹ Among Asian nations, there is no other country where the possibility of such a reaction provides an influential factor. Toward Japan alone, there can be some expectations of nuclear threats producing results. However, even this is a dangerous gamble, and as long as there are other safer and more effective means for the winning of the people's minds, it must be said that the possibility of China's resorting to nuclear threats is small.

Incidentally, the best policy that the Japanese Government can take to make such threats ineffective is to act exactly the opposite of loudly proclaiming "the threat of China" and of taking an unfriendly posture toward it, as it is doing now.

When considered in the foregoing way, it can be said that China's nuclear weapons in the military sense can only have the meaning of deterring America's nuclear power in order to enable China, which is confronting America with the Taiwan Straits as one focal point, to ensure its own security and to liberate Taiwan sometime in the future. Of course, in addition to this, they can be, politically and psychologically, the means of impressing others of the greatness and power of China. They can also strengthen international public opinion that all international agreements which exclude China are meaningless. However, if they are used in an intimidating way, their effectiveness will be lessened in the sense that it will endorse the correctness of the image of China as envisaged by America. It is thought that it is from these considerations that, from the very first nuclear test, China has been carefully avoiding making any statements which could be construed as the brandishing of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, it can be said that there is no reason for Japan, which is not confronting China over the Taiwan Straits, to consider China's nuclear weapons as a threat. The threat arises, not from China's nuclear weapons, but from the confrontation between the United States and China, itself. If Japan were to feel the threat particularly, it should be considered as arising from the fact that Japan is an ally of America, which is in confrontation with China.

³⁸ This is, of course, caused by the memory of Japanese aggression in China in the 30's and 40's.

³⁹ An analogous policy was partly successful during the period of the anti-Security Pact movement in 1960.

It seems that the strengthening of relations with America will have the result of further strengthening the threat.

The next question is whether there is a threat from conventional forces. It is true that, if mutual nuclear deterrence is established between the United States and China, there will appear the possibility of a limited war using conventional arms arising in the Taiwan Straits. But, can conventional forces play a big role in other areas and in other points of conflict? The examples of China's deployment of forces, which immediately rise to our minds, are the Korean War and the Sino-Indian border dispute. Of these two, the Korean War was fought for the purpose of ensuring the security of its own country and to help a friendly nation which was faced with destruction.⁴⁰ In the case of the Sino-Indian border dispute, it was a local and limited dispute, and it used force in order to strengthen its own bargaining power.⁴¹ It is difficult to use these examples as evidence to show "threats from China" toward Japan. As already stated, China does not have any territorial demands other than Taiwan and Hong Kong, and the adjustment of the Sino-Soviet, and the Sino-Indian borders. Its economic demands can be attained much more advantageously through the use of non-military measures. The only remaining cases where China may possibly deploy conventional forces are if Japan become embroiled in a war between the United States and China, or if China aided a revolution or a national liberation struggle in Japan. However, in the latter case, there is the principle of "self-reliance." It should also not be forgotten that there is a tendency among the leaders of China to avoid war, if there is no possibility of winning.

The only occasion in which there is any possibility of China's dispatching its armed forces would be when the following conditions are met: when "a revolutionary regime, which controls a part of the country, is established through civil war and there are definite prospects of the revolutionary regime's winning victory if support is given by China, when the revolutionary regime asks for support, and when the deployment of Chinese forces will not largely endanger its own security, from the standpoint of the international environment." Even in the case of the Vietnam war these conditions are not fully met. In the case of Japan, it should be considered that there will be a possibility of China's moving its armed forces only when Japan itself is engaged in civil war, with the nation completely split into two, and only when other major powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, are in a position in which they will hesitate to intervene, no matter what becomes of Japan. Even then, China will move its troops only if she has such capabilities. Under the present conditions, and in the foreseeable future, this possibility is near zero. It must be said that the possibility is greater that Japan will become embroiled in a Sino-American war.

⁴⁰ A brilliant analysis of the situation was given by Allen S. Whiting in *China Crosses the Yalu*, New York, Macmillan, 1960.

⁴¹ Recall that China was tacitly aiming at securing the Ladakh area in the West in exchange for the compromise at the McMahon line in the East.

When considered in this way, the core of China's Asian policy cannot but become extremely non-military, except her relations with America, and on the Sino-Indian border question (and also possibly on the Sino-Soviet border question). It can be said that the various goals set up by China can be most profitably pursued through operations to win the minds of the peoples of the neighboring nations, rather than through nuclear threats or dispatches of troops outside of her own national borders. China often asserts that it is the human beings and not nuclear weapons which will determine the final outcome of a war. Mao Tse-tung himself also said that "everything is done by man, and ultimate victory in a protracted war can not be attained either, unless attained by man."⁴²

In this way, the leaders of China attach very great importance to these human and subjective factors. They think that if they can win the minds of the people, even the Asian policy of powerful America can be turned into a castle built on sand. They consider the Vietnam war the best example for showing this strength of man. From this standpoint, what they are now pursuing most eagerly in Asia is the agitation of the minds of the people in the direction of fierce anti-American struggles.

Accordingly, if there are "threats from China" toward Japan, it will appear in the form of struggles to win the minds of the Japanese people. This will manifest itself in thought operations and propaganda maneuvers toward Japan, the aim of which will be to fan anti-American struggles to the maximum degree. Whether such activities should be called "threats" or not will become a question of each individual's sense of value. Persons who take the stand that such activities constitute "threats" often call these activities "indirect aggression." But, whatever name is given to these activities, they are actually not "threats from China."

No matter how other countries work upon the people of one's own country, operations from outside cannot have any great influence if there is a stable society in the country and if the Government has a high degree of legitimacy. Conversely, if there is strong dissatisfaction with the Government within a society, just a little activity from outside can become a cause for internal confusion. There are many people who fear subversive activities based on operations from China. However, so long as the people in general do not consider such actions justifiable to any extent, it is simple to suppress such activities.

Thus, the "threats from China" indicated in the expression, "indirect aggression" is not actually a threat coming from China, but a threat contained in the relations of the Government and the people of Japan. It can be said the best resistance to operations from outside in the struggle to win the minds of the people is not military strength or a nuclear umbrella, but the existence of a good Government.

Next, even assuming that China's present medium-range objective with the highest priority is the liberation of Taiwan, there still remains the question

⁴² Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War."

of what will happen after Taiwan is liberated. This is still a question for the future and it is difficult to make any predictions. However, this writer personally thinks that China's medium-range objectives will become centered on world revolution, her own security and peaceful economic development, with hostility toward America gradually declining. If this happens, it is thought that in the pursuit of world revolution China will emphasize "self-reliance" more and more.

This treatise does not aim at diagnosing the means for coping with the "threat from China." It merely attempts to offer a clue to what is meant by the "threat of China." Therefore, it can be said that there is no need to go any further, but let me add a few more words.

As implied in the foregoing, the threats to Japan do not arise from China's nuclear weapons or "indirect aggression," but from international tension stemming from the "Sino-American confrontation" and the absence of a dialogue within Japan. The means of coping with the threats must be discovered through calm and rational discussions. However, the following points are clear: (1) It is necessary to increase communications with China in order to better understand China's intentions and the true cause of tension; (2) The way to contribute to Asian peace and the security of Japan lies in easing the confrontation between America and China, and for this the settlement of the Taiwan question is necessary (not to mention the Vietnam war); and (3) Policies which will split national opinion will decrease national security. Thus, it can be said that emphasizing the "threat from China" and the strengthening of ties with America's nuclear strategy, in disregard of a strong feeling of unease at home, is definitely not an effective means of increasing national security.