CHANGING MUSLIM VIEWS OF ISLAMIC HISTORY AND MODERNIZATION

—An Interpretation of Religion and Politics in Pakistan—

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The subject of this article is a sociological analysis of the *romantic-Islamic* interpretation of Pakistani history. The analysis is made within the historical context of the Restoration (*tajaddud*) Movement of late medieval Islam and the various intellectual movements of Modern Islam in pre-partition Muslim India.

I

Since the latter half of the 19th century, Muslims have developed their own views of Islamic history, distinct from Western approaches[1] to Islamic history, in the process of their awakening to nationalism. Their changing views of Islamic history, then, may be treated as revealing the search for political community in the Muslim nations; and thus the study of modern Muslim views of Islamic history may throw light upon how and where the formation of attitudes regarding and interpretations of modernization takes place.

To Muslims, the rediscovery of their national history, brought about by political change, can be adequately expressed only through the phrase "rediscovery of Islamic history." According to their argument a new Muslim nation is to create its ideological foundation on universal Islamic history, and upon this foundation, is to interpret its history in modern national terms. The ideological formation of a political community is seen as occuring within the evolving process of secular national history; but national history itself is ultimately conceived of within the universal reference of Islamic history. I presuppose here that such a modern Muslim view of Islamic history marks

[1]   Jean-Jacques Waardenburg's *L'Islam dans le miroir de l'Occident, comment quelques orientalistes occidentaux se sont penchés sur l'Islam et se sont formé une image de cette religion* (The Hague, Mouton & Co., 1963) is noteworthy. He analyzed the methods and viewpoints of five outstanding scholars of Western Islamic studies, including I. Goldziher, S. Hurgronje, C. H. Becker, D. B. Macdonald, and L. Massignon. See also B. Lewis and P. M. Holt eds., *Historians of the Middle East* (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), Part II, which is the result of a series of study conferences at the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University held in 1956-1958: this discusses the nature of approaches of the Western scholars towards Islamic history.

a discontinuity with the premodern Muslim view of Islamic history before the 19th century, when there was no need to search for a modern national identity. The new view of history is necessarily to be understood in the context of the development of Muslim nationalism.

Strictly in India and Pakistan, and also to some extent in the Arab Muslim nations, the modern pattern of an idealistic view of Islamic history or totalitarian theorization of it developed only in the period between the two World Wars. The " romantic " character of this view has gradually evolved into a trend towards a " radical-romantic-Islamic " view.[2] Within this context we may notice that " socialist " and " Islamic " ideologies are conceived as co-existent, not opposing.

At the same time, there is a pronounced conceptual distinction between " Muslim " and " Islamic." The latter represents the interpretation which rejects the historical complex of Islamic and non-Islamic values, asserting the superiority of purely Islamic values. This consciousness of the distinction between " Muslim " and " Islamic " implies in turn the political distinction between the " Islamic State " and the " Muslim state," which was and is the crucial issue in the definition of Pakistan's polity.

Although the modern view of Islamic history functions as an ideological force for the reintegration of society, it cannot be concluded that there exists an established fundamental national consensus on the issues of the relation between Islam and the state, or between Islam and society. According to L. Binder's analysis of the issues concerning Islam as raised in the writing of the Pakistan Constitution of 1956,[3] ideological opposition may be found among (1) " *'Ulamā'* traditionalists," (2) "fundamentalists," (3) "*ijmā'* modernists," and (4) "secularists." This opposition no doubt shows a confusion over the question of the legitimacy of the Pakistan State. As President Ayub Khan himself pointed out in his autobiography, *Friends Not Masters* (1967), Islamic ideology has not been accepted as a consensual basis in the nation but rather has tended to contribute to the disintegration of national unity, even though it was declared to be the principle upon which the Pakistan State was founded. This dissension over the ideological foundation of the nation is Pakistan's basic weakness, one which is yet to be overcome.

A model has not yet been completed of either a modern Islamic view of history or a theory of an Islamic State. Consequently, each Muslim nation has to formulate a national ideology appropriate to the formation of its political community. This pluralistic approach is unmistakably embodied in the ideas of Ayub Khan. It marks a departure from the pan-Islamic conviction urged at the time of Pakistan's independence, that Pakistan was the world's first Islamic State whose exemplification of " Islam in one country " would be followed by other Muslim nations.

2   L. Binder analyzes, in *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York, John Wiley, 1964), the basic trends in the political dynamics of the Arab World in the 1950's, by combining "romantic-Islamic" with "radical-reform."

3   L. Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961.

In this article, I will examine the ideological change in India and Paki-
stan as a case-study in the formation of a modern Islamic view of history
and the views of history of the Muslim nations. With this in mind, I will
first discuss the history of social thought in Muslim India preceding the separate
independence, which provides the source of Pakistan's "Islamic State" theory.

As a rule, Western Orientalists have criticized Modernist Muslim attitudes
to Islamic history as "apologetics." But since "apologetics" are arguments
presented to an external opponent, based on the notion that confrontation with
an opponent on his ground will enable the apologist to respond to and refute
criticism, they are hardly acceptable as historical thinking. Beyond that, the
apologia is far removed from the problem of man's religious conscience or
his practice. The motivation behind the apologetic attitude in the case of the
Muslim study of history can be found in the desire of the colonial elite to
acquire equal footing vis-à-vis their colonial rulers.

In comparison with studies of Islamic history by Muslims written in
response to such external stimuli as Christian missionaries or Europe's Orien-
talists, history written for a Muslim audience must be based on indigenous
experience and, consequently, will strongly appeal to the people of the Muslim
society—even if their view of history may somewhat defy objective historical
thinking. In India and in Pakistan, historians and ideologues largely use
English when addressing the outside world, but communicate in Urdu to
their followers. By distinguishing between the levels of communication, we
should be able to apprehend the problems of self-identity as well as of the
hopes and aspirations of the Muslim society of India and Pakistan.

It is worth noting that, especially after World War II, the Orientalists
of Europe have gradually been moving away from their "approach from the
outside," and are making attempts to view Muslim society from within. That
is, they are trying to arrive at a "mutual understanding" with the contem-
porary generations in Muslim countries, and to offer criticism and advice as
equals. This new trend, represented by Professors H. A. R. Gibb and W. C.
Smith, naturally urges Muslim scholars to re-examine their apologetic posi-
tion. An attempt has already been made to respond to the new Western
method of "dialogues between equals" in Fazlur Rahman's *Islam* (London,
1966). Rahman suggests the Muslims to view their religion more objectively
while revealing to the Western world the inner reality of Muslim society.

II

Before considering in depth the new view of history and its ideological
relation to the reintegration of society, the author first wishes to discuss the
general character of the Islamic view of history, or of society, as conceived
within the framework of Islamic religious and social norms (*Sharī'a, Shar'*).
W. C. Smith has already pointed out that although in the final analysis Islam
can be considered a personal religion, the notion that history is the embodi-
ment of God's plan realizing itself in Islamic society (i. e., the religious

Community of the Islam [*umma*]) is more significant to Islam in both religious and social terms than it is to other religions.4 In Smith's scheme, *Sharī'a*, *Shar'* as a *revealed* system of norms relates man to God: the ideal society is realized in the concurrence of *Shar'* with history; the lack of concurrence between history and *Shar'* produces inner tension within society. This general view of history rejects dualism of history and *Shar'*, and tries to see a unity of the two in Islamic history. This theory of Islamic view of history is shared by M. Watt who asserts that the Islamic religious Community is charismatic.5

The relation between *Shar'* and history is manifested in the relation between political power (*mulk*) and religious authority (*khilāfa, imāma*); unity of the two is considered ideal, while any disparity is regarded as revealing decline (*inḥiṭāṭ, khalal*). According to W. C. Smith's theory, modern Muslims have become the heirs to Islamic history in a period of unprecedented decline, and consequently, their historical mission is to bring about its restoration (*tajaddud*).

A general theory of the Islamic view of history of this kind that has the relation between God and man as its nucleus may be plausible as a theory of comparative religion. But such view cannot be said to have existed consistently throughout the actual historical development of Islamic religion and society. Historically, *Shar'* came into being after the separation of the religious Community of early Islam into the church and the state, not just as the result of the unilateral growth of primitive Islam. It must be noted that, after that, *Shar'* was idealized as a general principle, premised upon the dual structure of reality found in the church and the state.

The church preached absolute obedience even to an unrighteous ruler in order to preserve order within the religious Community, and made it an immutable command embodied in *Ḥadīth*. This doctrine towards political power resulted in a continuing mutual distrust between the two. The state was unable to control society on its own; rather, it had to rule indirectly through the religious authority that represented the society. Thus, the representatives of the church, '*Ulamā*,' functioned at the same time as officials, through their close relationship with the political authorities, and as representatives of the Muslim society. The duties of the representatives of the community persisted from that time down to the present as a traditional function within Muslim society. The '*Ulamā*' studied jurisprudence (*fiqh*) which was the ramification (*furū'*), rather than the source (*uṣūl*), of Islamic Law; in applying *fiqh* they formally referred to *Shar'*. The jurist (*faqīh*), however, used it as a "legal device" (*ḥīla*) for the convenience of his clients. The principle of *Shar'* was formally esteemed but, in reality, ignored.

When '*Ulamā*' became *faqīh*, *Shar'* failed to realize itself in history, nor did it become the core of social morality. Moreover, it was synthesized with the heterogeneous values of *Ṣūfism* and with political philosophy at the turning point of Muslim history in the 11th and 12th centuries. It was this complex that formed later Islam. In later Islam, the integration of Islam by *Shar'*

4 W. C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

5 M. Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

alone had already become meaningless. The movement for the restoration of Islamic history, i. e., the negation of the status quo, which was started by Ibn Taimiyya in the 14th century was not an " anti-*Ṣūfism* " movement, but was one which aimed at the basic unification of *Shar'*, "*purified Ṣūfism*" and political philosophy (*siyāsa 'aqlīya*). The movement has been reevaluated as "neo-*Ṣūfī*" among the premodernist reform movements.[6] The view of Islamic history of the 18th century reform and restoration movement, "*Wahhābiyya*," should be considered as supported by not only the restoration of *Shar'* but also by other reformist-*Ṣūfī* views which were involved in *Shar'*.

However, this unity of *Sharī'a-Ṣūfism-political philosophy* in later Islam dissolved in the process of social change since the 19th century. For the first time Islam became a general principle for the Muslim Modernists. That is to say, the *Qur'ān* and *Sunna* were set free from the medieval authority (*ijmā'*). Westernized Muslim liberals held Modernist Islam to be the ideology of liberalism, while they considered the Prophet an ideal personality who was the highest embodiment of a liberal value-system. Moreover, Muslim history was viewed against the medieval history of barbarian Europe, while the glory of Muslim civilization alone was praised. The early Western-oriented liberals were followed by *radical-romantic* fundamentalists who were the first to comprehend Islam as a total social system. They restructured Islam as an ideology for the coming Muslim society. The pattern of Islamic history as propounded above by W. C. Smith comes to the closest to the view of history of these fundamentalists.

In opposition to the Islamic fundamentalists of modern times, the Modernists, who had formed the colonial elite and who have become the national elite after independence, support the existing system. They embrace the idea of the " Islamic State " as the basic principle for Pakistan's polity. Their esoteric interpretation, however, is based upon modern European law, and has been applied according to the rules of the latter. In his speech in the Assembly, for example, the late prime minister 'Alī K̲h̲ān, while recognizing in principle the theocracy of Islam, placed clear limitations upon its application, by stating that acceptance of theocracy was a different matter from the control of the state and society by *'Ulamā'*.

III

The unilateral impact of the Islamic view of history as based on Islamic Law and the norms it propounds cannot explain the complex structures of the Muslim society that existed prior to the 19th century. In order to understand the internal structure and the value concept of Muslim society of the pre-colonial period, one has to view it as a synthesis of *Sharī'a* and *Ṣūfism*, and of Islamic rule (*siyāsa dīnīya*) and secular rule (*siyāsa 'aqlīya*), each set existing in a state of internal tension.

Ṣūfism extended its network over the entire Muslim world including the

6   Fazlur Rahman, *Islam,* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966.

peripheral areas from the 13th century, taking root among the urban guilds which, constituting the basic fabric of Muslim society, embodied the social traditions of civic virtue (*futuwwa*). A *Ṣūfī* religious order called *ṭarīqa, silsila* was the local core of the universal religious Community. Not only *'Ulamā'*, kings, aristocrats and merchants, but the entire Muslim Community belonged to a *ṭarīqa. Ṣūfism* was a popular religious form that responded to the immediate needs and interests of individuals and small groups. The masses (*'awāmm*) came in touch with Islam through *Ṣūfism*, but had only indirect contact with the universalist *Shar'*. This interrelationship between *Ṣūfism* and *Shar'* may be considered as a tension between proximate values and ultimate values. On a more popular and local level, the proximate values offered a frame of reference for action on the popular level while the latter become significant only in modern Islam.

The reform-restoration movement (*tajaddud*) of the 17th and 18th centuries distinguished between the element of *Ṣūfism* that was in accord with *Shar'* (*bā-Shar'*) and the element of *Ṣūfism* that contradicted *Shar'* (*be-Shar'*), and tried to eliminate the latter. Thus, we can see that the Muslim reformers of the 17th and the 18th centuries were endeavoring to reunite *Shar'* and *Ṣūfism*, interpreting them as being fundamentally compatible. In the thinking of an 18th century Islamic reformer, Shāh Walīullāh, a Muslim evolves from the basic practice of *Shar'* to the esoteric world of *Ṣūfism* (*asrār, iḥsān*).

Shar' and *Ṣūfism* as world views seem unrelated to each other. Yet they did not remain opposed and in reality adapted to each other in a complex way. In theory, too, as may be seen in the thought of Shāh Walīullāh, there was a continuous striving for synthesis (*taṭbīq*). It is only in Modernist Islam that the two are considered contradictory, that *Ṣūfism* is treated as an un-Islamic or irrational element to be eliminated. The element of religious experience in Islam and the social basis of the religious Community are both lost; and it is possible to note within this process the recent internal crisis of Islam as a religion and the decay of its religious energy.[7]

Next, I would like to examine the pre-modern relationship between the rule of Islamic Law and the principles of secular rule (*siyāsa madanīya*). Within this relationship it is possible to point out the establishment of a dualism of political theory as well as of the political system. While Islamic Law was formulated on the basis of the *Shar'* which focused upon God, the principles of secular rule emphasized man and his society as central. The latter were essentially non-Islamic and had been developed by philosophers (*falāsifa*) after Hellenistic elements were integrated with it. It is incorrect to say that this school of thought had disappeared due to the criticism directed against it in the 12th century by al-Ghazālī. Rather, it should be regarded as having developed as an undercurrent until the 17th and 18th centuries even in Muslim India.[8] It is customary to regard the political theory of Ibn Khaldūn of the 14th century as isolated from the rest of Muslim views of history. But

7   H. A. R. Gibb, " Structure of Religious Thought," in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk eds., *Studies of Civilization of Islam*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1962.

Islam had internalized such secularized political theory.

This political theory is premised upon the Aristotelian theory that man is by nature a social animal, and that both material and spiritual needs of man (*ḥāja, ḍarūra*) arising from his nature (*fiṭra*) as a universal human being (*insān*) should be admitted. Shāh Walīullāh divided human society into four levels, namely, the most basic social unit *irtifāq* I, which provides for the satisfaction of basic human needs, such as housing, food, clothing and sex; *irtifāq* II, which corresponds to polis (*madīna*); *irtifāq* III, a federation of poleis (*mudun*); and finally *irtifāq* IV, a universal society. According to Walīullāh, these four levels of society are social organizations based on economic life (*mubādala*). His explanations are highly utilitarian. Political power is also explained as an organ and function of state, which is necessary to the life of society.

As Ibn Khaldūn had explained the principle of social organization by the non-Islamic concepts *'aṣabīya* in the 14th century, so Shāh Walīullāh applied a secular, sociological concept independent of the Islamic religious Community, *umma*, in his explanation of human society. He based his social theory upon the "art of happiness": according to his view society is formed by men for the pursuit of the greatest happiness (*sa'āda*) and it is the state's purpose to continually develop the social welfare (*maṣlaḥa*) for all the members of society. The idea of social welfare was later taken up by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (a 19th century thinker) and developed, for the first time, into an idea of the right to revolt against tyranny (*istibdād*) which was eventually supported by imperialism of the time.

As already mentioned above, in pre-19th century Islamic society, *Shar'*, *Ṣūfism* and political philosophy were integrated within the system of Islam, and created an inner tension. One can see in this integration the dynamism, not the stagnation, of Islam. Through *Ṣūfism* the religion of Islam was internalized by members of small societies as their personal ethics. At the same time, the political philosophy made room for the fulfilment of man's natural needs. The corporate structure of society, with the urban guilds at its nucleus, provided for the security of individuals, and each individual was able to cultivate his civic virtue within the subordinate organization to which he belonged. Again, as pointed out in the above, the *Ṣūfī* religious orders functioned on similar social basis.

With the progress of the colonial-capitalist social system in the 19th century the rapid disintegration of the old Muslim society saw the decline of *Ṣūfism* and of the political theory that had sustained Islamic society. At the same time, the corporate structure that had held Muslim society together fell apart, and the mechanism of the mediating corporate structure which had guaranteed security to individual Muslims was lost.

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8   Fazlur Rahman, *op. cit.*

IV

The social change of the 19th century destroyed the socio-economic foundation of the Islamic society of the 17th and 18th centuries and traditional Islam lost its integrating and balancing force. In its place, colonial capitalism began to reorganize society. This fundamental social change, the instant response to colonial capitalism and the birth of a new balance in society in the 19th century Muslim India have not been fully analyzed either in the West nor in India and Pakistan. The subject of modern Islam should be studied in the context of this social change, change which has not yet been made clear satisfactorily by historians. Generally, however, the prototype of modern Indo-Pakistani Muslim society established itself in the period.

In the Muslim society of North India, the establishment of this prototype of modern society was seen after the Mutiny (*ghadar*) of 1857. The failure of the Mutiny resulted in the overall fall of the old Mughāl aristocracy and opened the way to the Muslim colonial elite, who viewed this change as a "revolution in values." The new elite upheld moral courage and the spirit of liberalism. The mood of the new age developed into an intellectual movement known as the 'Alīgarh Movement, in which the social and political attitude towards both traditional Islam and modern West was different from any preceding pattern, and was referred to as "Muslim Modernist" by the Western observers.

Members of this elite at the initial stage were low echelon officials of the colonial government, who rapidly moved up the social ladder and came to constitute the modern middle class along with the Muslim lawyers who were politicians. Behind them were the Muslim landlords and merchant-capitalists who first appeared under British rule.

The Modernists categorically rejected traditional Islam as the residue of the old age (*rasm wa riwāj*). They inherited neither Ṣūfism, which was the source of religious experience of traditional Islam, nor the political philosophy of social welfare (*maṣlaḥa*). They argued against the conformist position (*taqlīd*) of traditional Islam and claimed that true Islam was a principle of *Nature* like the mechanistic rationalism of modern West. The early ideological leader of this movement, Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (who died in 1898) not only chose to not give any significance to the Indian Wahhābī view of history but also ignored completely the whole medieval development of Islam, insisting on the right to an individual interpretation of the teachings of *Qur'ān*.

At the same time, Ameer Aly, the eminent Bengali jurist who died in 1928, interpreted Muslim history from a liberal apologetic point of view, conceiving it as the history of a progressive civilization, to the satisfaction of the sense of self-esteem of the colonial elite. Thus, he created a model to be popularized by Muslim historical apologetics. Ameer Aly's motive was that of a colonial elite who wished to be on an equal footing with his foreign ruler. The early position of the historical apologetics of liberal Modernists has gradually developed to the direction of that of the *radical-romantic-*

nationalists.

Among the colleagues of Sayyid, there were those who viewed Muslim history as a rise and fall (*madd wa jazr*) and lamented the present state of destitution. The poet and biographer Alṭāf Ḥusain Ḥālī was well known among them. He was greatly inspired by Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān. It should be noted that, according to their view, with the end of the 'Abbās Caliphate in the 13th century began the period of decline, and the foundation of a great empire in North India by the Mughāls was not of any significance in the whole scheme of history of Muslims. Ḥālī's poems on Muslim history were not apologetics written for an outside world as were the works of Ameer Aly; they were addressed to wider audiences of Indian Muslims. Ḥālī was also the first to introduce modern English biographical writings into Urdu literature for the purpose of moral education.

The Indian Muslims evaluated Sir Sayyid's thought and educational activities not on the basis of having introduced modern English liberalism and rationalism to the Muslims, but rather for his contribution (*khidmat*) to the political and social uplift made in Muslim community being in critical situation. Sir Sayyid's seemingly radical liberalism was more or less resisted by the Muslims. When, after separate independence in 1947, the Muslims of India and Pakistan developed opposing official or semi-official views on the beginning of modern history of the Indian Muslims, Sir Sayyid was considered by Indian Muslims to have been essentially a secular Indian nationalist,[9] rather than a prototype of a communalist. The official Pakistan view, in contrast, made him a forerunner of Pakistani Muslim communalist.

It was during Sir Sayyid's time that British policy began to conceive of Indian Muslims in terms of "community" and, consequently, that the modern concept of the modern Muslim community within India was "created" in the structure of the colonial rule. The British felt that Sir Sayyid was the post-Mutiny representative of the Indian Muslim community, or Muslim public opinion; he himself looked upon his role as such. He belonged, however, to the initial stage before the coming of fully developed communalistic rivalries.

I would next like to examine the contemporary development of the opposing trend of thought and action by which the political '*Ulamā*' coped with British rule in India. Their methods can be understood as the union of political resistance against the outside intruder, i. e., imperialists, with the fight for preservation of *Sharʿ*. This position was represented in the Middle East by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, a contemporary of Sir Sayyid, who died in 1897, and by the Deoband School in India. The former resorted to the principle of *maṣlaḥa* to criticize the imperialist encroachments against Muslims, and greatly influenced the nationalist movement of Iran in the 1890's and that of Egypt in the 1880's.

Ideologically, the *traditionalist '*Ulamā*'* opposed Sir Sayyid who sought only the secular improvement of the status of the Indian Muslims; they asserted that in as much as the British imperialist rule extended over many Muslim

9   Abid Husayn, *Destiny of Indian Muslims*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1965.

countries, resistance to it by Indian Muslim should be supported by solidarity of the Muslims throughout the whole world. They utilized Islam as a political symbol, and opposed " disarming " Islam by Western-oriented Modernism (*dahrīya*). For the first time phrases were taken from the *Qur'ān* as slogans for popular political actions. In Muslim India, the Deoband Movement, whose ideology was close to the idea of al-Afghānī, contradicted the 'Alīgarh Movement. The *'Ulamā'* did not approve of the communal interests created by the British. Unlike the colonial elite, they had no relation with communal interests. In its later development the Indian Muslim communalism of the colonial elite transformed into Islamic nationalism of the All India Muslim League, while the anti-communalist Deoband Movement became linked to the Indian nationalist movement.[10] While the Muslim Modernists lost touch with the Muslim masses, the Deoband Movement succeeded in guiding the masses through the leadership of the *'Ulamā'*. From this it may be seen that the *'Ulamā'* in Muslim India acted as the representative of the masses as their colleagues did in the nationalist movements in other Muslim countries, especially in Iran.

Since the Deoband School inherited the thought of Shāh Walīullāh, its followers managed to avoid modern ideological divisions between *Shar'*, *Ṣūfism* and political philosophy, as was the case with the Western Modernists. It seems to me that both *Shar'* and the social theory of *maṣlaḥa* underlie the ideology of this school.

V

The change in political thought of the Indian Muslims between the two World Wars opened up a new phase in historical consciousness. The division of social and political thought among the Indian Muslims that prepared the way for separate independence also became apparent at this time. This trend of thought was represented by Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl (who died in 1938), who is regarded by the Pakistanis as " Pakistan's spiritual leader."

At this time, Islam was first presented neither as liberal ethnics nor as history of liberal civilization, but as the unified principle of a future social system and an ideology. We may say that here may be seen the characteristics of the thought of *radical reform* (revolutionary) Islam. Islam was conceived not as a static dogma, but as a vital activism that forcefully expands the potentiality of human personality, enabling man to conquer his environment.

The advent of this neo-Islam was concurrent with the disillusion of the Indian Muslim elite in regard to the Western liberalism and embodied in the 'Alīgarh Movement of the older generation, as well as in regard to the sense of over-all crisis the existing social system faced. Islam was conceived as a " social system" in order to overcome the crisis. Iqbāl was hailed by *radical-*

10   Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, *The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan,* Bombay Asia Publishing House, 1963.

romantic Muslim intellectuals as a prophet of coming age.

The ethics of neo-Islam urged that a Muslim come to an awareness of *elan* of the individual self (*khodī*) and that the self be absorbed (*be-khodī*) within the ideal Islamic religious Community (*millat-e Islāmīya*). In other words, emphasis was laid upon the ideal religious Community rather than upon the individual, and the individual was urged to find self-identity exclusively in the Community.

The problem here is that since an ideal religious Community is not in fact realized in modern political life, a method to realize it was not clearly set forth. Neo-Islamic thought was devoid of any clear political direction. It was Muḥammad ʿAlī Jinnāḥ who, as a political leader, adopted the concept of Islamic ideology of Iqbāl around 1938.

Jinnāḥ was accepted as a "great leader" (*Qāʾid-e Aʿẓam*) not for his political activities prior to 1938 but for his political leadership after that turning point. He gave clear-cut political direction to the "vitalistic neo-Islam" which had been aroused in the younger generation by Iqbāl. The meeting of the two reflects a new stage of development at which radical Muslim intellectuals joined the Muslim League enthusiastically. The movement led by Jinnāḥ developed into the "Pakistan Movement" (*taḥrīk-e Pākistān*) after the Muslim League's "Pakistan Resolution" of 1940, which culminated in the separate independence of Pakistan with the support of Muslim intellectuals.

The second trend of Indian Muslim thought between the two World Wars rejected all separatist Muslim activities and any form of communalism. It sought, rather, for Indian Muslim identity in an undivided India. The representative figure in this trend was Abū al-Kalām Āzād (who died in 1959), one of the Muslim leaders of the Indian National Congress. His thought evolved from the theocratic Islamic symbolism (that existed until the time of the Khilafāt Movement) to a secularist Indian nationalism of the 1920's and 1930's. This development shows that the Deoband School and the like were neither static nor reactionary, and that *traditionalist 'Ulamā'* could be transformed into secularism. Āzād's idea of Islamic secularism was expressed in his *Tarjumān Qurʾān* (Interpretation of the *Qurʾān* [Vol. I, 1930 and Vol. II, 1936]) written in Urdu. In his opinion, Islam was one of the world's universalist religions *neither inferior nor superior to* other ones. He also emphasized that Islam was a humanistic religion. On the question of the relation between Islam and the state, he said that separation of the two was the ultimate path for the modern development of Indian Islam. He insisted that religion should help not to divide but to unite man and that commitment to a group had nothing to do with man's spiritual salvation.[11] His stand was theoretically and politically in opposition to the Muslim communalist trend of the time.

This stand prepared the way for the ideology of the leaders of the Indian Muslims in the post-independence period. India after independence has formally rejected communalism and proclaimed a secularist state as the ideal

11   A.A.A. Fyzee, "The Essence of Islam," in Douglas Grant ed., *The Islamic Near East*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1960.

of India. Āzād formulated this secularist-Islamic position.

VI

After the separate independence, Pakistan has pursued the ideal path of the Islamic State and India that of a secular state. It is not correct to say, however, that the political leaders of Pakistan have attempted to establish a religious state in Pakistan. Pakistan's political leadership was in the hands of the secularist leaders of Muslim League, and the state policy was formed along the line of nation-building through secularization. '*Ulamā*' was not given any special privilege by the state. Although, therefore, India's secular state appears more progressive and Pakistan's Islamic State more reactionary, one cannot judge them only by their principles. It should rather be said that definite secularization was a purpose common to both, and the relation between state and religion in these countries should be assessed by the achievement of their actual secularization.

The ideal of the Islamic State of Pakistan played an undeniable role in national integration. At the same time, however, it led to disintegration and irreconcilable disputes among the people over the issue of the nature of the Islamic State. Secularist political leaders and high government officials asserted that even though the Islamic State was the fundamental principle of Pakistan, its actual operation had to be in conformity with the spirit of the Indian Act of 1937. The 1956 Constitution, which was abrogated in 1958, was oriented toward an Islamic State, as may be seen in the Preamble, but it failed to implement this principle. The government of Pakistan led by the Muslim League was secular and neutral in the eyes of the *Islamic-fundamentalist*. The *Islamic-fundamentalist* trend has been represented by Jamā'at-e Islāmī in the cities of West Pakistan, and has become a powerful anti-government force. Asserting that Pakistan is in fact not an Islamic State, the fundamentalists have led a movement to re-Islamize the State and the people. This movement culminated in the Punjab Disturbance of 1953. This fundamentalist force in the political field has been one of the main factors in Pakistan's political disunity and in the confusion over the question of legitimacy.

Pakistan's politics underwent a decisive change with the Revolution of 1958. The Commander of the Army Ayub Khan has divided Pakistan's history into two periods, namely, the period ranging from the Governor-General Jinnāh to the Premier 'Alī Khān (from 1947–1951), and the period after the latter's death to the Revolution. He called for a "return" to the former, calling the latter as anti-state and dangerous. He argues that the 1956 Constitution presented no solution to the problem of the Islamic nature of the state. Hence, in April, 1959, immediately after the Revolution he proposed as the first step in drawing up the Constitution the definition of the ideological nature of Islam to be embodied in the new Constitution.[12] He con-

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[12] Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 195. See also Javid Iqbal, *The Ideology of Pakistan and Its Implementation*, Lahore, Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1959, in which Iqbal responds to Ayub Khan's proposals in the above.

siders that Islam has been a disruptive factor in Pakistan's effort for national
unity and has attempted to formulate a position for Islam that would be more
amenable to the growth of democracy, national security and spontaneous
loyalty of the people to the state. First, he opposes the Islamic fundamentalists
who viewed Islam as supra-national. His attitude reveals his deep skepticism
towards *'Ulamā'*. He intends to remove *'Ulamā'* from its intermediary position
between the government and the people in order to appeal to and rule the
hitherto uncontrolled people directly, to pursue the idea of "Basic Democracy."
Second, Ayub Khan does not actually consider Pakistan as the pilot project
of the world's first Islamic State in modern times, but as one among the
Muslim nation-states. He concludes that there is no single model for an Islamic
State and Islamic Constitution; that each Muslim country should apply and
adapt the principles of the *Qur'ān* and *Sunna* to particular national conditions;
and that Pakistan, too, may evolve into an Islamic State as it suits its needs
and hopes. Third, he confirms the principle of superiority of the legislature,
refusing to create a supra-legislative body constituted of *'Ulamā'* empowered
with a veto. A noteworthy self-criticism can be seen in his recognition that
there have been feelings of mutual mistrust between *'Ulamā'* and the Western-
educated national elite (former colonial elite) ever since the latter half of the
19th century, and that Islam has not been reformulated in a way that has
enabled the uneducated people of modern times to understand it. After the
principles of the Islamic Constitution were thus defined, his next effort has
been to adopt an elected presidential form of government that would be
appropriate to the genius of the Pakistan people.[13]

VII

We may safely say that the dominant trend in the interpretation of
Islamic history has a strongly *romantic-radical reformist* character of Muslim
intellectuals which in turn is a reflection of their deeply-felt desire for the
"recovery of lost self" and for the reintegration of society and the individual.
This intellectual trend generally reflects the major problems in the developing
Muslim societies of today. Contemporary Muslims believe that the essential
problem facing the developing countries is not so much one of economics
and politics as of recovering humanity and guaranteeing security for all
members of society. For the Muslim intellectuals, *socialism* means the recovery
of humanity and a challenge to achieve internal unity of the self and society
which has been lost. If so, their view of Islamic history and *socialism* may
be said to stem from one and the same root within the political and social
structure. This inner need underlies the urge of nationalism and modernization
in Muslim nations. The task of development policies today is to absorb this
need into the developing order of society. The key to success in the develop-
ment policy may be the establishment of a political system in which the
power of the state will neither coerce those forces which are uncontrolled,

[13]   *Ibid.*, p. 204.

emotional, and symbolic, nor drive them to an anti-government position; but, rather, will draw them into positive and realistic channels within the development programs.

In parallel with that inner social force, those in power strive to bring society under their direct control so as to reintegrate the sate and society. But the basic question remains whether the social grouping can be utilized immediately within the developing political community, since the premodern traditional social grouping that served to maintain the system of security for individuals has already been dissolved under colonial capitalism and totally reorganized by it. In conclusion, as another problem of modernization, we wish to point to the general condition of disruption of the traditionalists and the Western-oriented Modernists; this disruption occurred under colonial capitalism in Muslim lands, but even after political independence, the problem has continued to exist and there is no indication that it will be resolved either by the Muslim national elite or the traditionalists in the near future.