

entrepreneurial group, conceived as constituting the old order, should be construed not only as being antithetical to a centrally-controlled economy but also as being adaptable to it, and of having been the driving force behind the agrarian reform in 1952 and the tariff-reform movement before the Revolution. By not using the vague concept of the national bourgeoisie, he has had the effect of directing scathing criticism at the vulgar Marxists; but if, because of the universality of capital and technique, the national identity of the industrialists and the relatively advanced position of industrialists versus the landowner-agriculturists are removed, the role of the Egyptian private entrepreneurs in the course of the revolution may be confined to the Janus' one face or the unilateral characters transcending the historical prescription.

Fourth, Mr. O'Brien also mentions the fact that the desire for an inflow of private capital from the West has disappeared in the course of the transformation to Arab socialism, but he does not discuss to any great extent the question of the influence which US and USSR aid has had on the Egyptian economy and its institutional framework. May it not be that the ambivalent attitude of the Egyptian government in its economic policy is due more to the recent trend in the international economy—the horizontal flow of private capital and the vertical flow of aid funds—than to the domestic factors of the Egyptian economy? It would seem that, before arguing the factors in international politics, we must re-examine the “socialization” of the Egyptian economy from the viewpoint of the fact that it has proved inevitable to intensify the degree of dependence on domestic savings and public investment in accordance with the decreasing of her foreign currency reserve, and that we should call to mind the fact that, in the course of the “Mixed Economy phase,” as the proportion of public to total investment increased, the proportion of dependence on US and USSR economic aid has also increased directly. Moreover, the independence of the national economy and the growth of producing power must be demanded at a time when it is impossible for the developing countries as a whole to reorganize the international economic organization. (*San-eki Nakaoka*)

HAROLD C. HINTON, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966, xiii+527 pp.

It is a very important task to analyse China in the context of the international scene: how China's foreign policy has been developed and what its special nature is; what manner of international influence China exerts and what are its characteristics. It is particularly urgent at present that this task should be studied, for the following two reasons. First, in the multipolarity of world politics which has replaced the hitherto dominant post-war problem of the American-Soviet conflict, China occupies a unipolar position and will be a major influence on the trend of international politics in the future,

together with America and the Soviet Union. Second, her future foreign policy may be greatly influenced by such factors as her independent development and stockpiling of nuclear weapons; the conflict of opinion over foreign policy between the "bourgeois reactionary" faction and the "proletarian revolutionary" faction, which has been brought to light during the course of the Great Cultural Revolution; and the passionate orientation to "world revolution" introduced on a mass scale through the use of "Mao Tse-tung's Collected Sayings."

The present book by Mr. Hinton, who is Associate Professor of International Relations at George Washington University and is connected with the Institute for Defense Analyses in that university, is ambitious and traces the unfolding of Chinese foreign policy during the fifteen-year period from the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949 up to 1964. As the author himself states, this book represents "an effort to understand and communicate as much as possible of what is significant about the important, interesting, and complex subject that is the foreign policy and relations of Communist China." (p.vii) Rather than attempting to grasp the aims, determining factors, and behavioural tendencies in Chinese foreign policy within a particular theoretical framework, Mr. Hinton has examined in detail, with the help of rich source material, the process of the actual unfolding of Chinese foreign policy. A great quantity of secondary source material, including newspapers and academic articles published in America and elsewhere, has been intensively utilized, in addition, of course, to primary source material such as that provided by the New China News Agency.

In the first half of Part I, which is devoted to background, the author touches on the development of the Chinese Revolution since the Republic of 1911 which he identifies as the "root" of China's foreign policy, and discusses principally the divergence between Soviet policy towards China, based on Soviet "national interest," and the revolutionary policy of the Chinese Communist Party, in particular that of Mao Tse-tung. In the second half a chronological summary of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is presented. Here the author divides his subject into the following six periods: (1) armed struggle (1948-51), (2) the search for an alternate policy (1951-55), (3) the Bandung phase (1955-57), (4) "the east wind has prevailed over the west wind" (1957-59), (5) the campaign against Khrushchev (1960-63), and (6) the 'third world' policy (1963- ). This section represents a concise review of the unfolding of Chinese foreign policy, and is convenient for glancing over the problem-points in foreign policy. The author's periodization, however, is not entirely above critical note. To make clear the special characteristics in the development of Chinese policy would it not have been better to have made such a division as (1) the Korean War period (1949-53), (2) the 'Five Principles of Peace' period (1954-57), (3) the strong foreign policy period (1958-65), and (4) the 'People's War' period (1965- ), and then to have subdivided these periods? In particular, period (3) was one in which the mutually contradictory foreign policies of support on the one hand for

'people's wars' in the first intermediate zone, and, on the other, for nationalist leaders, were adopted (at present China herself has made it clear that she had adopted these policies.) These policies, however, have become very complex due to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Thus, in view of the results of the Great Cultural Revolution, period (3) may be characterized as the period of "strong foreign policy," which may be interpreted as a period of transition.

Part II, Communist China on the World Stage, is comprised of five chapters. In this part the author deals with "Maoism" as the directing ideology of the Chinese Communist Party; the fundamental questions of ends and means in foreign policy; the Sino-Soviet alliance; relations with Western Europe; China's attitudes in the context of the international Communist movement; and China's policies *vis-à-vis* the non-Asian regions—the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

In his chapter on Maoism the author defines Maoism as "the entire evolving complex of patterns of official thought and behaviour that the CPC [Communist Party of China] has developed while under Mao's leadership." (p. 53) Thus, he considers it impossible to separate the views of Mao as an individual from those of the Chinese Communist Party. From this standpoint, he discusses the general characteristics of Mao's thought and its reflections in policies. When viewed in retrospect, especially subsequent to the Great Cultural Revolution, this interpretation of Maoism raises several problems. The main body of the Party at present maintains that an anti-Mao Tse-tung bourgeois reactionary line, represented by Liu Shao-chi, has existed continuously. Even if we cannot accept this contention without reservations, it is now generally accepted that there was a basic divergence between Liu Shao-chi and Mao Tse-tung regarding their conceptions of Marxism-Leninism. For a time (most probably from his withdrawal from the post of Chairman up to the 10th National Congress), Mao Tse-tung appears to have withdrawn from the front line of politics. If this is so, even recognizing the limitations imposed upon Mr. Hinton's interpretation by the time at which he wrote, we cannot but have doubts over the author's treatment of the Chinese Communist Party as a monolithic entity. However, this problem remains unsolved for students of China to tackle in the future.

On the characteristics of Chinese foreign policies, the author draws attention to a number of noteworthy points. For example, he says, "It might be thought that the CPC would manufacture an atmosphere of external crises whenever it wanted to launch an economic offensive at home," (p. 64) thus providing a suggestion regarding the relation between internal and external policies. Again he says, "It is obvious that the CPC is projecting its image of its own rise to power on the underdeveloped areas." (p. 22) This is one of the author's main contentions. China's basic policy in relation to the so-called first intermediate zone of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, he argues, consists of attempting to export the Chinese revolutionary formula. On the other hand, he says, "The CPR's [Chinese People's Republic] policy towards

Western Europe consists essentially of trying within limits to establish beneficial economic relations and split the region politically from the United States, while at the same time opposing Western European influence in the underdeveloped areas whenever Chinese revolutionary objectives seem to require it." (p. 146) Why errors and failures occur in the Chinese foreign policies which have had such aims "seem to be attributable," the author states, "to ideologically caused misconceptions more often than to insufficient or incorrect factual information." (p. 105) This is a criticism of the view that the errors and failures have been caused by the Chinese leaders' ignorance of other countries.

The author also pays a great deal of attention to China's territorial interests. "My own view is that the CPC hopes to dominate the entire mainland of Asia south of the Soviet border, but that it concedes the right to an autonomous existence, and even to spheres of influence of their own, to Japan and Indonesia, which are effectively beyond its reach." (p. 75) Thus says the author, but may there not be some disagreement over this question? It is unthinkable that at present China is really intending to restore the extensive territory of the Chinese Empire of the Ching dynasty. If the attempt were made to realize such a "Chinese Empire," the counter-effects would be too great and would merely have the effect of alienating China's neighbours. It is an undisguisable fact that China desires the communization of Asia and of the whole world, but this fact and the restoration of the Ching Empire are clearly different in significance; the emphasis is placed on the former.

At the beginning of the chapter entitled "Objectives and Instrumentalities of Foreign Policy," the author points out that "many of the puzzling peculiarities of Communist Chinese external behavior arise out of frustration at the considerable gap that exists between aims and desires, on the one hand, and available means and attainable results, on the other." (p. 107) As China's aims of foreign policy the author lists such points as (1) "hegemony of some sort on at least the mainland of eastern Asia," (2) "a leading role in the 'socialist camp' and the international Communist movement," (3) "to provide a 'model,' or example, and if possible a degree of leadership, for the whole of the underdeveloped areas," and (4) "to make China a superpower comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union." (pp. 117-8) Further, he gives an explanation of the means to be employed in carrying out foreign policy, dividing them into 'violent,' 'semiviolent' and 'nonviolent.' China is refraining from the use of force because she is afraid of the retaliatory power of America, of which she was made painfully conscious during the Korean War.

Part III, Communist China as an Asian Power, seems to be the part to which the author has devoted his greatest efforts. As well as tracing in detail the Korean War, the first and second Indonesian crises, the crisis over the Taiwan Straits, the boundary disputes, and other important questions of foreign policy with which China has been faced, he makes clear China's

policies in relation to the countries on her periphery. In this section he teaches us much regarding actual relations. Nevertheless, as a whole, his account is not entirely free from the blemish of over-concentration on China's security concerns. For example, would it not have been right to take into consideration, as a background element in the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis (which marked a turning-point in Chinese foreign policy) the international crisis over the "Iraq Revolution" which occurred immediately before it? Again, as regards Sino-Burmese relations, for example, the author appears not to have conceived of this matter in terms of the mutual relations between China's policy *vis-à-vis* Ne Win and her policy in relation to the Burmese Communist Party (White Flag), nor has he understood these two policies to be mutually contradictory. These may perhaps be unreasonable demands on the part of the reviewer, who is writing with knowledge of the effects of the Great Cultural Revolution in mind.

The basic conceptual tool employed by the author throughout the work is the notion of power politics. This is clearly evident in his final examination of the China policy of the United States. From this point of view the author evaluates America's policy of blockading China as basically sound and effective. However, even if we cannot express wholehearted agreement with the author's position in this matter, it is no mistake to say that the work is a superior study of China's foreign policies and one to which much labour has been devoted. But this makes it all the more regrettable that because of the time of writing the book covers the period up to the beginning of 1965 and not the subsequent years. As is well known, China became internationally "isolated" from mid-1965, while concurrently Lin Piao's slogan "Long Live the Victory of the People's War" was issued, after which the decisions to brand the Soviet Union as an "enemy" were taken. Further, in 1966 the Great Cultural Revolution was begun. Violent changes have taken place in the Chinese political situation within the space of little more than two years, causing a great change in foreign policy. Consequently, I feel that a new point of view is required in our studies of China's foreign policies. I think that in the main this will be reducible to the essential question of the form in which the two opposed and mutually contradictory policies within the Chinese Communist Party have manifested themselves in the sphere of foreign policy. Through such difficult studies we will no doubt be able to attain a clearer understanding of the nature of Chinese foreign policy. (*Katsuhiko Ōta*)

ALASDAIR I. MACBEAN, *Export Instability and Economic Development*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966, 364 pp.

Not a few scholars studying developing economies have held the view that, because of the specialization in the production of a few primary products and the substantial role played by these products both in total exports and in the gross national product, and because the price fluctuations