

THE KOREAN WAR AS AN EPOCH OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

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The Korean War marks an epoch in the development of modern history after World War II. For Japan in particular the war had a great significance. Not only did the Korean War play a great role in the process which set out from the destruction accompanying Japan's defeat and led up to the present state of economic development, but the fact that Japan today possesses military forces, after having renounced rearmament under Article 9 of her Constitution, is also due to the occurrence of the Korean War. Establishing the significance of the Korean War provides a key for the evaluation of post-war Japanese history.

I. THE ASIA POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE EVE OF THE KOREAN WAR

1. Korea

It was in 1947 that America, which was holding Korea south of the 38th parallel under military occupation, established its Korean policy in response to the situation which followed World War II. The repatriation of the occupation forces reached its peak in May of that year, and in particular the financial retrenchment strongly demanded by the Republican Party made it forever impossible to station in Korea the force of 45,000 men. What was more, since the Truman Doctrine proclaimed by President Truman in March rendered absolute the expenditures for foreign aid to Greece and Turkey, the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Korea became all the more probable. In May the Secretary for the Army, Patterson, advocated the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Korea, and in September Lieutenant-General Wedemeyer, who had returned from a tour of inspection in Korea, recommended to the President the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. forces. Thus, on the 25th of September the Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that from the point of view of military security the maintenance of the bases and forces which the United States then had in Korea was of no strategic value.

The simultaneous withdrawal of American and Soviet forces proved impossible because of the American-Soviet conflict. Between August and September, 1948, the Korean Republic and the Korean Democratic People's Republic came into being in south and north Korea respectively, and in December the Soviet Union caused all its forces to be withdrawn from North

Korea. South Korea was disturbed by guerrilla warfare carried on by Koreans who refused to accept the Syngman Rhee régime. America had been training a Constabulary with the intention of making them into a South Korean army in due course, but since they were not yet sufficiently trained American combat units had been left in Korea until 1949, and it was only on the 29th of June that the withdrawal of the American forces was completed. A group of military advisers numbering 500 men, the Military Aid Group to Korea (KMAG), was left behind after the withdrawal of the American forces for the purposes of training the South Korean army.

The Syngman Rhee régime continued to be exposed to resistance from the part of the Korean people, and was continually facing crises. As a part of its anti-Soviet strategy America continued to give support to the Syngman Rhee régime, gave it economic and military aid, and concluded with it a treaty of mutual defence and military assistance. However, America continued to be oblivious of the great value of South Korea for her anti-Soviet strategy.

In March, 1949, General MacArthur drew "America's line of defence" from the Philippines through the Ryukyus, Japan, and the Aleutians to Alaska.

In January, 1950, the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, described the same "defensive perimeter" as running from the Philippines through the Ryukyus and Japan to the Aleutians.

In each of these cases South Korea was outside America's line of defence. This of course did not mean that America had lost interest in South Korea. Having provided economic and military aid, and having concluded a treaty of military assistance, America was ready to leap to the aid of South Korea in case of emergency. Acheson stated that America held direct responsibility for Korea just as for Japan, and although in a lower degree, as in Japan had opportunities for direct action.

In order to surmount the crises of his own régime, Syngman Rhee repeatedly advocated military action against North Korea. America gave repeated warnings that Syngman Rhee might start a civil war for the recovery of lost territory. America was holding up the dispatch of the large quantities of arms to be supplied to the Syngman Rhee régime under the terms of the military aid agreement. The reason for this was that, if these large quantities of arms were supplied, Syngman Rhee might at any time embark on a civil war for the recovery of lost territory.

There were two reasons in particular for America taking precautions over Syngman Rhee's conduct. The first was connected with America's world policy. The Truman Doctrine developed first into the Marshal Plan, and then led to the establishment of NATO in 1949. America placed her main tasks in anti-Soviet strategy in the strengthening of NATO, and was in no posture to interfere in wars in Asia. The other reason was connected with America's Asia policy. The Chinese Communist Revolution had succeeded in 1949, and a radical reappraisal of America's policy in Asia was called for. At the beginning of 1950 America had still not thrashed out a new policy

for Asia. For Syngman Rhee to start a war on his own initiative was something which America found undesirable.

2. *Communist China*

The Chinese Communist Revolution succeeded in October, 1949, with the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. The task for America became that of whether or not to recognize the People's Republic as the *de jure* government of China. Secretary of State Acheson set out the conditions for recognizing a new government as being (1) that the new government should be in control over the territory which it declares to be its own, (2) that the new government should undertake the discharge of its international obligations, and (3) that the new government should enjoy the support of its people.

Mao Tse-tung was in no haste to obtain recognition from the "imperialist states." He held that the imperialist states, which had always been hostile to the Chinese people, would make no attempt to treat China on a basis of equality, and that so long as the hostile attitude of the imperialist states remained unchanged China should not accord them any legal status in China. Not only was this the case, but the Chinese government bent all its efforts to attacking America as one of the imperialist states. With the confinement of Angus Ward, the American consul at Mukden, on the 25th of October, the Chinese government began positive attacks on America.

A succession of countries, led, of course, by the countries of the Communist bloc, but including some non-communist states as well, granted recognition to the new government of China. Burma was followed by India, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Norway, Ceylon, Denmark, Israel, Afghanistan, Finland, and Sweden, and on the 18th of January Switzerland recognized the new government.

The Soviet Union, which had at once recognized the new government, attempted to contrive the expulsion of the Nationalist government from the United Nations. In the course of the debate on the Soviet proposal in the Security Council on the 12th of January the American delegate, Ernest Gross, declared that the United States government would vote against the draft resolution submitted by Malik. But he went on to make it clear that the American government considered the question procedural rather than substantial and that his vote against the Soviet motion could not be considered a veto. He declared that his government would "accept the decision of the Security Council on this matter when made by the affirmative vote of seven members."

America imagined that at a time when one state after another was giving recognition to the new government she would not be able to run counter to the general trend of world affairs. In the event, however, the Soviet proposal was rejected, and the Soviet Union began its boycott of the United Nations.

Although America imagined that she must recognize the new government sooner or later, China continued her attacks on America, causing America's

attitude to harden. On the 14th of January the Chinese government seized the property of the American consulate in Peking. On the 18th (by Washington time) Secretary of State Acheson declared that the seizure of the property of the American consulate clearly showed that the Chinese government was not seeking recognition by America.

The 18th by Washington time corresponds to the 19th by Peking time, and on the 19th the Peking radio reported that the Chinese government had decided to grant recognition to the revolutionary government of Ho Chi-minh. Up to this moment France had intended to recognize the Chinese Communist government, but now that this government had recognized the Ho Chi-minh government against which France was fighting in Indo-China, recognition was withheld. After the hardening of the attitudes of America and France the number of countries recognizing the Chinese Communist government declined sharply, and only Holland and Indonesia recognized the Chinese Communist government in the period between the granting of recognition by Switzerland on the 18th of January and the outbreak of the Korean War on the 25th of June.

However, the fact that America had caused her attitude to the Chinese Communist government to harden did not mean that America had caused any Chinese policy to be laid down. The Chinese Communist Revolution was to complete the territorial unification of the country by the conquest of Taiwan and Tibet, but America's China policy was still a matter of controversy at home, the debate revolving around the countermeasures to be taken in regard to the situation created over Taiwan.

3. *Taiwan*

Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in December, 1949. President Truman expected that Taiwan would be taken by the new government before long, before the end of 1950. President Truman had thus decided that the fate of Taiwan was to be left to the decision of the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek. Louis A. Johnson, the Secretary for Defence, wished to prevent a communist take-over in Taiwan, even at the expense of American military intervention, but President Truman checked his Secretary of Defence on the grounds that the Taiwan question should be considered not from a military point of view but from a political one.

Among the Republicans there was a group of congressmen supporting the cause of Chiang Kai-shek who were known as "the China lobby." They were always going back and forth between China and America, and were demanding that the government should extend its protection to the Chiang Kai-shek régime. General MacArthur responded to their call. President Truman felt that it was necessary to make a declaration of policy in regard to Taiwan, and on the 5th of January, 1950, he declared that his government had no intention of interfering in the Chinese civil war, nor did it intend to give military aid to the Taiwan government. Again, on the 12th, he

declared that as far as America was concerned the Taiwan question was definitely closed. On the same day Secretary of State Acheson made a statement in which Taiwan as well as Korea were placed outside America's defence line.

The pro-Chiang Kai-shek Republicans raised their voices ever more loudly on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek. In Congress on the 19th of January the Republicans rejected the government's bill for the continuation of economic aid to South Korea by 193 votes to 192. Congressman Donald L. Jackson pointed out that Korea "bears no relationship to our national defence." According to Congressman Jackson, "South Korea is a Bataan without a Corregidor, a Dunkirk without a flotilla, a dead-end street without an escape. Formosa is essentially a point in the line of defence which includes Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa, all essential and vital to the national defence of the United States." At a later time a compromise was reached and aid was sent to Korea, but for the pro-Chiang Kai-shek faction Taiwan was of chief importance and their interest in Korea from the point of view of national defence was extremely slight.

Within the American government Secretary of Defence Johnson continued to press for intervention in Taiwan. On the first of June he came to Japan by air, accompanied by General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and had talks with General MacArthur. His aim in coming to Japan lay in arriving at conclusions regarding America's security problems in the Far East in connexion with the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan. General MacArthur, a supporter of the cause of Chiang Kai-shek, handed Johnson a memorandum which stressed that from the point of view of America's strategy Taiwan should not be handed over to the Communist government. Johnson and his party set out on their return journey on the 23rd, and there were frequent reports in Washington that when Johnson returned he would recommend American intervention in Taiwan to the President. In order to make clear the government's view of these reports Secretary of State Acheson made a declaration on the 23rd of June to the same effect as his previous declaration on the 12th of January, saying that the President still had not the slightest intention of intervening with the use of force in the existing Taiwan situation.

The armies of the communist government had succeeded in subjugating Hainan island on the 30th of April. The next target would naturally be Taiwan. In May it was forecast that Taiwan would fall by the 15th of July. American reports indicated that about the 10th of June the communist government had increased its forces along the coast opposite Taiwan from 40,000 to 156,000 men. The fate of Taiwan lay in the balance.

The Democrats and the Republicans were more or less alike in placing Korea outside America's line of defence. The clash of opinions took place over how Taiwan was to be regarded. This clash of opinions embraced not only the question of how Taiwan was to be regarded, but also that of how

to cope with the Chinese Communist Revolution. The clash of opinions over Taiwan was the focus of the American policy controversies in the first half of 1950.

4. *Indo-China*

Indo-China was the region in which America sought to contain any further spread of communism, imagining that it was inevitable that the communist government would create a unified China by subjugating Taiwan.

The success of the Chinese Communist Revolution was an extraordinary encouragement to the revolutionary forces in Indo-China under Ho Chi-minh. On the 19th of December, 1949, the Republic of Viet-Nam radio sent out an inflammatory declaration to the effect that "the 19th of December, 1949, will be celebrated as the day marking the successful conclusion of the resistance of the Viet-Nameese people against French oppression," and so introduced a new stage in the civil war.

On the 27th of February, 1950, France announced that she had requested arms deliveries from America. Rather than sending arms, America first sent the 7th Fleet to the Saigon area. The 7th Fleet arrived there on the 16th of March. Forty-two aircraft from an aircraft carrier anchored off-shore gave exhibitions of formation flying over central Viet-Nam and over the military port of Tourane. According to newspaper reports, this constituted a declaration of America's material interests in East Asia as well as being a gesture of support for the puppet régime set up by the French (the Bao Dai régime), and was a warning to Russia and China regarding America's future interest in Southeast Asia.

Far from producing the desired effect, however, the American fleet was actually shelled by the revolutionary forces. The shelling continued for an hour and a half from 10 o'clock on the night of the 17th of March. This shelling was the spark which led to the organization of an anti-American demonstration by 3,000 students and 1,000 workers in Saigon. The demonstrators marched through the city, tearing down American flags as they passed. The American fleet left on the 20th amid the strictest precautions, but the indignation of Saigon was unabated, and the strike of students, involving also merchants and taxi-drivers, was prolonged. America's show of force against the Indo-Chinese revolution (or national independence) merely planted in the minds of the people of Indo-China feelings of indignation against the improper interference of American imperialism.

America expedited economic and military aid to France. An A. F. P. report from Washington on the 8th of June said that aircraft had been dispatched to Indo-China as the first consignment of American military aid. The aircraft sent were twin-engined bombers, approximately twenty in number. Next, a U. P. report from Washington on the 12th stated that within the next two weeks America would be sending to Indo-China enough military supplies and other material goods to equip eight battalions of the Bao Dai

forces, this being the second consignment of military aid for Indo-China.

Having suffered a great reverse in its China policy as a result of the Chinese Communist Revolution, America sought to contain the blow in Indo-China, and embarked on a military intervention against the Indo-Chinese revolution (or national independence). In order to equip the complete line-up against the Asian revolution, America set about the construction of military bases along the American line of defence linking the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. Military aid to the Philippines, including the suppression of the revolutionary forces, the Hukbalahap movement, was stepped up, while the spur was applied to the building up of Okinawa Base, and the plans for building bases throughout Japan were expedited.

5. *Okinawa*

In October, 1949, at the time of the Chinese Communist Revolution, Congress voted for the expenditure of \$58,000,000 for construction work for the land and air forces in Okinawa. Under the shock of the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution the construction of bases on Okinawa was hurriedly pressed forward. On the 30th of December the public relations department of the headquarters of the Occupation Forces announced that in order to obtain the tools and materials required in the large-scale building works then being carried on in Okinawa the co-operation of Japanese businessmen great and small was being sought. It was believed that the required materials would cost approximately \$25,000,000, and Japanese capitalism, which was suffering from the effects of the 1949 rationalization slump, looked to base construction in Okinawa as a great opportunity for recovering from the depressed state of business.

Base construction in Okinawa was intensified after the beginning of 1950. On the 6th of January the GHQ public relations bureau announced that a wireless telegraphy network linking all the Ryukyus had been more or less established. On the 9th of March the GHQ popular education and press bureau announced that Major-General Christiansen, the officer commanding the bureau of construction, Far East Forces, had established an office in Tokyo for construction work in Okinawa. On the 15th this officer announced that he would receive tenders from Japanese construction firms for the construction of nine prefabricated type warehouses in Okinawa. On the 17th the General Officer Commanding U. S. Airforces in the Far East, Lieutenant-General Stratimeyer, announced that he had signed orders relating to the first batch of living quarters for Air Force personnel to be constructed in Okinawa, and would shortly give orders for construction to commence. On the 18th of April, as a result of the tenders offered by firms under the new Okinawa construction plan, the American firm of Morrison-Knudsen and the Japanese firm of Shimizu Kensetsu were awarded the contracts for the first batch of construction work, and the contracts were signed at the Tokyo office for construction work in Okinawa. The contract awarded to

the firm of Morrison-Knudsen was for concrete foundations for permanent structures, etc., and amounted to \$963,000, while that awarded to the firm of Shimizu Kensetsu was for nine steel prefabricated warehouses and other goods, amounting to a total of \$189,000.

The progress of base construction caused the American government to make a public statement of its Okinawa policy. On the second of April, Voorhies, the Assistant Secretary for the Army, declared in the Appropriations Sub-Committee of Congress that the American forces would occupy the Ryukyu islands indefinitely, and stated that while one-third of the cultivable land in the Ryukyus was occupied by American military installations, the inhabitants could sell to the occupation forces the articles which the occupation forces required, and would thus be able to obtain money, so that the indefinite occupation of the Ryukyus would be of advantage to the inhabitants also. According to the U.P. agency, this statement by Secretary Voorhies was the first official statement by the American authorities.

Having proclaimed the permanent occupation of Okinawa, America pressed forward the construction of bases under the assumptions of the policy of permanent occupation. On the 15th of June General Christiansen announced that contracts providing for the construction of 490 housing units in Okinawa would be issued to Japanese construction firms on the following day. On the 27th of June, Colonel Wren, a technical officer of the Okinawa Technical Area, U.S. Army, signed contracts with Tōshiba and Shimazu Seisakusho for the construction of electric power installations covering the whole of the island of Okinawa.

The construction of bases in Okinawa was pressed forward with the co-operation of Japanese enterprises. However, Okinawa could attain its full significance as a base only on the condition that bases should also be built throughout Japan. The *Washington Post* of the 27th of May pointed out that under present-day conditions of atomic warfare it was necessary to have bases in sufficient breadth and depth to meet the requirements of an effective defence system facing Soviet penetration into the Pacific area, and maintained that for this purpose small islands such as Okinawa were of no use, since an island would have to be at least as big as those of Japan to provide effective defence bases.

6. *Japan*

It was Joseph Dodge, who directed the reconstruction of the Japanese economy as an adviser to GHQ in 1949, who gave the clearest expression to the tasks facing American policy in Japan. In a deposition before Congress made on the 2nd of April, 1950, he expressed himself as follows:

“I would ask that in the future America should continue to pay close attention to Japan as the focal point of the rights and interests which she has established in the Far East. In the past year, and in particular as a result of the events which have recently taken place in the Far East,

we have been made painfully aware of the necessity of strengthening the position of these rights and interests in Japan. It may be that in the future, as America's Far East policy unfolds, the time will come when a call will be made for Japan to be used as a spring-board for America, and as a country supplying the material goods required for American aid to the Far East."

In order to establish their policies for the new situation brought into being by the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution, the Americans held a rapid succession of conferences during the first half of 1950. In January, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, General Vandenberg, Chief of Air Staff, and other leading military personalities came to Japan for talks with General MacArthur. In February a conference of Far East diplomats was held in Bangkok, centred on P. Jessup, who in the previous year had supervised the compilation of the "White Paper on China" and who had travelled widely in the various countries of Asia as Ambassador-at-Large, the highest adviser to the Secretary of State. In April an economic and trade conference was held in Tokyo for the purposes of discussing economic questions covering the whole of the Far East region, and plans for comprehensive aid to Asia were looked into. In May the sixth annual conference of ECAFE was held in Bangkok with America as one of the participants, and counter-measures relating to industry and foreign trade centred on Japan were discussed. On the 18th of June Secretary of Defence Johnson and General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, came to Japan and had a meeting with General MacArthur. The content of the American policies clarified by these talks and conferences consisted in 1) making Japan into a permanent base, and setting up America's anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese strategy on this assumption, and 2) making Japan into "the workshop of Asia" and preventing the spread of communism to Southeast Asia by putting Japan's industrial might to use in the rehabilitation of Asia.

However, there still remained an important difference of views within the American government over the actual steps to be taken if it were decided that Japan could be made into a permanent base. This difference of views was revealed over the question of the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan.

The armed forces of the United States thought that continued occupation of Japan was necessary in order to ensure freedom of movement for the American forces over the whole of Japan so that they would be in a position to fight a decisive war against the Soviet Union and China. Hence they advocated the continuation of the occupation and opposed the early conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

The State Department was in favour of an early Peace Treaty with Japan. It was clear from the lessons of history that a long continued occupation would provoke resistance from the part of the occupied nation. An

early Peace Treaty was needed if the Japanese people were not to be revolted. The problem lay in what was to be done about Japan's security after the Peace Treaty had been concluded. The State Department thought that instead of America guaranteeing Japan's security it would be sufficient if bases were made available to the American forces by the Japanese under a bilateral agreement. This proposal of the State Department met with the support of General MacArthur.

In March, 1950, Tracy Voorhies, the Assistant Secretary for the Army, proposed a "half-treaty" formula with the idea of neutralizing the difference of views between the State Department and the armed forces, while at the same time ensuring that the armed forces would get their way. Japan would be permitted to recover nominal sovereignty and the internal administration of the country would be entrusted to the Japanese government, but GHQ and the occupation forces would remain in Japan. According to the American student of international politics, the late Mr. F. S. Dunn, the Far East Bureau of the State Department were prepared to accept Voorhies' proposal.¹

However, the assault of some American soldiers belonging to the occupation forces by a group of communists in Japan on the 30th of May (the 5-30 Incident) at last made it apparent that the Japan-America honeymoon was at an end, and caused America to contemplate once again the ending of the occupation and the conclusion of a Peace Treaty. It also became necessary to wipe away the external appearance of military occupation in order to persuade the Japanese to make bases available to America. The solution of the Peace Treaty question became a matter of urgency for America, with the result that on the 18th of June Secretary of Defence Johnson and General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, came to Japan, followed on the 21st of June by J. F. Dulles, a State Department adviser. Each had meetings with General MacArthur, but no meeting took place between Johnson and Bradley on the one hand and Dulles on the other. After both parties had returned home everything was set for dealing with the matters in question, but at this point civil war suddenly broke out in Korea.

II. THE KOREAN WAR

1. The Outbreak of the Civil War

The crisis of the Syngman Rhee régime deepened throughout 1950. In order to divert the nation's eyes from internal affairs Syngman Rhee repeatedly advocated military action against North Korea.

Kim Il-sung opposed Syngman Rhee with two policies in particular. On the one hand he advocated the peaceful unification of Korea and supported the Korean National Front movement. The Korean National Front had a programme for creating a united government of North and South Korea on

¹ F. S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 88.

the anniversary of the liberation of Korea, the 15th of August. On the other hand, Kim Il-sung had a plan for the unification of Korea by force of arms. "Having certain information that Syngman Rhee was making preparations for an attack across the 38th parallel at the beginning of May" he was devising "counter-measures for the repulse of this attack."²

On the 10th of June the Korean National Front dispatched delegates to the 38th parallel with the intention of handing over to the South Korean side an appeal for the realization of its August programme. Syngman Rhee's forces fired on them. On the 16th the Central Committee of the Korean National Front passed a resolution "calling upon political parties and organizations in South Korea to develop the struggle for unification over a wide field in order to bring about the peaceful unification of Korea." On the 19th the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Soviet of North Korea resolved to appeal to the South Korean parliament for the setting up of a federated government which would serve as a parliament for both North and South Korea, putting forward this proposal as a means of achieving the unification of Korea.

At this time, that is to say, up to the 19th of June, Kim Il-sung's policy was the peaceful unification of Korea. Nevertheless, on the 25th of June Kim Il-sung cast aside peaceful unification and embarked upon unification by force of arms.

To this day the question of which side attacked first remains unsolved in a welter of mutual recriminations. It may be that Syngman Rhee's forces provoked the action. Even if we suppose that this was so, what is of greatest importance for history is to be found in the facts that Kim Il-sung did not merely repel Syngman Rhee's provocation, but embarked on the plan of unification by force of arms which he had in preparation since May in the background of the Korean National Front, and developed an attack along the whole front with the intention of securing unification by force of arms.

America had made no preparations to begin hostilities in Korea on the 25th of June. In the opinion of the American military advisers in Korea the South Korean forces were still by no means in a fit state for large-scale warfare. The training programme was behind time, and as of 15th June even the training at battalion level had not yet been completed. The American military mission was obliged to postpone the target-date for the completion of training at battalion level to the 31st of July, and that for training at regiment level to the 31st of October.³ Of the \$10,970,000 aid for Korea passed in May, only \$350,000 had left America as freight by the 25th of June, and the quantity which had actually arrived in Korea accounted for only \$1,000. The military mission believed that 15% of the arms and 35% of the

² *Kim Nissei Senshū* (Selected Works of Kim Il-sung), Kyoto, Vol 2, Sanichi-shobō, 1952, p. 93.

³ R. K. Sawyer, *Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War*, Washington, G.P.O., 1962, p. 102.

transport in the possession of the South Koreans were unserviceable. With the weapons then available the front could be held only for about 15 days.⁴ General Roberts, the head of the military mission, was not at his post on the 15th of June, since he was travelling abroad at the time, while his deputizing staff officer, Colonel Wright, was in Tokyo on the 25th of June, seeing off members of his family who were returning to the United States, and he received news of the commencement of hostilities while at church on Sunday.⁵

America had no direct connexion with the outbreak of civil war in Korea. The Korean War began, perhaps as a result of advantage being taken of provocation from the part of Syngman Rhee, and certainly as an armed and revolutionary war of unification waged by Kim Il-sung. However, the war remained essentially a civil war.

2. *America's Intervention and the Internationalization of the War*

The day on which the Korean War broke out was Saturday the 24th of June in America. President Truman was in Independence, Missouri, enjoying the week-end with his family. After receiving news of the outbreak of hostilities he got the Security Council of the United Nations to adopt a resolution of censure against North Korea, and at the same time decided upon two policies of his own. He caused General MacArthur to assist the South Korean forces with arms and ammunition, and ordered the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits. The reason given for the dispatch of the 7th Fleet was that of preventing the Korean War from having repercussions in Taiwan, and the fleet was charged with the duty of preventing both attacks from Communist China against Taiwan and attacks from Taiwan against Communist China. President Truman put the 7th Fleet under the command of General MacArthur, and instructed it to use Sasebo, Japan, as its base.⁶

The dispatch of American forces, however, was not confined to Korea and Taiwan. President Truman took the opportunity to decide on an expansion of military aid to the Philippines and Indo-China. The declaration which he issued on the 27th of June is still of extraordinary interest when viewed from the present day.

“...I have ordered the United States sea and air forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support.

“The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will soon use armed invasion and war. ... In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

⁴ Sawyer, pp. 103-4.

⁵ Sawyer, pp. 119, 122.

⁶ H. S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2 (Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-53) London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1956, p. 354.

"Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government of Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland....

"I have also directed the United States Forces in the *Philippines* be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippines Government be accelerated.

"I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the Forces of France and the Associated States in *Indochina* and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with these forces." (My italics)

In this way President Truman made a counter-revolutionary declaration covering the whole of Asia and involving military intervention against national independence movements.

The Chinese Communist Revolution was a severe set-back to America's Asia policy. Korea was outside America's line of defence, and it seemed that Taiwan would be left to be incorporated in Communist China by force of arms. America's policy for the containment of Communism was concentrated in strengthening her defence line linking Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines on the one hand, and on the other in her Indo-China policy for preventing the spread of the Chinese Communist Revolution into Southeast Asia. General MacArthur and the pro-Chiang Kai-shek group among the Republicans advocated safeguarding Taiwan from the Chinese Communist Revolution and the inclusion of Taiwan in America's line of defence, but the Korean War led to an immediate outward extension of America's defence line to Korea and Taiwan as well as producing unity among the divergent views of America's Asia policy which had been current in the United States, and unified and determined America's counter-revolutionary policy from Korea and Japan to Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

In all senses of the expression the Chinese Communist Revolution marked an epoch in modern history. The Chinese Communist Revolution would have been completed by the incorporation of Tibet and Taiwan in a unified China. To this day it is still a riddle how Kim Il-sung interpreted the international situation, in which the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations and the United States had concluded a treaty of mutual defence and military assistance with South Korea, and decided to embark on a revolutionary unification of Korea by force of arms. But whatever Kim Il-sung's subjective interpretation of the situation may have been, the objective fact is that the Korean War put off the completion of the revolutions in Korea and China, revolutions which were to have been completed by the peaceful unification of North and South Korea, and by the unification of China by force of arms.

When it was decided that the 7th Fleet should be based on Sasebo for

the defence of America, Japan became a forward military base for intervention in the Chinese Communist Revolution. The influence of the Korean War on Japan was epoch-making in Japan's contemporary history.

III. THE KOREAN WAR AND JAPAN

1. *Rearmament*

The Korean War made Japan into a counter-revolutionary base in all senses of that expression. The first aid sent to South Korea by America in her intervention in the Korean civil war was sent from Japan. Arms and ammunition were sent from the American forces stationed in Japan, and later these forces themselves were dispatched to Korea. In its intervention in the Chinese Communist Revolution the 7th Fleet was based on Sasebo. Further, GHQ openly set to work on the rearmament of Japan.

While dismembering the Japanese army and navy under the policy of demilitarization, GHQ had left a nucleus of the former Japanese forces in the form of an information organization, with the intention of making provision for the rebuilding of the Japanese forces at a later date, but it was only at the beginning of 1947, at the time of the great "1st of February" strike plan, that the first moves were made towards the rebuilding of the armed forces. The plan for a strike proved abortive, but according to Mr. W. Macmahon Ball, the British Commonwealth representative on the Japanese Control Commission, "The restoration of the Japanese fighting forces in some form or other is sympathetically discussed at Allied social gatherings, and this is well known to the Japanese. It was, therefore, not surprising that early in 1947 the Japanese Foreign Office informally sounded out Allied representatives on the prospects of being allowed a standing army of 100,000 men and a small air force."⁷ It was fear of revolution which made the Japanese government think of rebuilding the armed forces.

The military authorities at GHQ sought to have the national rural police, set up under the new Japanese police system in 1947, made into the actual nucleus for the rebuilding of the armed forces. According to Major-General Willoughby, Chief of Department G2, GHQ, the national rural police "can be termed a sort of 'rural constabulary' in transition to a 'lightly armed mobile security force': it is in fact the nucleus of Japan's defence establishment, the army of the future."⁸

In 1948, when the Chinese Communist Revolution subjugated Manchuria, the government in Washington decided on its line of policy in regard to Japanese rearmament. In October it was decided in the National Security Council that "SCAP was to shift responsibilities as rapidly as possible to the Japanese, and SCAP personnel would be reduced; a 150,000 man national

⁷ W. M. Ball, *Japan, Enemy or Ally?*, New York, John Day Co., 1947, pp. 106-7.

⁸ C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, *MacArthur, 1941-1951*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1954, p. 342.

police force was to be organized; Japan would be allowed to assimilate the reform programmes at its own pace and in its own way; and the psychological impact of the Occupation in Japan would be reduced to a minimum."⁹

The rebuilding of the Japanese forces, either as planned by the Japanese or as advocated by the Americans, was occasioned by revolutionary crises at home and abroad. The rebuilding of the Japanese forces was indeed charged with the duty of counter-revolution.

The rebuilding of the Japanese armed forces decided upon by Washington under the impact of the Chinese Communist Revolution was given the chance of realization by the Korean War. On the 8th of July, 1950, some ten days after America had embarked on her armed intervention, General MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to establish a Police Reserve. The Police Reserve was later renamed the Militia, and has now become the Defence Force with every appearance of being a fully-fledged military force, but at all events it was set on foot by General MacArthur and the Washington government trampling underfoot the provisions of the Japanese Constitution which they had laid down on their own initiative.

2. *The Conclusion of Bilateral Peace Treaties*

The rearmament of Japan occasioned by the Korean War was one aspect of an American programme for the establishment of bases throughout Japan. There was controversy within the American government as to whether this should be brought about by continuing the occupation, or by means of a Peace Treaty under which Japan would make bases available, but the resignation of Army Assistant Secretary Voorhies in June, 1950, and the relinquishing of his post by Defence Secretary Johnson in September decisively led America in the direction of concluding a Peace Treaty. From the point of view of seeking Japan's co-operation in the new situation created by the Korean War, too, the concession over the conclusion of a Peace Treaty was a necessity. Further, as regards the form of the treaty, the fact that the concrete content of the treaty was to consist of provisions for the establishment of bases throughout Japan made it inevitable that America should conclude a bilateral Peace Treaty with Japan.

The Japanese people were not all in favour of a bilateral Peace Treaty. A public opinion poll run by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* in August 1949 showed that 72.4% wanted perpetual neutrality as the means for ensuring Japan's security in the future, while 16.6% wanted collective security and 10.6% were satisfied with the existing situation. A poll of 86 specialists in all fields run by the *Asahi Shimbun* in November of the same year showed that 59% wanted a multilateral Peace Treaty including all the belligerents, 21% wanted separate (bilateral) Peace Treaties, and 20% were unable to give any concrete reply. On the subject of ensuring Japan's security after the conclusion of peace 39% wanted perpetual neutrality, 36% wanted membership of the

⁹ Dunn, p. 77.

United Nations, 7% wanted regional collective security, 8% wanted a military agreement with a specific country or a guarantee of security by a specific country, and 10% could not express themselves simply. In the same December the *Mainichi Shimbun* carried out surveys at mass level in Tokyo and Ōsaka, and the results showed that 49.2% wanted separate (bilateral) Peace Treaties, 33.8% wanted a multilateral peace, even if it entailed some delay, 16.8% were satisfied with the existing situation, and 2% made no reply. On the subject of ensuring Japan's security 48% wanted perpetual neutrality, 32% were relying on America, 14% wanted collective security, 2% made other replies, and 15% were satisfied with the existing situation. At least a third of the people surveyed wanted a multilateral peace and perpetual neutrality, and there was no small number who wanted perpetual neutrality even if bilateral Peace Treaties should prove unavoidable. On the 15th of January the Peace Study Group in Japan (Heiwa Mondai Danwa Kai) organized by a group of liberal and democratic intellectuals issued a declaration proclaiming its opposition to the granting of bases and demanding a multilateral peace and a declaration of neutrality and non-aggression. The declaration by the Peace Study Group represented the will of no small part of the Japanese people.

In order to bring about the conclusion of a bilateral treaty America embarked on the manipulation of Japanese public opinion. The question which the Americans raised was that of the repatriation of the Japanese prisoners of war detained in the Soviet Union. William Sebald, Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan, raised this question at the 102nd meeting of the Council on the 21st of December, 1949, and thus began preparing the ground for a bilateral peace treaty by fanning the fear and hatred of the Japanese people for the Soviet Union. His attacks on the Soviet Union were continued at the 108th meeting of the Commission on the 1st of March, 1950, and the 113rd meeting on the 10th of May. On the 27th of May, the Soviet representative, Lieutenant-General Derevyanko, suddenly returned to the Soviet Union, accompanied by the 46 members of the Soviet delegation and their families.

The question of the Soviet detainees was the Japanese people's grievance. The manipulation of Japanese public opinion by the Americans, who were preventing the redress of this grievance, drew the Japanese people to America's side at the same time as it increased their fear and hatred of the Soviet Union, and sharply switched the hopes of the Japanese people from a multilateral peace to a bilateral peace.

While this manipulation of Japanese public opinion was taking place, the Korean War broke out. Propaganda to the effect that it was the Soviet Union which had caused North Korea to commence hostilities by invading South Korea and that the communist menace had now loomed close, had the decisive effect of drawing the Japanese people still further to the side of America and a bilateral peace. A public opinion poll run by the *Asahi*

Shimbun in November, 1950, showed that 46% wanted a bilateral peace and 21% wanted a multilateral peace. Whereas in the poll run in the previous year 15% had said that they were satisfied with the existing situation this proportion was now increased to 33%, while on the subject of the laying out of bases after the conclusion of peace 30% were in favour, 37% were opposed, and 33% were satisfied. The results of this poll made it clear that there was still considerable doubt and uneasiness among the Japanese people. However, the unending disputes within the Communist Party resulting from the criticism of the Cominform and the confusion over the Peace Treaty in the Socialist Party, a party which was heading for a split in its ranks, prevented these feelings of doubt and uneasiness in the Japanese people being reorganized and directed towards a multilateral peace. The movement for a multilateral peace was defeated. The bilateral peace of September, 1951, came into being as a peace which was a "half-peace" when viewed in the light of the occupation in the past, and a "half-occupation" when viewed in the light of the peace still to be concluded.

Though the movement for a multilateral peace had been defeated the Peace Study Group in Japan published a new statement of its views under the new conditions created by the outbreak of the Korean War, and its contention that it was necessary that the question of the conclusion of peace "should not be considered in isolation, but understood in the broader context of the problems of international peace" was epoch-making in that it set out the theoretical segments linking the movement for a multilateral peace in 1949-51 with the Peace Movement of the present day. President Truman made a direct connexion between the Korean War and the Indo-China question and decided to adopt a counter-revolutionary attitude throughout Asia, thus establishing the tradition which has produced the present war of intervention in Viet-Nam. The Peace Movement being carried on in Japan today over the Viet-Nam war makes contact with the now past Korean War through segments constituted from the theory of a multilateral peace and the international peace question.