

THE BUILDING OF A NATIONAL ARMY

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In their work entitled *A Cross Polity Survey*, published in 1963, A. S. Banks and R. B. Textor divide political modernization in the countries of the world into five historical types. These types, which are derived from an unpublished paper by C. E. Black, "Modernizing Societies," are as follows.

- (1) Early European or European-derived (early modernizing European society or offshoot). 11 polities.
- (2) Later European or later European-derived (later modernizing European society or offshoot). 40 polities.
- (3) Non-European autochthonous (self-modernizing extra-European society). 9 polities.
- (4) Developed tutelary (developed society modernizing under tutelage). 31 polities.
- (5) Undeveloped tutelary (undeveloped society modernizing under tutelage). 24 polities.

Banks and Textor include Japan in type (3), along with the Soviet Union, People's China, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Nepal, Thailand, and Turkey. I do not know the typology used by Black on the basis of this classification. However, the classification is constructed with two factors as its axis, the historical division between states of European origin and colonies, and the division into stages of development—advanced developed, late developed, and undeveloped. Consequently I, too, recognize that Japan must be included in the third type in this classification. However, a Japanese cannot but have doubts over the propriety of applying the adjective 'autochthonous' to it. Professor Maruyama Masao 丸山眞男, one of the representative students of political science in present-day Japan, considers the modernization of Japan to have been *a conscious process of Westernization*. If we are to find a special meaning in the modernization of Japan, should we not rather pay attention to the fact that, rather than being something inherently Japanese, it was a form of modernization consisting in the acceptance of the results of modern European society, but an acceptance in which the Japanese had applied

selection on the basis of their own judgment? If the Japanese leaders' possession of such a degree of independence is to be described as autochthonous, we may accept the description as legitimate. If, however, it means that the various factors in modernization developed out of the society of the Tokugawa period in the same way as in Europe, we must find the description difficult to accept, except in a few cases.

The modernization, or Westernization, of Japan began with "*Kaikoku*" 開國 or the opening of the country to foreigners in 1853 and was rapidly propelled forward by the Meiji Restoration, the quasi-revolutionary change of 1868, but since this change possessed the bias peculiar to itself to which we have alluded above, we may say that modernization in the original sense of the word is still developing in Japan at the present day.

Since the moving spirits in the Meiji Restoration and the Meiji government came from the lower ranks of the *samurai* 武士 class in the clans in the Tokugawa period their ideology was of a fairly warrior-like character. Further, the main motive which inspired these leaders of the modernization of Japan was that of preserving Japan's independence, of preventing the Western powers making Japan into a colony. There is no doubt that they thought of modernization as a means of implementing rapidly the policy of "*Fukoku-kyōhei*" 富國強兵 or "national prosperity and strengthening of the armed forces." Some of these members of the former *samurai* class became politicians responsible for political leadership in the Meiji government as civilians, and at the same time they carried on paternalistic leadership in economic, social, and cultural life. On the other hand, another section of the same class became military specialists within the framework of the new political institutions, built up the new armed forces, and co-operated in the attainment of the government's political aims. Consequently, the Meiji régime, at least in the first generation, grew up as a military state for two reasons. Firstly, the *raison d'être* of the state was the maintenance of national prestige with the help of military power, and no other causes competed with national survival. Secondly, no purely civilian personnel had yet arisen in the political or social fields, and the leaders of *samurai*-class origin had no inclination to examine any possibilities other than that of the military state. Because of the latter Japan's character as a military state gradually became an end in itself, and its defensive character at length transformed itself into something of an aggressive character. The aim of the present paper is to examine, over as wide a field as possible, the manner in which the modernization of Japan was carried out in the case of the armed forces, and the special characteristics and

limitations which attached to it.

I

There are many aspects to what is generally described as "the modernization of the armed forces." However, the first point to which we should direct our attention is *the disbandment of feudal retainers*. It is usually the case that this is accompanied by the formation of a centralized and national army which takes the place of the existing forms of military power. It was a revolutionary change for military power which in feudal times had been dependent only on a small number of warriors possessing status privileges to be transformed into a *mass army* which was recruited from the people, who possessed no privileges and who normally had no acquaintance with weapons. In order to bring this transformation about, it was first necessary to destroy the myth that victory in war depended on the individual skill of members of the feudal warrior class. Instead, it was necessary to attach importance to the quantity and quality of the new fire-arms, and the numbers of troops which would be necessary for their systematic use. It was natural that the people, who possessed a low status and had hitherto been thought of only as personnel supplementary to the feudal warrior class, should now come on to the stage as a leading role in the situation. Consequently, this was not suitable to the position which the people occupied in feudal society. Instead, it was necessary to integrate the people with nationalism or to liberate them in a democratic society. Or at least we may say that the change could not have been carried out without the prospect of these things.

Small-arms and artillery had been imported into Japan from Europe in the mid-16th century, and had shown their worth in the civil wars during the latter half of that century. However, after the establishment of the hegemony of the Tokugawa régime over the whole of Japan at the beginning of the 17th century, the state of internal peace and the closure of the country to foreign intercourse which persisted for about two centuries and a half had denied Japan any opportunity of carrying out such a change as we have mentioned above. It was the Western powers' demands for the opening of Japan in the latter half of the 19th century which were the occasion of the final destruction of the feudal military system. The feudal leaders of Japan were clever enough to perceive behind the impact of the opening of the country the threat of the grasping colonialism of the European powers, who had swallowed

up the countries of Africa, the Near and Middle East, and Southeast Asia one after the other. Until that time the Tokugawa Shogunate had been prohibiting the building of large ships and the building up of excessive stocks of fire-arms (by the Buke-shohatto 武家諸法度 or Prohibitive Orders to the Military Class). The reason was nothing other than the prevention of insurrection against the Shogunate. Again, the principle of maintaining the separation of the military and agricultural classes was strictly adhered to, and the privileged position of the *samurai* class was firmly upheld. Ideologically, too, the warlike spirit of the *samurai* class, known as *Bushidō* 武士道, was extolled, while the traditional military arts involving the use of the sword and lance were given excessive importance in comparison with Western military technology, for example, fire-arms, and the loyalty and bravery of the common people was unduly despised.

However, it now became indispensable to have increased fire-power with which to resist the heavily-armed Western powers, and the Shogunate made haste to order the feudal lords to make cannon and warships, or to learn the art of gunnery. This was undoubtedly the first step towards the modernization of the armed forces. However, one year after the issue of these orders only 550 one-*kamme* cannon (firing a 3.75 kg. shot) and approximately 800 smaller pieces had been made in the 200 and more clans throughout the country. These figures, which imply an average of only 7 cannon per clan, show the markedly backward character of Japanese military technology. Even so rudimentary a reform of fire-arms as this was not accomplished without friction. For example, in a memorial presented to the Shogunate in the same year, 1853, Tokugawa Nariaki 徳川齊昭, the Lord of the Mito 水戸 clan, and a leader of the anti-foreign party, while calling for increase in numbers of cannon, held that the Japanese were superior to foreigners in the use of the sword and the lance, and advocated greater efforts in training personnel in the use of these weapons. In contrast to this it is interesting that among the lower ranks of the *samurai* class, who were unable to make full use of their abilities in feudal society, there were some who were able to grasp the change in values at once.

For example, Kido Takayoshi 木戸孝允, who later became one of the principal promoters in the Meiji Restoration and was one of the most eminent of the Meiji government, made the following proposals to the Lord of the Chōshū 長州 clan in the same year, 1853:

"If we have only mock gunnery of the kind practised at Uraga this summer we will be quite unable to resist their machines. Therefore

I propose that we should at once begin work on the construction of fire-arms. It goes without saying that victory is not decided by fire-arms alone, but it seems that with insufficient equipment of fire-arms we will not be able to fight to the best of our abilities in naval engagements, coastal defence, field operations, or any other kind of warfare.”¹

In this way the threat of foreign military pressing force actually on Japan led to the setting aside of the Tokugawa Shogunate's prohibition and the strengthening of the fire-power of the forces of the Shogunate and the feudal lords. If this were to be carried forward properly it would be necessary to have many personnel skilled in the use of fire-arms, and not only would it necessary to reorganize the traditionally formalized military force composed of swordsmen of *samurai* class status, but it would also be necessary to adopt riflemen of commoner status. This, however, was scarcely brought about at all in the reforms at the end of the Tokugawa period. We may think that this was due to resistance based on the feudal status system. Only in the Chōshū clan, at the time of the engagement with the English, French, American and Dutch combined fleets, were Takasugi Shinsaku's 高杉晋作 “*Kiheitai*” 奇兵隊 and other commoners troops (*nōhei* 農兵) organized. Further, even these troops were disbanded immediately after the Meiji Restoration. (The fact that Ōmura Masujirō 大村益次郎, Yamagata Aritomo 山縣有朋, and Katsura Tarō 桂太郎, who came from the Chōshū clan with this experience, undertook the establishment of the new army of the Meiji government is worthy of attention, in that the experience may have been a powerful motive in their adoption of the conscription system.) In the Satsuma 薩摩 clan greater efforts were directed to the strengthening of fire-power, particularly artillery. Such were these efforts that in the Boshin Sensō 戊辰戦争 (civil war) in 1868 the Satsuma clan provided as much as five units of artillery and one mortar unit for the forces of the new government. However, the military reforms in the Satsuma clan went no further, and they did not go so far as to adopt commoners. This was because there were in the Satsuma clan a large number of the lower *samurai* class known as *gōshi* 郷士. It is probable that the rather reactionary role played by the clique of the ex-Satsuma clan in the Meiji government was not unconnected with this fact. In 1862 the Tokugawa Shogunate drew up plans for a military reform and undertook the building up of forces which at that time were on an unprecedented scale—8,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry, 800 artillery, 2,000

¹ Kidokō Denki Hensanjo 木戸公傳記編纂所, *Shōkiku Kidokō Den* 松菊木戸公傳 (Biography of Prince Kido Shōkiku), Vol. 1, Tokyo, Meiji-shoin, 1927, p. 28.

gunners for coastal batteries and 1,400 other personnel, a total of 13,000. Since the Shogunate had the small numbers of the *samurai* class under its direct control, the greater part of these forces would have been recruited from among the commoners, but because of lack of finance the schemes of the Shogunate remained mere paper plans. At the same time the Shogunate planned to build a navy, and ordered two warships of 1,000 tons from America, and one of 3,000 tons from Holland. Further, it is worthy of attention that work was begun on the building of a purely Japanese-made gunboat "Chiyodagata" which, although only of 138 tons, was completed in 1865. However, in this case, too, the Shogunate's plans for the establishment of a navy of 5,000 men were not brought to realization.¹

In 1867 the Tokugawa Shogunate requested aid from the French army through the French minister Léon Roches, and it was arranged that 18 French military personnel should undertake the training of the Shogunate's force of 11,000 infantry, as well as that of cavalry and artillery.² This importation of the French military system left fairly marked traces, so much so that when the Meiji government planned a unified military system for the whole country in October, 1870 (at that time the clans still possessed sovereignty, and their military systems were not uniform), it was decided to model the army on the French system and the navy on the English system.³ This fact also shows that the modernization of the military system took the form of Westernization.

Although reforms in the military system advanced rapidly in this way at the end of the Tokugawa period under the impact of foreign countries, they remained subject to all manner of restrictions deriving from feudal status-society which prevented their completion. For them

¹ Ministry of Education, *Ishin-shi* 維新史 (History of the Restoration), Vol. 3, Tokyo, 1941, pp. 193-199. As against this, I would note that men such as Enomoto Takeaki 榎本武揚 and Nishi Amane 西周, who were dispatched to Holland at this time for the purposes of naval studies, later exercised a greater influence in the modernization of Japan.

² *Ishin-shi*, Vol. 4, p. 363.

³ Yamagata Aritomo, who at that time held the post of *Shōyu* at the Ministry of Military Affairs, had visited Europe to inspect their military systems, and having seen the results of the Franco-Prussian War desired the adoption of the German military system. However, it was impossible to change all at once the tradition which had been imported from France in the past, and for the time being it was decided to adopt the French system. One of the obstacles was lack of knowledge of the German language. Traditions of studies of foreign languages have such an effect. Matsushita Yoshio 松下芳男, *Meiji Gunsei-shi Ron* 明治軍制史論 (On the History of the Military Systems of the Meiji Period), Vol. 1, Tokyo, Yūhikaku, 1956, p. 65.

to advance further the Meiji Restoration was indispensable.

In the Boshin Sensō which accompanied the Meiji Restoration the new government did not yet possess military forces directly under its control, and the war was fought with a mixed force made up of units provided by the loyal clans. There was a great lack of unity in the direction of operations since the rights of command were split up among the clans, and there was a strong tendency for the conduct of the warriors to aim at the performance of exploits for the benefit of the clan or the individual, rather than taking the form of co-operation in the realization of the government's political goals.¹ It goes without saying that an army of so feudal a character was not suitable as the military force at the command of a government which aimed at political reforms. Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文, who later became the supreme leader in the second period of the Meiji government, proposed at this time that the forces of the clans should be separated from the clans and made into an army directly under the control of the government.² Besides preventing these forces being used by the clans in anti-government activities, this proposal aimed at the rapid establishment of an army directly under the control of the government. However, there was no fundamental solution to the problem other than the abolition of the clans and the setting up of a centralized state. Even so, it was nearly impossible for the Meiji government, devoid of military forces as it was, to abolish the clans. Hereupon, in accordance with a proposal put forward by Yamagata Aritomo, the military leaders of the three leading clans—Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛 (Satsuma), Kido Takayoshi (Chōshū), and Itagaki Taisuke 板垣退助 (Tosa 土佐)—were summoned to Tokyo as Generals of the Emperor. Under their leadership, between six and eight thousand men, including several units of artillery, were collected under the standard of the Emperor in June, 1871. This programme of the establishment of *Shimpei* 親兵 (the Imperial Guards) brought great success.³ Needless to say, this force was composed of *samurai* from the three great clans, and there was a strong tendency for their loyalty to be directed to Saigō and the other individual leaders. Nevertheless, the Meiji government was able to carry out so great a work as *Haihan-chiken* 廢藩置縣,

¹ S. Fukushima, "Kanryō-sei to Guntai 官僚制と軍隊 (The Bureaucracy and the Army)," in *Iwanami Kōza: Nihon Rekishi* 岩波講座: 日本歴史 (Iwanami Lectures: The History of Japan), Vol. 17, Tokyo, Iwanami-shoten, 1962, pp. 39-40.

² Shumpōkō Tsuishōkai 春畝公追頌會, *Itō Hirobumi Den* 伊藤博文傳 (Biography of Itō Hirobumi), Vol. 1, Tokyo, 1940, pp. 410-413.

³ Tokutomi Iichirō 徳富猪一郎 ed., *Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den* 公爵山縣有朋傳 (Biography of Prince Yamagata Aritomo), Vol. 2, Tokyo, 1933, pp. 58-110.

the abolition of the clans and the establishment of prefectures in July, 1871, having in the background this military force, slightly unsuitable for uniting the state. In actual fact, this success may be considered to have been due more to the government's guarantee of the debts of the clans, which were near to financial collapse, than to the effect of military threat. At any rate, by this means the autonomy of the feudal lords was abolished, and at the same time *the distinction between civil and military officers* was more or less established. As an accompaniment to this, the Imperial Guards having a markedly feudal character lost their own basis and proceeded to their dissolution.

II

Hereupon the armed forces of Japan entered their second stage, a stage marked by *the institution of conscription*. After *Haihan-chiken* an ordinance issued by the Ministry of Military Affairs in August, 1871, ordered all castles and ammunition to be taken over by the government and disbanded all forces in the small clans and prefectures with an assessed fiscal capacity of 10,000 *koku* or less. Again, in the large- and medium-sized clans only one section was to remain in the prefecture, and the rest of the troops were to be organized in four *chindai* 鎮臺 or 'garrisons' in Tokyo, Ōsaka, Kumamoto and Sendai, and these troops were to form a standing army directly under the control of the government. They numbered more than 20 battalions, approximately 8,000 men, and including *Shimpei* the total forces under the command of the government amounted to approximately 14,000 men at the end of 1871. They were volunteers, mainly drawn from *shizoku* 士族 or the ex-*samurai* class, and the system, which was called '*sōhei*' 壯兵, had the attributes of a *professional soldier system*, which, in Europe, was set in opposition to the conscription system of military organization. This system of military organization presupposed the existence of the status of *shizoku*, the new appellation of the members of the former *samurai* class. Since at that time there are said to have been 400,000 *shizoku*, and since the government had undertaken to take the place of the clans in paying them their personal stipends, without distinction of being *sōhei* or not, the government was saddled with a great financial burden. Further, since the *sōhei* continued to be more powerfully influenced by their personal relations with individuals in the former clans than by the orders of the government, the central government's desire to sweep away the old system, either political or social, could scarcely be carried out with

thoroughness. On the other hand, again, as the pressure of the Western European powers was maintained after the establishment of the new government, the government found it necessary, while expanding the army, to make efforts to build a navy, a very expensive undertaking, and for this reason also the government was pressed by the necessity of abolishing the stipends of the *shizoku* and the *sōhei* system in the interests of economy and of adopting the less expensive conscription system.

The Conscription Ordinance was promulgated in January, 1873. Since at that time the land forces were organized on the French pattern we may assume that in form they were largely in the French tradition, although they were also considerably influenced by Prussia. It is said that universal conscription began at the time of the French Revolution. However, the 'levée en masse' in the course of the Revolution appealed to the patriotism and egalitarianism of the citizens which had naturally arisen along with the Revolution, and it was in no wise an institution purposively devised by the Revolution. Further, since the Jacobins used this popular army not merely for the purposes of defence but sought to spread republicanism all over Europe by means of foreign campaigns which led on to the long Napoleonic Wars, it came about that "most Frenchmen believed conscription to be an evil,"¹ and after 1818 this French military system passed to a species of selective conscription system. Under this system the names of 20,000 men were drawn each year, and they were required to serve with the colours for seven years, but it was easy to avoid this obligation by hiring a substitute or by paying an exemption fee. Thus in fact the system became one under which military service was not based on the egalitarian principle, but was a form of long-term service confined to the poor. At the time this system was called "l'impôt du sang" (the blood tax). In contrast to this, in Prussia, which was invaded by the French armies, the conscription system was adopted in 1813 on the tide of popular feeling in the wars of liberation against France, and Prussia kept to this system thereafter. At the time of the great victory over Austria at Sadowa in 1866 Prussia was calling up 63,000 men every year under a non-discriminatory conscription system, and was employing a three-year period of training with the colours, a short period for these times, followed, in addition, by 16 years in the reserve. France had no reserve system following the period of seven years' service with the colours. If the shorter period of training was

¹ R. D. Challener, *The French Theory of Nation in Arms, 1866-1939*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1955, p. 12.

effective, the Prussian system must clearly be more profitable for raising vast bodies of troops in time of war. Napoleon III, who had sustained a grievous blow by the victory at Sadowa, made haste to reform the military system. The French people, however, who had lost confidence in their government, resisted this out of a fear that it would lead to the militarization of their country, with the eventual result that France was defeated by Prussia in 1870.¹ The laying down of the Conscription Ordinance in Japan took place under these circumstances in 1873.² For this reason, while the Japanese system was modelled on the old French system it also had a tendency to incorporate the advantages of the Prussian system. In the official proclamation which accompanied the promulgation of the Conscription Ordinance the ancient military institutions of Japan are drawn upon as a reminder of the tradition of military service by peasants, and the subject of egalitarianism is taken up. "The Restoration of Imperial Rule... has reduced the stipends of hereditary and idle members of the *samurai* class and has permitted them to abandon the profession of arms, to the end that the Four Orders of the People may be at length endowed with the rights of freedom. This is the way by which the upper and lower classes may be brought to the same level and human rights made uniform, and it is the basis for uniting the military and agricultural classes. The members of the military class are no longer members of the *samurai* class as in former times, nor are the people the people as in former times. Both are the people of the same Imperial Country, and in their service of their country, too, there should be no difference between them. ... The Westerners call this 'l'impôt du sang.' This means that the people serve their country with their blood. ..." This document faithfully reproduces the way of thinking of the French, which while appealing to egalitarianism and patriotism gradually lost the spirit of spontaneous service and ended by describing the conscription system as "the blood tax." It is certain that no burning loyalty towards the government could be expected after the Meiji Restoration, since it was not accompanied by a liberation of the land such as that which accompanied the French Revolution, for in this matter nothing was done except to begin work on the reform of the Land Tax in July, 1873, after the promulgation of the Conscription Ordinance, and further, the results of this Reform did not go beyond the confirmation

¹ R. D. Challener, pp. 3-45.

² In 1871 Yamagata Aritomo, then *Hyōbu-taya*, and others had stated in a proposal for the enlargement of the armed forces that the recent victory of Prussia over France was due to large reserves of troops. (Y. Matsushita, Vol. 1, p. 115.)

of the peasants' rights of land ownership while the burden of taxation was either unaltered or was even higher than it had been in the time of the Tokugawa Shogunate. It seems probable that levying full-time military duties from these peasants unilaterally and unprecedentedly must have been entirely in the nature of a "blood tax." It was perfectly natural that the peasants should resist this, and that in the next four or five years there should have been about 15 cases of peasant uprisings against the conscription system in various parts of Japan. This was due to the fact that in those days there was as yet no system of representative government in Japan, and the government was a despotic one which enforced compliance with its policies unilaterally, without ever consulting public opinion. We must surely be led to the conclusion that it was a great misfortune for Japan that universal compulsory military service was decided upon in this way, without any attempt to persuade the people and without any spontaneous uprising of a willingness to participate. In order to make up for the passive character of the people the government resorted to one unreasonable measure after another, while the people employed every excuse in their attempts to secure exemption from military service. This was a passive expression of their intention to oppose the conscription system. At a later date this attitude to military service on the part of the people became an undesirable but general characteristic of the people's participation in politics.

Further, under the existing political conditions the government was able to call up for active service each year only a bare 10,000 men. Consequently, in this situation it would seem that there was no necessity for the government to go so far as to adopt the conscription system. The reason for the government's enforcement of conscription was primarily the necessity of another military system to replace the *shizoku* military system after its abolition. Under a volunteer system it would probably have been impossible to get rid of the *shizoku* and make the peasants into soldiers. We may also suppose that another reason was that the government wished to use its dictatorial powers to establish the basis for a future expansion of military manpower before democratic institutions, such as those of the representative system, could come into being and exercise restrictions on armaments. When the Meiji Constitution (Dai Nihon Teikoku Kempō 大日本帝國憲法) was laid down in 1889, and the Imperial Diet opened, Itō Hirobumi had all the principal forest lands throughout the country assigned to the ownership of the Imperial House. This action was taken to prepare the way for keeping up the Army and Navy by grants made under the head of 'Expenses

of the Imperial Household' if the military estimates were ever voted down in the Diet.

Thus, in the Conscription Ordinance (to which resistance was expected) a large number of reasons for exemption were recognized in advance, as in France. These reasons comprised physical unfitness, exemptions for officials and students, the payment of a substitute fee, and cases in which consideration had to be given to matters connected with the Japanese family system. It appears that physical unfitness was not related to any particular stratum of society, but many of the intellectual classes were put under this classification on grounds of weakness of the muscles, bad eyesight, etc. We may suppose that at this time officials, students of public institutions and those studying abroad were practically all members of the *shizoku* class. Again, by the payment of a fee, admittedly a rather high one of ¥270, those who could afford it were able to obtain life exemption from military service without more ado. We may suppose that for these reasons the persons who underwent military service would have been adopted predominantly from the impoverished peasantry. Exemption on the grounds of considerations connected with the family system may justly be regarded as peculiar to Japan, but in this case also we may suppose class inequalities operated. The institution of the household or 'family' (*ie* 家) which persisted in Japan down to the end of the Second World War, was the paternalistic large family system, and it performed the function of assuring a large supply of family labour among the peasantry in particular. The Conscription Ordinance gave consideration to the continuance of the institution of an '*ie*,' and granted exemption from military service to the family head (or head of household), his heir, the grandchild destined to succeed the heir to only sons, grandsons, and adopted sons of heads of families belonging to an '*ie*,' to persons acting as family head in the place of invalid senior relatives, and to persons whose elder or younger brothers were undergoing military service. Since at this time it was the custom to divide the holding of agricultural land when a new family (*bunke* 分家) was established, the second and third sons were kept in the family for a long time among the landowning or tenant peasants who cultivated only minute areas of land, so that they might avoid dividing their holdings. In contrast to this, opulent landlords and landowning peasants whose holdings were of large area were able to make arrangements for the establishment of new families or the adoption of sons as they pleased, and by assuming the position of the head of a household were able to obtain exemption from military service. In this way, out of the 300,000

to 400,000 young men who reached the age of 20 in each year, approximately 10,000 who could find no reason for avoiding military service were obliged to undergo three years of military service. In the light of the situation described above we may suppose that they were principally landowning or tenant peasants cultivating minute holdings.

The *shizoku*, who continued to persist as a class, reacted strongly against the conscription system. As against this, the government completed the taking over of small-arms, etc., in the former clans in 1874 and issued an ordinance prohibiting the carrying of swords in March, 1876, thus enforcing its prohibition of the free possession of arms, while in August, 1876, it abolished the stipends of the *shizoku*, giving them government bonds in compensation, and thus finally accomplished the institutional liquidation of the body of feudal retainers. A section of the *shizoku* who were dissatisfied with the government for these reasons took advantage of the opportunity of a split among the government leaders at the time of the agitation for the invasion of Korea in 1873 and rose in rebellion, but they were completely defeated by conscript forces drawn mainly from the peasantry, the last actions being the Seinan Sensō 西南戦争, the war fought in south-western Japan in 1877, and hereupon the arguments for the *shizoku* system of military organization were deprived of all foundation. Their defeat merely provides another proof of a fact which we have stated above—that the mass use of fire-power decides victory in war—but in the society of these times it was thought of as being a spectacular success for the conscription system.

Seventeen years later, after the first Conscription Ordinance in 1889, the government laid it down in the Meiji Constitution that military service was a duty of the people, and the conscription system became a firmly consolidated institution. At the same time the Conscription Ordinance was subjected to sweeping revisions, and for the first time a system which approached universal conscript service was produced. Exemption on grounds connected with the family system was abolished, while officials and students were no longer exempted from military service, but were merely allowed to have their military service postponed. However, since the idea of universal conscript service had taken root in the national consciousness, no criticism of the system of military service resulted. The conscription system is not the only system appropriate to a modern state, for England was able to respond adequately to the demand of modern warfare with the help of a volunteer system based on the spontaneous will of the people, and it would appear to have been a loss for the modernization of the Japanese state, in the true sense of

that term, that not the slightest consideration was given to the question of its adoption.

III

Finally, let us consider the question of the mechanisms for the control of the armed forces. In this we include not only the institutions and policies by which the government administers and controls the armed forces—what is generally known as ‘civil-military relations’—but also the means by which discipline is maintained among officers and men within the armed forces themselves.

One of the reasons for which the leaders of the Meiji government negated the *shizoku* system of military organization was the difficulty of controlling armed forces organized in this way. A good example of this is to be found at the time of *Seikan Ron* 征韓論 (the Agitation for the Invasion of Korea) in 1873. After Saigō Takamori and Itagaki Taisuke resigned there was a continuing series of resignations from the Imperial Guards, and the government was obliged to reduce the number of its battalions. These *sōhei* of *shizoku* origin had sworn personal loyalty to the leaders in the former clans, and did not yet have that sense of responsibility which would have fitted them as members of a modern system of organization. The expedition to Taiwan in 1874, also provides a notable example of the defects of the *shizoku* system. Since dissatisfaction among the *shizoku* of the Satsuma clique was all too strong after the ending of the agitation for the invasion of Korea, the leaders who were near to the Satsuma clique—Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視, Ōkubo Toshimichi 大久保利通 and others—fearing that they might rebel, organized an expedition to Taiwan. But since the American Government refused the government's application to borrow American merchant shipping for transport to Taiwan, the government contemplated abandoning the expedition, fearing a hardening of the attitude of China. However, Saigō Tsugumichi 西郷從道, the commander of the expedition and the younger brother of Saigō Takamori, held fast to the *shizoku* position, which attached more importance to the employment of military power than to judgment in diplomacy, and in the end he led the expedition out of port on his own responsibility. In this way the government was put in the embarrassing position of being compelled to accept the risk of hostilities with China. All the generals of the Chōshū clique—Yamagata Aritomo, Miura Gorō 三浦梧樓, and others—who were asked by the government to prepare operational plans for the hostilities with China,

said that there was no chance of success because of a lack of the arms and ammunition required for the opening of hostilities and because, if foreign countries adopted a neutral position, the expedition could not be supplied, and they advised the government to reconsider the sending of the expedition. In spite of this, the two generals of the Satsuma clique alone adopted a bellicose attitude, declaring their willingness to fight with the available arms if war were decided upon.¹ At that time only 20,000 troops could be mobilized, a fact which indicates how improvident the advocates of the *shizoku* system of military organization were.

It appears that the government leaders did not give much attention to the control of the armed forces after the arguments for the *shizoku* system of military organization had been completely overturned by the Seinan Sensō. At that time Itō Hirobumi came to hold the leading power in the government, while in the Army Yamagata Aritomo applied himself to the establishment of such new institutions as he found to his liking. Both were members of the Chōshū clique, and although their opinions might differ it is probable that they were completely free from any feeling of bad faith such as would be occasioned by the Army breaking away from the government's control. This is probably one of the reasons why no consideration was given to 'civil-military relations' in Japan. However, from the point of view of government control the military institutions built up by Yamagata were by no means devoid of a dangerous character. A representative case is the *independence of the General Staff Office*, which was established in 1878. This was done by Yamagata, who had wished the adoption of the German military system on the basis of a proposal put forward by Katsura Tarō, who had twice been to Germany to study and had made a detailed study of the military institutions and military administration of that country. After this event the Japanese military system was gradually switched from the French to the German system, and one of its important results was the adoption of *the division of the army into two chains of command—administrative and operational*. In Germany, as early as 1655 under the Great Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, a General Staff Office was formed, and the Chief of Staff had direct access to the Sovereign without the intermediacy of the Minister for War. Further, it is said that from 1866, after Von Moltke, the Chief of Staff issued operation orders directly to commanding officers. However, it was only because the successive sovereigns of the House of Hohenzollern were greatly interested

¹ Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyūjo 早稻田大學社會科學研究所, *Ōkuma Monjo* 大隈文書 (The Ōkuma Documents), Vol. I, Tokyo, 1958, pp. 75-77.

in military matters, and in time of war combined in their persons the offices of supreme commander and Chief of General Staff that it was possible to preserve unity under this dual system, a system which was attended by the danger of dividing the command of the armed forces in cases where the presiding judgment of sovereigns such as these could not be looked for.¹

In Japan the Ministry of Military Affairs (*Hyōbu-shō* 兵部省) was established in 1869, and in February, 1872, it was divided into the Army Ministry and Navy Ministry. As early as July, 1871, an Army Staff Bureau had been established under the personnel orders of the Ministry of Military Affairs, in which it was specified that the Bureau should "take part in secret duties and planning, collect maps and political information, and be in charge of spies, intelligence, and other matters." (In the case of the Navy no similar mechanism was set up until 1887.) However, at this stage the chief of the Bureau also held the office of *Hyōbu-tayū* 兵部大輔 (the Vice-Minister) and his duties were entirely under the control of the Minister for War (*Hyōbu-kyō* 兵部卿). At the same time, however, it was laid down that the *Hyōbu-tayū*, who was also chief of the Staff Bureau, should be of the substantive rank of colonel or above and that the *Hyōbu-kyō* should be of the substantive rank of major-general or above. In this way the institution of *giving exclusive appointment of military officers* was established at an early date. This is directly opposed to the practice in England and America, where the Minister for War is a civilian and it is thought that this assures democratic control of the army, and the adoption of the institution was based on the idea of giving priority to military efficiency. As early as December, 1871, a memorial was presented in the names of Yamagata Aritomo, the *Hyōbu-tayū* and Chief of Staff Bureau, and others in which it was maintained that in view of the prime consideration on making provision against Russian penetration to the south, armaments should be expanded, and that this should be given priority over all other policies.² Herein we can see the later role of the General Staff Office in its leading function of uniting the whole of Japanese society under the principles of militarism. Thereafter, in February, 1874, in accordance with the opinions of Katsura Tarō, who had returned from study in Germany, the Staff Bureau was enlarged as a Bureau attached to the Army Ministry (again with Yamagata as Chief), thus opening the way

¹ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 6, 31, 78, 193ff.

² Y. Matsushita, Vol. 1, pp. 45, 100, 114.

to the later independence of the General Staff Office.

The Regulations for the General Staff Office of November, 1878, lay down that the Chief of the General Staff Office "shall take part in the secret duties of the military council" (that is, shall assist in important secret duties at the Emperor's operational headquarters), and it included the clear provision that, in time of war, the Chief of the General Staff Office should pass down operational instructions to commanders after these had received the personal sanction of the Emperor.¹ In this way was established the mechanism by means of which the administrative orders of the Army Minister and the operational orders of the Chief of the General Staff Office were transmitted dualistically, although at the highest level both proceeded from the Emperor. Under the *Dajōkan* system, in force from 1869, the Army Minister came under the *Dajō-daijin* 太政大臣, who assisted the Emperor, and together with the Navy Minister he was in charge of the administration of military duties. This means that *the Chief of the General Staff Office and the Dajō-daijin occupied positions side by side*. Yamagata Aritomo was promoted from Army Minister to Chief of the General Staff Office, Saigō Tsugumichi was made Army Minister, and Ōyama Iwao 大山巖, another member of the Satsuma clique, was made Vice-Chief of the General Staff Office. In point of personal relations also, Yamagata was pre-eminent as senior to Saigō. It is worthy of note that, along with the precedence in rank which the Chief of the General Staff Office enjoyed over the Army Minister, these appointments took account of the balance of forces between the Satsuma and Chōshū cliques. It was only at a much later date that the modern principle of making appointments on the basis of past performance was applied to appointments in the armed forces.

This dual system was confirmed under the provisions of the Meiji Constitution of 1889. The eleventh article of this Constitution laid it down that "the Emperor commands the Army and Navy," and this was generally known as the *Tōsui-taiken* 統帥大權, or Prerogative of Supreme Command. This was considered to be different from the *Kokumu-taiken* 國務大權, or Prerogative in the Duties of the State, exercised by the Emperor with the assistance of the Ministers of State (*Kokumu-daijin* 國務大臣), and was spoken of in terms of *the independence of the Prerogative Supreme Command*. As against this, the twelfth article prescribed that "the Emperor shall decide the formation and the sums to be spent on the maintenance of the military and naval forces." This was known as the *Gunsei-taiken* 軍政大權, or Prerogative of Military

¹ Y. Matsushita, Vol. 2, pp. 10-11.

Administration, and was considered to come under the *Kokumu-taiken*. In this connexion Minobe Tatsukichi 美濃部達吉, a representative student of constitutional law in the 1920's and thereafter, published an interpretation from the point of view of constitutional theory according to which the matters concerned with the Prerogative of Supreme Command which the Emperor decided with the assistance of the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of Naval Command and others consisted merely in the Emperor determining the will of the Army and Navy in his capacity as Great Generalissimo and did not consist in the determination of the will of the state in his capacity as head of the state, and that consequently such decisions could not override decisions regarding the will of the state made with the assistance of the Ministers of State.¹

As a matter of tradition, however, the members of the military forces did not recognize that the Emperor was bound by the Constitution. Consequently they were incapable of understanding theories such as those in which a distinction is made between the exercise of the two capacities of the Emperor, and they believed that, provided the Imperial Prerogative of Supreme Command had been personally exercised, cabinet decisions could be overridden without impediment. If such an interpretation is adopted, it means that the will of the armed forces as represented by those who assisted the Emperor in his exercise of the Prerogative of Supreme Command had, for practical purposes, attained the position of the supreme directing will in the state. This is so because under the Constitution the Emperor is to act with the assistance of the Ministers of State, and so it is a general principle that he should not make personal political judgments. Thus in the sphere of state affairs the will of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of State as made available to the Emperor becomes the will of the Emperor, and in the sphere of military operations the will of the members of the armed forces who assist the Emperor becomes the will of the Emperor. However, in respect to the former, the responsibility of the assistants of the Emperor was clearly shown by means of the countersignature system employed by the Prime Minister and the Ministers of State, and consequently it was permissible to discuss the merits of the orders made. In the latter case, however, there was no countersignature system which fixed responsibility among the assistants of the Emperor (this was a form contrived by Yamagata Aritomo who excluded the form of assistance of the *Dajō-daijin* at the time of the issue of the Imperial Rescript to the Army and Navy), and it was stressed that the military operational orders issued were in

¹ Y. Matsushita, Vol. 2, pp. 302-304.

the nature of the absolute orders of the Emperor in his capacity as Great Generalissimo. The original of this arrangement would seem to have been that of putting aside all criticism of the control of the armed forces from the point of view of sectarian interests and of setting up a hierarchy of absolute obedience to orders extending down to the lowest ranks. The result, however, was that the impression was created that the Emperor's Prerogative of Supreme Command, in which the element of the Emperor's personal decision was strongly represented, had pre-eminence over the Emperor's constitutionalist Prerogative in the Duties of the State, thus rejecting Minobe's constitutionalist interpretation which we have mentioned above.

The existence of the Emperor's Prerogative of Supreme Command was a great obstacle in the way of the establishment of Japanese constitutionalism. Far from controlling the armed forces, the Japanese civilians were obliged to retreat to the position of defending themselves from control by the armed forces. In this matter a great influence was exercised by the institution of *appointing exclusively military officers to the posts of the Army and Navy Ministers*. After the institution of the practice of giving exclusive appointment of military officers in respect to appointments to the office of *Hyōbu-kyō* which we have mentioned above, the Regulations for the Army Ministry of 1873 made no provision regarding the qualifications of appointees to the post of *Hyōbu-kyō*, but the Institutional Rule for Army Appointments of 1876 again restricted the post of *Hyōbu-kyō* to general officers. This prescription was reproduced in the Administrative Regulations for Appointments to the Army Ministry of 1879, but in 1881 was abolished once more. Nothing specific regarding the Army Minister was laid down in the Institutions for Officials at the Army Ministry of 1886, and it was merely laid down that military officers should be appointed to posts at the Army Ministry. However, in the Revised Establishment List of Personnel at the Army Ministry of 1888 it was clearly laid down that the Minister and Vice-Minister should be general officers. In this way the prescription governing appointments to the post of Army Minister were repeatedly changed, but in fact no appointments other than those of general officers were made.¹ This course of events would seem to indicate that those who

¹ No restrictions were placed on appointments to the post of Navy Minister (*Kaigun-kyō* 海軍卿) in the Regulations for the Navy Minister of 1873, and the first holder of the post, Katsu Yasuyoshi 勝安芳 (a former retainer of the Shōgun) was appointed to the rank of Vice-Admiral three months after taking up his post. The first holder of the post of Navy Minister under the new title of *Kaigun-daijin* 海軍大臣 was Saigō Tsugumichi, a Lieutenant-General, who took up his post in 1885. In the Institutions for Officials at the

laid down these prescriptions did not fully understand their significance.

In 1891, only two years after the laying down of the Constitution, the armed forces ministers in the Matsukata 松方 cabinet (the Army Minister Ōyama Iwao and the Navy Minister Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀, both members of the Satsuma clique) brought forward proposals for the expansion of the armed forces on the occasion of a cabinet reorganization, and caused indignation among their cabinet colleagues by adopting the attitude that if these proposals were not accepted they would refuse to put forward successors to their posts. In the following year, 1892, when the Minister of the Interior, Kōno Togama 河野敏鎌, began to prosecute those responsible for government interference in the second general election, the Army Minister, Takashima Tomonosuke 高島鞆之助 (the successor of Ōyama, and a member of the Satsuma clique) resigned his post as a gesture of support for the interference and opposition to its punishment. Next, the three senior Army and Navy personalities and members of the Satsuma clique, General Ōyama Iwao (former Army Minister), Lieutenant-General Kawakami Sōroku 川上操六 (Vice-Chief of Staff, the Chief of Staff being Prince Arisugawa 有栖川宮, virtually a figure-head) and Vice-Admiral Nire Kagenori 仁禮景範 (head of the Naval College, Navy Minister in the next government, and like Inoue Ryōkei 井上良馨, Chief of Naval Operations, a member of the Satsuma clique, but seven years his senior and first Chief of Naval Operations) visited the Prime Minister, Matsukata, who like them was a member of the Satsuma clique, and brought about the resignation of the cabinet by threatening to refuse to appoint successors to the posts of the Army and Navy Ministers if the opinions of the armed forces ministers were not accepted.¹

This course of events clearly proves that the system under which officers of the armed forces exclusively held the posts of the Army and Navy Ministers was thought of as an instrument to be used in forcing the opinions of the armed forces on the cabinet, even in matters with which the armed forces were entirely unconcerned. Observing this, the members of Matsukata's cabinet removed the prescription that the Minister and Vice-Minister should be general officers from the Establishment List when the Institutions for Officials at the Army Ministry were revised in

Navy Ministry of 1886 the post of Navy Minister was restricted to officers of the armed forces for the first time. Further, in the revision of the Institutions for Officials which was made in 1890 the Navy Ministry was freed from the restriction of ministerial appointments to officers of the armed forces in advance of the Army Ministry. (Y. Matsushita, Vol. 1, pp. 178, 348, and Vol. 2, pp. 91, 316.)

¹ *Itō Hirobumi Den*, Vol. 2, pp. 788, 860.

August, 1891. In this way it was at last recognized that the restriction of the qualifications for tenure of the posts of the armed forces ministers was an important question affecting the cabinet's control over the Army and Navy. However, in reply to questions put to him by the Emperor Meiji in September, 1891, Itō Hirobumi, who by that time was one of the *Genrō* 元老 or Elder Statesmen, said that the limitation of the posts of Army and Navy Minister to general officers and flag officers would appear to have originated, in Europe as in Japan, from the necessity of defending the prerogatives of the sovereign, that in order to prevent a change to a republican system the sovereign's prerogative of controlling the armed forces must not be entrusted to the Diet or the political parties, and that for this reason it was best that politicians, who would be liable to be moved by the political parties, should be excluded from the posts of the ministers in charge of the administration of the armed forces and these posts filled by general officers or flag officers, thus stabilizing the administration of the armed forces. Again, the Emperor Meiji suggested to Matsukata, when as mentioned above he was faced by the resignations of the armed forces ministers, that he should choose successors to the posts of the Army and Navy Ministers after hearing the opinions of four of his ministers in particular—Gotō Shōjirō 後藤象二郎 (Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, a former retainer of the Tosa clan), Kōno Togama (Minister for Justice, a former retainer of the Tosa clan), Enomoto Takeaki 榎本武揚 (Foreign Minister, a former retainer of the Shōgun), and Sano Tsunetami 佐野常民 (Minister for Agriculture and Commerce, a former retainer of the Hizen 肥前 clan). When these four ministers urged Matsukata to remain in office he asked the advice of Itō Hirobumi on the question of finding successors for the posts of the Army and Navy Ministers. Itō Hirobumi refused, and prevented the materialization of civilian ministers for the armed forces. On receiving an ultimatum from the Army and Navy on the following day, Matsukata tendered his resignation, and since it was Itō (who had been planning the formation of a political party for some time) who became Prime Minister of the second cabinet, the impression was given that there might have been collusion between Itō and the armed forces. In this way Itō, who was the highest political leader of that time, showed that because of his origins in the former *samurai* class he had an extraordinary concern for the preservation of the monarchy and had closed his eyes to the prejudiced views of the brass of the armed forces.¹ On the other hand, we must not disregard the fact that the Emperor Meiji, who

¹ *Itō Hirobumi Den*, Vol. 2, pp. 788-790.

as a constitutional monarch was in a position in which he did not give political expression to his personal views, asked questions and made suggestions which were tantamount to political activities in connection with the revision of the military system which had been decided upon by the cabinet, or regarding the Prime Minister's intention to resign. These facts may also enable us to understand why the armed forces, headed by the Emperor as Great Generalissimo, could not entirely shake off the attributes of a private army of the monarchy.

Further, the fact was that the inculcation of the idea that the armed forces were a private army of the monarchy was the most important instrument for the control of the troops, from officers down to the rank and file, employed by the military leaders who regarded themselves as not being subject to the control of the government. We may suppose that it was a case of a monarchy which could not fit into the system of constitutional government and armed forces which could not modernize themselves existing in a relation of mutual dependence. The following occurs in the memorial presented to the Emperor in 1881 by the councillors (*sangi* 参議) who asked for a gradual transition to a constitutional system of government:

"There are certain means by which the foundations of a constitutional monarchy are made secure. The first is the establishment of a Council of Elder Statesmen, an institution composed of mature members of the aristocracy. The second is the personal command of the land and sea forces by the Emperor....

As for the organization of the Army and Navy, it may be said that the Son of Heaven is the generalissimo of the forces in the field, and the members of the armed forces are the teeth and claws of the Royal House. Therefore those who are members of the armed forces have the duty to love their country whole-heartedly and to be loyal to their sovereign. They shall never exercise the power of forming parties, or of discussing matters of government. It is now fitting that this discipline should be instituted, and that Your Majesty should come forward to play a personal part in it, so that this example may be shown to the world, and being transmitted among the people may become a custom which will forever be a bulwark to the state."¹

On the one hand it is said that the members of the armed forces possess patriotism and loyalty because they are the protecting power of their sovereign, while on the other hand it is recognized that the armed forces will not be able to preserve their character unless it is laid down

¹ *Ito Hirobumi Den*, Vol. 1, pp. 230-231.

as a matter of discipline that their members do not take part in politics and unless the Emperor in person gives them disciplinary encouragement. May not this be taken to indicate that there was a great gap between the idea of the functions of the armed forces commonly entertained by the politicians of these times and that entertained by the actual officers and men of the armed forces, and that no other means of suppressing this difference could be found than that of drawing on the authority of the Emperor? In 1878, three years before this memorial was presented, there occurred a mutiny among the Imperial Guards which is known by the name of the "Takebashi disturbance," and the penetration of the doctrines of liberty and popular rights into the armed forces became a question of deep concern. Among the successive countermeasures taken in regard to this were the issue of the Admonitions to the Armed Forces in 1878, the issue of the Imperial Rescript to the Armed Forces in 1882 (both drafted by Nishi Amane 西岡 and his associates) and the establishment of the Military Police system in 1881.

After the promulgation of the Conscription Ordinance the lower ranks of the armed forces were well treated in respect to food and clothing, but they were lacking in a positive consciousness of their duties, and desertions were frequent. The question of establishing discipline among the lower ranks was important from this point of view. The generals Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau, who embarked on a reform of the armed forces of Prussia at the beginning of the 19th century, believed that a national spiritual awakening was needed in order to rebuild the Prussian army, which had lost the confidence of the people, and that for this purpose it was indispensable that the deprivation of the people's political rights in general should be amended, so that even in the armed forces the value of the people as individuals would be respected, and that barbarous sanctions should be abolished. The Japanese leaders, however, who had instituted compulsory education along with conscription, were not pleased by a rising interest in political matters among the people. On the contrary, they took fright at it, and they sought to suppress the political parties and took great pains to make the armed forces non-political. Since the political aim of building a monarchist army possessed a clearly antithetical character in relation to representative democracy, the higher ranks of the armed forces, which were filled with *shizoku* from the former clans,¹ while pretending not

¹ Up to August, 1925, 69 persons were appointed to the rank of general. Among them 14 came from the Chōshū clan, 11 from the Satsuma clan, 7 were members of the Imperial House, 5 came from the Fukuoka clan, 3 were former retainers of the

to take part in politics, interfered in politics on a wide scale and battled furiously against party politics. For the same reason the lower ranks of the armed forces, which were drawn from the commoners, were never permitted to awaken to the political consciousness which was proper to them as members of the Japanese nation or to discuss political matters.

Such a self-contradictory demand, which while technically looking towards a raising of the educational standards of the nation prevented the raising of the democratic political awareness of the nation, begot the emphasis on the consciousness of being a member of a private army of the Emperor which required the lower ranks of the armed forces to give a blind, religious obedience to the Emperor. In a certain sense, however, it may be that so long as armies exist the demanding of blind discipline will be a fate which can scarcely be avoided.

In 1881 the *Aikoku Shinshi* 愛國新誌, the organ of the liberty and popular rights movement, passed the following criticism on the connexion between the armed forces and despotic government:

"When despotic government commits oppression in the state it does not do so without instruments or teeth. . . . Since he who is a soldier is one who has power. . . he is the one who responds best to use by a despotic government. Must not those who love liberty beware of this?"¹

However, no such fundamental criticism appeared for a second time after the "Imperial Army" headed by the Emperor as Great Generalissimo had been established. Since war and military matters proceeded from the action of the Emperor they were considered sacred, and to oppose them or to speak of peace was at once considered criticism of the Emperor, although it was permitted to speak of a peace of conquest to be attained through war. The public enfranchisement of pacifism in Japan did not take place until after the laying down of the Japanese Constitution of 1947. We would seem to be obliged to say that this was the greatest distortion in the modernization of Japan.

Shōgun, and those from other clans numbered 2 or less. There were 39 full admirals, of whom 15 came from the Satsuma clan, 3 were members of the Imperial House, and those from other clans numbered 2 or less. None came from the Chōshū clan. Calculated from Ijiri Tsunekichi 井尻常吉, *Rekidai Kenkanroku* 歴代顯官録 (A Record of Eminent Officers in the Service of the Successive Emperors), Tokyo, Chōyōkai, 1925, pp. 360-363, 540-542.

¹ Meiji Bunka Kenkyūkai 明治文化研究會, *Meiji Bunka Zenshū* 明治文化全集 (Complete Collection of the Culture of the Meiji Period), Vol. 14 (Liberty and Popular Rights, cont.), Tokyo, Nihonhyōron-shinsha, 1956, pp. 173-175.