Eleven people are included in this category: Vladimir Dunaev, Valentina Kurganskaia, Gennadii Malinin, Aleksei Pugaev, Irina Savostina, Aleksandr Skryl’, Andrei Sviridov, Petr Svoik, Valer’ian Zemlianov, and Evgenii Zhovtis. One preferred to remain anonymous (he is referred to below as Anonymous No. 3). No substantial difference of opinion was found between Russian intellectuals and nationalists. In particular, Zemlianov (a member of the parliament) and Sviridov (a free-lance journalist) expressed views that were very similar to those of the nationalists.

The views of this group can be summarized as follows. On nation-building, their views break down into two groups: those who think that policy is not fair to all nationalities (a state is being established with certain privileges for Kazakhs, a monoethnic Kazakh state is being established with subsequent cultural assimilation or even the ousting of other nationalities), and those who do not perceive any clear policy. No respondent expressed the belief that a state was being established without any privileges or discrimination on the basis of ethnic background. According to an absolute majority, Kazakhstan ought to establish a state as a common home for all ethnic groups. As to the possibility of civic nation-building, there were almost equal numbers of positive and negative answers. As regards the possibility of building a monoethnic Kazakh state, the response was primarily negative, yet some expressed the fear in such a possibility.

This group’s respondents maintained that the state works on, first of all, regulating personnel questions in government structures. According to a majority, Russian should become a second state language, but a fraction of respondents would be happy if it had official status. In the opinion of many, government cultural policy and its support for the Kazakh language are of a declarative character; some, however, are of the belief that it really contributes to the development of Kazakh.

All respondents agreed that history was being rewritten, and a majority saw the renaming of streets and cities as a negative phenomenon. As for Kazakh repatriates, according to many, their return is conditioned by political goals, and it is premature, yet a portion of respondents considered it to be the reestablishment of historical justice. Economic problems were the most frequently mentioned reason for population flight. Many also blamed discrimination against non-Kazakhs. In the view of Russian intellectuals, the state conducts a policy that facilitates the population flight though it is not in favor of the departure of Russians, or the government has no desire to halt their departure. According to a few respondents, the government deliberately conducts a policy facilitating population flight.

All respondents in this group expressed the view that Kazakhs were increasingly monopolizing state structures and that this was caused by a deliberate state policy and was unfair to non-Kazakhs. As for conflict prevention, the state’s actions are limited to slogans, or even aggravate the situation. Constitutional and legislative reforms are necessary, and
quotas for each nationality should be introduced in state structures. A few respondents expressed the desire for territorial autonomy. Many warned that the nationalities policy conducted by the state could lead to ethnic tension: personnel policy in government structures, language policy, renaming of streets and cities, changes in the system of education were cited as factors that could cause such conflicts.

No one expressed the view that a state was being established without discrimination on the basis of ethnic background (Q1). The most popular response was: “I do not see a clear policy with respect to nation-state building” (4), followed by “a multiethnic state is being established with certain privileges for Kazakhs” (2). According to Zemlianov and Sviridov, “a monoethnic Kazakh state is being established that presupposes the subsequent ousting of other nationalities,” while Svoik expressed the opinion that a “soft ethnic state” was being established. Zhovtis and Skryl’ did not choose any of the suggested answers. Zhovtis’s response was “a paradoxical combination of the second and third answers” (“a multiethnic state with certain privileges for Kazakhs” and a “monoethnic Kazakh state with subsequent cultural assimilation of other nationalities”). Commented Skryl’: “A modification is occurring of the old form of the paternal state (the Soviet state) by changing signs. The essence is the same as before.”

Asked what kind of state should be established (Q2), ten (all but Skryl’, who agreed that Kazakhs should have certain privileges) expressed the belief that it should be a state as a common home for all ethnic groups without any privileges or discrimination. Sviridov, while supporting this idea, “if worse comes to worse” conceded the option of establishing a multiethnic state with certain privileges for the Kazakh people.

Asked about the possibility of building a civic nation (Q3), four answered positively and the same number answered negatively. Sviridov and Svoik were of the opinion that it was theoretically possible but in reality very difficult or impossible. Skryl’ found the question difficult to answer, commenting: “If the term ‘possible’ is understood as ‘necessary,’ then ‘yes.’ If it is understood as “Can it happen?,” then ‘no’ in the near future.” A positive answer to this question was based on the following reasons: a majority of Kazakhstanis understand that all should live under equal conditions (7); nationalists do not enjoy the support of the population (6) (Skryl’ commented, “at least for now”); many have a common mentality (5); and people understand that all Kazakhstanis share a common fate (3).

Reasons given for a negative answer were: Kazakhstan lacks democratic institutions through which interethnic relations can be regulated (5); many are inclined to emigrate abroad (5); some Kazakhs think that their rights should predominate (4); some non-Kazakhs think that they are discriminated against (4); there is no common idea capable of consolidating society (3); there is no agreement as regards the country’s territorial integrity (2); some non-Kazakhs do not respect the Kazakh language and culture (2); and “The current leadership of Kazakhstan is not interested in this” (Skryl’).
As to the possibility of establishing a monoethnic Kazakh state, seven denied such a possibility, while four said that such a state was possible (Q4). Reasons for a positive answer were as follows: a steady decrease in the non-Kazakh share of the population (4); state policy to change the composition of the population by nationality to the advantage of Kazakhs (4); and state support of the Kazakh language and its introduction into government activities that will lead to the domination of the Kazakh people (3). Sviridov also noted as a factor Kazakhs’ predominance in power structures. Reasons given for a negative answer were: it is impossible to assimilate or oust non-Kazakhs (6); objective processes will be conducive to the creation of a multiethnic state (6); and the Kazakh language has not been established to the degree at which it would prevail in society (3). Skryl’s explanation was of a different character: “Existing tendencies in Kazakhstan can cause the country’s collapse before any real changes occur in settling interethnic relations.”

To question 5, what the state works on as regards the nationalities question, the most popular answer was regulation of personnel questions in state structures (9), followed by reviving the Kazakh culture (4), regulation of the language problem (3), raising the ethnic consciousness of Kazakhs (3), and regulating migration processes (2). According to three respondents, the state does not work on anything, yet two of these three indicated regulation of personnel questions. Skryl’, one of these two, commented: “People in power and speaking in the name of the state are concerned only with issues of maintaining and strengthening their own personal authority.” In Zemlianov’s view, the state’s activities are “all to the benefit of the titular nation.”

According to a majority (9), Russian should become a state language (Sviridov commented that if this was not impossible, then at least Russian should acquire an official status). Only Zhovtis and Skryl answered that Russian should not become a state language but should acquire official status. Zemlianov complained: “In accordance with the Law on Languages of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a knowledge of the state language is required. But the conditions for this do not exist, even among parliamentary deputies. Hence, [people] are being pushed out from the structures of the state service.”

A variety of evaluations were given regarding the current language situation (Q7). Five respondents expressed the opinion that Russian would continue its dominance, as the significance of Kazakh remained unchanged; four were of the opinion that Kazakh’s importance had grown while that of Russian had declined; two answered that Russian continued its dominance, and the significance of Kazakh was declining (in Savostina’s opinion, Russian continued its dominance, and the significance of Kazakh either remained unchanged or was declining.) Malinin marked two answers: Kazakh grows in importance without causing harm to Russian, and Russian continues its dominance, as the significance of Kazakh remains unchanged. Perhaps Malinin was trying to say that Russian would remain the dominant language while Kazakh was being developed. Skryl’ expressed

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This comment was given for question 3(b).
concern about both languages: “As instruments of communication on the state level, both languages are deteriorating.”

Respondents also expressed disparate views on state support of the Kazakh language (Q8). Six interviewees expressed the belief that state support was of a declarative character; four answered that Kazakh was being developed thanks to state support; and three answered that Kazakh was not being developed despite state support (among the last three respondents, two also indicated that state support was of a declarative character).

The most popular answer to the question on cultural policy (Q9) was that the state was conducting no policy in support of culture (5). Skryl’s comment perhaps reflects the views of all respondents: “The leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan creates the appearance of concern for the state of cultural matters.” According to Zemlianov and Sviridov, conditions were being created only for the development of Kazakh culture. Anonymous No. 3 agreed with this opinion but indicated that the government was taking into consideration the development of the cultures of all peoples in Kazakhstan. Kurganskaia expressed the belief that “conditions are being created for the development of the cultures of all peoples, but more [resources] are devoted to the culture of the Kazakh people.” Only Pugaev answered that efforts were being made to build an all-Kazakhstan multiethnic culture.

To the question about Kazakhstan’s symbols (Q11), there were a variety of answers. Four answered that the symbols somewhat reflected Kazakhs’ history and traditions; two said that they fully did so; and two were of the opinion that they reflected their history and traditions but rather weakly. Skryl’, agreeing with the last option, added: “Symbols are based on elements that have been introduced or invented quite recently, hence, the historical link here is quite weak.” One respondent answered that the symbols reflected Kazakhs’ history and traditions but not sufficiently; another expressed the belief that they did not reflect Kazakhs’ history and traditions.

As to whether they should reflect Kazakhs’ history (Q12), five answered that they should, while seven said that they should not (Savostina and Svoik marked both “they should” and “they should not”). Among those answering negatively, five indicated that symbols ought to reflect the multinational population of Kazakhstan, while three indicated that symbols ought to be abstract and not reflect the ethnic characteristics of one or another ethnic group (Zemlianov agreed with both positions.) Skryl’ rejected all of the suggested answers, commenting that symbols “ought to reflect, to the extent possible, all of the above and to consist of symbols of common humanity.”

Negative answers predominated as to the renaming of cities and streets (Q13): ten expressed a negative opinion of it. The reasons given were as follows: it facilitates alienation among non-Kazakhs (8); history should not be rewritten (7); it is a waste of money by bureaucrats (6); it is not always justified with respect to the merits of the persons for whom streets are named (4); and it does not help to increase the level of ethnic consciousness among Kazakhs (3). Malinin elaborated on the last answer: “By denying
Zhovtis commented, “In many cases, Kazakhs do not have a single view of one or another historical figures.” Sviridov alleged that there was a double standard: Pasteur Street was renamed, while “all streets are named for little-known Kazakh khans and *batyrs* [heroes]. At the same time, there are tens and hundreds of figures of Russian and other national backgrounds from the history of Kazakhstan from the eighteenth to twentieth centuries are ignored, because they are not Kazakhs.” In the view of Skryl’, Pasteur Street should not be renamed Makataev Street, after the Kazakh poet of the twentieth century, although Skryl’ respects this writer. Only Pugaev answered positively to this question, explaining that it was a necessary process for the reestablishment of justice. Nevertheless, his comments were rather critical: “In this process, it isn’t an especially historical or scholarly approach that dominates; rather, it is bureaucratism and incompetence by bureaucrats and personal biases.” Pugaev was also of the opinion that renaming was not always justified: “Many streets are named for persons whose historical significance is seriously exaggerated or completely false.”

Regarding the reviewing and reevaluating of historical values (Q14), all respondents without exception agreed that such cases were frequent. Zemlianov commented: “The official, negative relation to the Soviet period... to pre-Revolutionary Russia, as a colonizer. Although historically, Kazakhstan joined [the Soviet Union] voluntarily, as did all nations: Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, the Baltics, etc.” Sviridov, on the contrary expressed support for the rewriting of Soviet “pseudo-history,” but he voiced disapproval of the tendency to extend the history of Kazakhs as far back in time as possible. Other respondents expressed similar opinions: “Again, unfortunately [they are] writing a history that is more favorable to them” (Zhovtis); “The simplest way to pass for a reformer is to show a lack of respect for one’s own history” (Malinin). Skryl’ explained the reevaluation of history as “a desire by Kazakhstan’s leadership to play the national card to strengthen its authority.”

Regarding Kazakh repatriates (Q15), eight said that their return was conditioned by political goals and did not represent genuine assistance to them. Other opinions were: it is premature because of insufficient resources for their housing and employment (5); it is problematic because some Kazakh repatriates find it difficult to adapt in Kazakhstan (3); it is unfair because the state should first resolve the problems of its citizens (2). Sviridov indicated that the return of repatriates was necessary for increasing the share of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, “for the regime, but not for society, not for the people of Kazakhstan.” Three respondents expressed the view that the return of ethnic Kazakhs represented the reestablishment of historical justice.

Regarding population flight (Q16), the most popular opinion was that economic problems were responsible for it (10). Five explained it by reference to discrimination against non-Kazakhs (Svoik partly agreed with this opinion but commented that “‘discrimination’ is too strong an expression”). Three respondents explained it as being
motivated by the desire to return to the historical homeland. Other comments were: “there is no future for children” (Savostina) and “the population outflow is conditioned by uncertainty about the future” (Kurganskaia).

Regarding migration policy (Q17), many expressed doubt that the state was to blame. Responses were as follows: the state, while not in favor of it, conducts a policy that facilitates it (6); it has no desire to halt it (5); and it deliberately conducts a policy facilitating it (3). Only Savostina answered that the state would like to halt the outflow of the population but was incapable of doing so (she also chose the suggested answers that the state deliberately conducts a policy facilitating the population flight and that it has no desire to halt it.) No one answered that much was being done to change the current situation.

In the view of all respondents interviewed in Almaty, Kazakhs enjoy a dominant position in the state structures (Q18). As mentioned above, question 18 in the Astana questionnaire was worded differently. Thus, the answer given by Zemlianov, who was interviewed there, cannot be compared fully to those by other respondents. It is perhaps possible, however, to assume that he agrees with other respondents. Six respondents expressed the belief that Kazakh predominance was unfair with regard to non-Kazakhs, and Svoik partly — but not entirely — agreed with the statements that “it is fair” and “it is unfair.” Skryl refrained from offering a judgment. He asserted instead that the situation was created by “the outflow from Kazakhstan of active, qualified representatives of other ethnic groups.”

All respondents agreed with the proposition that Kazakh predominance was a deliberate state policy for increasing the share of Kazakhs in state structures. Other reasons cited for the situation were the strength of traditions among Kazakhs (2); leaders within state structures prefer to refrain from hiring non-Kazakhs, as they fear that they may soon leave Kazakhstan (2); and non-Kazakhs do not seek to work in government structures (1).

The evaluation of the state’s conduct regarding conflict prevention (Q19) was rather negative. Six expressed the belief that there was no real work being done to prevent ethnic conflict, while three evaluated it as satisfactory and three did so negatively. Asked who was primarily deserving of credit for maintaining interethnic accord, four respondents named the president, and three the people of Kazakhstan. One of the respondents who named Kazakhstan’s people commented: “The people themselves attempt not to meddle in conflicts, as they understand their danger.” Two respondents cited the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. The parliament and the government were each cited once. The reasons given for a negative appraisal of conflict prevention were: the state’s actions are limited to sloganeering and declaration (6), and they aggravate the situation (5, including Skryl’, who only partly agreed with this position).

As to securing greater guarantees of interethnic accord (Q20), eight respondents answered that constitutional and legislative changes were necessary, while six supported the idea of introducing quotas in organs of government for representatives of various nationalities. In this regard, Sviridov commented: “This is especially important not only in
government but also in education (there are no Russian rectors in institutions of higher education; there is 1 dean in 100).” Two respondents expressed the opinion that new government institutions should be established; and two maintained that territorial autonomy ought to be created. Svoik said that democratization of the regime, beginning with local self-government, was also necessary. Other opinions were: “rejection of the paternal system of government” and “the economic development of Kazakhstan.”

Asked whose interests were expressed by the state’s nationalities policy (Q21), as many as eight answered that the policy reflected the interests of the president and those who are closest to him; five said that it reflected the interests of bureaucrats, regardless of ethnic differences; five said it reflected the interests of the Kazakh majority of the bureaucratic apparatus; and four said it reflected the interests of Kazakhs with consideration for the interests of others. Zemlianov and Sviridov indicated that the policy expressed the interests of Kazakhs alone (Sviridov commented that such interests were not those of all Kazakhs but, rather, those of the Elder zhuz.12) These two respondents, however, indicated agreement with other suggested answers, such as the policy reflected the interests of the president and those who were closest to him; of the Kazakh majority of the bureaucratic apparatus; and of bureaucrats regardless of ethnic differences.

Concern was expressed about the possibility of interethnic conflicts. To the question of whether the nationalities policy could lead to ethnic tensions (Q22), seven answered positively (Skryl’ added “with time it [such tensions] will become more open”) while only two gave a negative answer. Savostina explained her answer by saying that “Kazakhs are by nature very passive.” Pugaev commented, “At present, no. It is not out of the question in the future.” Sviridov expressed the belief that ethnic conflicts, though possible, did not occur because Russians and other “Europeans” preferred to leave Kazakhstan or to “collaborate” (with the regime).

The following factors were cited as facilitating ethnic tension: language policy (8), personnel policy (8), the renaming of streets and cities (7), changes in the educational system (7), reviewing and reevaluating history (6), and migration policy (4). Six respondents marked almost all factors mentioned here. Zemlianov, one of these six, commented, “The robbery of the people; the tribal policy in politics, and clan politics in the economy.” Said Skryl’, “the general paternalistic character of the existing authority.”

*Intellectuals of ethnic minorities*

There were nine respondents in this group: Aleksandr Dederer, Amanchi Gunashev, Bakhtiiar Kadyrbekov, German Kim, Georgii Ksandopulo, Nadir Nadirov, Mussib

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12 Zhuz is a group of tribes. There are three zhuz in Kazakhstan: Elder, Middle and Younger. President Nazarbaev is from the Elder zhuz. See also chapters one and two of this volume.
Navruzov, and Leonid Pitaenko. One person preferred to remain anonymous (Anonymous No. 4). Each of them represented a different ethnic background: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Chechen, German, Greek, Korean, Kurd, Tatar, and Uzbek. Many of them lead organizations representing their ethnic groups.

The opinions expressed by intellectuals of ethnic minorities can be summarized as follows. With respect to nation-building, many expressed the opinion that a state was being established with certain privileges for Kazakhs, or a monoethnic Kazakh state was being established with subsequent cultural assimilation of other nationalities. A majority answered that a state should be established as a common home for all ethnic groups without any privileges or discrimination, yet a few expressed support for building a state with certain privileges for the Kazakh people. The view regarding the possibility of civic nation-building was largely optimistic. As for the possibility of building a monoethnic Kazakh state, there were a fairly equal number of positive and negative answers.

Respondents in this group were of the opinion that the state was working on regulating the language problem and personnel questions, and raising the ethnic consciousness of Kazakhs. Russian should become a state language, or it should be accorded official status. Many expressed the belief that the Kazakh language was being actively developed thanks to state support. As to state symbols, opinion was divided: some said that they should reflect the history and traditions of Kazakhs, while others said that they should not. Both positive and negative answers were given for the renaming of cities and streets. Most respondents were of the opinion that history was being reviewed very often or to a certain extent.

Intellectuals among ethnic minorities expressed the view that the return of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad was conditioned by political goals and did not represent genuine assistance to them, or that it was premature since there were insufficient resources for their housing and employment. Yet some respondents indicated that it represented the reestablishment of historical justice. Among the reasons for the population flight, economic difficulties were frequently cited, while some explained it as being motivated by the desire to return to the historical homeland as well as by discrimination against non-Kazakhs. More than a half of the respondents indicated that the state would like to halt population flight but was incapable of doing so; some also expressed the following views: that the state, while not in favor of it, conducted a policy that facilitates it, and that the state had no desire to halt it or deliberately conducted a policy facilitating it.

According to almost all respondents, Kazakhs have a dominant position in the state structures, and this dominance is unfair. They blamed both a deliberate state policy and traditions among Kazakhs. A rather optimistic view prevailed as to the government’s role in conflict prevention, with respondents naming the president as a main contributor to the maintenance of interethnic accord. As for the measures necessary for keeping peace among ethnic groups, constitutional and legislative reforms were most frequently mentioned, followed by quotas in organs of government for various nationalities, and
territorial autonomy. Some respondents found difficult to answer the question of whether the state’s nationalities policy led to interethnic tension; at the same time, there was a roughly equal number of both positive and negative answers. Among those who express the belief that the nationalities policy would harm interethnic relations, personnel policy was mentioned as a factor that could facilitate such tension.

To question one, only Nadirov answered that a state was being established as a common home for all ethnic groups. Others said that a state was being established with certain privileges for Kazakhs (4) or a monoethnic Kazakh state was being established with subsequent cultural assimilation of other nationalities (4). Two did not see clear policy in this respect. As for a desirable policy (Q2), six expressed the belief that a state should be established without any privileges or discrimination, while two agreed with the opinion that a state should give certain privileges to Kazakhs. Anonymous No. 4 did not answer to this question.

An optimistic view prevails as to the possibility to build a civic nation (Q3). Seven give a positive answer, while Ksandopulo and Nadirov deny such a possibility. Those who answer positively explain their attitude by the following reasons: a majority of Kazakhstanis understands that all should live under equal basis (6); nationalists do not enjoy support of the population (3); people understand that they share a common fate (2); many Kazakhstanis have a common mentality and they all consider one another compatriots (1). As for a negative answer to this question, Ksandopulo points out that “Some Kazakhs think that their rights should predominate” and that “Some non-Kazakhs do not consider themselves to be full-fledged citizens,” while Nadirov, agreeing with Ksandopulo, additionally blame lack of democratic institutions and indifferent attitude toward the country’s future.

As to the possibility of establishing a monoethnic Kazakh state (Q4), respondents were divided into opposing camps: four respondents answer “yes” and “no” respectively (Navruzov did not answer to this question). Reasons for a positive answer were as follows: a steady decrease in the non-Kazakh share of the population (4); state policy to change the composition of the population by nationality to the advantage of Kazakhs (3); and state support of the Kazakh language (3). Those expressing skepticism about the establishment of a monoethnic Kazakh state explained their position on the following grounds: an objective process that will be conducive to the creation of a multiethnic state (3) and the difficulty of assimilating or ousting non-Kazakhs (2).

To the question about the state’s activities (Q5), seven respondents indicated regulation of the language problem, six mentioned the regulation of personnel questions and elevation of ethnic consciousness of Kazakhs, five mentioned the revival of Kazakh culture, and three answered the regulation of migration processes. Nobody agreed with the opinion that the state did not work on anything. As compared to other groups, intellectuals of minorities had a more serious view of the state’s work on nationalities policy.
As for the status of the Russian language (Q6), five said that Russian should become a state language, while four said that it should not become a state language but ought to acquire official status. The following opinions were expressed on language process in the country (Q7): Kazakh grows in importance without causing harm to Russian (3); Russian continues its dominance, as the significance of Kazakh remains unchanged (3); and Kazakh grows in importance while Russian declines (2). Nobody expressed the opinion that the significance of Kazakh was declining. As for state support of the Kazakh language (Q8), the most popular answer was that Kazakh is being developed thanks to state support (5; according to Nadirov, “only among Kazakhs”), followed by the opinion that Kazakh is not being developed despite state support (2) and state support for Kazakh is of a declarative character (1).

Regarding cultural policy (Q9), the opinions among respondents in this group were rather different from those of other respondents. Five expressed the belief that conditions were being created for the development of the cultures of all peoples residing in Kazakhstan. This may be partly explained by the fact that four of them are leaders of ethnic cultural centers and also members of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, which officially aims to create such conditions. Dederer said that efforts were being made to build an all-Kazakhstan multiethnic culture. Meanwhile, two said that the state was conducting no policy in support of culture. Kim did not agree with any of the suggested answers: he commented that “Conditions are being created for the development of national cultures of all peoples living in Kazakhstan; however, privileged conditions are being created for the culture of the Kazakh people.”

To the question on state symbols (Q11), the following answers were given: they reflect the Kazakh people’s history and traditions, but not sufficiently (3); they reflect Kazakhs’ history and traditions somewhat (2); and they fully reflect Kazakhs’ history and traditions (1). Gunashev, who indicated that the symbols somewhat reflected the history of Kazakhs, gave the following reasons for his answer: “a weakly developed sense in the past of Kazakh statehood, the lack of a firm tradition of developing state symbols, and Kazakhstan’s long history under Russia’s jurisdiction.” Three respondents found the question difficult to answer. When asked whether they should reflect Kazakhs’ history (Q12), four respondents answered that they should, while five answered that they should not (among them four indicated that state symbols should reflect the multinational populations, and one said that they should be abstract.)

As for the renaming of cities and streets (Q13), three (including Kim) answered positively, while four answered negatively (Pitaenko commented, “for the most part”), and Nadirov said he was indifferent. The reasons for a positive answer were as follows: that it is a necessary process for the reestablishment of historical justice (3) and that it is necessary for inculcating Kazakhstan patriotism among the entire population, regardless of nationality (1). On his mixed evaluation regarding renaming of streets, Kim commented: “Some streets ought to be renamed, but not on such a massive scale and not with unknown names. In the
directory for Almaty, among over one hundred renamed streets, there are only a couple of non-Kazakh names — and these are also not very well known. Can you guess who Furmanov Avenue will be named after? I think everyone knows already but won’t say.

The reasons offered for a negative answer were as follows: it facilitates alienation among non-Kazakhs (4); it is a waste of money by bureaucrats (3); history should not be rewritten (2). Kim indicated agreement with all the suggested answers here except “history should not be rewritten,” saying that it was not always justified: “Who’s Makataev and who is Louis Pasteur? Why not rename the little streets and alleys that have strange names like ‘second coal street’ or ‘third hydraulic street.’” He also believes that it does not help to increase the level of ethnic self-consciousness among Kazakhs because: “They don’t know after whom a street is named, and a name is merely an empty sound linked to the realization that they are masters here; it doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with the feeling of national consciousness.”

Regarding the review and reevaluation of historical values (Q14), five answered that one frequently encountered such cases. According to Gunashev, this was a normal process: “In the past the history of the Kazakh people was shown in a one-sided, tendentious light. A Russian perspective on it dominated.” Dederer explained this as “a desire to support patriotism in society.” Two respondents said that the review and reevaluation of history did not occur on a mass level, and only Nadirov indicated that they were practically no such cases.

With respect to the return of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad (Q15), the following opinions were expressed: it is conditioned by political goals and does not represent genuine assistance to them (6); it is premature, since there are insufficient resources for their housing and employment (5); it represents the reestablishment of historical justice and is absolutely justified (4); it is necessary for increasing the share of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (2); it is unfair (2); and it is problematic because they find it difficult to adapt in Kazakhstan (1).

As to the reasons for the population flight (Q16), seven respondents blamed economic difficulties. Other explanations were: the desire to return to the historical homeland (3) and discrimination against non-Kazakhs (3). Kim commented: “All opinions have a basis behind them, but many emigrate ’just in case’; that is, because they fear for the future and see no prospects.” The following views were expressed regarding the state’s migration policy (Q17): the state would like to halt population flight but is incapable of doing this (5); the state is not in favor of it but conducts a policy that facilitates it (3); the state has no desire to halt it (2); and the state deliberately conducts a policy facilitating it (2).

As to whether Kazakhs enjoyed a dominant position in the state structures (Q18), all respondents except Navruzov answered positively. Nobody expressed the belief that it

13 He apparently implies that Furmanova Avenue may be renamed after President Nazarbaev.
could be justified, while six condemned it as being unfair. As for the reasons for such a phenomenon, five cited a deliberate state policy, and five explained it as a result of Kazakh traditions (Gunashev and Pitaenko agreed with both views). Ksandopulo and Dederer, agreeing with the opinion that it was a deliberate policy, also expressed the belief that leaders within state structures preferred not to hire non-Kazakhs, as they fear that they might soon leave Kazakhstan.

The following evaluation was given as to state’s conduct in the area of conflict prevention (Q19): satisfactory (5), positive (2), and negative (2). Five expressed the belief that the president was a main contributor to the maintenance of interethnic accord, and only two mentioned the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan. The reasons given for a negative evaluation were: the state’s actions are limited to sloganeering and declarations (3) and despite the fact that appropriate goals may be established, they are not fulfilled by bureaucrats (2).

Asked about the necessary measures for guaranteeing interethnic accord (Q20), eight expressed the opinion that constitutional and legislative changes were necessary; four indicated that quotas by nationalities should be introduced in state structures; two said that new state institutions should be established; and one expressed the view that territorial autonomy ought to be created.

To the question of whose interests were expressed by the nationalities policy (Q21), the following answers were given: the interests of Kazakhs with consideration of others (4); those of the Kazakh majority of the bureaucratic apparatus (4); those of bureaucrats regardless of ethnic differences (2); and those of the president and his henchmen (2). The answers given by Navruzov and Kadyrbekov were of a rather official character: they indicated that the interests of the whole people of Kazakhstan were expressed (Kadyrbekov also agreed with the view that the interests of Kazakhs, with consideration of others, were expressed). Nobody stated the opinion that the interests of only Kazakhs were expressed.

Asked whether the nationalities policy could lead to interethnic tension (Q22), five found the question difficult to answer, while two respondents denied such a possibility. Nadirov and Kadyrbekov expressed the opinion that the policy could lead to tension, noting such factors as personnel policy in state structures, language policy, and changes in the education system.