

Russians and the Russian language

By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the borders of the Russian state reached right up to Kazakhstan's steppe in the west, north, and northeast. Later, the nomadic periphery was pulled into the sphere of influence of the centralizing Russian state. From the mid-eighteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the ground was established for a state administration in Kazakhstan. In 1822 and 1824, respectively, in the Middle and Younger *zhuz*, the authority of the *khan* was abrogated, and a system of territorial-administrative rule was introduced.

In 1824, the entire territory of the Younger *zhuz* was divided into three parts: Eastern, Middle, and Western *chast* [an administrative division]. These *chasts* were divided into *distantsiia* and these in turn were formed into administrative *auls*. In 1822, in the Middle *zhuz*, Omsk *oblast* was created, containing the following internal *okrugs*: Omsk, Petropavlovsk, Semipalatinsk, and Ust-Kamenogorsk. In 1824, Karkaralinsk and Kokchetav external *okrugs* were formed; in 1831, Aiaguz; in 1832, Akmolinsk in 1833, Bian-Aul and Uch-Bulak; in 1834, Aman-Karagai *okrug* was formed, later renamed Kushmurun; in 1844, Kokbekty *okrug*. These *okrugs* were themselves broken down into *volosts*, which were themselves divided into administrative *auls*.

By the reforms of 1867, 1868, 1886, and 1891, this cumbersome administrative system was unified. Six *oblasts* were created: Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, Turgai, Uralsk, Semirechie, and Syr-Daria, which encompassed nearly the entire territory of present-day Kazakhstan. Mangyshlak *uezd* was included within the Caspian [Zakaspiiskaia] *oblast*, and the Internal *orda* was included within Astrakhan *guberniia*.⁵²

The introduction in Kazakhstan of state administration and economic ties to the Russian state was accompanied by the colonization and settlement of the region. The first stage of settlement was of a military character and included Cossacks. This was followed by peasant colonization of the region, accompanied by the resettlement of significant numbers of ethnic Slavs, mainly, Russians to Kazakhstan's territory.

According to the first census of the Russian empire, conducted in 1897, in Kazakhstan there were 454,402 Russians (10.9 percent of the region's total population) and 79,573 Ukrainians (1.9 percent). Owing to the Stolypin resettlement policy, between 1911 and 1913, the Russian-Ukrainian population [in Kazakhstan] reached 1.5 million, and its share of the total population had already reached 30 percent.

In Soviet times, because of the Soviet government's encouragement of migration processes, the Russian population grew at a significantly faster rate than did the Kazakh population. If in the first all-Union census in 1926, there were 1,279,979 Russians (19.68 percent) and 860,822 Ukrainians (13.23 percent), then in the 1959 census, there were 3,974,229 Russians (42.68 percent) and 762,131 Ukrainians (8.18 percent). Thus, the Russian population

⁵² N. E. Masanov, *Kochevaia tsivilizatsiia kazakhov*, pp. 226-227.

increased by 210 percent, while by absolute numbers and percentage, the Ukrainian population dropped sharply.

According to the 1970 census, there were 5,521,917 Russians (42.44 percent) and 933,461 Ukrainians (7.17 percent). The figures for the 1979 census were 5,991,205 (40.80 percent) and 897,964 (6.11 percent). Thus, from the 1970 and 1979 censuses, as well as from that of 1989, we see, for the first time in more than century, a gradual decline in Russians as a percentage of the population against an overall increase in their numbers: 42.44 percent, 40.80 percent, and 37.82 percent. The 1989 census showed the same absolute increase in the Russian population: 6,227,549 people.

In the context of the Soviet Union, Russians constituted an “all-union titular nation,” and they virtually always dominated every place and everywhere all official and public spheres of life. As a result, there was the ubiquitous dominance of the Russian language, Russian culture, Russian history, Russian literature, Russian-language mass media, and Russian-language education. Priority was given to historical figures of the Russian state; Russian poets, writers, scientists, and politicians; and Russified stereotypes and symbols. Only in particular regions (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), where, before incorporation into the Soviet Union, a literary language was established and the level of education was sufficiently high, did there occur opposition to the Russian diktat in language, science, history, and culture.

At the same time, Russian was the language of interethnic communication throughout the Soviet Union. As the data from the censuses show, the share of the population speaking Russian constantly rose. Thus, for example, in Kazakhstan, the percentage of the non-Russian population that spoke Russian fluently in 1989 was 72.9 percent. For Kazakhs, the percentage was 64.1 percent.

A consequence of the complete domination of the Russian language was the fact that the Russian population — in the Russian federation and beyond — had no real command of the languages of the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus, for example, according to the 1970 census, the level of Russian-native bilingualism was 20 percent among Estonians and Georgians; 30 percent among Ukrainians, Armenians, Moldovans, and Lithuanians; and 40 percent among Belarusians, Kazakhs, and Latvians. Among Russians the level was a mere 3.1 percent. According to the 1989 census, just 0.8 percent of Russians were fluent in Kazakh.

Such a state of affairs was quite naturally conditioned by the Soviet state’s policy with respect to the unification and standardization of language. From the beginning, Russian was chosen as the de facto state language of the Soviet Union. Consequently, Russians unwittingly became hostage to the Soviet authorities’ imperial approach to the language problem. Everyone was forced to learn Russian, while Russians were not motivated to learn and did not know languages of the Soviet Union’s other peoples.

The only real experience Russians had was of everyday nationalism and ethnocentrism beyond the boundaries of Russian’s own historic settlement, in Eastern Europe. From time to time, however, the iron fist of totalitarianism would be employed against anti-Russian

nationalism: especially in Stalinist times, in campaigns against bourgeois nationalism. Mass deportations and genocide were carried out against entire peoples.

The sole area in which, from the perspective of the party itself, a concealed but growing opposition to "Russian chauvinism" was legitimate and justified was personnel policy. The Soviet elite of the "small nations" was always consolidating itself and firmly insisted on the priority of its personnel representation in government structures, especially in positions in remote places. It skillfully argued with communist slogans about the need to conduct party-economic work directly in the place of residence with "national cadres."

Consequently, the position of "national"[natsionalnyi], that is the ethnically non-Russian bureaucracy constantly became stronger. This development was tied to the fact that the ethnic Russian party-economic nomenklatura was not fluent in the languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union and had no ambition of working in the far-off national areas. It regarded its service in the so-called national republics as an important and necessary but short-term stage in one's bureaucratic career, leading to postings in Moscow.

The result was the local authorities' gradual and increasing ethnicization and the cooptation [okup] of a national bureaucracy. This process became especially noticeable in the post-Stalin and, in particular, the Brezhnev period. In 1964, the first secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan's Communist Party became D. A. Kunaev. Henceforth, there was a noticeable increase in the proportion of the bureaucracy of ethnic Kazakh background. This was regarded by some authorities as an asymmetrical and disproportionate share of the Kazakh population in Kazakhstan.⁵³

This disproportionate domination of the national republic's party and economic bureaucracies and the Soviet nomenklatura, in the 1980s and the early 1990s, contributed to the political actualization of particular demands by titular nations to the detriment of general state, All-Union interests and primarily at the expense of ethnic Russians in the national republics. A natural consequence of this process was the collapse of the Soviet empire.

In December 1991, against their will, Russians in Kazakhstan became inhabitants of a sovereign and independent Kazakhstan. It was hard to believe that the Soviet Union was no more. Many Russians of a paternalistic bent hoped that Kazakhstan's independence would be simply a juridical fiction and that Kazakhstan would remain a part of the same former country. They had all the more reason to believe that this was likely, given the fact that communists, headed by Nursultan Nazarbaev, first secretary of the Central Committee of Kazakhstan's Communist Party, remained in place and that no essential changes had taken place in state structures. Sovereignty, therefore, was regarded by them as some kind of juridical fiction, and there was still hope of continuity of power.

After the republic was accepted into the United Nations, however, the Kazakh political elite promptly declared its true political intentions. In April 1992, Nazarbaev announced his program entitled "Kazakhstan's Strategy of Political and Economic Development to 2005,"

⁵³ See, for example, V. A. Tishkov, *Ocherki teorii i politiki etnichnosti v Rossii* [Moscow, 1997], pp. 213-214.

which unambiguously stated the proposition that “Kazakhstan is a state for the self-determination of the Kazakh nation.” Thanks to Nazarbaev, the principle that “the rights of the nation, the indigenous ethnos, enjoy a higher standing than do human rights” triumphed in Kazakhstan. In 1993, Nazarbaev’s statement regarding the self-determined Kazakh state was given legal force at the highest level — in the preamble to Kazakhstan’s new constitution.

In this situation, Kazakhstan's Russians, owing to many factors — mainly lack of commonly recognized leaders on a national level, an organized structure, an intelligentsia with a background in the humanities, their own mass media — have proved unprepared for the completely altered state of affairs in interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.

Starting from nothing and with great difficulty, Russian activists were compelled to create their own civic movements, overcoming powerful government opposition. Such groups included Lad [Accord] and Russkaia obshchina [the Russian community]. This kind of activity was hindered by lack of preparedness and the fear of the majority of Russians to stand up for their particular interests. They immediately encountered charges of imperial chauvinism and undermining Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. The Russian movements, therefore, failed to acquire national importance, remaining, for the most part, local and, less often, regional groupings, mainly in northern and northeastern Kazakhstan.

The Soviet Union’s collapse and the coming to power of ethnocratic regimes throughout the entire post-Soviet space led to a massive departure of the Russian population for Russia. Consequently, there has been a growing inclination for emigration, a result of which (as clearly underestimated statistics show) is the departure from Kazakhstan of hundreds of thousands of Russians.

Thus, according to official statistics alone, in 1993, 170,129 Russians left the country; in 1994, 283,154; in 1995, 160,883; in 1996, 120,427; in 1997, 174,616; in 1998, 186,397; and in 1999, 89,998. At the same time, the negative balance in Russian migration for 1993 was 123,777; for 1994, 251,934; 1995, 126,468; 1996, 96,384; 1997, 157,462; 1998, 124,494; and 1999, 72,335. In this way, more than a million Russians left the country for good.

More objective data with respect to these developments can be found in Kazakhstan’s first census, which establishes a decline in the number and percentage of the Russian population, to 1.3 million people and to 29 percent (see table). If we assume natural growth of the Russian population of 0.3 to 0.5 percent, we can say that Russian emigration exceeded 1.5 million people.

At the present time, according to various public opinion surveys, 80 to 90 percent of Russians would like to leave Kazakhstan; something on the order of 40 to 45 percent are making efforts or are planning to leave in the near future; and only 10 to 15 percent of Russians are firmly committed to remaining in the country. Quite naturally, therefore, Russians are oriented either toward the past, and they are overcome by a deep nostalgia and idealization of the Soviet Union, or they are oriented in an outward direction toward Russia, as all prospects

for social, economic, and political development are tied to and conceptualized through the prism of the integrating processes of Kazakhstan and Russia.⁵⁴

The basic reasons for the departure of Russians is their difficulty in adapting to the uncertainties of market conditions, which are deepened by the psychological discomfort and tremendous stress that Russians experience in Kazakhstan, as they do in all post-Soviet republics, in adjusting to ethnocratic political regimes. Such regimes can be harsh — ruled by law in the Baltics, aggressive and xenophobic in the Caucasus, authoritarian and antidemocratic in Central Asia.

From these conditions there follow different strategies for survival in the set of circumstances that comprise an ethnocracy. In the Baltics, the approach is tolerance and conciliation, for there is economic motivation, and Russians experience no psychological, cultural, or racial alienation. There are fear and panic in the Caucasus, where Russians have nothing positive to look forward to. There is a sense of entrapment and complete alienation in Central Asia, where among Russians themselves there are powerful stereotypes regarding their civilizational and racial superiority over “Asiatics”.

Russians living outside of Russia, therefore, are compelled to make a fateful decision. In the Baltics, the main issue is to be incorporated into the state and civic system that has been created: in principle, ethnolinguistic and all other problems are secondary. The Caucasus are another matter. Here, a person’s life was hardly valued much in the past; now the region is mired in conflict, confrontation, and war. For this reason, Russians believe, “there is nothing that can be done, and it’s best to get out sooner rather than later.” As a matter of fact, this view is also shared by the indigenous population of the Caucasus. Central Asia leaves Russians little chance for survival, so migration is unavoidable.

Matters are different in Kazakhstan. This is a huge, sparsely settled territory; population density is minimal. There is no serious labor competition, and concentrated settling and clear predominance of Russians in the cities and in the northern and northeastern *oblasts* that are close to Russia. There is a special relationship with Russia — all the more so, since Russian, such as it is, has maintained its leading position as a means of communication and is still employed in the state sector.

It is precisely for these reasons Russians in Kazakhstan are torn by the dilemma of whether to leave, because “the situation in Russia is no better.” Such binary oppositions can be replicated ad infinitum: irredentism or Eurasian union, “the sense of civilizational and racial supremacy together with an inferiority complex,” “the consciousness that one is needed while being powerless and unable to affect in any real way one’s situation,” “the willingness and ability to work while being incapable of earning in an honest way the slightest means for life sustenance,” “criticism of Asian venality together with a silent complicity in ubiquitous corruption,” etc. Thus, one group of Russians will leave; another hopes for better; a third will

⁵⁴ *Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane*, issue I, fall 1995 [Almaty, 1996]; issue II, winter 1995-96 [Almaty, 1996]; issue III, spring 1996 [Almaty, 1996].

wait and see; a fourth [does not leave because it believes that] “Nobody awaits [us] in Russia”; a fifth is capable of living under any regime; and a sixth doesn’t care who is in power — “We don’t care, let [them] do what they want”; etc.

The one thing that all Russians in Kazakhstan feel deeply and are apprehensive about, the one thing they fear and internally reject, is the fact that Kazakhs want them to assimilate. Assimilation is carried out in several ways: by the rewriting of history, the widescale introduction of the Kazakh language in all aspects of life, and most of all by the education process, the renaming of anything bearing any sort of designation, the obvious reduction (if not elimination) of Moscow television and radio retransmission, constant criticism of the Russian state and Russian politicians, etc.

As a whole, despite the great desire to emigrate, the survival strategy of the Russian population in Kazakhstan is highly differentiated, with respect to both geographical and sociocultural factors, depending on the degree of awareness of real or perceived assimilation.

A large part of the Russian population consists of people of lower social status — that is, working class, without a high level of education. In contrast to other groups, they are very tenacious. Indifferent to politics and government, they are not disturbed by language or personnel policy. They can easily incorporate themselves into any labor market or sector of this market, quickly adapting to the values of a market economy and with relatively little pain occupying any position. At the same time, the Kazakh population, as a rule, is not in a position to compete with them. Sociocultural survival or the fear of assimilation, therefore, is for them problems of another day, for their children. In the current situation, the Kazakh ethnocracy, occupying the cloudless heights, has left this group outside its sphere of influence. Thus, migration for them is a future matter.

The high average statistical age of Kazakhstan’s Russian population should be noted: 45 to 47 years. This determines the very large share of pensioners in this group. Pensioners do not enjoy great opportunities for emigration; nevertheless, the Kazakh ethnocracy does not leave the elderly in peace. It has carried out pension reform, raising the retirement age for men to 63 and for women to 58. This despite the fact that the average lifespan in Kazakhstan does not exceed 57 for a man and 66 for a woman. Constant increases in utilities long ago put into doubt the physical survival of retired persons.

The economic crisis, the combination of the pseudo-market and the state policy of eliminating small and mid-size businesses, the VAT together with high tax rates have permanently limited the range of possibilities [zhiznennoe prostranstvo] for Russians and for the entire population of Kazakhstan employed in private sector. This has stimulated emigration among the most mobile and educated portion of society — all the more so, given the fact that competition from Kazakhs has sharply complicated and narrowed the chances for Russian employment involving state service.

Yet, owing to the predominantly rural and marginal character of the Kazakh population, certain possibilities and opportunities for survival have opened up for the remaining

Russian population, thanks to the massive departure of Russians, which has led to a shortage of qualified mid-level bureaucrats and a lack of qualified and honest administrators.

Russian emigration from Kazakhstan is of a complex and multifaceted nature, characterized by a person's degree of adaptation to the values of his surroundings and his level of integration into the system of social, economic, state, and civic relations, as well as his relation to the state policy of driving Russians from the country and provoking their emigration.

Interestingly, if in the Baltics the main difficulty for Russians seems to be integration into the state and civic system, then in Central Asia, it is much more important to maintain one's own roots, one's sociocultural direction, for here there are no institutional limitations or barriers as there are in the Baltics. This state of affairs is due to the fact that state policy in the Central Asian region, in both its latent and obvious forms, is directed at provoking Russian emigration and encouraging assimilation. It is another matter entirely that in the northwestern area of the former Soviet Union, Russians are potentially prepared to assimilate, while in the southeastern area the fear of such assimilation is one of the most important factors driving the desire to emigrate.

The emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan has become a basis of apparent stability in Kazakhstan. The annual departure of hundreds of thousands of Russians has become a unique dividend for the ruling regime of Nursultan Nazarbaev, as it leads to the opening up every year of hundreds of thousands of jobs and reduces the tension related to the economic crisis. It also frees up hundreds of thousands apartments, which surpass by many times the rate and scale of housing construction during Soviet times; and it frees up tens of millions of dollars in unpaid pensions, salaries, and benefits, which in turn reduces budget expenditures.

Do Russians have a future in Kazakhstan? Yes, without a doubt! The need for them is felt more and more by the entire society. "Russian" as a concept in Kazakhstan is connected to such ideas as human rights, democracy, civil society, a law-based state, etc. Kazakh ethnocentrism has caused a massive corruption of the bureaucracy and the entire ruling regime, which is destroying faith in the authoritarian ethnocracy among Kazakhs themselves as the best way of expressing and defending the interests of the indigenous ethnos.

State policy

In a word, the authorities of Kazakhstan declare their support for the friendship of peoples, peace, stability, and interethnic accord. In point of fact, however, they carry out a policy of discrimination that is rather moderate in form but sufficiently harsh in substance, moreover, one that puts pressure on Russians and other nonindigenous ethnic groups to leave Kazakhstan. To this end, institutional and political methods are employed, in particular, territorial and administrative reforms, language policy, and personnel policy in state structures.

Legislative decisions constitute one of the most important aspects of ethnocentric policy in Kazakhstan. As we have noted, the 1993 and 1995 constitutions contained many

declarations and articles regulating interethnic relations. Other juridical acts of Kazakhstan's legislation are also full of such ideas. As regards enabling legislation, for the Ministry of Justice alone, it includes a host of contradictory positions on interethnic relations. A tremendous contribution has been made and is being made in laws of various levels by the Terminological Commission, the Commission on Language, ministries of various levels, etc. In the final analysis, they are all aimed at differentiating and regulating onomastics and announcements and articles on language policy — all of which directly affect interethnic relations.

Territorial-administrative reforms play a key role in the authorities' ethnocentric policy. Thus, for example, in 1994, the decision was made to move Kazakhstan's capital to the country's north, to Tselinograd/Akmola (subsequently renamed Astana). The purely political aims of the move were fear of possible aggression from China and southern neighbors as well as neutralization of the opposition and disavowal of the old party-economic nomenklatura and Soviet-era Kazakh intelligentsia. The main goal, besides these, was ethnodemographic: moving the capital to the north, to predominantly Russian-language *oblasts*, was in accord with the aim of stimulating the resettlement of the predominantly Kazakh political elite to the northern, Russian-language region and thereby changing the ethnodemographic situation, increasing the number of Kazakhs among the population of northern Kazakhstan.

With this very same goal in mind, the 1997 territorial-administrative reform was carried out. It affected only those *oblasts* in which the Russian population predominated. Hence, the "Russian" Eastern Kazakhstan *oblast* (according to the 1989 census, Russians accounted for 65.9 percent of the population) was attached to the "Kazakh" Semipalatinsk *oblast* (50.7 percent Kazakhs).

The predominantly Kazakh *oblast* of Dzhezkazgan (46.0 percent Kazakh) was incorporated into the Russian *oblast* of Karaganda (52.2 percent Russian); the Russo-Kazakh *oblast* of Kokchetav (39.5 percent Russian, 28.8 percent Kazakh) was incorporated into predominantly Russian Northern Kazakhstan *oblast* (62.0 percent Russian); the Kazakh *oblast* of Turgai was incorporated into the predominantly Russian *oblasts* of Akmola (44.6 percent Russian) and Kustanai (43.7 percent Russian); and the predominantly Kazakh *oblast* of Taldy-Kurgan (45.3 percent Kazakh) was incorporated into the Kazakh-Russian *oblast* of Almaty (41.6 Kazakh, 30.1 percent Russian).

At the same time, in order to attract Kazakhs to the predominantly Russian *oblasts* of Northern Kazakhstan, *oblast* centers were transferred to Russian cities only: Ust-Kamenogorsk, Karaganda, Kokchetav, Kustanai, and Almaty. In light of the complete dominance of Kazakhs in the administrative ranks in the center and in provinces, this caused a significant rise in the Kazakh population in the cities mentioned above.

A substantive change in the ethnodemographic situation in northern Kazakhstan was achieved as a result of these cunning government actions. According to Kazakhstan's first census in 1999, the share of Kazakhs increased significantly in the northern *oblasts*, reaching the following percentages as compared to the 1989 census: Akmola *oblast*, 37.5 percent, versus 22.4 percent; Eastern Kazakhstan *oblast*, 48.5 percent (27.2 percent); Karaganda *oblast*, 27.5

percent (17.1 percent); Kustanai *oblast*, 30.9 percent (22.8 percent); and Northern Kazakhstan *oblast*, 29.6 percent (18.6 percent).

The personnel policy to the advantage of Kazakhs has led to the ethnicization of the state apparatus and has become the basis for patronage-clientelistic system, established by authorities and extending from the top to the bottom. For its part, the patronage-clientelistic system has become a basis of Kazakhstan's authoritarianism, according to which all officials — the whole bureaucratic class were forced to go through a strict selection process according to their loyalty to the president and his henchmen.⁵⁵

In this regard, as we have noted, the language policy plays an important role, prescribing as necessary a knowledge of Kazakh and giving preference to those who are fluent in the state language. We have already noted that the constitution requires a fluent command of the Kazakh language as a condition for occupying the positions of president and speakers of the Senate and Mazhilis (see section on Kazakh language). Moreover, henceforth the new administrative codex requires that 50 percent of broadcasting time be in the Kazakh language.⁵⁶

At the same time, in accordance with the frequent declarations of President Nazarbaev and his close circle, Kazakh culture should play an integrating role, and a knowledge of the Kazakh language is a “moral debt of every citizen of Kazakhstan.” Consequently, for employment in state organizations as well in commercial enterprises and nongovernmental organizations, preference is given to those who are fluent in the state language.

In Kazakhstan, therefore, by means of institutional, legislative, territorial-administrative, and other methods and devices, state bodies are carrying out a very severe and multifaceted policy, in education, employment, and other areas, giving preference to the Kazakh language and to those of ethnic Kazakh background. The country's public opinion is also hostage to extreme dogmatists of ethnocentrism.

Interethnic relations in contemporary Kazakhstan (in lieu of a conclusion)

Since independence, the interethnic situation in Kazakhstan has been characterized by the asynchronous growth of a host of problems; an increase in their contradictions; and, as throughout the former Soviet Union, the politicization of interethnic relations on the highest level. There has, at the same time, been a spontaneous process to eliminate these problems as they develop.

The current situation was conditioned by ethnodemographic conditions that came into being in the republic from the 1950s to the 1980s. Mainly, however, it is a result of political

55 N. E. Masanov, “Politicheskaiia elita Kazakhstana,” *Politicheskaiia elita Kazakhstana: istoriia, sovremennost', perspektivy*, pp. 35-50.

56 Kodeks RK “Ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh” as of January 30, 2001, No. 155-II ZRK, article 342[2].

processes in Kazakhstan during the years of sovereignty and their effect on interethnic relations, to a great extent national-revanchist tendencies and national populism, elevated in the early 1990s in the public consciousness of former ethnic minorities and, most of all, the former titular nations in connection with the achievement of state independence.

As a result, the former “big brother” was gradually pushed out of state and administrative bodies, then from the country and out to parterre as the “younger” and yet still respected brother. (This, by the way, corresponds quite nicely with the principle of genealogical lineage, characteristic of nearly all peoples of the former Soviet Union.) We shall look at this problem in a more fundamental way.

As a result of the general process of ethnicization of civic consciousness, blatant ethnocentrism of the dominant group, and the national-revanchist policy conducted by the authorities, stereotypical opinions have taken hold in Kazakhstan society regarding interethnic relations, along with serious differences in the understanding of public and political events, depending on one’s ethnic affiliation.

At various times, such peculiarities of interethnic relations have been reflected in scores of ethnodemographic surveys of public opinion. Thus, for example, from fall 1995 to spring 1996, the Monitoring Center for Interethnic Relations in Kazakhstan carried out ethnosociological research in three stages involving 3,000 city dwellers in five cities. These represented not just Kazakhstan’s main regions, but, to a greater extent, it reflected their peculiarities — the north: Petropavlovsk; the south: Shymkent; the east: Ust-Kamenogorsk; the west: Uralsk; and the southeast: Almaty.

We took account of this objective reality in our survey, insofar as the urban population of Kazakhstan has traditionally and generally, with the exception of the south, been settled mainly by Russian-Slavic population. Of those surveyed, 48.0 percent were Russian, 35.8 Kazakh, and 15.8 percent representatives of other ethnic groups. Natives of Kazakhstan represented 76.7 percent of respondents. Among Kazakhs, natives of Kazakhstan were 96.0 percent; among Russians, 68.7 percent; and among other ethnic groups, 57.2 percent.

The survey was conducted against the background of rather rapid changes in the ethnic composition of the population, along with powerful and multifaceted migration processes, during which the emigrating mass of the Russian-speaking population was propped up, so to speak, by a no-less-powerful wave of a marginal Kazakh population from *auls* to the cities. Thus, according to official data only, during 1994, 480,839 people left the country, and the negative migrational balance amounted to more than 410,000 people. The number of people who migrated within the republic was more than 330,000. For the most part, emigration involved the Russian population. In particular, more than 283,000 Russians left Kazakhstan (comprising 58.9 percent of all emigrants); departing Germans numbered more than 92,000; Ukrainians, some 37,000.

According to official statistics, in 1995 alone, the migrational process involved some million people: 614,591 people left their places of residence, including 225,861 Russians; 212,238 Kazakhs; 91,597 Germans; and 33,572 Ukrainians and other groups. New arrivals

numbered 376,096, including 220,017 Kazakhs; 99,393 Russians; 15,848 Ukrainians; and 11,855 Germans and other groups. The negative balance of the migrational process amounted to 238,495 people, affecting mainly the Russian and German populations (126,468 and 79,742 people, respectively).

With respect to external emigration — that is, departure from the country — 309,632 people left the republic. This number includes 160,883 Russians and 82,652 Germans and other groups. Official statistics also show that 71,137 people entered the country, including 34,415 Russians and 18,662 Kazakhs and other groups. The negative balance of external migration totaled 238,495: 126,486 Russians and 79,742 Germans and other groups.

Concerning practically all the peoples of Kazakhstan — 97 of a total of 119 nationalities are mentioned in the official statistics of 1995 — one can observe a population decline in the republic. The single exception is the small population increase for quite obvious reasons among the following groups: Kazakhs (7,779); Chechens (497); Ingush (101); Turks (94); and Karakalpaks (17).

Regarding internal migration, the picture is completely different. Here, the Kazakh population has been most greatly affected: some 310,000 people, that is 93.7 percent of all internal migrants in Kazakhstan according to data for 1994. Altogether in 1994, the migrational process involved more than 1,212,000 people, that is more than 7 percent of Kazakhstan's entire population. Of course, if in just a year more than 7 percent of the population was involved in resettlement processes, then we can unambiguously state that a very complex situation has come into being in this state, requiring a significant part of the population to give up their places of residence and imposing difficulties on them. The effect of this process is hardly equal on the urban residents of Kazakhstan, who are mainly Russian, or the rural inhabitants, who are mainly Kazakh.

It is quite natural, therefore, that the absolute majority of those surveyed declared that the ethnic composition of the surrounding population had, in recent times, greatly changed — especially where they live — more than 51 percent of respondents (some 50 percent assert that there are now more Kazakhs). There was also a great deal of change among leadership, which was confirmed by more than 48 percent of those surveyed (46.9 percent assert that there are more Kazakhs among them); in the ranks of the urban population, in the view of 65 percent of those surveyed (59.5 percent believed that this was to the benefit of the Kazakh population); and at places of employment, according to more than 38 percent of respondents (36.7 percent saw an increase in the ranks of Kazakhs).

Interestingly, different ethnic groups understand this process in different ways. The majority of Kazakhs do not seem to notice it. Just 35.6 percent of Kazakhs (according to earlier data, 31.3 percent) noted the increase in Kazakh population where they live, while 34.6 percent of Kazakh respondents (fall 1995, 32.8 percent) did not notice or did not wish to see changes taking place in society. More than 1 percent of Kazakhs (10 percent previously) believe that the number of other nationalities among their neighbors has increased. Naturally, Russians see these changes in a more exaggerated form than do Kazakhs. Thus, 59 percent of Russians (62.6

percent three months ago) noted an increase in Kazakhs where they lived, while only 10.9 (10.7 previously) did not notice any increase. It is important to note that representatives of other nationalities perceive this in an even more extreme way, 55.4 and 16.9 percent, respectively (64.7 and 9.6 percent at the end of last year).

With respect to changes in the ethnic situation — at the workplace, in the city, and especially among the leadership positions — Kazakh respondents, according to current and previous surveys, are on average twice as unlikely to notice such changes than are Russians. In particular, almost half as many Kazakhs as Russians are aware of the proportionate increase in Kazakhs in leadership positions, at work, and in urban areas. At the same time, a large number of Kazakhs rather than Russians note an increase in favor of Russians.

Obviously, all this demonstrates the narrow-mindedness and lack of objectivity of the ethnic view of one's surroundings; it also shows the inability adequately to perceive the situation in society. As a whole, however, a distinct tendency can be observed according to which practically every group of respondents — in the first or second period of the survey — unambiguously perceive a change (in the workplace, city, leadership positions, among one's own neighbors) to the advantage of Kazakhs, whether this is to a lesser degree (the view of Kazakhs) or to a greater degree (the view of Russians and "others").

We shall examine the main results of second stage of our research (late winter 1996), in comparison with the results of the first stage (late fall 1995), which ought to demonstrate the degree of representation and authenticity. Simply put, to confirm or reject them.

The material situation of most of those surveyed — 57.8 percent (59.0 percent previously) — has unambiguously worsened in comparison to Soviet times. Undoubtedly, the continuing fall in production, the deepening crisis in Kazakhstan's economy, and the general impoverishment of the population have become accomplished facts, confirmed by the data of our survey.

It is noteworthy that Kazakh respondents evaluate the economic situation much more optimistically than do representatives of other nationalities. Twice the proportion of Kazakhs, compared with Russians, say that their material situation has not changed in comparison to Soviet times. Again, twice as many Kazakhs as Russians say that their material situation has even improved. In keeping with this, twice as many Russians believe that their material situation has worsened. Twice as many Kazakhs as Russians are unambiguously satisfied by their real or perceived economic situation.

Inevitably, the question arises as to why Kazakhs perceive economic the process more positively than Russians and other respondents. Is it because they really live better than others, or because they view things through a kind of "filter" that distorts and alters their perception of the world, making them biased observers, compelling them to unintentionally mystify objective reality: compelling them to praise the government only because they perceive it, in ethnic terms, as their own. I believe that the behavior of Kazakhs is equally conditioned by one and the other.

Is it possible that the Russian population also distorts or filters its perception of the world, in this case by belittling results of the economic policy of Kazakhstan's authorities?

The Kazakh population would seem to have been more optimistic in evaluating its economic position in Soviet times. This is due to its greater level of marginality. After all, the greatest part of the Kazakh population, according to the 1989 census, lives in rural places: 62 percent, while the majority of Russians, 77 percent, live in cities. In principle, a high level of progovernment sentiment among Kazakhs inevitably compels them to idealize any government, "their own" ethnocratic government all the more so. Greater individualism among Russians, a consequence of their higher degree of urbanization, compels them, in principle, to regard more critically any government, especially one that is ethnocratic Kazakh.

In this regard, of course, there is particular interest in the explanation of the economic crisis that exists in social consciousness. The clear majority of those surveyed believe that the government and its policy are the main reason for the crisis in our country. Meanwhile, there is little understanding of the deep reasons for the economic crisis. Only an insignificant fraction of those surveyed understand that a genuine process of privatization, as a means of redistributing property, has not taken place in Kazakhstan, this being the main condition for genuine liberalism and society's economic progress.

If we consider this problem through ethnic cross-sections, then here we see direct evidence of serious and deep differences in the perception of social and economic processes according to respondents' ethnic affiliation. Thus Kazakhs and Russians basically blame embezzlement and corruption by bureaucrats for the economic crisis. Kazakh respondents are much more loyally disposed to the government than representatives of other nationalities.

Against this economic background, a definite majority of those surveyed unambiguously believe that interethnic relations have become noticeably worse since Soviet times. In keeping with the above positions, Kazakhs are more optimistic in their perceptions of interethnic relations. Twice as many Kazakhs as compared to Russians believe that interethnic relations remained the same as in the past. Those who believe that such relations have become better are five to six times greater among Kazakhs than among Russians. Twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that relations have become worse. It is clear that Kazakhs have a more optimistic view than Russians of interethnic relations.

In characterizing recent changes in interethnic relations, Kazakh respondents in this case are not inclined to overdramatize matters, as compared to representatives of other nationalities who perceive the situation with greater unease.

Another question asked of respondents is important for evaluating the character of interethnic relations: Have you personally encountered conflict that stemmed from interethnic relations?

As in the other cases, Kazakhs are not inclined to take note of interethnic conflict. Half as many Kazakhs, as a rule, have personally encountered conflicts on interethnic grounds as Russians. At the same time, Russians, on average, are one and a half to twice as likely as Kazakhs to find themselves in a conflict owing to interethnic reasons.

But to the question, Have you or your family experienced discrimination [ushchemlenie] because of ethnic background, four-fifths of those surveyed do not believe that they have experienced such discrimination. Thus, regardless of conflicts that exist in social stereotypes, a clear majority do not believe that they are discriminated against on the basis of ethnic identity. What is noteworthy, however, is that Kazakhs are six to seven times less likely to feel discomfort in interethnic affairs. This is a very significant difference.

Relevant in this regard are data regarding discrimination and human rights violations on grounds of interethnic relations. Half as many Kazakh respondents as Russian respondents testify to this.

A third as many Kazakhs as Russians indicate that their rights to equal protection by law have been violated by prosecutors' offices and the courts; half as many Kazakhs indicate that their right to work and right to equal pay for equal work have been violated; five times as many Russians as Kazakhs indicate that their rights to secondary and higher education have been violated; and twice as many Russians indicate that their right to government service has been violated; etc. Thus, one can assert that there are frequent violations of human rights on interethnic grounds, including those for which various government organs are to blame.

The above data clearly testify to the stereotypes current among Kazakhstan's population. The majority is convinced that there is widespread discrimination at various levels of civic life, depending on one's ethnic affiliation. And, apparently, it is quite natural that half as many Kazakhs as Russians are concerned about a decline or radicalization of interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.

Despite many declarations, Russian respondents are much more critical than Kazakhs in evaluating the activity of all branches of government, including the president, the government, and the former parliament [note: the new parliament was elected in 1999]. Kazakhs' stereotyped view constitutes the main social support for the current political regime in Kazakhstan.

In this regard, the answers to the question — Who is the main guarantor of interethnic stability in Kazakhstan — are quite revealing. They illustrate vividly the greater degree of paternalism among Kazakh respondents as compared to Russians. Thus, the majority of Kazakhs “have faith in a good tsar,” and so twice as many Kazakhs pin their hopes in the president.

As in previous cases, almost twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that the main condition necessary for preservation of interethnic accord in Kazakhstan is the observation of human rights. At the same time, almost twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe in the supremacy of the law.

The tremendous paternalistic mood of the Kazakhs is nicely illustrated by their belief in a strong presidential branch: twice that of the Russian population. Belief in executive branch is the same among Russians and Kazakhs; they also share a lack of faith in the legislative branch.

As to who is responsible for worsening interethnic relations, four times as many Kazakhs as Russians had difficulty answering this question. Five times as many Russians as Kazakhs blamed the president.

In this connection, the attitude of respondents to the collapse of the Soviet Union is quite telling. This demonstrates to the greatest extent the eclectic quality and the ethnic thinking of our respondents. Fifteen times as many Kazakhs as Russians had an unambiguously positive response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, while three times as many Russians as Kazakhs had an unambiguously negative response. Twice as many Russians as Kazakhs perceived the Soviet Union's collapse with regret.

The greatest contrast among the population is found with regard to the laws on language and citizenship. Four times as many Russians as Kazaks blame these laws for worsening interethnic relations.

A related question is attitude of respondents to the question of eliminating the danger of interethnic conflict. There seems to be a strong paternalistic tendency among the population, hopes that the government will impose order from above, but no understanding that they alone can secure the country's prosperity and eliminate the danger of conflict.

Ethnic sympathies and preferences were revealed to the greatest extent in answers to questions regarding what to do in order to eliminate the danger of interethnic conflict. Just as with the questions concerning who is guilty of the deterioration in interethnic relations, four times as many Kazakhs as Russians had difficulty answering this question.

All of this leads one to conclude that Kazakh respondents either hardly think about interethnic relations or, like any dominant group, perceive them through "rose-colored glasses" or deliberately avoid discussing them. It is, therefore, possible to state confidently that they thereby involuntarily create the favorable grounds for ethnographic tendencies in our state.

Yet, one can suppose that in the particular case of the hypothetical passage of the law on the Russian as a state language, Russian respondents hypostatized and exaggerated the role and significance of this factor for society. Accordingly, almost ten times as many Russians as Kazakhs consider such a law necessary; five to six times as many Russians as Kazakhs would welcome a law on dual citizenship. Three to four times as many Russians as Kazakhs favor guaranteeing proportional staffing of government organs by various nationalities.

Obviously the answers by Kazakh respondents, which representatively reflect the overall mindset of the Kazakh ethnos, are unambiguously inclined toward the conception of a sovereign Kazakhstan, an authoritarian-statist and, at the same time, ethnocratic state. This while Russian respondents express their preference above all for greater tolerance and even for a democratic political system, or for integration into a restored Soviet Union. There is an obvious tendency by the two largest ethnic groups — Russians and Kazakhs — to perceive interethnic reality in a dissimilar way and from different perspectives.

This is confirmed in especially striking terms by the answers to the questions regarding how the state should conduct itself concerning interethnic relations. Fifteen times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that the state ought to maintain a privileged position of the native

ethnos. One and a half as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that the state ought to be equally attentive to the needs and interests of all ethnic groups.

These differences, however, do not negate the great coincidence in views in the mindset of the surveyed respondents. Interestingly, the majority of Kazakhs and Russians, in response to the question of what needs to be done to eliminate the danger of interethnic conflict, answered in almost the same way, frequently citing economic factors. With respect to government institutions, Kazakhs are more loyally inclined, while three times as many Russians call for changes in the ruling elite.

In order to understand more fully the mood of those surveyed, it would seem appropriate to enter more deeply into their sympathies and preferences. It is important to note that one and half times as many Russians as Kazakhs responded positively to the question of whether their views on interethnic relations corresponded to those of their parents, while one and half times fewer Russians as Kazakhs responded negatively to this question.

A noticeable reduction was observed in the share of conscious nationalists who are well aware of this. In our view, conscious nationalism on the part of Russians is rather of a traditional, imperial, post-Soviet, and compensatory character. It seems to illustrate to us the following data: every seventh to eighth Russian appeals to the idea of halting emigration of the Russian-speaking population, unification with Russia, reconstituting the Soviet Union, and refusal to learn the Kazakh language. Kazakh's conscious nationalism is different: it is solemn, ethnocentric, state-owned and of a belated, compensatory character, making up for the supposed past suffering during Soviet times, which is actively promoted by pseudo-historical research.

This last conclusion is fully confirmed by the fact that the majority of Kazakhs surveyed believe that Kazakhs should dominate the state-political system, that Kazakhstan's president should be a Kazakh only, and that the president should know the Kazakh language. A tenth as many Russians answer the first question in this manner; half as many answer the second one this way; and only for the third question are the Russian and Kazakh responses nearly analogous.

Here, as well, we see the substantive difference in the evaluation of the state policy regarding ethnic relations. Twice as many Kazakhs as Russians and representatives of other ethnic groups believe that a democratic policy of equality of all peoples is being carried out in Kazakhstan. Ten times as many Russians as Kazakhs describe this as an apartheid policy of segregation according to ethnic background. Twice as many Kazakhs as Russians characterize it as a continuation of the Soviet policy of "friendship of peoples." Clearly, there is an idealization by Kazakhs of the state policy on interethnic relations, against the background of a critical perception of the same by Russians and other ethnoses in Kazakhstan.

Also quite revealing are the differences in answers to questions regarding separate instruction according to native language for school children and students in higher education. Six times as many Kazakhs as Russians consider separate instruction useful and necessary, while twice as many Russians as Kazakhs are, to some extent, critical of such instruction. As to quality of education, half as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that separate instruction limits

and impoverishes children's development. With respect to higher education, three to four times as many Kazakhs favor separate instruction. Half as many Kazakh as Russian respondents believe that separate instruction sharply lowers the quality of higher education.

It is obvious that Kazakhs either do not understand all of the negative consequences of separate instruction or they deliberately advocate it as a means of strengthening further their dominant ethnic position in the future. It is also certain that, in these circumstances, Russians, like any dependent group, are very concerned about and show a great deal of loyalty with respect to the nationality question.

With respect to how the mass departure of Russians and Russian-speakers affects the situation in Kazakhstan, the answers are ethnically strongly differentiated: three to four times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that jobs will open up; three times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that a portion of residential property will open up; and seven times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that a greater share of financial resources will become available. Six times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that there will be fewer conflicts on interethnic grounds; six to seven times as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that there will be a revival of Kazakh culture; twice as many Kazakhs as Russians believe that the Kazakh language will become dominant.

As we can see from this comparative analysis, Kazakhs, for the most part, interpret the consequences of Russians' departure from Kazakhstan from the perspective of possible advantages and dividends, which they hope to derive from this situation. And, naturally, they do not enjoy any support on this issue from the Russian perspective. For their part, Russian respondents concentrate to a greater degree on the negative consequences, which Kazakhs either strive to ignore or do not pay attention to.

Twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that competition among clans is intensifying; twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that the intellectual and educational level of the population is sharply falling; twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe the authoritarianism and legal disorder will grow; two to three times as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that the economic crisis is deepening; and three to six times [sic] as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that the country will succumb to feudalism. An insignificantly small number of Kazakhs — a fortieth of those surveyed — believe that as a result of the Russians' departure from the country, democratic tendencies in state life will intensify, while not a single Russian believes that this will occur.

A very important indicator of the differences in ethnic stereotypes can be found in the answers to the question regarding persons' attitudes toward other nationalities. This illustrates the perception of the system of interethnic relations through the prism of one's own self, the degree of satisfaction with the existing balance of forces and established order of ethnic relations.

The huge difference in the answers of Russians and Kazakhs is striking. Thus, the share of Kazakhs who believe that people of different nationalities relate to them in a friendly manner is one and half to two times higher than the analogous answer of a Russian respondent. At the

same time, the proportion of Russians who believe that others relate to them in an indifferent manner is one and a half to two times greater than that of Kazakhs; these proportions are the same regarding those who do not know how others regard them. Three times as many Russians as Kazakhs answered that others relate to them in a hostile manner.

Undoubtedly, a related question is whether one's ethnic affiliation serves as a barrier to receiving a good education. To this question, twice as many Russians as Kazakhs answered positively. Ten times as many Russians as Kazakhs responded positively when asked whether ethnic affiliation was a barrier to gainful employment or to establishing a career; six to seven times as many Russians as Kazakhs affirmed that ethnic affiliation was a barrier to material well-being.

The above data unambiguously show that Russians themselves, as well as representatives of other nationalities, feel themselves to be second-class citizens in Kazakhstan and experience obvious discomfort owing to their ethnic affiliation.

Quite naturally, for the great majority of Kazakhs, Kazakhstan is their homeland, while Russians are five times less likely to describe the country in this manner, despite the fact that three-quarters of them were born here. Among Russian respondents, the situation is fundamentally different. For the absolute majority of Russians, their homeland is the entire Soviet Union or their place of birth — and to a far lesser degree Kazakhstan.

One might assert that in their answers to this question Kazakhs are oriented to a greater extent toward Kazakhstan as their historic homeland, while Russian respondents are more inclined to appeal to the idea of statehood (the Soviet Union) and place of birth (for a significant proportion, Kazakhstan's territory) but not an independent Kazakhstan. Here, apparently, become manifest unconscious alienation and disdain for the geopolitical reality stemming from the Soviet Union's collapse. This may serve to multiply the ethnocentric stereotypes in the social consciousness of the Kazakh population and in state practice.

This, apparently, is why a quarter as many Russians as Kazakhs feel that they are citizens of Kazakhstan. Fifteen times as many Russians as Kazakhs do not feel themselves to be citizens of Kazakhstan.

These data directly correlate to the answers for a question relating to the opportunity to leave Kazakhstan. Nearly ten times as many Russians as Kazakhs answered that they would leave without a second thought. Six times as many Kazakhs as Russians answered that they would not go anywhere else. It must be admitted that these data to a significant degree characterize the ethnopolitical aspect of the problem and the negative expectations of the Russian and non-Kazakh populations in general.

Data regarding the departure of the Russian-speaking population from Kazakhstan and the influx of rural Kazakh population to the cities is very revealing. In particular, the answers to the following question are extremely interesting: "Do you believe that Kazakhs desire the departure of all non-Kazakhs from Kazakhstan?"

As might be expected, a clear majority of Kazakhs surveyed answered negatively to this question; only isolated individuals openly desire the departure from Kazakhstan of other

peoples, which is the most striking illustration of the Kazakh social consciousness. In this respect, Russian respondents have a different opinion about Kazakhs' view on migration. The majority have difficulty answering the question, but one-fifth of surveyed Russians attribute to Kazakhs the desire to get rid of them. Thus one can assert that nationalism has not yet metastasized in the Kazakh social conscious.

Serious differences can also be observed regarding the perception of the wave of the marginal population from *aul* to city. Twice as many Russians as Kazakhs have a negative attitude toward the resettlement of Kazakhs in the cities. At the same time, twice as many Russians as Kazakhs believe that such resettlement will feed into the criminal element in the cities. It is understood, however, that the mass rural influx is of a compulsory nature: one and a half times as many Kazakh as Russian respondents believe this is so.

Despite the significant differentiation in perception of the world due to different ethnic stereotypes, sympathies, and preferences, the majority of respondents are rather tolerant regarding the study of Kazakh and Russian. Nearly the same number of Kazakhs as Russians favor compulsory instruction by Kazakhs of Russian. Two-thirds as many Russians as Kazakhs are in favor of the study of Kazakh by Russians. Again, two-thirds as many Russians as Kazakhs favor the study of Kazakh by state servants.

A great deal of tolerance is also observed with respect to who should be considered a native inhabitant of Kazakhstan. The greatest part of Kazakhstan's population opposes the idea of division on the basis of native and nonnative. It is felt that such a division would serve as a means to establishing the bases for ethnic domination in the process of political ethnocentrism in the early stage of sovereignty. Right now, the need for such arguments has fallen by the wayside.

The ideas of respondents with respect to Kazakhstan's main source of internal threats are interesting. Most of those surveyed have unambiguous responses: more than anything else, they fear China. Nearly the same number of Russians and Kazakhs share this fear. But there is a divergence in opinions according to ethnic affiliation.

Thus seven to nine times as many Kazakhs as Russians see the country's main security threat in Russia. At the same time, a similar number of Russians and Kazakhs are most concerned about the neighboring states of Central Asia. Seven to eight times as many Russians as Kazakhs count on Russia as an external guarantor of ethnic stability in Kazakhstan.

Ten times as many Kazakhs as Russians responded negatively to the question of whether a union with Russia was necessary. What form should such a union take? Here, opinions were divided in a substantive way. Three to five times as many Russians as Kazakhs favor a federated union — that is, Kazakhstan's de facto incorporation into Russia. One and half as many Russians as Kazakhs favor a confederated union. Obviously, the number of Russian respondents increases in proportion to the degree of integration with Russia, while for Kazakhs the opposite tendency is observed.

Thus, a main finding of the 1995-96 survey is the presence in society of serious differences in stereotypes with respect to ethnicity. These testify to different perspectives of the

situation and rather serious differences in views and perceptions of the country's fate and course of development.

Kazakh stereotypes are quite obviously infected with the powerful virus of ethnocentrism and state nationalism. They are oriented toward a paternal, strongly presidential branch, authoritarianism, and ethnocracy. These leave no room for any significant representation of other ethnic groups, especially in positions of power. At the same time, Kazakhs are rather loyal and tolerant in matters that do not concern the ethnocratic state. In such areas, they are prepared to make certain concessions and to formulate a more flexible position.

The perspectives and stereotypes of the Russian population are to a large extent oriented toward the past (appeals to the Soviet Union) or outside (appeals to Russia) than they are to the internal, Kazakh geopolitical system. Their views are more tolerant, and, in contrast to Kazakh stereotypes, they do not seek to strengthen a dominant position in the state but rather to achieve at least formal social equality and equal civic rights in matters not directly concerned with institutions of power.

Unfortunately, much of the respondents' testimony demonstrates a divergence in Kazakhstan's ethnic "heartland." In the current situation, one can assert that there is extraordinary danger, given illusions by Kazakh respondents regarding the concentration of power; their paternalism; their careless faith in the "good tsar"; and their naive hope for strong order, which they believe can be established only by reform from the top, via the president. Russian respondents are more self-assured, believing more in human rights and democracy and the values of a civic society than they are in reform from above. This is a cause of some optimism regarding interethnic relations in Kazakhstan.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ *Ethnopoliticheskii monitoring v Kazakhstane*, issue I, fall 1995 [Almaty, 1996]; issue II, winter 1995-96 [Almaty, 1996], pp. 3-22; issue III, spring 1996 [Almaty, 1996].