CHAPTER 4

Zakī al-Arsūzī and his Contribution to the Arab Nationalist Ideology

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Introduction

What is the nature of the contribution Zakī al-Arsūzī had made to the Arab nationalist ideology, and what distinguished him from other nationalist Arab thinkers of his time?

This is the question I shall labor to answer in the present study. My initial starting point is the tentative hypothesis that al-Arsūzī belonged to one of the most dominant intellectual streams of nationalist Arab thought. By and large, the distinctive feature which characterized this nationalist school of thought is its adoption of what Nāṣīf Naṣṣār has labeled “the linguistic vision of the nation (al-tašawwur al-lughawī lil-ummah),”¹ taking the common national language as the first, if not the only determinant of the national entity. Al-Arsūzī however, I hasten to add, differed from other advocates of this mode of thought in that the locus of his efforts centered on studying the “linguistics (fiqh)” of the Arabic language, and on seeking to offer a sociological understanding for it. Contrary to other generic theorists of Arab nationalism, moreover, al-Arsūzī paid greater attention to the political issues involved. He thought long and hard about the modern Arab state, and had always tackled pertaining problematic questions, such as authority, democracy, sectarianism, etc.

To validate my proposition, I shall compare and/or contrast the various contributions of other nationalist Arab thinkers to those al-Arsūzī himself had made in the ideological field of Arab nationalist thinking, or rather, to put it more aptly, in
ideologizing Arab nationalism. I shall begin by touching upon the background considerations that buffeted the early stirrings of nationalist feelings and ideas in the Arab East (al-mashriq al-‘arabī). I shall then pause to discuss Šāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣarī as the pioneer theorist of Arab nationalism. The major conceptions crystallized by various nationalist thinkers are briefly sketched and analyzed along the way, as they became the ideological foundations on which Arab nationalism was later based. Following that, I shall highlight the kind of transformations Arab nationalism had undergone at the hands of Mishīl ‘Aflaq. I shall subsequently review the main ideas propounded by one of the most prominent representatives of the so-called “regionalist (iqālimī)” national trend, namely Anṭūn Sa‘ādah, who opposed the generic idea of Arabism (‘urūbah) and its concomitant, comprehensive ideology of Arab nationalism. Finally, I shall conclude by expounding the distinct nature of al-Arsūzī’s own contributions to the evolution of the Arab nationalist ideology.

Background Considerations for the Rise of Nationalist Arab Thinking

The rise of the early nationalist ideas, sometime in the second half of the nineteenth century, was one result of the Arab East opening up to Western thoughts and Western political systems. It was also a product of the spreading of education in that area, manifest in the burgeoning number of schools, newspapers and printing presses. Ironically, this rise in the levels of literacy and education standard was offset by the ceaseless efforts made to reform the Ottoman Empire whose weakness and backwardness were becoming obvious for all to see. In his book, Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Ḥadīth (Modern Arab Thought), Ra‘īf Khūrī noted that nineteenth-century Arab thinkers and men of letters found themselves “face to face with new values, new ideas and new perceptions, which were almost common knowledge to world writers and thinkers at the time of the French Revolution.” So “Arab people too started talking about the homeland (watan), the nation (ummah), nationalism (qawmīyah), freedom, natural rights and equality.”

Of course, it was no sheer accident that Khūrī has grouped together these specific terms of reference which, later on, became the actual conceptual tools of Arab nationalist thinking in its earliest formations. For, within the intellectual framework of this mode of nationalist thought, two modern trends have always crisscrossed and got closely interrelated – the secular trend, and the constitutional
If we go back to Buṭrus al-Bustānī, the pioneer advocate of patriotism (waṭanīyah) in the Arab East, we clearly see the close interrelationship of these two trends in his own mind. In fact it was this interrelationship that led him to uphold the patriotic (waṭanī) ideals, as expressed most fervently in his Nafīr Sūriyah (Syria’s Bugle), a paper he issued in reaction to the bloody 1860 sectarian clashes in Mount Lebanon. In his series of leaders, entitled “Al-Waṭanīyahāt (Patriotics),” al-Bustānī began writing about the Syrian homeland and the various sects and ethnic groups of its diverse population. He considered that “the love of the homeland is an integral part of religious faith,” and “those who replace it by any form of fanatic sectarianism (ta’īfiyah) do not deserve to belong to it, because they are practically its deadliest enemies.” Having stressed the paramount need for citizens of the homeland to enjoy their full freedom, including “civil and religious freedom, freedom of speech and, above all, freedom of conscience,” al-Bustānī was quite categorical in calling for the separation of religion, the state and politics. The intellectual premises for this separation were the distinctions he had made between the religious and the civic. The former is “a private relationship between the individual and his Creator,” whilst the latter is a public relationship “between the citizen and his fellow countrymen (ibn al-waṭan),” and between “him and his political government.” Al-Bustānī also called for the abrogation of the common practice of holding civil and spiritual authorities together in the hands of one person. He considered “[such duality as liable to] impair both religious and civic rulings and judgments. We do not exaggerate to say,” al-Bustānī adds, “that it is impossible for urbanization and civilization to prosper and develop under such practices.”

These same secular and constitutional modern trends were also interrelated in the mind of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī, another pioneer producer of nationalist intellectual output in the Arab East. Searching for reasons behind the decline, or “the cooling down (futūr)” as he called it, of Arab and Islamic countries, this Muslim shaykh and clergyman identified “tyranny (istibdād),” especially political tyranny, and ignorance. He, accordingly, construed that the best means to effect the Arab and Islamic renaissance (nahḍah) were freedom and rationalist knowledge. Understandably enough, in his struggle to attain freedom, al-Kawākibī clashed with the political establishment, headed by the Ottoman Sultan who held in his hands both religious and political authorities, within the general framework of the “Islamic state (dawlah islāmiyyah).” Al-Kawākibī called for the abrogation of the theocratic state as
a political entity, turning the Islamic Caliphate (which, to him, must rightfully return to the Arabs) into a mere symbol of the common religious denominators. He also stressed the need to replace the religious union with “national unity (ittiḥād waṭanī),” the sectarian harmony with “racial harmony (wifāq jinsī),” and the administrative with “political attachment and sense of belonging (irtībāt siyāsī).” Thus, as Suḥaylah al- Riyāwī has noted, towards the end of the nineteenth century, al-Kawākibī had decisively settled the problematic mix up between the religious Islamic unity and the nationalist Pan-Arab union, turning the former into a symbolic religious league, whilst making the latter a fully-fledged political state.4

In his parallel struggle to spread knowledge and rationalism, al-Kawākibī inevitably clashed with the religious fundamentalists. He attacked those who reduced education to theology and to some primitive principles of arithmetic, having firmly bolted the doors of the ijtihād (jurisprudence) in Islam, thereby spreading among people the climate of defeatism, weakness and fatalism. In confronting them, al-Kawākibī advocated the freeing of Islam from stagnation, superstition and narrow-mindedness, as Islam is the quintessential “rational” and “natural” religion. He further stressed the need for the freedom of faith, since there can be “no coercion in religion (lā ikrāh fī al-dīn)” (The Koran, 2:256), and since religion “is what the individual, not society, believes in.” Al-Kawākibī had also rejected clerical intervention in political affairs, except what is directly related to the clerics’ religious duties. He even went as far as calling for the separation between religion and the state, Jān Dāyah tells us, stressing his firm belief that religious authority must not be exercised “in matters other than strict theological affairs.” Al-Kawākibī considered it the duty of the elite to “teach the public how to distinguish between religious faith and the civil state, for this distinction has become a prerequisite and a must in the present time and place.”5

The second half of the nineteenth century, the time al-Kawākibī was writing in, witnessed the spreading of literary societies and associations throughout Bilād al-Shām (natural Syria), all calling for the resurrection of the Arabic language and the Arab cultural heritage. Gradually, though progressively, these societies got politicized, especially after the 1875 establishment of the influential Beirut Secret Society (jam‘iyat bayrūt al-sirrīyah) whose field of active range extended to Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon. In a secret leaflet published and distributed in 1880, this society was outspoken in its demand for self-independence for Syria, united with Mount Lebanon, along with its demand for the recognition of Arabic as an official
Such early formulas of Arab national consciousness, expressed in different ways throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, developed further in reaction to the Turkish coup d’etat of July 1908. The resultant Turkish nationalist trend reflected itself in the policy of coercive “Turkishization” of the Ottoman Empire, formally adopted by the Turk Unionists. A number of national Arab societies and associations, both public and underground, started the struggle to carry out wide-ranging reforms, based on the principles of decentralization and self-rule for all Arab provinces under Ottoman rule. From then on, the Arabs have started organizing their lives on new, nationalist bases.

‘Umar al-Fākhūrī (1895-1946) clearly expressed this new tendency in his *Kayfa Yanha al-'Arab* (How Would the Arabs Rise), published in 1913. He called for the inculcation of an “Arab nationality (*jinsiyah ‘arabīyah*),” i.e. Arab nationalism, and what he called a “Kemalist end,” to be crystallized by nationalist Arab thinkers and embraced by every single Arab, so much so “it would become religious faith for whose sake everyone of us would be willing to sacrifice his self-interests, his happiness, even his life. It would link the Arabs together in a spiritual union that develops their economic resources, turning each and every one of them into a solid constituent brick in a solid wall.” Needless to say, of course, that the act of crystallizing such a “Kemalist end,” according to al-Fākhūrī, necessitates an intellectual revolution (*thawrah*) effecting a radical change in the feelings, viewpoints, traditions and beliefs of the Arab nation, thereby creating a “new nationalist spirit (*rūh qawmīyah jadīdah*).” The greatest task, or rather the first prerogative and duty entrusted to Arab thinkers,” al-Fākhūrī adds, “lies in effecting such an intellectual revolution. For, it will gradually lead to the formation of a new faith and a new religion – the indispensable Arab nationality without which the Arabs will never rise. Only such nationality will prepare the Arabs to come to terms with the realities of the harsh laws of life.”

Delegates to the First Arab Nationalist Conference, held in Paris, June 1913, to unite all Arab parties and associations and help organize their activities, stressed this same nationalist spirit al-Fākhūrī had called for. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Zahrāwī (1855-1916), for instance, chief representative of the Supreme Committee of the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization (*ḥizb al-lā-markazīyah al-idārīyah al-‘uthmānīyah*) and the elected president of the whole conference, gave an interview to the editor of the Parisian *Les Temps* the night the Conference was opened. He told
him that Arabs, “numerically at least, are a significant, not to say the most significant, racial group in the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs, moreover, are distinguished from other Ottoman races by their unity of language, traditions, interests and aspirations. Such characteristics entail specific rights which have so far been neglected.” Although al-Zahrāwī expressed Arab willingness to “establish a strong, pluralistic Ottoman population in which the Arab [totality] can rise and evolve without barriers,” he was forthright in voicing his nationalist Arab view when he stressed the fact that “the religious correlation has always failed to achieve political unity.”

Another delegate, ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-‘Uraysī (1855-1916), one of the representatives of the Young Arab Society (jamīyat al-‘arbīyah al-fatāḥ) and owner of the Beirut-based daily Al-Mufīd (The Useful), wondered in his address to the conference whether the Arabs have a right to form a nation, or enjoy what he called a “group right (ḥaqq jamā‘ah).” Al-‘Uraysī went on to argue: “Groups are not entitled to this right unless they have in common the unity of language and race, according to German political scientists; or the unity of history and traditions, according to Italian political scientists; or united political ends and aspirations, according to French political scientists. Now if we look at the Arabs from all three different perspectives, we find that they are brought together by the unity of language and race, the unity of history and traditions, and the unity of political ends and aspirations. The Arabs therefore, and according to all political scientists without exceptions, are entitled to have every right of a group, of a people, of a nation.” Al-‘Uraysī then asked, and answered “now if you inquire about the nature of this right the Arab nation has, I tell you by way of explication that the first inalienable right a group of people has is the right to a nationality (jinsīyah).”

Despite such outspoken nationalist sentiments however, the Arab movement at this stage of its development sought a compromise. It was hoped that such a compromise solution, based on reformist premises increasing Arab contribution to the local government, would maintain the unity of the Ottoman Empire against Western threats and Western greed. On the other hand, the solution should guarantee for Arabs a decentralized political system in their regions, along with genuine self-independence.

Iskandar ʿAmūn (1875-1920), also delegated by the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization to the Paris Conference, expressed this wish for reforms on the bases of decentralization. He addressed his fellow delegates by saying:
Some brother Turks who support the centralized system imagine that the purpose of the whole Arab renaissance is cessation from the Ottoman Empire. Nothing can be farther from the truth; the Arab nation only wants to replace the corrupt form of government, which is about to destroy the whole state, with another form based on decentralization, which we hope will achieve success and salvation for us and for them (...).

In conclusion, the Arab nation [wants] a pluralistic Ottoman government, neither Turkish nor Arab, where all Ottoman citizens are equal in rights and duties.”

For its part, the First Arab Nationalist Conference adopted a decision calling for “decentralized” administration in every Arab district. It also called on the Ottoman government to recognize Arabic as an “official language in the state,” which is the first step to guarantee Arab cultural independence. For, contrary to the Balkan nations who managed to retain their cultural independence, thanks to their own religious organizations, Arab Muslims in particular are “forced to study in Turkish schools, where the Turkish language dominated all subjects. The only refuge left for Arabs was the Christian missionary institutions, hence their great contribution to the Arab renaissance.”

The policy of coercive “Turkishization” however, went ahead. The Turk Unionists tried to repress the budding Arab movement by brutal means, manifest particularly harshly in the killing off of a number of Arab leaders in Beirut and Damascus, 1915 and 1916 respectively. The Western Allies encouraged Arabs to rebel against the Turks, and the Arab Revolution actually started in al-Hejaz in June 1916. All these factors led to a radical shift in Arab thinking, moving away from the call for decentralized reforms to the subsequent call for a complete break away and full political independence. Arab nationalist thinking moreover had a new boost with the ending of the First World War, the subsequent break up of the Ottoman Empire, the failure of the “Islamic league (jāmi‘ah islāmiyyah),” and the establishment in Damascus of the first independent Arab government. Prince Faysal presided over this government, which included all prominent Arab nationalists from Bilād al-Shām, Iraq and al-Hejaz. From then on, Arab nationalist thought moved in two main directions. The first was the open and non-ideological drive, thoroughly blending with the early stirrings of Arab nationalist sentiments, always following in the footsteps of its characteristic secular and constitutional democratic tendencies. The second was the highly ideological drive, which confined nationalist Arab thinking to a strict, self-
enclosed system of thought that came to problematize its intricate relations to both secularism and constitutional democracy.

The well-known social reformer and man of letters, Amīn al-Rīḥānī, might well be considered a typical advocate of the former, non-ideological direction Arab nationalist thought had taken in the period between the wars. Al-Rīḥānī’s secular line was clear in his “Al-Qawmīyāt (Nationalistics),” a series of articles stressing the need to secularize the educational and political systems. He started by defining spiritual freedom as the state in which “the individual is in full possession of his self, i.e., free from all kinds of shackles oppressing his soul and mind, whether familial, religious or political.” Political freedom is a part of this larger spiritual freedom, which cannot prevail in society except by “proper education and proper upbringing.” The nation, in turn, cannot be developed and civilized “unless its Christian and Muslim intellectuals sit together to discuss any religious, political or social issue without the public kicking up the dust of ignorance, or pouring out the poison of fanaticism.”

As for the secularization of the educational system, al-Rīḥānī believed that “only the establishment of public national schools, totally free from any religious color or shape” could root out ignorance. He saw that political secularization, a fundamental prerequisite for genuine reforms, could only be achieved through “purifying religion and keeping it away from the nitty-gritty of party politics.” For, religious political partying is by far “the greatest stumbling block in the path of national unity.” According to al-Rīḥānī, a government founded on institutionalized sectarianism is quid pro quo “an oppressive and oppressed government.” “Its achievements and efficiency are totally wasted, its sense of justice is necessarily impaired by the shackles of people meddling with religion.” It is an extinct, outdated form of government “no matter how much longer its day seems to last.” It is on such clearly secular foundations that al-Rīḥānī based his approach to, and intervention in, the Arab nationalist question. His view matured with time, moving away from the level of Syrian national union to the more comprehensive Arab national unity. For him, Arab nationalism in its modern form can no longer accept “divisions into majorities and minorities,” because “the Christian and the Muslim are treated equally.” It is directly linked to the common Arab language on the one hand, and to people’s interests, founded on justice, fairness and the equality of rights and duties, on the other. As for Arab unity, it can be achieved gradually, beginning with the “possible,” the “decentralized and partial” union in the initial stages. Its full consummation, however, necessitates the spreading of the common nationalist feeling across the social board,
“first amongst the common public rather than the exclusive elite, amongst the ruled rather than the rulers. The latter group would then find itself obliged to comply with the wishes of the people, and be led by the overwhelming popular forces.” Still, al-Riḥānī was adamant that this nationalist feeling could never grow and mature except through a nationalist, Pan-Arab educational system, building in every Arab country public, mandatory, non-sectarian schools with one, unified academic syllabus. Only such an educational system would guarantee the spreading of nationalist Arab values, minimizing as much as possible various deviants and differences within the creed of Arab nationalism.¹²

In Waṣīyatī (My Will), published in April 1931, al-Riḥānī linked the achievement of Arab unity to the spreading of secularism and the establishment of democratic Arab regimes. Al-Riḥānī said, addressing his fellow Arabs:

Arab union founded not on religion but on rationalism is a holy union and I recommend it to you. You must know, too, that minorities can never escape persecution and foreign tyranny, or at least foreign intervention, except by uniting (…) even blending with the majority, spiritually, mentally and culturally, so much so that [Arab] countries would have neither majorities nor minorities. You must know that there will be no glorious future for Arabs, none of that dear dream of a comprehensive Arab union, without the establishment of a civil and democratic rule, based on justice and the equality of rights and duties. You must know and be sure, finally, that in the great Arab nationalist state, religious fanaticism and religious sectarianism will all vanish, or be confined to small insignificant circles and pockets. In their place, the Arab homeland will have the unity of language, culture and race, all linked to the sublime human ideal and to the reciprocity and mutual interests of all citizens.¹³

Şāṭi’ al-Ḥuṣarī: The Pioneer Theorist of Arab Nationalism

Early advocates of the Arab nationalist ideology faced three major challenges in their ceaseless efforts to vindicate the Arab nation as a unified and self-contained entity that had existed from ancient times. These challenges, to my mind, have come to dictate and govern their subsequent intellectual development since the early 1930s. The first was the plethora of existing Arab regimes and national entities. By and large, this increasingly obtrusive, problematic phenomenon was due to the kind of divisions
and atomization imposed by Western colonial powers in the aftermath of the First World War. In turn, such divisions contributed to the burgeoning of sectarian and regionalist tendencies that opposed the more generic call for a comprehensive Pan-Arab unity. The second challenge was Arab Communism, raising the banner of socialism and “internationalism,” and taking class struggle to be the prime mover of Arab progress. The third challenge was political Islam, which came to the fore in the 1930s, following the failure of the religious reformist movement headed by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh. The well-known Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwān al-muslimūn) was the spearhead of this political Islamic movement, always juxtaposing “Islamic unity (waḥdah islāmiyyah)” against the nationalist Arab unity.

Ṣāḥīʿ al-Ḥuṣarī is largely considered the pioneer theorist of nationalist thought and the first intellectual to have ideologized Arab nationalism. Of course, there is a touch of irony in this commonly held view, considering al-Ḥuṣarī’s deep roots in the Ottoman society and the Ottoman culture. As William L. Cleveland has suggested in his well-known book, al-Ḥuṣarī was one of the last converts to Arab nationalism, as he embraced the nationalist creed only after his visit to Damascus, July 1919, to work alongside Prince Fayṣal in the field of education.

Widely read in European thought and fluent in many languages, having lived his youth in the Balkans, then bubbling with nationalist ideas, al-Ḥuṣarī derived his nationalist conceptions from nineteenth-century European thinkers. The “romantic” German nationalists, including Arndt, Herder and Hegel particularly influenced him. He highly admired Fichte and his Die Reden an die Deutsche Nation, in which he stressed the paramount significance of the unity of language, history, religious faith and nationalist education in the life of all nations. As for al-Ḥuṣarī’s intellectual and theoretical background, Naṣīf Naṣṣār tells us, they were part of the natural context of nationalist ideological thought. Here, in this case, when a certain thinker committed to a certain ideology rises up to the level of theory, “his real concern is not so much to postulate a comprehensive scientific theorem enveloping the issue in question.” Rather,” Naṣṣār adds, “his top priority is to gather whatever theoretical pretexts at hand to defend the identity of the group he belongs to and believes in.”

Al-Ḥuṣarī, accordingly, approached the nationalist question from a strictly cultural perspective. His starting point was that the nation is one “of nature’s living creatures.” The Arab nation in particular is an old entity that has existed for thousands of years, with the Arabic language as “its soul,” and history as “its memory and
sensibility.” Arab nationalism, which means simply the “love” of this nation, has remained latent despite the weaknesses that affected the Arab national consciousness at certain historical stages. Its influence, on the spiritual level, has always been manifest in “the spirit of Pan-Arabism” and in other “moral (ma‘nawī)” connections binding the Arabs together. As al-Ḥuṣarī himself put it:

The constituent elements of nationalism are the unity of language and the unity of history, along with the residual sharing of communal feelings and activities, communal hopes and sorrows. All speakers of the Arabic language and all citizens of the Arab countries form, in this respect, one nation. Arab nationalism is only the feeling for, and the faith in, the unity of this nation, which necessitates the active participation of all to bring down existing barriers separating its various parts.\(^{18}\)

Although al-Ḥuṣarī was quite open to free interaction with the West, and was willing even to borrow wholesale Western models, he nevertheless made a sharp distinction between civilization and culture. The former includes sciences, technologies and means of production, and is by its very nature “internationalist.” The latter includes literatures and languages, and is by nature “nationalist”:

Nations are differentiated one from the other by their distinctive cultures, but they all share a common civilization. Culture per se is national and civilization international (…). I believe that borrowing, in its widest and most complete sense, is the only way for Arabs to catch up with the civilizational caravan moving ahead of them (…). Yet, I have limited this exclusively to the civilizational realm; I did not include the cultural, for culture is not one of the things you can copy or borrow from abroad.\(^{19}\)

By this distinction, al-Ḥuṣarī has actually instituted “the rule of separation” that kept cropping up in nationalist writings, between Western sciences and technologies and between the Western cultural traditions that cradled them.

Al-Ḥuṣarī saw that the numerous “regionalist tendencies,” caused by the multiplicity of existing Arab entities and regimes, are the major obstacles facing the restoration of the past, glorious times of Arab unity. However, depending on the Italian and German experiments and on what he called “the steady directionality” of the history of nationalist ideas, he expected that Arab nationalism is destined to overcome all regionalist and sectarian trends, as it did triumph over “the idea of the
Islamic Caliphate.” He also warned against another danger threatening Arab nationalism, posed by the Communist internationalist tendency. The spreading of the “internationalist” message is “very harmful, even detrimental to all Arab people,” al-Ḥuṣārī argued, because it would stop dead “the incubation period” and “the maturing process nationalism needs in its early stages.” It would also kill off “all the budding, genuine patriotic fervor before it becomes firmly rooted in people’s souls.” Al-Ḥuṣārī considered Arab unity as something “natural and predestined.” Its establishment necessitates, in the first place, the spreading of “faith” in Arab souls that they belong to one nation. Nationalist efforts must systematically consolidate the “spiritual and moral (ma’nawī)” task of achieving Arab unity, which demands “above all else a deep nationalist faith.”

Inevitably, by focusing so strongly on the historical and linguistic factors, especially the latter, in the forming of the nation and the establishment of nationalism, al-Ḥuṣārī undermined the role other factors play. He grossly underestimated the economic factor, because nationalism, as he put it, “does not arise out of material interests but is rather a sweeping emotion emanating from the bottom of the heart.” He also underestimated the significance of the state factor, thereby avoiding the whole debate about the form of government and the nature of the political system. Nor did he accept religion as a constitutive of nationalism, because, as he put it:

*I regard “Arab unity (waḥdah ‘arabīyah)” as an independent issue, totally separate from “Islamic unity (waḥdah islāmīyah)” and “Islamic Caliphate” (…). Much strongly as I believe in the idea of Arab unity, and much as I say that we must struggle to achieve it, I equally believe in the impossibility of an “Islamic unity.” I further maintain that raising the question of the Islamic Caliphate at this stage is indeed harmful to both Arab unity and “Islamic solidarity (taḍāmūn islāmī).”*

In his study of al-Ḥuṣārī, Wa’līd Qazīḥā has wondered about the reasons that pushed him to give so much prominence to language and history over other factors:

*[Al-Ḥuṣārī’s conception of Arab nationalism was defined] by the socio-political status quo in the region, and by the restrictions imposed on it by foreign powers. On the one hand, al-Ḥuṣārī could not have claimed any racial superiority, as did some German nationalists, because the Arab homeland was still living under political, economic and military control enforced by much more developed and advanced societies. On the other*
hand, his call for Arab unity could not have relied on Islam, as that would have divided, rather than united, the Arab nation. He could not have insisted on the founding of the Arab state as a prerequisite for the existence of an Arab nation either, since that would have meant that the Arabs were far from being a real nation.

At any rate, when al-Ḥuṣarī excluded those other factors from his nationalist creed, he was understandably avoiding some of the most problematic issues. For, raising such issues would have harmed the conventional conception of Arab nationalism, which al-Ḥuṣarī shared with the class of elders [who pioneered the Arab struggle for independence at the early times of Western domination].

Cleveland has scrutinized another aspect of al-Ḥuṣarī’s personal character: “[This nationalist thinker,] who ascribes a semi-spiritual power to the living language and to the history of the nation, and who sees that the only means to achieve Arab unity lies in the awakening of the nationalist spirit in the hearts and souls of its legitimate sons, shocks you by having hardly ever sought to inspire those people by his nationalist ideology. There is no room in his creed for the people; nor is there much appreciation or respect for people’s innate qualities.” Cleveland himself attributes this to the emphasis al-Ḥuṣarī had laid on the role of education in effecting the national awakening. “Basically,” Cleveland concludes, “al-Ḥuṣarī addressed the intellectual elite, not the general public of common people”; hence his hostility towards colloquial dialects, which he saw as a “divisive factor.” Al-Ḥuṣarī pinned all his hopes on the educated “youth” who must be taught the proper nationalist values through establishing schools, training teachers and delivering lectures.

The Maturity of the Nationalist Arab Ideology

Ṣāṭī’ Al-Ḥuṣarī’s “linguistic and cultural (lughawī thaqāfi)” perception of Arab nationalism was by no means an odd, isolated tree in the wilderness. Rather, it was an extension to the “simple linguistic (lughawī basīṭ)” vision which came to the fore in the second half of the nineteenth century. As we have seen, and as Nāṣīf Naṣṣār has pointed out, Buṭrus al-Bustānī was one of the early intellectuals who took note of the paramount significance of the role of language in the national entity. Ḥusayn al-Muṣṭafī (d. 1890), however, was the first thinker to give this “simple linguistic” vision its proper theoretical expression, primarily through his “nation-language
dictum. He defined the nation as “a number of people grouped together by a sense of union which, inductively, comprises the native tongue (lisān), the geographic location and the religious faith.” Yet, “the nation as a native tongue,” al-Mursīfī added, “preceded all other unifying factors.” Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in the period separating al-Mursīfī from al-Ḥuṣarī, the linguistic vision of the nation has been tinged with overt racial, even racist, overtones. Although such racist touches were latent in early writings of the pioneer advocates of the linguistic and literary renaissance, they were clearly kept in check. No doubt the radical shift in the problematic Turkish-Arab relations gave prominence to the then popular theme of the Arab race (‘unṣur ‘arabī). The early stirrings of this “linguistic and racial (lughawī-‘unṣurī)” vision of the nation can be traced back, as Naṣṣār suggests, to the writings of Ibrāhīm al-Ŷāzījī (1847-1906) and Aḥmad Fāris al-Shidyāq (1801-1887). At a later period, language was clearly interconnected with race in the writings of ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-‘Uraysī who saw language as “the vehicle for racial revival and the means for the total Arab resurrection,” turning both into fundamental factors for the national sense of belonging. Šalāḥ al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (1887-1916), too, saw language as “the first determinant of the nation” and “one of the greatest factors in its awakening and evolution.” He embraced both the “Ottoman nation (ummah ‘utmānīyah),” based on political premises, and the “Turkish nation (ummah turkiyah),” which parallels the “Arab nation (ummah ‘arabīyah),” based on linguistic premises. Attached to both is the conception of nationalism which, to him, can operate in complex, heterogeneous national entities.

Nationalist Arab thinkers who were contemporaneous to al-Ḥuṣarī, and who contributed with him to crystallize the nationalist Arab ideology in the 1930s and the 1940s, all agreed on looking at language as the basic constitutive of the nationalist Arab entity. Qaqṣantīn Zurayq was one of them. In a lecture delivered at the Syrian University (presently Damascus University) in 1938, and later in a book which carried the same title, Al-Wa’y al-Qawmī (The National Consciousness), he stressed the fact that “[when the nationally-conscious Arab looks] at the Arabic language, he must know where it originally came from and how it spread. He must understand the distinguishing features that set it apart from other languages, along with the special innate powers that enabled it to so completely dominate such a wide range of regions (aqṭār > qutr). For each language has a unique creative power and unique qualities which distinguish it from others. And, of all other languages, Arabic has shown great vitality and flexibility manifest in its precision and its structural and organizational
sense of order. These factors entitled Arabic to be the best means to convey all kinds of sciences and literatures.” As a first step to consolidate Arab nationalist consciousness, Zurayq called on all Arab thinkers to “explore the secrets of this hidden vitality, and come to grips with the special powers embedded in our Arabic language, so that we can use them in organizing our present and building our future.”26

Another nationalist thinker, ʿAlī Nāṣīr al-Dīn, also stressed the significance of the language factor in his book, Ḍaṣīyat al-ʿArab (The Arab Cause). He considered the Arab as “he whose native tongue is Arabic” but, later on, he expanded this definition of the nation to become “a group of people enjoying the unity of language, history, literature, memories, traditions, interests and aspirations.”27 ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿAlāyīlī, too, looked at language in his Dustūr al-ʿArab al-Qawmī (Arab Nationalist Constitution) as one of the factors which “sought to create the nationalist feeling,” alongside “interests, geographical location, race, history and traditions.” Still, he gave special prominence to language which constitutes “the cornerstone for erecting the solid national edifice.” Language has “a great impact on people’s feeling of unity” and is able to establish “the nationalist union (rābiṭah qawmīyah)” among all members of the nation. It is “the means of communication” for those people and “the vehicle for spreading their ideas and feelings.” For all these reasons, al-ʿAlāyīlī tells us, it is the duty of Arabs to “mind their language in every possible way, on educational, scientific, artistic and literary levels.”28

Theorizing for the idea of Arab nationalism, which began with the initial stressing of the primacy of language, gained momentum and was considerably enriched by the inclusion of new conceptions, such as “the nationalist mission (risālah),” “the nationalist philosophy” and “the nationalist baʿth (resurrection).” These concepts did not feature in the writings of al-Ḥuṣarī, the pioneer nationalist theorist of the linguistic trend. For, contrary to the “romantic” German nationalists like Arndt, who celebrated German supremacy over other nations, due to the superior German language and dynastic genealogy, al-Ḥuṣarī confined himself to the much more modest task. He merely tried to evoke proud feelings for, and admiration of, Arab civilization without having any faith in or claim to racial superiority. Contrary to German nationalist thinkers, too, al-Ḥuṣarī did not call on Arabs to carry the burden of civilizing the world, nor did he believe in a larger, more sublime pattern for human evolution and human progress.29

Most probably, Zurayq was the first to use the conception of “the nationalist
mission” in his book, *Al-Wa’y al-Qawmi*. He maintained that “the ultimate goal of any nation is the mission it carries to human culture and human civilization,” and the nation that has no such mission is “not worthy of the name.” The Arab nation, accordingly, ought to have “a sublime mission,” and each Arab should feel that “the Arab natural environment and national history have entitled the Arab nation to accomplish a unique mission whose positive logical prerequisites are not available for any other nation.” “The supreme intelligence and the supreme power in this universe has entrusted the Arabs with something no other people could deliver to humanity.”

Although he was fully aware that such passionate feelings for a “nationalist mission” may lead to extremism, as was the case with Western colonial nations which used it as “a cover to hide their greed and materialistic interests,” Zurayq did not think that the Arab nation runs a similar risk. For, “the real danger the Arab nation faces is not excess and extremism but insufficiency and scarcity; our problem is not megalomania and authoritarianism but lack of faith and determination.” An Arab belief in such a nationalist mission, Zurayq concluded, would give the struggle for independence “a new meaning,” “doubling Arab efforts and strengthening them to achieve unity and independence,” thereby making their future role on the world stage as glorious as was once their past:

The Arabs of the past ages were able to digest the complex civilizations of the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians and the Indians. They assimilated them in their active minds and eager souls, then reproduced them to the outer world in a unified, harmonious, formally colorful and substantively rich mould. In the same way, the Arabs of the future will soak up the sciences of the West, adding new elements out of their own creative reactions to them, then remold them all in a new unitary whole. This will be the key to a new life bequeathed by Arabs to the nations of the world, as they did once bequeath their glittering civilization in past centuries.

For his part, Nāṣir al-Dīn saw that although the Arab nationalist “mission” was part of the larger “comprehensive human mission,” it nevertheless remains “the most sublime and most useful.” It is “the mission of goodness, righteousness and strength, addressed to the Arabs first and, then, to people at large.” This same “eternal mission (*risālah khālidah*),” carried out by the Arab nation, was one of the main ideas adopted by the Arab Ba’th Party (*ḥizb al-ba’th al-‘arabī*) in its First Constitutional Conference, held in April 1947. As the nationalist Arab party par excellence, the
Ba‘th stressed the distinctiveness of the Arab nation and its latent ability for creativity, renewal and innovation. It did not consider the Arab nationalist mission as something new but rather as the product of a long history. For, this Arab nation, which came to express itself in “a multiplicity of forms in Hammurabi’s legislature, in jāhiliyah (the pre-Islamic era) poetry, in Muḥammad’s religion, in al-Ma’mūn’s cultured age, has had one common feeling and one common goal throughout history, despite all the intermittent periods of deviation and decline.” As for the present, “the mission is that the Arabs must seek to resurrect (ba‘th) their nation, because this is the best they can offer mankind, and because human values can not be fruitful and productive except in a healthy nation.” Thus, the belief in the distinctiveness of the Arab nation was never an expression of a racist tendency. It rather stemmed from the conviction that the Arab “mission” or “message” is humanist by nature, and that the Arabs are more qualified and better equipped than other nations to carry it, because of their longer and more intense experience, and because of their proven ability to renew and recreate.33

Like the “nationalist mission,” the conception of the “nationalist philosophy” also featured first in Zurayq’s mentioned book, Al-Wā’y al-Qawmī. Zurayq called for the institution of a nationalist philosophy “made into a pure, percolated idea assimilated by all sons of the Arab nation. The objective is to blend it with their feelings and emotions that out of this blessed cocktail comes a nationalist ‘creed’.” He regarded this philosophy a necessary precondition for the Arab renaissance. “There is no hope, no chance whatsoever for this renaissance to succeed if it does not emanate from a nationalist philosophy which moulds its spirit, defines its ends, specifies the directions it takes and outlines the ways and means to achieve it.”34 Al-‘Alāyilī, too, saw that such a nationalist philosophy is badly needed, “as it is the power that infuses principles with the necessary energy, activating the present state of things and adding up the elements of resistance and the will to survive.” He highly valued its multiple use, which lies in protecting the Arab cause and keeping it intact and immune “to all fragmentation and atomization caused by forthcoming storms, no matter how strong and violent, blowing against it today and in times to come.” Al-‘Alāyilī stressed the fact that each nation has its own nationalist philosophy which cannot be borrowed, and which acts as that nation’s “healing medicine and nourishing food.”35 He outlined three major characteristics for the nationalist Arab philosophy to have in order to be “solid and strong.” The first is that it should be made into a faith, rooted in the heart and linked to the mind, not the other way round,
because “the success of the nationalist idea depends on how far we can turn it into a form of religion.” The second is that it must be “flexible” in the sense that it does not clash with the developing Arab mind but “remains broad enough to contain it, and not to limit its emotional and intellectual dimensions.” The third is that it should be deeply engrained in the Arab mind and soul.36

It is worth noting in this respect that the conception of the “nationalist ba’th” was by no means alien to the nationalist discourse of the 1930s. It was however closely linked to the political movement that sought to represent and incorporate it. This movement was probably the product of two political groups merging together in the early 1940s. The first comprised a number of Syrians who were born in the Alexandretta Province. Following the Turkish annexation of the Province, they took refuge in Damascus, and formed a nationalist political group. The second was composed of a number of Damascene youths who grouped together initially to support the Iraqi revolution. The coming together of the two groups gave birth to the Arab Ba’th Movement (harakat al-ba’th al-’arbī) in 1942, then to the Arab Ba’th Party in 1945. The First Founding Conference, which gave the party its constitution, was held, as we have seen, in April 1947.

*Mīshīl ‘Aflaq: A “Revolutionary” Tendency and a Vague Secularism*

Zakī al-Arsūzī and Mīshīl ‘Aflaq met intellectually through the conception of the Arab ba’th. For a brief period they also met personally, probably inside the party that carried the same name, the Arab Ba’th Party. Soon however they went their separate ways, politically, intellectually and personally. To highlight their points of similarity and/or difference, I shall outline the major ideas which ‘Aflaq proposed and which heavily relied on his view of the “inqilāb (coup d’état, revolution),” henceforth a new conception in nationalist Arab discourse.

‘Aflaq considered that Arab contacts with the West, beginning with Napoléon Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign, have pushed the Arab renaissance in the “wrong” direction. He believed that French thinking has poisoned Arab renaissance ideas, and he categorically stated that Western theories and Western political systems emanated from Western culture and, thus, did not meet the needs of the Arab environment. For, the Arabs are not “a tiny, marginal nation” that would carry “a mission other than its own.”37 Thus, contrary to other nationalist Arab intellectuals, ‘Aflaq did not see in the
West anything other than its ugly colonial face. ‘Aflaq’s view of the Arab nationalist action, moreover, was dominated by his idealism, seeing the Arab ba’th essentially as an “apolitical mission.” He considered the faith which precedes “clear rational knowledge” as the prime, “original (asl: origin)” impulse behind the Arab nationalist ba’th. It was also what “set the ba’th movement apart from, and made it inevitably clash with, all other nationalist movements which denied the value of faith.” Accordingly, in this context, ‘Aflaq severely attacked the Communist theory with its transnational tendency. As he put it, Communism is “a materialist, internationalist and artificial mission which ignores the hard realities of existing nationalities and nationalisms all over the world.” It denies the solid spiritual bases and the close historical relations on which the nation is founded.” To ‘Aflaq, “the fully conscious Arab could never be a Communist unless he would abandon his Arabism.” As for the brand of socialism he embraced, he saw it as “only a means” to broaden the popular power base for unity, attracting workers and peasants to the arena of unionist struggle. For, Arab socialism, ‘Aflaq maintained, will be “the servant of Arab nationalism and a significant factor in its ba’th.” Socialism will be saturated by the Arab nationalist philosophy which “does not condone materialism,” and which therefore confines its meaning to the economic organization of society, with the aim of “guaranteeing justice and self-sufficiency.”

On the standard bases of possessing nationalist faith, ‘Aflaq divided the Arab people into two categories; a small minority having absolute faith in a united Arab nation, and an overwhelming majority having no such faith yet. It is the duty of the faithful minority to act up as “a microcosm for the healthy nation,” seeking to revive and lead it to the much hoped-for ba’th. In turn, it is the inalienable right of this minority to lead the totality of the “still sleeping” nation, thereby representing the majority even before being mandated to do so by the people. As ‘Aflaq himself put it: “We represent the totality of the nation which is still sleeping and denying its reality, still forgetful of its true identity, completely oblivious to its needs. We went ahead of it and therefore we have the right to represent it.” ‘Aflaq added:

It is characteristic of this revolutionary (inqilābī) stage, then, that the leadership of the vast popular movement is left in the hands of a minority (…). But it is a very special minority, always conscious of the realities of its national status quo, always upholding the cause of its country and the rights of its people (…). Here, this minority proceeds to represent and lead the people even before it is given a clear mandate by this people to do
so. It is this minority that seeks to awaken the people to its present realities, organizing its struggle and leading it on the path for the *inqilāb*.

The ideological tool for this leading minority is “the living party” or “the revolutionary organization” which firmly believes “it is creating a new history for the Arab nation.” “Staff members of this party,” who are “professionals,” earning their living from and “totally dedicated to party work,” will be “the storm troopers for a genuine Arab *ba’th* which contributes to the welfare of humanity at large.” Aflaq considered the revolutionary movement, and “the very idea of speed” in burning the stages as the exact opposite of the reformist movement and its “evolutionary ethos,” which he regarded as a negative “sickly deviation.” For, contrary to other nations, the Arabs have known only two kinds of life, “*inqilāb* or decline.” Their development, in turn, cannot be achieved by gradual or natural evolution; “the gap is far too wide and an *inqilāb* is necessary for the hard evolution to be won.”

In dealing with the conception of time, ‘Aflaq, like most nationalist Arab thinkers, gave primacy to the past over the future. He took refuge in the past so as to rehabilitate the future, calling on the Arab nation to “rise to equal heights of its glorious past.” As he himself put it:

> The past is something real, something original in the life of our nation (...) and we mean by the past that time when the Arab soul was crystallized and fully realized. But what on earth do we mean by the future, which keeps pushing and enticing us to fight for, if not the time when our genuine soul is crystallized and realized again. In this precise and true sense, we have to set our past forward as a torch and as sunrays to enlighten our future path.

It seems that his nostalgia for the past on the one hand, and his over-magnifying the role of faith on the other, are among the major factors which made ‘Aflaq identify, or get mixed up between, Arab nationalism and Islam, despite their different operational fields. An added factor might be the rise of political Islam in the 1940s. The Muslim Brotherhood was emerging as a serious rival competing with the nationalist configurations in the Arab political arena.

‘Aflaq found it a partial understanding of nationalism to see it as something independent of religion. Nationalism is not “confined to earth, as is commonly thought, standing aloof, too far removed from heaven” for religion to be considered
“a detractor, wasting away the valuable national assets.” Rather, “religion is an integral part of, and a major contributory to, nationalism.” The fear that nationalism would clash with religion, moreover, was wholly unjustified for ‘Aflaq, since nationalism, like religion, “springs from the heart and from the will of Allah.” “They go hand in hand, embracing and supporting each other, particularly when religion embodies the national genius (‘abqariyyah) and is perfectly suited to its nature.” The relationship between nationalism and religion in the West is totally different from that of the Arab world. It was perfectly logical for nationalism to dissociate itself from religion in the West, “because religion came to Europe from without [and] it was not written in the vernacular, i.e. the European national languages.” Islam for the Arabs was “different,” and its relation to Arabism cannot be said to form “a typical relationship between any religion and any nationalism.” The Arabs are unique among the nations of the world in that their national awakening has been directly linked to “a religious mission.” “In its pure reality, Islam sprang from the heart of Arabism, perfectly expressed the Arab national genius and closely shadowed its history.” Of course, at a later stage, ‘Aflaq made a clear distinction between “false” and “true” religion. The latter is “always on the side of the oppressed and on the side of those who rebel against corruption.” He even started attacking what he called “religious conservatism.” Nonetheless, he remained adamant that religion is “at the very heart of the Arab nationalist cause” and that the ba’th movement “cannot separate itself from religion.” For all its nationalist orientations, addressing all Arabs “irrespective of their religious faiths or sects,” Arabism still sees in Islam “a nationalist dimension that has a crucial role and status in Arab nationalist history and in Arab nationalism.”

**Antūn Sa‘ādah’s Secularism and “Regionalist” Vision of the Nation**

If Mishil ‘Aflaq’s secularism seemed too vague and loose in the multiple relations it maintained to the Arab nationalist ideology, Antūn Sa‘ādah’s secularism went to the other extreme. It was so strict and dogmatic that it practically dictated and controlled the whole bulk of the “Syrian nationalist (qawmī sūrī)” ideology as founded and popularized by Sa‘ādah.

Sa‘ādah is by far the supreme representative of the “regionalist” national tendency, who offhandedly rejected liberalism and firmly believed in the historic role of the individual, charismatic leader. Very early on, he warned against the dangers of
“mixing between political and religious ends,” practiced by those “who are greedy for power and who always seek political authority through, and by means of, religion.” He considered that “believers of all religious faiths are brothers only in the spiritual sense of the term. Socially and economically, however, brothers are only the citizens of one society, brought together by their social environment and united by their various ways and means to earn their living – i.e., by the demands of life, not by the dictates of heaven or religious faith.” Sa‘ādah saw that, throughout history, the nationalist causes have always led to the “dissolution of the theocratic state, Christian and Mohammedan alike.” As for Arabism which, to him, meant only “the unity of countries speaking Arabic and believing in the Mohammedan faith,” it was nothing “but a new nominalization for the old theocratic, Mohammedan union.” It merely signified “a religious unity limited by language, replacing the old, absolute religious union.” Against this brand of Arabism, Sa‘ādah juxtaposed his Syrian nationalism (qawmiyyah sūriyyah), “a unitary nationalist movement, comprising elements from different sects, races and creeds.” From the very early stages, “these people who joined the movement,” Sa‘ādah wrote, “believed that they are the sons of one Syrian nation (ummah sūriyyah), united together by one ideology, one interest and one will.” Also, the founding premises were as follows: “Every individual of the Syrian nation has the right to free choice in issues pertaining to metaphysical beliefs, such as Allah, heaven and hell, eternity and death. The individual Syrian is free to embrace whatever creed he wants. He is only asked to be a true nationalist who believes in his homeland and his nation.”

In other words, Sa‘ādah refused to consider religion as a factor in the founding and the evolution of nations. Nor did he accept language as one of these factors, for “one of the greatest mistakes,” Sa‘ādah added, “is to equate the nation with the language it speaks.” The unity of language “does not determine the nation,” although “language is necessary for holding the nation together.” Rather, based on his conception of the “uni-factor,” Sa‘ādah considered the geographical location and environment as the primary factor in determining the national entity. The environment is the pot which melts various groups, remolding them into “one temper and one character.” The nation, to Sa‘ādah, is a group of people inhabiting a particular region or country. Their activities in, and their reactions to, this geographical location endow them, in the course of time, with specific features and characteristics that distinguish them from other groups. The region, therefore, is “the most important and perfect national uni-factor.” Now since the Arab world is not one
region or one geographical location, it cannot be said to have “one psychological and physical character”; hence, to Sa‘ādah, “it cannot have one nationalism.”

For my part, I suppose that Sa‘ādah’s “regionalist” vision of the nation was basically a severe reaction to the religious and theocratic conceptions. His systematic narrowing down of the idea of nationalism to include only Bilād al-Shām, moreover, sprang from the specific realities of this region, which distinguished Bilād al-Shām from other regions and environments of the Arab world. Bilād al-Shām has always been characterized by its plethora of religions and religious sects. It has always been fertile grounds for different “isolationist” and “sectarian” tendencies, which, in turn, have always opened the door for foreign intervention. What supports my thesis is that, at a later stage, Sa‘ādah himself extended the realm of “Syrian nationalism” to include Iraq, another Arab country bordering Bilād al-Shām and composed of a diverse population embracing various religions, sects and creeds. In fact, as Śāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣarī has pointed out in his two books, Difā‘ ‘an al-‘Urūbah (In Defense of Arabism) and Al-‘Urūbah bayna Du‘āti-hā wa-Mu‘āridi-hā (Arabism, its Advocates and Detractors), that Sa‘ādah had founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (al-hizb al-sūrī al-qawmī al-ijtimā‘ī) “in order to fight the sectarian spirit and the isolationist tendencies he witnessed in Lebanon.” The call for Syrian nationalism was his mid-way out “to condemn both narrow Lebanese isolationism and broad Arab nationalism.” His prejudices and obvious bias against Arabism were originally due, al-Ḥuṣarī adds, to a grave “misunderstanding.” Sa‘ādah had failed to comprehend the true meaning of Arabism and Arab nationalism, always confusing them with Bedouinism and desert life on the one hand, and with political Islam and Islamic party politics on the other. Inevitably, this had led him to the illusion that Arab nationalism “was nothing but a mask put on by advocates of Islamic sectarianism, and thus, understandably he started to attack Arabism as severely as he did attack and condemn sectarianism in general.”

Of course, al-Ḥuṣarī and Sa‘ādah were united in their secular approach and “elitist” thinking. The former however blamed the latter for the excessive overemphasis he laid on the significance of the environment and the geographical location. Al-Ḥuṣarī rejected Sa‘ādah’s view that these are the major factors in the life of nations, and in directing and understanding the facts of history. Al-Ḥuṣarī also blamed Sa‘ādah for grossly underestimating the role of language in this field.
What Did al-Arsūzī Add to the Arab Nationalist Ideology?

Nāṣīf Naṣṣār includes Zakī al-Arsūzī’s contributions to the Arab nationalist ideology under what he calls “the linguistic and metaphysical vision (al-taṣawwur al-lughawī al-miṯāfīzīqī)” of the nation. He sees in al-Arsūzī a genuine Arab thinker and nationalist ideologue, whose bulk of thought had always revolved around a single idea – the ba‘th of the Arab nation. “Al-Arsūzī thought he was destined to play a messianic role in crystallizing this nationalist idea, especially after the substantial political experience he had gained in the aftermath of the Turkish annexation of the Alexandretta Province.” To achieve this end, Naṣṣār adds, “[al-Arsūzī] never wavered in using his philosophical and educational background, heavily saturated with Bergsonian and Platonist influences, thus opening up the nationalist idea to the broad horizons of metaphysical thought.”

The keen analyst of his Al-Mu’llafāt al-Kāmilah (Complete Works), however, can detect two distinct modes of thought, so much so that we can speak of two stages in al-Arsūzī’s intellectual development. The first phase, extending approximately from the early 1940s to the mid-1950s, was dominated by the image of the “traditionalist” and idealist national ideologue who resorted to every possible pretext at hand to prove the “glory” and supremacy of his nation, and its capability to effect its own renaissance. The second phase, starting with the late 1950s and extending to the time of his death in 1968, was dominated by the image of the modern social reformer. Here, al-Arsūzī looked into the future to anticipate substantial socio-political problems facing the Arab nation, then offered realistic solutions based on his nationalist Arab orientations.

1. The Advocate of the “National Ba‘th”

Zakī al-Arsūzī’s intellectual starting point was his attempt to define the nation and its major constituent elements. He was not all that different from other nationalist Arab thinkers dealing with the nation as an organic, self-contained entity that has existed from ancient times. To him, the nation was “a natural extension to the family, founded on the natural sympathy amongst brethren (ikhwān), just as the family is founded on the mutual compassion and the strong emotional ties binding blood relatives (qurbā).” The feeling that links the individual to the destiny of his nation, therefore, is “natural,” spontaneous, instinctive, and always taken for granted. To
vindicate this vision, al-Arsūžī analyzed the linguistic origins of the word “ummah (nation).” He found that the two terms, “ummah” and “umm (mother),” have the same root in Arabic, derived from “amm (to resort to, to go to).” The “umm” in this family of related words is the corporal image of the “ummah.” For, in the same way that “the children are brought up (…) by their mother, whom they see as the source of their lives, so is the ummah the source of brotherhood (ukhūwah) in society and the foremost goal and the object of love and affection which brethren seek.” As for the constituent factor which maintains the life of the nation and distinguishes it from other nations, it is decidedly the language. For, al-Arsūžī tells us, so long as “the nation’s expressive and communicative means is alive, the nation itself will stay alive.”

The nation however is not an extension to the family only in so far as “the compassionate (rahmānī) dimension” is concerned, i.e. the intimate interconnectedness of its members through the symbolic “womb (raḥm).” It also appears as a creed (‘aqidah) and an ideology embraced by the people in reaction to common natural and sociological events. As al-Arsūžī put it:

The rise of the nation on the stage of history is much akin to the rise of inspiration in conscience, or like the appearance of the primitive animal species on the natural stage. Just as inspiration in the conscience is caused by reactions to a number of symbols impinged as images on the brain, and just as species appear in nature as life’s reaction to environmental changes, so does the nation appear in human history as a creed. The nation is the compassionate experiment in existence, embraced by people in response to common natural and social circumstances. The depth of this response is the ultimate measure of the nation’s originality.

In al-Arsūžī’s view, nationalism came to embody this creed following the historical transition from the Middle Ages to the modern civilization, which “replaced the motto of brotherhood in religion with the natural brotherhood among kinsmen and relatives.” National consciousness became “the source of sublime ideals and the well from which all legislatures and systems sprang.” Following in the footsteps of Ṣāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣarī, al-Arsūžī maintained that the nationalist ideology of Europe appeared in the nineteenth century after “the vanguard (tali‘ah)” had succeeded in “resurrecting (ba‘th) both the mother tongue, long neglected for the church language, and the national history of the people.” Unlike the pioneer theorist of Arab nationalism, however, al-Arsūžī linked nationalism to citizenship and to the political state very
early on in his career. He considered that “[the term “qawmīyah (nationalism),” which is derived from “qawm (people),” means] those citizens willing to take up arms to defend their homeland and share in the establishment of their state. The nation is thus a much hoped for wish, fulfilled only in so far as the citizens are brought up to be free.”

Having embraced the nationalist ideology, the major concern preoccupying al-Arsūzī’s mind was how to get the Arab nation out of the backward state it lived in; how to nudge it onto the road of progress and modernity again. He attributed the backwardness of the Arabs to an essentially external reason, what he called “the domination of the aliens over the national Arab environment.” As “the intruder and the hybrid came to dominate our environment,” al-Arsūzī maintained, “the well of our compassionate feelings dried up; our human insight was blinded (…) and the value system in our society was disrupted.”

He found no other way out of the abyss of Arab backwardness except through “the national ba’th,” the same path taken up by the European nations after the French Revolution. “Then,” al-Arsūzī adds, “freedom fighters for independence” and the “genius” sons of the nation rose up to evoke the national spirit among the public. They struggled “to resurrect (ba’th) the forefathers’ cultural heritage” and to rehabilitate the forefathers’ language, by “showing its supremacy over other languages.” They sought to “commendate national heroes,” and to vindicate their nation’s claims to independence by “revealing the sublimity of its jāhiliyah (the pre-Islamic era), its natural state before the advent of Christianity. They discovered the nation’s genius as manifest in its history and embodied in its arts and literatures.”

By comparison, the Arab way to “national ba’th” lies in their return to the “well” of their national life, the era in which the main features of their life evolved “naturally” in the jāhiliyah. It also lies in tapping the sources of national “genius” and creative cultural wealth, embodied in the Arab language. As al-Arsūzī put it, “our language is the clearest manifestation of our national genius and the reservoir of our cultural heritage. We have no other option but to consciously go back to experience it fully so as to reach the same level of dignity our forefathers had attained.”

Al-Arsūzī pointed out that the term “jāhiliyah” has two linguistic origins; “jahl (ignorance)” and “jihālah (innocence).” The former is nearer to “the state opposed to knowledge,” whilst the latter is closer to “the state of spontaneity.” He adopted the second sense of the term, considering the jāhiliyah as the Arabs’ “natural” and “golden age,” the “age of heroism” in which “the sublime values, spontaneously and
unconsciously assimilated by the Arab forefathers, had inspired them to heroic deeds irrespective of results.” The motive for action in the jāhilīyah was “the sheer beauty of the heroic deed, not its outcome.” The Arab “in his golden age used to sacrifice himself, his blood and his material possessions, to realize his humanity.”

To al-Arsūzī, such a return to the jāhilīyah would by no means counterpoise Islam. National Arab “glory” is closely linked to Islam, because Islam was “an extension” to the jāhilīyah. It added to the prevalent Arab “spontaneous,” “innocent and natural (fitrī)” values a new set of “religious” values and rules, so much so that if the jāhilīyah represented “the youthful stage” in the life of the Arab nation, then Islam was “the age of maturity, the age of steadiness and stability.”

Al-Arsūzī dedicated himself to study the “linguistics (fiqh)” of the Arabic language, hoping to coin a new Arab philosophy in which “whatever life has woven spontaneously is raised to the level of consciousness,” al-Arsūzī wrote. “We [the Arab nation] would then work hand in hand with providence to decide our destiny,” for:

The Arab tongue, if studied creatively, could lead us to comprehend the miraculous nation that had instituted it as an expression of itself, containing its experiences and drawing up its major characteristic features. The Arab language has become, in a real sense, the body of the national Arab self and soul. It can also lead us to establish a developing humanist culture whose budding origins are deeply rooted in nature, whilst its branches are sprouting up all the way to the mala‘ a’lā (the divine and sublime substance).

As he compared Arabic with other languages, al-Arsūzī noted that the Arab tongue is by nature “primitive (bidā‘ī),” “primal (badi‘)” and “structurally etymological.” Its diction is referential, going back to the “vocal and visual images derived directly from nature,” i.e. the external circumstance or state, whether echoing noises in the external natural world or expressing the inner feelings of human nature. Contrary to other languages, moreover, Arabic has remained “static” and “eternal” throughout the ages, always maintaining that “harmony” between essence and appearance. Other languages have undergone various transformations. “Over ninety per cent of the Turkish vocabulary is made of foreign and hybrid words”; “the English and French languages have also adopted hybrid terms.” In Arabic however, the foreign and hybrid word remains “repugnant,” “pejorative” and “alien.” This major difference,
in his view, is due to the different linguistic nature of the Arabic language. Even the diction of the Arab tongue has deep roots in “nature.” On the other hand, European languages, especially French, are historical, deriving their vocabulary from Latin. Both Arabic and European groups of languages have subsequently developed “in opposite directions,” leading to differences between the structure of “the Arab Semitic mentality and the Greco-European mentality; the former has become a culture with distinct heavenly and spiritual, compassionate stamp, whereas the latter has turned into a relativist culture.”

From this conception of “the natural language,” which came into existence with the appearance of the first man on native Arab soil, and which came to incorporate the “genius” of the Arab nation, al-Arsūzī moved to the concomitant conception of “the national mission” the Arabs carried to the whole world. To al-Arsūzī, the Arabs are not just a nation but the “source and origin” of all nations and all peoples. Their national structure is blessed with the aura of “sanctity and holiness,” because “it was jointly erected by divine providence and human will acting together in perfect harmony.” This is manifest in the “harmonious nature” of the Arab legislatures and the “supremacy” of the Arab language and culture. Human civilization owes it to the Arabs that “they invented the three godly religions, founded language” and “converted” people to the right path. All these “privileges” and “merits” made the Arabs occupy a unique position in the human family, equivalent to that of “the first-born son of the royal family.” They had also made the Arab mission and guardianship of all nations consequential matters in history. As he himself put it:

The Arabs have inspired the whole world with the notion of eternity, derived from their own eternal nature.

The Arab nation is the original well from which all Semitic peoples sprang. It is a world unto itself, whose sun has never set ever since man appeared on the stage of history. With its successive emanations, the Arab nation periodically cleanses the other peoples and absolves them of their sins, always guiding them to achieve their ends (…). Ever shedding its light on humanity, it [the Arab nation] might at times seem fragmented and atomized, its sons secluded in a nutshell of egoism. Soon however, a prophet or a za‘īm (leader) would rise and shine, resurrecting the Arab nation and spreading the light of its blazing glow as a new twilight and a new beacon guiding the other nations of the world to fulfill their respective national missions.
Like other nationalist thinkers who adopted the conception of “the Arab mission,” al-Arsūzī sought to highlight its inherently humanist nature. He maintained that the Arabs, always retaining “the humanist conditions,” had conquered the world only to “civilize” it. Only for the sake of “truth and justice” did they sacrifice their blood to take over other countries; only to uproot “corruption from the world” did they spread their culture among all peoples. Their “mission” in the present historical era is to “create a harmonious world where nature and humanism co-exist.” This mission is particularly relevant now, because materialism has dominated and repressed spirituality in modern civilization, “turning the world away from the original and essential to erect its nationalist structures on peripheral and exterior foundations.”

The Bergsonian impact on al-Arsūzī’s thinking looms large here. For, based on his distinction between the two facets of civilization – urbanization, which includes various kinds of tools and machines, and culture, which contains art, poetry, philosophy and ethics – al-Arsūzī blamed Europe for its excessive materialism. Europe has so oppressed and subjugated man with its determinism that it lost the “meaning,” which is “an Arab product carried to the world with the divine, godly religions.” Having achieved their own renaissance, the Arabs must convert Europe and the world again to this spiritual meaning. The consequential meeting of Arabs and Europeans would then guarantee that meaning and perception, that physics and metaphysics, that the mission and the knowledge would all complement each other, thus safeguarding humanity’s road to salvation.

2. The Modern Social Reformer

The traditional and idealist tendencies of Zakī al-Arsūzī’s mode of thought can be said to have manifested themselves in his call on Arabs to go back to the jāhilīyah “golden” age, and to struggle to reach the same “level of consciousness” their forefathers had formerly attained when they created Arab culture. The seeds of his modern thinking, however, were also growing early on in his career. He stressed, for instance, the significance of modern science and industry and the significant role they play in safeguarding progress of all peoples and nations. He also emphasized the fact that the “national ba‘th” could not be realized only by going back to the “well” of Arab nationalist life but, in addition, it demands a balance between “Arab genius” and modern civilization:
As we share with the rest of the world the universal experience as we share with our forefathers the compassionate spiritual experience, it is our top priority to establish a firm, healthy and scientific bases for our thinking. Similarly, it is our first duty to build, through modern industry, solid foundations for our life in nature, initiating a developing human culture inspired by our own traditions and cultural heritage.  

By the end of the 1950s, the political dimension gradually dominated the meditative and “metaphysical” dimension in al-Arsūzī’s writings. Between 1959 and 1964, he published four political books dealing with issues pertaining to the state, to democratic rule and to political education. Such an intellectual shift of focus was doubtlessly related to the great political upheaval of those turbulent years, particularly the unity between Egypt and Syria in February 1958, the subsequent failure of the experiment in September 1961, and the Ba’th takeover of political power in Syria, March 1963.

Reflecting such major transformations, al-Arsūzī’s intellectual interest underwent radical shift. The focus centered on three basic issues: first, the search to find the real reasons behind Arab backwardness and behind the failure of Arab renaissance; second, the attempt to identify the major practical problems facing the Arab nation; and, third, the arduous task of suggesting the set of “reforms” needed to achieve the Arab national “ba’th.”

(1) Reasons for Arab Backwardness and for the Failure of Arab Renaissance

In almost all his writings, al-Arsūzī kept stressing the responsibility of the Western colonial powers for the failure of the Arab renaissance, because Arab contacts with modern civilization have been made “under the auspices of Western colonialism.” In his later writings, however, al-Arsūzī gave more prominence to the analysis of internal reasons, which caused this failure and kept the Arabs prisoners to backwardness. He maintained that “[this backwardness came to dominate all aspects of Arab life, political and other] after the Arabs neglected life and stayed away from nature. Their emotional life dwindled to such a level that it became barely confined to the realm of desire.” Also, the Arab obsession with conventions and traditions had turned their culture into a self-enclosed entity “parroting whatever their ancestors had said in previous ages.” Al-Arsūzī established a strong link between backwardness and tyranny, making freedom a necessary precondition to eradicate both. He attributed the
various degrees of success and failure among nations seeking to achieve their respective renaissance to their different stages of willingness and readiness to practice this freedom, especially political and religious freedom. The European peoples were able to achieve their national renaissance only after they abandoned sectarian fanaticism, after they subjugated their whims and traditions to reason and rationalist critiques and, “above all, after they embraced democracy.” Al-Arsūzī noted that “this is what turned the European public away from sectarianism and elevated them to the present level of civilization.”63 As for Arabs, and despite the fact that they adopted the principle of “shūrā (consultations)” in their early political life, they soon abandoned it. Their political system started to veer towards “theocratic leadership” and, following the suspension of the ījīhād, the only option left open for them was merely to “abide by conventional views.”64

The “miraculous” success of the Japanese renaissance preoccupied al-Arsūzī’s thinking, particularly when he set it against the failure of the Arab renaissance. On a number of occasions, he analyzed this experiment, writing many articles in which the pioneer nationalist ideological thinker seemed so liberated from the strictures of his nationalist creed. He pointed out, rather approvingly, that the Japanese had found it necessary to incorporate the Western civilizational models, not through translation, as did the Arabs, but by adopting wholesale the language of their detractors at the expense of temporarily neglecting the “holy” language of their forefathers. Such a stage-burning process was followed “to shorten the [transitional] period and to come to grips with the real origins of Western civilization.” Although it hurt their national pride, the Japanese adopted English as a primary language in education, from elementary schools to higher educational levels, and in all state sectors. They considered it the language “whose native speakers had made their way to democracy and modern industry, the two foundations on which modern civilization was established.” The Japanese renaissance, however, was not only due to Japanese flexibility,” as al-Arsūzī called it, but also to the kind of intellectual “toughness” they showed in their firm holding on to their values. By comparison, the Arabs seemed so “rough minded and so morally loose” that their culture was limited to “book-keeping” and “retaining the past without getting in touch with the present realities.” Similarly, their character was so “proud” that it verged on an idiosyncratic sense of “self-sufficiency.”65

In “Aqṣar Ṭarīq ilā al-Ḥadārah (The Shortest Way to Civilization),” an article published four years before his death, probably inspired by the Japanese experience,
al-Arsūzī maintained that “the shortest, fastest and safest” way for Arabs to move on lies in mastering “the language of people ahead of [them] in the field of modern civilization.” He called for the adoption of English as the second language in Arab schools, considering both “its wide-spread use amongst people” and “the richness of its cultural products.” He excluded “Arab elementary schools [which] must not teach any foreign languages.”

(2) The Most Pressing Problems Facing the Arabs

Al-Arsūzī saw that Arab backwardness is manifest in tangible problems facing the Arab world, such as sectarianism, the dominance of conservative thinking, public apathy and the general weakness of the Arab character. A number of factors have contributed to the rise of these problems, including the religious and sectarian differences in the Arab homeland, the existence of various religious minorities scattered in different parts of the Arab world, the strategic geographical location Arab states occupy on the world map, and the consequential burdens history has laid on Arab shoulders to carry. “If the central location of our homeland in the world has decreed that we act as the judge of peoples’ destinies,” al-Arsūzī tells us, “it is also the reason why countries, large and small, have constantly coalesced to prevent our national renaissance.”

Al-Arsūzī paid double attention to the problem of sectarianism in the Arab world. Initially, this problem appeared as a result of foreign colonial powers sawing the seeds of religious discrimination and “encouraging sectarian tendencies.” Later on, the problem persisted due to the continued existence of private sectarian schools and courts of law. Al-Arsūzī saw that the spreading of education, the secularization of the educational and judicial systems would uproot the sectarian phenomena and safeguard society’s shift towards rationalism. Social harmony and homogeneity are “relative to the spreading of education” and it is the duty of the state to remove all barriers blocking the road to national unity by banning all “sectarian schools and courts of law.” It must institute “one school for all youths, one court of law for all citizens.” Also, the government must systematically raise public consciousness to such levels that enable the people to “to comprehend the delicate historical phase” they live in, by spreading education in the broadest measures possible.

Al-Arsūzī defined conservatism as “a way of thinking and a pattern of life” which seeks to revive the past and retain the inherited traditions and conventions. On
the intellectual level, it reveals itself through narrow-mindedness, mental prejudice and fanaticism; whereas, on the social level, it is reflected in public indolence, stagnation and fear of the unknown. In a conservative society “the youthful generations seem to carry the stamp of old age,” whilst in a progressive society life tends to yearn, “as in youth, for a better world” and for renewal and innovation, despite “the risks it runs.”

Public apathy and the general weakness of the Arab character, al-Arsūzī maintains, are due to “professional politicians” adopting “crooked” and “chameleon, misleading” ways in dealing with the public. He blamed both politicians and the public, particularly the latter, because it fails to see through these politicians and through the game of party politics, despite the interest it apparently shows. Al-Arsūzī stressed that public disinterestedness in politics, closely linked to “tyranny and colonialism,” is one symptom of the dying social group. For, “humanism and politics are counterparts; whoever abandons politics lets his humanity so dwindle as to become a dwarf freak.” The only way open to keep the public politically active and interested is to politicize this public and get it involved in “practicing politics itself.”

(3) The Way to the Arab Renaissance

“How do we make every Arab strive to establish a united Arab state which gathers all Arabs together and brings back their former glory?” This question was the starting point for al-Arsūzī to map out the road for the Arab renaissance and national “ba’th.” He identified three major steps leading to this national goal – preparing the people to carry out public duties, establishing the modern state, and achieving Arab unity.

(i) Democracy: The Means to Prepare the People to Carry out Public Duties

Al-Arsūzī considered that preparing the people to carry out public duties would be possible only through “awakening” in their consciousness the meaning of modern civilization. This civilization has undergone three stages of development, each of which has manifested itself in a radical change or revolution in public affairs. The first is the intellectual revolution, replacing the old view of nature and the universe with a new one. The second is the social revolution, starting in the eighteenth century with the declaration of human rights, and replacing tyranny and class distinction with freedom and equality as the two principles on which modern humanism is founded.
The third is the political revolution, largely brought about by the awakening of the national consciousness in the nineteenth century. Independence for all people and their freedom to decide their destiny, along with uniting all sons of the one nation in one national state, have become the two major mottoes of the present historical phase. It is precisely through such an overemphasis he laid on democracy as the “human facet” of this modern civilization that al-Arsūzī clearly distinguished himself from other nationalist Arab thinkers, especially Mishīl ‘Aflaq. He rose to prominence as the democratic nationalist thinker par excellence, restoring and rehabilitating the constitutional democratic drive that had stamped the early formations of Arab nationalist thinking. To al-Arsūzī, only democracy can turn the public away from sectarianism; only democracy can “overcome whatever divisive factors history has sneaked in amongst us.” Modern democracy itself, al-Arsūzī adds, is founded on two principles: “each citizen has the right to decide his own destiny” and “share with other citizens the right to collectively decide the nature and the destiny of the state.” The ideological premises for democracy, moreover, take it for granted that “the constituent elements of the human psyche include a rational mind fully equipped to know the truth, as well as a consciousness predisposed to virtue.” Freedom and equality, accordingly, are the “two indispensable preconditions for the life of a group or a nation in modern civilization.”

Al-Arsūzī defined freedom as “the right of the individual to order his patterns of behaviour as he wishes, choosing every aspect of his life, from profession to religion.” It is also the individual’s right to share in “deciding the public destiny.” This makes “every person a master of himself, laying down his own laws and patterns of behavior and carrying out public laws expressing his own will.” The citizen therefore effects a change in the social fabric “transforming authoritarian social relations between king and subjects to free and democratic relation between free and equal citizens.” This freedom, to al-Arsūzī, includes freedom of belief and freedom of expression, both reflected in the citizens’ right to air their views in the press, and in their free right to associate and form political parties. As for equality, which also preoccupied al-Arsūzī, he defined it as people having “equal rights to order their patterns of behavior as they wish, along with their equal right to share with others the ordering of state affairs.” This includes their right to contribute to, and be part of, state authority, through various elected councils (legislative, local and municipal), and through supervising state budget and expenditure.
In brief, democracy for al-Arsūzī was geared to “find the proper climate for individual talents to grow and develop freely, [whereby] the citizen becomes a real artist, taking it upon himself to create and share in creating the state body according to his own view of life and existence.” He outlined the necessary conditions for democratic rule, which are: first, subjecting the executive body to the authority of the legislature; second, electing the legislative body directly by the public; third, safeguarding the rule of law; and fourth, considering the public not only as the source of law but also as “the final judge of right and wrong in law-making.”

Looking at the hard realities of the Arab present state, however, al-Arsūzī did not find that citizens’ cooperation to build the state body is sufficient to “achieve full democracy.” So he emphasized the paramount need to “prepare” the Arab citizen and make him “ready to understand public issues.” He must also be equipped with the necessary “courage” to cooperate with other citizens in “supervising the proper execution of public affairs by law officials.” This can be achieved only through developing popular councils and through safeguarding the freedom of the press. In fact, the free press, to al-Arsūzī, is “the most sublime manifestation of freedom,” and it is according to this freedom that “humanist progress is measured.”

(ii) The Foundations of the Modern State

Generally speaking, nationalist Arab thinkers paid no attention whatsoever to the problematic modern state. Their constant preoccupation with the division/unity dichotomy led them to believe that existing “regional (quṭrī)” Arab states are mere “artificial” entities devised by Western colonial powers. Such entity, they believed, will be swept away and demolished almost automatically once the single national Arab state is founded. Al-Arsūzī was different in that he carefully analyzed the real problems of the modern state in a number of articles and books, particularly Matā Yakūn al-Ḥukm Dīmuqrāṭīyan (When Governance is Democratic) and, later in, Al-Jumhūriyah al-Muthlā (The Ideal Republic), which he apparently meant it to be the Arab equivalent to Plato’s Republic.

Al-Arsūzī’s analysis of this problem took two forms – abstract metaphysical and concrete socio-political. His point of departure was that the state “has its roots in the malaʿ aʿlā,” i.e. it was initiated in heaven. The common saying, “the Sultan is Allah’s image on earth” testifies to such truism. It embodies the “image of the ideal nation” and expresses “the tendency of the true to unfold and confirm itself among the
people,” where top priority is for morals. Before the institution of laws and legislatures, the national state was founded on kinship or what al-Arsūzī called “the compassionate sympathy.”

Yet, al-Arsūzī also saw the state as a reflection of “society’s conscious character” whose first task is to help elevate citizens “to the level of freedom, and enable them to consciously share in the public destiny.” Its second task is to organize society in such a way “that every citizen can make a perfect harmony between his needs and the rights of others.” “To fulfill its natural elements,” the state seeks to realize a number of sublime values, too, especially brotherhood, equality and freedom.

Al-Arsūzī pointed out that the Arabic term “jumhūrīyah (republic)” is a linguistic composite of “jamm (multitude)” and “jahr (speaking out in public),” meaning “the society whose members express their opinions in administering public affairs.” He identified between the two terms “republic” and “democracy,” in both meaning and linguistic origin, stressing that the latter is derived from a Greek composite connoting “the society which manages its own affairs.” He then moved to define “the ideal state” as that which “completely fulfills its terms of existence. It is a state erected by the mind, freed from any default [by being] fully responsive to the prevalent relations within the social body.” He considered that the good state takes into account two primary doctrines: equality of opportunity and social justice. In other words, it is the state that lays down equal terms in preparing its citizens for public life and that creates harmony between their rights and duties. It seems that al-Arsūzī’s belief in both doctrines has led him to adopt a special kind of “socialism based on limiting private property.” The objective is to “remove inequality and differences among classes, thus turning all citizens into brothers.” Each and every citizen becomes a property owner, “the peasant owns his house and farm, and the worker owns a share in the factory.”

Although al-Arsūzī was aware of the common denominators between this brand of socialism and Communism, particularly in “declaring war against the parasite, whether individual or group,” he nevertheless linked his socialism to both Arab nationalism and democracy. In an article entitled “Al-Qawmīyah wa-al-Ishitirākīyah Mulāzīmān lil-Tāb‘ al-Insānī (Nationalism and Socialism are two Concomitants of Human Nature),” al-Arsūzī saw that “if nationalism is deeply rooted in human nature, socialism too has accompanied the establishment of every healthy society.” In other articles, especially “Ishtirākīyat-nā Ishtirākīyah Dīmuqrāṭīyah (Our Socialism is Democratic Socialism),” he suggested that “Arab socialism” needs, in addition to land reforms, the institution of popular councils as “the basis for democratic life.”
Arab socialist thinking, based on “humanist considerations not on materialist theories,” must give top priority to the individual well-being rather than focus on the socio-economic relations amongst individuals. “And the individual prospers,” al-Arsūzī maintained, “when his means of living are kept independent, not totally linked to the collective livelihood of the group.” Allocating a farm and a house for every peasant is thus better than having farmers share in a farming co-operative.”

Still, al-Arsūzī did not only lay the foundations on which the modern state ought to be established. He also dealt with the “epidemics” which might threaten its existence, especially “favoritism, bribery, using one’s personal influence or strong connections to run state affairs,” and “intentionally delaying the accomplishment of public work.” He similarly attacked some persistent “defaults” in educational policy, where “the theoretical part vastly outweighs practical training, despite the fact that modern science is characteristically industrial and practical.” Al-Arsūzī, moreover, paid special attention to, and warned against, the “specific dangers” of the one-party state, since “the state grows and develops by the exchange of citizens’ opinions and experiences in a climate of freedom and equality.” He maintained that “suspending the free exchange of ideas in politics, and suspending jurisprudence in religion, would lead to the same result – stagnation and the subsequent failure to accommodate the demands of both human nature and civilization alike. Free debate and free speech, on the other hand, always develop national expertise and safeguard the establishment of healthy societies.”

(iii) A Realistic Look at Arab Unity

Like other nationalist Arab thinkers, al-Arsūzī confronted advocates of the “regionalist” trends by stressing the need for an Arab union gathering all together “under the banner of Arabism.” Yet, in his view of the forms and of the best means possible to achieve this unity, he was much more realistic and practical than his Arab counterparts.

Al-Arsūzī defined the “regionalist” trend as the movement “whose advocates approach Arab public issues and problems in ways confined to the limits imposed, and solutions prescribed, by colonial powers in control of one region of the Arab world.” Its aim, “always masquerading behind different opinions on how best to serve the public interest,” is ultimately “to oppose the Arab nation’s struggle against colonialism.” He saw the call for “Syrian nationalism” as one such expression. It
seeks to maintain Arab “isolationism in narrow-minded regionalism (iqlīmīyah),” whereby “each Arab state is confined within the borders mapped out for it by colonial authorities so as to keep it an easy tool in colonial hands.”83 Initially, al-Arsūzī aspired that the Arabs would succeed in establishing one, unified Arab state, “with borders stretching from the Indian to the Atlantic Oceans.” It would thus occupy a centrist position, linking Asia, Europe and Africa, overlooking world transportation and communication routes. Only such a state would restore the Arabs to their “former glory,” uncover their true “national character,” and enable them to carry out their humanist “mission.”84 Following the establishment in February 1958 of the United Arab Republic, the unitary state combining Egypt and Syria, al-Arsūzī expected this state “to resurrect (ba’th)” the Arab nation and restore it to “the track of civilization.” Yet, he estimated that this must depend, in the first place, on accomplishing two fundamental missions. The first is that the United Arab Republic should completely fulfill the terms of its existence “by bringing Arabs together under the banner of Pan-Arabism.” The second is that it must find the ways and means to achieve prosperity for its Arab sons. “The more free citizens participate in legislating for this unitary state, and the more attentively they supervise the execution of their own laws, the stronger [this] united Arab State will be.”85

With the passage of time, however, and after the cessation of Syria and Egypt in September 1961, al-Arsūzī started to realize the difficulty of actualizing such a dreamy, Pan-Arab, nationalist unitary state. This made him look more realistically at the whole issue, practically effecting a radical shift of focus in his thinking. First, he stressed the need for a gradual process to reach Arab unity, progressively expanding cooperative and economic relations between existing Arab countries. Second, he called on the Arab masses to get involved in the struggle for unity by putting pressure on their respective governments and rulers to further develop inter-Arab unitary relations. In “Ḥizb al-Ba’th Maḥall Iltiqā’ al-‘Arab al-Ahrār (The Ba’th Party is the Place for the Free Arabs to Meet),” an article published two years before his death, al-Arsūzī wrote about the “practical” way to reach Arab unity. He argued: “Since all is still in the hands of [Arab] states and governments, it is imperative for the masses to intensify their pressure on their respective leaders, if not to achieve a comprehensive union which goes beyond those leaders’ whims and idiosyncrasies, then at least to make them develop interrelations between Arab countries.” He called for a tentative initiative to declare a unitary Arab nationality, to systematize customs and tariffs, and to develop means of communication and transportation between Arab countries.

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would make the Arab people feel the need for the subsequent stage of political
unification. On almost every occasion, al-Arsūzī had previously called for the lifting
of all restrictions imposed on business transactions, on the freedom to work, on
passports and visa permits between Arab countries. He also called for the
establishment of one joint Arab bank, one monetary system, one postal service and
one educational system with one unified syllabus, in addition to one comprehensive
communication and transport network.

On one occasion, al-Arsūzī conceded this intellectual shift of focus from
preaching for the one comprehensive Arab union to the more “modest” call to
develop inter-Arab relations. He attributed this change to the fact that “the Arab
masses have not yet reached the level of consciousness necessary to allow for the
carrying out of such a great task as establishing the all-Arab state, under the banner of
Pan-Arabism.” The Arab states, moreover, are “not yet ready to embark on such a
decisive project.” Besides, “establishing one unified Arab state, from the Indian to the
Atlantic Oceans, is such a momentous and dangerous event for world order and world
détente.” Now, considering that things are realistically the way they are, and till the
time Arab consciousness is sufficiently raised, for rulers and ruled alike, al-Arsūzī
saw that declaring a common Arab nationality, which entails the “abrogation of
passport and visa controls, the lifting of restrictions imposed on the freedom to work
in all Arab countries,” along with systematizing Arab customs and tariffs, might well
be an important preliminary step on route to the comprehensive Arab union. After all,
this is what happened in Germany following the establishment of the “Tariff Union”
between German states. The broad German masses came to realize the “benefits of
unity for the development of their economic prosperity.”

Is There Still Any Relevance Today for al-Arsūzī’s Views?

Nearly three years before his death, Zakī al-Arsūzī published an important article
entitled “Al-Badawī Ḥāris al-‘Urūbah (The Bedouin Guard of Arabism).” In this
article he clearly stated the latent contradictions in his own character, which made
him fluctuate between his nostalgia for the past and his longing for the future:

The Bedouin son of the desert does not only stand for originality. He is also the symbol
of the adaptability of the Arab nation to subsequent historical stages. [For,] this Bedouin
has been contemporaneous to the successive civilizations of Babel, Memphis, Athens, Rome and Constantinople, as he is now contemporary to the civilizations of London and Moscow. In every historical stage, he has delved into the major civilizational stream, but strictly from the Arab perspective and the Arab viewpoint (…). I believe that civilizing the Bedouins is a grave error (…). Arab states should, conversely, provide the Bedouins with the necessary means for survival, so that they can keep intact the spontaneity of the Arab nation. They would provide urban centres with youthful elements which preserve the national Arab simplicity and innocence in battling against fate and destiny (…). Every genuine Arab renaissance has been achieved at the hands of the Bedouin sons of the desert. 89

Even the committee authorized to collect his works, composed mainly of his former students and admirers, did not fail to detect this contradiction which stamped al-Arsūzī’s character. In the Introduction to the fourth volume of his Al-Mu’alla’fāt al-Kāmilah, the committee noted the “sharp contrast” between his belief in the charismatic absolute leader, and his call for complete democracy for all the people; between socialism, or the limited socialist principles he came to embrace under mounting pressures exerted by the quickening tempo of world events, and his firm belief in the independence of the individual as manifest in the limited private ownership he carefully guarded and protected; and between the trade union organizations he called for in his later years, and the compassionate sympathy which formed the inner cohesion of the social group.” 90 Nor was it difficult for Anṭūn Maqdisī, one of his closest friends and most perceptive disciple of his thought, to detect a “similar contradiction.” Al-Arsūzī was, on the one hand, a strong advocate of modernity, but his idealism, on the other, was “absolute.” Al-Arsūzī combined in his thinking “genius and naivety,” “the mythological mind and the scientific mind,” always preferring “the artistic to the scientific and analytical methodologies.” Al-Arsūzī found in the former methodology the “genuine Arab thought,” whilst in the latter he found the “methodology of the Greek and Western mind.” 91

It might be possible to attribute this contradiction in al-Arsūzī’s character to two main factors – the various intellectual influences he was open to, and the wide gap he discovered between his dreams and the harsh facts of the existing Arab reality. Al-Arsūzī has leaned on German idealist philosophy, on Bergsonian and Plotinist philosophies and, later, he got himself acquainted with science in its classical, Newtonian form. He then returned to the Koran and to the sources of Arab thought in
the jāhilīyah and the early Islamic era. When he found himself in the most confusing period of contemporary Arab decline, he juxtaposed the deteriorating Arab present to the past glory of the Arab nation. It seemed to him that “the return to the well” might be the way out to achieve a new renaissance. The objective was not only to derive inspiration and strength from it, but also to carry to the world at large a new cultural mission that can save humanity from the tyranny of materialism and modern technology.”

To concede that there are contradictions in al-Arsūzī’s character, however, as most scholars commonly agree, should not hinder the attempt to question his views in light of the recent events occurring after his death. Indeed, the severe crisis facing Arab nationalism at the end of the second millennium necessitates such an inquiry. Only then can we see whether al-Arsūzī’s nationalist ideas, or at least some of them, are still valid and relevant today.

I hasten to add that a number of al-Arsūzī’s nationalist views still are, especially in the second stage of his intellectual development, when he featured as a modern social reformer. It is true that the crisis of Arab nationalism today is a fact no one can deny, leading some to talk about the “death” of Arabism and its being a mere “illusion” in the first place. Nevertheless, it does seem to me that this crisis was not the product of the grand nationalist ideals posed, but rather of the gaps and loopholes that appeared in the very structure of the nationalist Arab ideology. By and large, these weaknesses and loopholes are closely related to abandoning the constitutional and democratic drive within this ideology. They are also due to the vague and problematic relations between secularism and Arab nationalism. The harsh measures taken by nationalist forces to attain political power and realize these nationalist ends played an equally distinctive role. The thoroughly undemocratic stamp that came to characterize the Arab nationalist ideology in general manifested itself in giving priority to the “revolutionary” over the democratic and constitutional legitimacy. This fact is itself due to the common practice of looking at freedom exclusively from the country’s viewpoint, whilst totally ignoring the freedom of the individual citizen. Doubtlessly, such lack of democratic orientations has played a considerable part in activating the present ideological crisis of Arab nationalism. It was the first step on the road leading to the present alienation of the Arab masses from public affairs and from politics and political action in general. On the other hand, the intricate network of relations between secularism and Arab nationalism has hindered the spreading of rationalism in the Arab society. The nationalist forces that came to power in some
Arab countries have also failed to secularize certain sectors of Arab life, especially politics and education. This has systematically frustrated attempts to establish a modern civic state in which loyalty is dedicated to the country itself, not to the family, sect or tribe.

Returning to al-Arsūzī, it is clear that his firm stance on the side of democracy and secularism shows that he was aware of the dangers posed by these two loopholes in the fabric of the Arab nationalist ideology. He was also conscious, particularly in his later years, of the major difficulties blocking the nationalist dream to establish one comprehensive Arab union. Still, he was a pioneering vanguard in transcending the conventional nationalist view that saw only one form for Arab unity; i.e., the united Arab state. In all these respects, al-Arsūzī’s writings still have some relevance and validity today. They might even be useful for whoever wishes to get Arab nationalism out of its present crisis, seeking to remold it in a new shape, bridging the gaps in its ideological body, and systematically widening its humanist horizons away from any claim to racial, cultural or civilizational “superiority.” Indeed, our world has come to witness the stormy winds of change blowing on all twentieth century ideologies. All ideologies in the last few years have been adapting themselves to accommodate the new radical changes. Perhaps Arab nationalism should not be the odd one out.
Notes


3. Buṭrus al-Bustānī, Nafīr Sūrīyah (Beirut: Dār Fikr lil-Abdīth wa-al-Nashr, 1990). Buṭrus al-Bustānī, commonly held to be the pioneer leader of the Enlightenment in Bilād al-Shām, was born in al-Dabīyah, a village in Mount Lebanon, in October 1819. Having studied Arabic and Syriac languages, he joined ’Ayn Waraqah, one of the most prestigious Christian-missionary schools in Bilād al-Shām. He spent thirteen years there, studying Arabic language and literature, philosophy and theology, in addition to Latin and Italian. After graduation, he was appointed an instructor at the same school, where he met some Protestant American missionaries in 1840. He embraced the Protestant faith and worked with these missionaries, teaching translation and Arabic language and literature. In 1847, he helped establish the first association in Bilād al-Shām, the Syrian Association for the Science and Arts (al-jam‘īyah al-sūrīyah lil-ulūm wa-al-funūn). He also took part in founding the first National Anglican Church, totally independent from the American Missionary Church. From 1860 on, he intermittently worked in journalism, issuing in September of the same year the first paper in Syria, Nafīr Sūrīyah, dedicated to tolerance, national unity and the fight against religious fanaticism. In 1863, he established the National School, a higher institute, founded on the principles of religious freedom and anti-sectarianism. He returned to journalism in 1870 to issue with his first-born son, Salīm, a semi-monthly called Al-Jinān (The Paradises). Soon after, he collaborated with his son on starting a new daily, Al-Jannah (Paradise). In 1869 he finished his ten-year compilation of Muhīṭ al-Muhīṭ, a huge dictionary he later abridged as Quṣr al-Muhīṭ. The best and most important work he had accomplished, however, was his first Arab Dā‘irat al-Ma‘ārif (Encyclopedia), the first volume of which was published in 1876, followed by five other volumes just before his death in 1883. See Yūsuf Qazmā Khūrī, Rajul Sabaq li-‘Aṣri-hi: Al-Ma‘allim Buṭrus al-Bustānī (Amman: Al-Ma‘had al-Mālikī lil-Dirāsāt al-Dīniyyah / Beirut: Bisān, 1995).


al-Kāmilah li-‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī ma‘a Dirāsah ‘an Ḥayāti-hi wa-Īthāri-hi (Cairo: Al-Hay’ah al-Miṣrīyah lil-Ta’līf wa-al-Nashr, 1970). Al-Imām ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī was born in Aleppo, most probably in 1855. He spent his childhood moving between Aleppo and Antakia, where he learned the basics of Arabic and religious studies, in addition to the Turkish and Persian languages. From his own readings, he also learned about history, philosophy, economics and politics. Although he spoke no European languages, his writings show that he was familiar with the ideas of the enlightened Europeans, which filtered through to the Arab and Islamic world via different legal and illegal channels. He occupied various official positions, in Aleppo municipality and in Aleppo theological courts, but he decided to turn to journalism so as to spread his enlightened and reformist views, calling on the public to resist tyranny, ignorance and religious fanaticism. In the beginning he worked for the official paper, Al-Furāt (The Euphrates), then issued in 1877 the first independent Arab daily, Al-Shahbā (Aleppo), which was closed down by the Ottoman authorities two years later. He issued another paper, I’tidal (Moderation), also closed down by the authorities. Al-Kawākibī felt he was being persecuted in his native country, so he decided in 1898 to take refuge in Cairo, where he wrote his most famous books, Ḥabā’i al-Istibdā (The Natural Dispositions of Tyranny) and Umm al-Qurā (Mother of Villages), before he died, presumably poisoned, in 1902.


13. Amīn al-Riḥānī, “Waṣiyātī,” in Al-A’māl al-‘Arabīyah al-Kāmilah, Vol. 8, pp. 495-510. Amīn Fāris al-Bajānī, commonly known as al-Riḥānī, was born in al-Fārikah village, Mount Lebanon, in 1876. He received his elementary education at the village school then immigrated to New York when he was only twelve years old. He spent four years on his own in New York before his father joined him to open a drugstore. Although he worked in
the family shop, al-Rīhānī was adamant to pursue his studies at a night school. He later joined
the law college, where he spent only one year, then decided to abandon his studies and
dedicate himself to full-time writing. In 1898, he returned to Beirut to have a deeper
knowledge of the Arabic language. He spent four years there and went back to New York
again to start writing in both Arabic and English, primarily in the fields of literature, literary
criticism, sociology and politics. He kept shuttling between the United States and Lebanon
until 1912, when he eventually decided to settle in his native country. From his base in
Lebanon, he made many trips to the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt and Morocco,
getting in close touch with various Arab kings and rulers. His writings show his clear
indebtedness to the French enlightened thinkers, like Rousseau and Voltaire. He rejected
religious fanaticism and called for tolerance, democracy, Arab unity and, especially, the
mutual interaction between Eastern and Western civilizations. He died in his village in
September 1940. See Muḥammad ʿAlī Mūsā, Amīn al-Rīhānī: Hayātu-hu wa-Āthāru-hu

14. Şāṭī’ al-Ḥuṣārī, who belongs to a well-known Aleppo family, was born in August
1880 in Sanaa, Yemen, where his father worked as a judge. He learned Turkish and French at
an early age and before he fully mastered Arabic. After his graduation from the prestigious
Istanbul Royal School, he was appointed a secondary school teacher in the Yaniyā district, on
the borders between Albania and Greece. The five years he spent there marked his early
interest in the nationalist question. Al-Ḥuṣārī also occupied many administrative posts in
Macedonia, which was the center of the nationalist activities for various Turkish officers,
including Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) who established the Association of Union and Progress
(jamʿiyyat al-ittiḥād wa-al-taraqqī). After the 1908 coup d’État in Turkey, al-Ḥuṣārī was
appointed Director of the Teachers Institute and editor-in-chief of two educational
periodicals. Between 1910 and 1912, he visited a number of European countries to get
acquainted with their modern educational systems. His all-important intellectual shift from
the Ottoman union to Arabism started early in 1916. In 1919, he moved to Damascus and
joined the Arab nationalist circles surrounding Prince Fayṣal. He was appointed Director of
General Education then Minister of Education. When the French occupied Damascus in July
1920, he moved with Prince Fayṣal to Iraq, where he occupied senior positions in the
Ministry of Education and the Higher Institute for Teachers. He was appointed Head of the
Baghdad Law Faculty in 1913, then Curator and Supervisor of the Directorate of Antiquities.
He became well known as one of the prominent advocates of Arab nationalism and was
forced to leave Iraq in the late 1930s and move to Lebanon, where he spent five years. The
Syrian government subsequently called him to office in Damascus and offered him a

26. Qaṣṭānṣīn Zuraqy, “Al-Wā`y al-Qawmī (Naṣṣ Muḥādara Ulqiya-t fī Ghuṭūn Shahr Kānum al-Awwal 1938 min ‘alā Madraj Jāmi‘at Dimashq),” in Muḥammad Kāmil al-Khaṭīb, ed. & pref., Al-Qawmīyah wa-al-Waḥdah, Pt. 2: Hiwārāt wa-Niqāshāt (Dāmasc: Wizārat al-Thaqāfah, 1994), pp. 796-879. See also Qaṣṭānṣīn Zuraqy, Al-Wā`y al-Qawmī (Beirut: Dār al-Maṣḥīrīq, 1939). Qaṣṭānṣīn Zuraqy was born in Dāmasc, May 1909, to an Orthodox family. He received his elementary and secondary education in the schools of the Orthodox sect before he joined the American University of Beirut. After his graduation from the Faculty of Humanities, he continued his studies in the United States, where he obtained a
Ph.D. in history, Princeton University. He occupied a number of diplomatic and academic posts, and was appointed President of the Syrian University in 1949, a post he held for three years. He moved back to Beirut and became Vice-President of the American University of Beirut, then its Acting President between 1954-57. Despite his heavy diplomatic and academic responsibilities, including various visiting professorships to American universities, Zurayq took an active interest in the intellectual and cultural life of numerous Arab societies and associations. He was a prolific writer, and his academic and educational works left a great impact on the most prominent figures of Arab nationalist thought. Although he is over ninety at present, his constant writings still reflect the nationalist interest that came to preoccupy him throughout his long life. See Anis Sâyigh, ed., Qastanîn Zurayq: 65 ‘Āman min al-'Atâ’ (Beirut: Bisân, 1996).


28. ‘Abd Allâh al-‘Alâyîlî, Dustûr al-'Arab al-Qawmî (Beirut: Maktabat al-'Arfān, 1941), pp. 88-90. ‘Abd Allâh al-‘Alâyîlî was born in Beirut, 1914. He spent his early years moving between various religious elementary schools, kuttâbs, before his father managed to enroll him in al-Hirsh school, established by the Association of Islamic Charitable Intentions (jam‘iyat al-maqâṣid al-islâmiyyah). He stayed there until 1924, learning the basics of reading and writing, then left for Cairo and spent many years at al-Azhar, studying under its famous scholars and clerics. In 1938 he published his first book, Muqaddimah li-Dars al-Lughah al-'Arabiyyah (Introduction to the Study of the Arabic Language) in Cairo and returned to Beirut in 1940. Al-‘Alâyîlî taught in the Great ‘Umarî Mosque, where he became famous for
his sermons that called for the rejection of sectarianism and religious fanaticism. He wrote poetry and literature and was interested in Islamic history, writing an extended biography of Imām al-Ḥusayn. His nationalist thinking and his preoccupation with political action came to the fore in this period. It is believed that he joined the League of National Action, established in 1933. He contributed regularly to the local press, encouraged and helped found the Party of the National Call (ḥizb al-nidā’ al-qawmī). Later on, he worked closely with Kamāl Jumblāṭ to establish the Progressive Socialist Party (al-ḥizb al-taqaddumī al-ishtirākī) in the late 1940s. Between 1954 and 1955, al-‘Alāyīlī published the first four volumes of Al-Mu’jam al-Kabīr (The Great Dictionary), which he meant it to be a modern, revisionist approach to the study of Arab linguistics and Arab encyclopedic compilation. He was then commissioned to write Al-Mu’jam al-‘Askarī (The Military Dictionary), working over ten years to finish it. In 1978 he published his influential book Ayūn al-Khaṭaṭa (Where We Went Wrong?), which created a huge outcry and was subsequently banned because of the new bearings it had on Islamic theology. Al-‘Alāyīlī died in Beirut, December 1996. See Mahā Shahrūdī, “Ma‘ālim fī Ma‘ālīmat al-Shaykh ‘Abd Allāh al-‘Alāyīlī,” Al-‘Irāq (Damascus), Vol. 55, No. 4, 1996, pp. 167-172.
high school. His articles in the Syrian press gradually made him a prominent name in the literary and intellectual scene. Probably in the early 1940s, he turned to politics and tried to establish a nationalist political party. He contributed to a number of manifestos and communiqués entitled “Al-Ihyā’ al-‘Arabi (The Arab Revival),” a dry run for the Ba’th Party manifesto. In July 1942, he decided, with his friend al-Bītār, to resign his teaching post and dedicate his time to direct political action. ‘Aflaq was General Secretary of the Ba’th Party ever since it was officially established in April 1947. After the severe political crisis of the mid-1960s, and the subsequent split of the party into two factions, ‘Aflaq headed the party wing which took power in Iraq. He was converted to Islam but he kept it secret and asked his friends and comrades not to announce it till after his death. ‘Aflaq died in Baghdad, June 1989. See Dhūqān Qurqūṭ, Mishīl ‘Aflaq: Al-Kitābāt al-‘Ulā ma’a Dirāsah Jadīdah li-Sīrat Ḥayātī-hi (Beirut: Al-Mu’assasah al-‘Arabiyah lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Nashr, 1993).

38. ‘Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba’th, pp. 200-203, 208-211.
40. ‘Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba’th, pp. 156-158.
41. ‘Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba’th, p. 178. See also ‘Aflaq, Fī Sabīl al-Ba’th, pp. 76-77.

43. My brief review of Anṭūn Saʿādah’s ideas relied specifically on Anṭūn Saʿādah, Al-Āthār al-Kāmilah, Vol. 5; Vol. 9 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.); Al-Muhādārāt al-‘Ashr fī al-Nadwah al-Thaqāfīyah Sanat 1948 (n.p.: n.p., n.d.). Anṭūn Saʿādah was born in al-Shuwayr village of Mount Lebanon, March 1904. His Roman Orthodox father, Khalīl Saʿādah, was well known for his progressive views. Having received his elementary education in the village school, Anṭūn Saʿādah immigrated to Brazil in 1919 to join his father. He pursued his studies there and helped his father issue and edit Al-Jarīdah (The Paper) and then Al-Majallah (The Magazine). Both father and son joined the Masonic Order, the Temple of Syria’s Star, shortly afterwards. Saʿādah’s preoccupation with public affairs led him to establish the Syrian National Association (al-rābiṭah al-waṭanīyah al-sūrīyah) and the Party of Free Syrians (ḥizb al-ahrār al-sūrīyin) in Brazil. After more than ten years abroad, Anṭūn Saʿādah decided to go back home. He worked in journalism and taught Near East cultural history at the American University of Beirut. In October 1932, he resigned his teaching post and decided to dedicate his time to party politics, having established the hard core of the Syrian National Social Party,
following three years of active secret operation. Mounting campaigns against the party and against Saʿādah himself, who was frequently arrested, led Saʿādah to immigrate again. He left for Argentina in the summer of 1938 and never returned to Lebanon until March 1947. Two years on the party was officially banned and Saʿādah was arrested and charged with sedition, inciting rebellion, and plotting to stage a coup d’état against the state. He was convicted, sentenced to death, and was actually shot on July 8, 1949. See Jibrān Jarjū, Anṭūn Saʿādah mundhu al-Wilādah hattā al-Taʿṣīs (1904-1932) (Beirut: Muʿassasat Fikr lil-Aḥbāth wa-al-Nashr, 1982); Rūlān Sayf, Anṭūn Saʿādah Zaʾīm lil-Mustaṣqībal (n.p.: n.p., 1999).


45. Naṣār, Taṣawwurāt al-Ummah al-Muʿāṣirah, pp. 280-279. Zākī Najīb al-Arsūzī was born in June 1900, most probably in Latakia, where his father worked as a lawyer. He moved with his parents to Antakia and joined both the local religious school, kuttāb, and state elementary schools. He continued his secondary school education in Konya, learning Turkish and French. After his graduation, he was appointed a teacher at the Antakia tajhīz. He also worked as an administrative officer of the Arsūz area, and an official in the education department. In 1927, he left for Paris on a three-year grant to study philosophy at the Sorbonne University. In France he was highly influenced by a number of philosophers and thinkers, including Emile Brēhier, the translator and famous commentator of Plato, and Henri Bergson, known for his severe critique of the “tyrannical” materialism dominating Western civilization. He was also influenced by the idealist German philosophers, and greatly admired Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Khalduʿn. After his return home, he was appointed a teacher of history and geography at the Antakia tajhīz, where his nationalist views became prominent. Between 1930 and 1934, he taught at the secondary schools of Aleppo and Deir al-Zur, but the French mandate authorities suspended and sacked him. He returned to Arsūz and played a major role in the struggle against the annexation of the Alexandretta Province to Turkey, always working under the banner of Arabism and within the ideological parameters of the League of National Action. In 1940 he was forced to leave the province and move to Iraq, where he taught philosophy in Baghdad. Here too, however, he was suspended and fired and had to return to Damascus in less than a year. He taught in Hamah (1945-1948) and Aleppo (1948-1952) secondary schools, and was eventually appointed an instructor in the Institute of Elementary School Teachers in Damascus, a job he held until his retirement in 1958. It is believed that, following the break of the League of National Action, al-Arsūzī formed a
nationalist political grouping, the Arabism Club (nādī al-ʻurūbah), to which he attached a library he called “the Arab Baʾth”; hence the claim, by many of his biographers, that al-Arsūẓī was the first to use the term “baʾth.” It is also believed that since the beginning of the Second World War, al-Arsūẓī played a prominent role in founding and organizing the Arab Baʾth Movement, which gave birth to the Arab Baʾth Party. Al-Arsūẓī died in Damascus, early July 1968, after a long illness. See Zakī al-Arsūẓī, Al-Muʿallaṣāt al-Kāmilah, Vol. 1 (Damascus, al-Idārah al-Siyāṣīyah lil-Jaysh wa-al-Qūwāt al-Musallahāh, 1972), pp. 5-24; Al-Maʿrifah (Damascus), No. 113, Jul. 1971.


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