The Developing Economies, XLI-2 (June 2003): 243–63

THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN THAILAND: THE RISE OF THE URBAN INTELLECTUAL ELITE AND THEIR SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

TSURUYO FUNATSU
KAZUHIRO KAGOYA

This paper, based on an analysis of quantitative survey data, reexamines the stereotype of the Thai "middle class" as a homogeneous elite class at loggerheads with the lower strata. Our results support the contention that the Thai middle classes are, in fact, of mixed social origins, and suggest that their process of emergence is characterized by the fact that a large number have risen from the lower urban strata. We argue that because of these characteristics, the social consciousness of the Thai middle classes is more complex than the stereotyped explanation, and contains elements that cannot be fully explained by a perspective based on class theory.

INTRODUCTION

THIS paper examines the process of emergence of the middle classes[1] in Thailand and their social consciousness, and focuses on how these reflect salient features of the country's developmental process. In political and social analyses of Thailand in the 1990s, the urban "middle class" (or *chonchan klaang* in Thai) has been identified as an affluent class consisting of homogeneous urban-based elites, as distinct from farmers and other people on the lower rungs of society's ladder (Funatsu 2000). This is a class which, though small in size, wields strong political clout. It has been considered one of the most influential actors in political developments in Thailand in recent years, and in particular, it has played an important role in the processes of democratization and political reforms that followed the "Bloody May Massacre of 1992" (Ockey 1999; Girling 1996). As such, it can be included as one of the most politicized of the middle classes, discussion of which makes up the theme of the present special issue. Political discourse based on

[1] In this special issue, the term "middle class" and its plural form, "middle classes," are deliberately used with a clear distinction in meaning. The former is used when the social stratum in question is reminiscent of the existing middle class in Western society, while the latter is employed to connote the distinctive complex or compound social classes that are emerging in Asian countries.

this solid image of a middle class has exerted a strong influence on the actual course of Thai political development. It has been pointed out, for instance, that the protagonists of political reforms in the 1990s often applied pressure on Parliament evoking the "public opinion" of the "middle class." Moreover, when the 1997 Constitution was established (a development that was stimulated by the political reforms of the 1990s and made possible by the crisis atmosphere that prevailed in the wake of the currency crisis of 1997), the advocates of reform arranged for the new Constitution to incorporate political ideals designed to appeal to the "middle class." These included stipulations concerning the need for procedural transparency and minimum educational requirements regarding eligibility for election (Tamada 2001, pp. 125–26).

The first aim of this paper is to show that this solid image of a middle class with a common political orientation, emphasized in studies of Thailand, is a political discourse reflecting the country's uneven development, demonstrated in particular by a strong concentration of social and economic resources in the capital city. It is important to point out, however, that the discourse on the Thai "middle class," while ostensibly based on the broadly-defined Western definition, has focused to a large extent on one narrow segment of the Thai middle classes, namely, the intellectuals. Thus, it must be borne in mind that although having made an impact on actual politics in Thailand, a discourse on the "middle class" as defined in these narrow terms is not necessarily the same as an empirical study dealing with the Thai middle classes as a whole. In fact, it is very rare for studies of the Thai "middle class" to deal with the entire spectrum of the middle classes present within the country.[2]

The second aim of the paper is to clarify, with the use of quantitative survey data from the 1990s, the process of social mobility of the middle classes in Thailand and the structural characteristics that followed from their attainment of status. Our analysis reveals that the process of the emergence of the middle classes was characterized by a combination of a rather limited upward social mobility from the farm sector together with a peculiar pattern of "intermingling" among different social strata in the cities, which permitted intensive upward social mobility from the lower rungs of city dwellers. This pattern of mobility reflects the fact that Thailand experienced a type of rural-to-urban migration different from that in other countries/regions of East Asia (such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan), while undergoing a seemingly similar compressed process of economic development (see the paper by Hattori and Funatsu in this special issue). These factors have produced a marked effect on the social consciousness of the Thai middle classes.

[2] As far as we are aware, ours is the first quantitative analysis of the stratification structure of Thailand in the 1990s based on the data prepared by using a standard sampling method. Analyses of class consciousness, such as those by Prudhisan and Chantana (1999, 2001), are also based on empirical data, but these studies are inadequate for clarifying the stratification structure because the sampling methods they use are not sufficiently random.

Furthermore, data on the middle classes in the capital show that, while the process of upward mobility (intergenerational occupational change) is open to flexible "intermingling" among people of different class origins, once they reach a certain class destination by attaining present occupations that define them as members of the middle classes, inter-class differences based on educational credentials solidify and become very pronounced. This juxtaposition of the very fluid process of mobility on the one hand, and the very solid inter-class differentials at the point of status achievement and thereafter on the other, is worthy of special mention as a defining feature of the stratification structure produced by Thailand's rapid and compressed economic development and the unusually strong concentration of opportunities for upward social mobility in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area.

In presenting these findings, this paper, building upon the development of the controversy over the Thai middle classes as it has evolved thus far, divides the empirical category of the middle classes into an (elite) upper white-collar stratum and lower middle strata, and discusses the characteristics of the Thai middle classes, conceptualized as encompassing these two broad categories.[3] In carrying out our empirical analysis, we define the upper white-collar stratum as consisting of an upper white-collar class (the new middle class), who are employed in professional-technical jobs, administrative-managerial jobs, and nonroutine clerical jobs, and the lower middle strata as consisting of the old middle class (proprietors), and routine nonmanual employees, including routine clerical, sales, and service workers.

I. CONTROVERSY CONCERNING THE THAI "MIDDLE CLASS"

A. *Discussion of the Emergence of the Thai "Middle Class" and Its Political Nature*

In Thai studies, the "middle class" has been discussed in connection with frequent changes in the development of democratization. After the short period of democratization between October 1973 and October 1976, in particular, the newly emerged middle classes which had forged a new sense of horizontal solidarity, began to attract a great deal of attention as a new political force distinct from the preexisting ones, such as bureaucrats, merchants, and farmers, who lacked a sense of unity among themselves (Juree 1979). This newly emerged class consisted of people who belonged to the urban upper-middle income bracket (such as hotel managers, proprietors of construction businesses, independent craftsmen, professionals, and administrative officials) whose numbers increased in the period between 1958, when

[3] The usage of these expressions is in accord with the policy stated in the "Introduction" to this special issue. Moreover, these expressions are by no means peculiar to this paper alone, as they are employed by researchers of Thai studies such as Girling (1981) and Prudhisan and Chantana (2001) and by other studies on the Asian middle classes (Hsiao 1999).

the national development scheme was launched, and the 1970s. It was pointed out that these people, who had supported the Student Revolution of 1973, soon changed their minds: they found the mayhem brought about by the impetuous political change unacceptable, and tacitly expected that the military would regain control, restoring political stability and protecting their economic interests (Anderson 1977). At the same time, however, it was also suggested that it would be better to characterize the newly emerged "middle class" of the 1970s not as a coherent class, but rather as "middle strata" displaying a diversity of class characteristics, and with no well-defined political orientation (Girling 1981, pp. 144–47, 177–78).

However, the tone of discussions about the "middle strata" emphasizing their diversity and instability changed suddenly after the "Bloody May Massacre of 1992," which set in motion the wave of democratization of the 1990s. In fact, the emphasis of the discourse on the "middle strata" including the old middle class receded in the 1990s and the elite "middle class" began to attract attention.

More specifically, the change in the discourse about the "middle class" was touched off by the findings of a survey undertaken by the Social Science Association of Thailand on the demonstrators immediately before the massacre. The report asserted in its analysis of the class composition of the demonstrators that approximately 60 per cent of them could be identified as the new middle class, namely, professionals and highly paid employees of private firms. The report led some newspapers and other mass media to begin calling the political upheaval a "middle class revolt." It also prompted those Thai researchers who frequently referred to this analysis to concoct an image of a new "middle class," whom they called a "mob with cellular phones," a class consisting of people who not only enjoyed affluent lifestyles but who were also ready to take part in politics; the same researchers began to give these people a place in studies of Thai politics and society (Anek 1993).

Subsequently, Thai intellectuals began to turn their attention to professionals, technical experts, administrators, and managers employed by private firms or state-run corporations on the strength of their bargaining powers or professional expertise in the market (Voravidh 1993, p. 125). Thai scholars began to consider these as new elite categories capable of replacing bureaucrats and other old elites. The question of whether this new class could prove to be a genuine agent of democratization became a focus of political analysis during the 1990s (Nithi 1993, pp. 52, 63; Hewison 1996; Ockey 1999).

B. *The Rise of the Elite "Middle Class" and Skewed Development Centered on Bangkok*

An affluent urban "middle class" came to the foreground during the 1990s in the context of two imbalances that had characterized Thailand's economic development for decades. First, ever since 1982, when the Thai economy began to change from

one based on agriculture to one led by manufacturing, a significant change occurred in economic structure. The change, however, was mainly to do with value-added growth. When looked at in terms of occupational structure, the agricultural population continued to account for as much as 47 per cent of the civilian labor force until 1990. This unevenness between the economic and occupational structures aggravated another imbalance, namely, the wide gap in development between the capital city and the rural areas. In Bangkok, which accounts for only 10 per cent of the total population of Thailand (the city contains 57.6 per cent of the urban population however), a growing concentration of industrial investment, and educational and employment opportunities was discernible after the 1960s (Suehiro 1989). This trend toward the concentration of economic and social resources in Bangkok gained momentum during the period of rapid growth from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s,[4] with metropolitan Bangkok's gross regional product rising from 31.1 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 51.5 per cent in 1994. Furthermore, 30 per cent of the "middle-class" jobs with rising incomes (professional and technical jobs, administrative and managerial jobs, and nonroutine clerical jobs) were concentrated in Bangkok (Table I). The result was that the income gap between the urban elites and the rural farmers grew wider during the period of rapid economic growth (Table II).

The absence of rapid rural depopulation in Thailand, despite the widening income disparity between the capital and rural areas, can be attributed to the segmented character of the Thai labor market. In this type of labor market, the labor force has been segmented into two sectors by the level of education, one consisting of workers with sufficient educational qualifications and with long-term employment, and the other consisting of those without such qualifications, who were employed on a short-term basis (Chalornphob 1992, pp. 53–62). The dual structure of the labor market is closely related to the regional disparity in two main ways. First, rural residents, who mostly have not had schooling beyond the elementary level,[5] have found it difficult to settle in the cities with long-term secure jobs, even when they have migrated there on a seasonal or even on a yearly basis. Second, many of the migrant workers from rural areas, upon expiration of their short-term employment contracts in the city, have gone back to farming or day labor in rural areas which, though suffering from low productivity, have been receptive to them.[6] It follows that

[4] Thailand registered real GDP growth rates of 13.3 per cent and 12.2 per cent in 1988 and 1989, respectively, followed by an annual average of 7.6 per cent in the seven-year period from 1990 to 1997.

[5] Thailand's gross enrollment ratio of the secondary education stood at 39.6 per cent in 1990—the lowest in Asia. This is because the relatively high gross enrollment ratio in the cities (77 per cent in Bangkok) was more than offset by the extremely low rate in the rural areas where more than a half of the population is concentrated. For further details on the inequality of educational opportunities in the cities and the rural area, see Funatsu (2003).

[6] One important background to this situation was that until around 1980, Thailand's agriculture maintained a high capability to feed a large number of the workforce.

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE SHARES OF EMPLOYED PERSONS BY OCCUPATION IN THAILAND AND CONCENTRATION RATIO TO BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AREA (BMA)

	(1) Professional and Technical	(2) Managerial and Administrative	(3) Clerical	(4) Sales	(5) Services	(6) Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries	(7) Transportation and Communication	(8) Manufacturing	(9) Miscellaneous	% Total [No. of Persons Employed: 1,000 Persons]	Ratio of the New Middle Class Jobs in BMA[a] (%)
1960	1.3	0.2	1.1	5.3	2.0	82.5	1.1	5.9	0.7	100	15.0
	(14.5)	(39.0)	(35.4)	(16.6)	(28.5)	(0.8)	(19.9)	(19.6)	(26.9)	[13,772]	
1970	1.7	1.5	1.1	5.0	2.8	79.6	1.4	6.7	0.2	100	22.5
	(17.1)	(27.7)	(35.9)	(16.9)	(13.5)	(0.2)	(17.7)	(22.8)	(55.6)	[16,652]	
1980	4.4	3.1	2.7	12.6	4.6	48.0	2.9	21.5	0.2	100	26.4
	(24.3)	(35.0)	(50.7)	(22.8)	(36.2)	(1.2)	(21.6)	(18.2)	(51.2)	[14,562]	
1990	6.4	2.8	3.8	12.3	4.2	47.8[b]	3.0	19.6	0.2	100	33.4
	(21.6)	(27.9)	(25.5)	(27.0)	(23.6)		(28.3)	(33.1)	(29.3)	[21,519]	
1995	5.1	2.9	4.1	13.2	5.2	40.9	4.6	24.0	0	100	30.3
	(25.0)	(38.5)	(33.9)	(16.6)	(24.2)	(0.1)	(26.4)	(16.2)	(85.7)	[29,118]	
2000	6.6	3.1	3.9	14.9	5.5	40.0	4.0	21.9	0.0	100	33.7
	(32.6)	(34.6)	(32.3)	(18.4)	(29.8)	(0.3)	(28.5)	(14.4)	(96.7)	[32,994]	

Sources: The figures for 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 are based on the National Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Census*, various issues. The figures for 1995 and 2000 are based on the National Statistical Office, *Labor Force Survey*, various issues (Round I).

Note: Figures in parentheses represent BMA's percentage shares in the occupations concerned. The year 1980, when the definition of BMA was revised and broadened, saw sharp increases in the rates of concentration in the metropolis.

[a] The ratio represents the number of persons employed in the new-middle-class-like occupations (referring to the columns 1, 2, and 3 in this table) in metropolitan Bangkok, divided by the total number of persons employed in the metropolis (Funatsu and Kagoya 2002, p. 203).

[b] The percentage figure for 1990 is not shown here because it is inconsistent with the corresponding figures for other years and is thus deemed unreliable.

the farming population in the rural areas did not benefit fully from urban prosperity. Meanwhile, the incomes of the urban middle classes reached levels far in excess of those of farmers and ordinary workers (Suganya and Somchai 1988, pp. 35–49), a disparity that has paved the way for a discussion about an elite "middle class," which was assumed to form a solid and clearly identifiable social class.

The interest shown in the elite "middle class" at the time was also bound up with inquiries into its political orientation. Such analyses portrayed the Thai "middle class" as being far less quantitatively significant than elsewhere in East Asia, and as being a politically monolithic entity. They emphasized that this class, while enthusiastic in promoting democracy (as shown by its role in the political change of 1992) had conflicts of interest with the farmers. It was asserted, for example, that when it came to issues of fiscal allocation, the elite "middle class" believed that "allocating budgets to the rural areas would do no good to Thailand on its way to industrialization." On the question of elections, the "middle class" was allegedly willing to deny

TABLE II

CHANGES IN NOMINAL MONTHLY SALARIES BY OCCUPATION, 1986–2000

(Baht; Bangkok in parentheses)

	1981[a]		1986	1988	1990	1994	2000	Ratio of Monthly Salary to National Average	
								1986	2000
National average			3,631	4,106	5,625	8,262	12,150		
Professional and technical							31,366		2.6
(Own account)	4,954	(9,451)	6,407	26,707	—[b]	41,780	—	1.8	—
(Employees)	6,629	(10,906)	8,500	9,649	15,132	21,368	—	2.3	—
Proprietors	7,721	(7,682)	5,367[c]	5,773[c]	8,453	12,175	17,039		1.4
Employees in clerical, sales, and service jobs	4,228	(5,737)	5,521	5,830	8,048	11,608	14,678	1.5	1.2
Manufacturing workers	3,531	(4,489)	3,989	4,202	5,375	6,890	10,500	1.1	0.9
Miscellaneous workers	2,506	(3,070)	1,989	2,050	2,521	4,410	6,869	0.5	0.6
Agriculture									
(Own account)	2,561		2,449	2,825	3,684	4,836	7,014	0.7	0.6
(Agricultural laborers)	1,700		1,827	2,011	2,428	3,575	4,796	0.5	0.4

Sources: National Statistical Office, *Report of the Household Socio-Economic Survey*, various issues.

[a] Since the data for 1981 are available only on an area-by-area basis, the average monthly incomes of non-agricultural occupations and agricultural occupations shown here are those in the urban area (with the figures for Bangkok shown in parentheses) and the rural area, respectively.

[b] The figure for the self-employed professional and technical jobs in 1990 is not shown here because it is inconsistent with the corresponding figures for other years and is thus deemed unreliable.

[c] It is not known why the 1986 and 1988 figures for proprietors decreased or remained low while those for other occupations were on the increase.

the farmers the chance to exercise their political rights on the grounds that "if Thailand was limited to Bangkok, undesirable politicians from the rural areas would not have been sent to Parliament" (Sungsidh and Pasuk 1993a, pp. 108–9). In other words, a perspective based on class theory was propounded. Proponents of this view argued that throughout the 1990s, the "middle class," as the major beneficiary of the fruits of urban-centered development, both manifested and championed a form of political consciousness advantageous to its own class interest. This perspective also found its way into debates in the real political world over the need for political and social reforms. On the one hand, political reformers of the 1990s regarded the "middle class" as a friendly force outside Parliament, which would help raise "public

opinion" in favor of reforms. On the other, intellectuals concerned about the lopsided distribution of the fruits of economic development, a situation that remained disadvantageous for farmers and people of the lower strata, sharply criticized the "middle class" for its failure to believe in the principle of equality, the basis for democratization (Nithi 1993, pp. 52, 64), and for its indifference to the wide wealth gap between the rich and poor (Girling 1996, pp. 47, 57).

C. *Flaws in Discussions concerning the Thai "Middle Class"*

Existing discussions on the Thai "middle class," with their emphasis on the urban elites as a coherent class, leave much to be desired from an empirical point of view because the characteristics of the class they describe are not readily identifiable from a systematic analysis of social stratification.

One drawback of the existing discussions is that they have formulated a uniform image of the "middle class," on the basis of a static data set, observed at a particular point in time, about wide wealth gaps between Bangkok and the rural areas. To be sure, in a comparative sense the Thai middle classes are much smaller in size than those of other East Asian countries (see the paper by Hattori and Funatsu in this special issue). Nonetheless, however, the number of the middle-class job holders within Thailand has increased steeply over several decades, so much so that the "middle class" is rapidly losing its character as a simple monolithic class. For example, between 1960 and 1995, when industrialization got under way, the number of people holding new middle class jobs (i.e., professional and technical, administrative and managerial, and nonroutine clerical jobs) increased from 2.6 per cent of the civilian labor force to 12.1 per cent; and in metropolitan Bangkok alone, the number of such people increased by a factor of 12.2.[7] But existing studies have failed to answer the basic question of from what social strata and through what channels of occupational mobility the growing middle strata were recruited.

Another drawback is that although existing studies seem to imply that the structural gap between the capital and the rural areas manifests itself directly as an actual inter-class political conflict, it is in fact questionable whether this assertion faithfully reflects the actual social consciousness of the various classes. In particular, the political discourse that assigns to the "middle class" the role of a subject, or a reformer, who should solve problems caused by national development policy, is but a pseudo analysis dictated by normative views about what roles the "middle class" ought to perform. The discourse, moreover, overlooks the fact that the "middle

[7] The rates of increase in the number of workforce in other occupations in Bangkok during the same period were much lower: sales, 5.20 times; services, 4.89 times; and production jobs, 7.17 times. It should be pointed out, furthermore, that according to the *Labor Force Survey* (1995: Round 1), the number of employed population in new middle class jobs accounts for 30.3 per cent, and if those employed in old middle class jobs are included, the number reaches 38 per cent of the total employed population in Bangkok Metropolitan Area.

class" has itself been a beneficiary (and thus an object) of a Bangkok-centered development process. In other words, existing studies have failed to provide a sound foundation for advancing a hypothesis concerning the coherence of these strata as a solid class sharing a common social consciousness.

Taking into account the above features of existing studies, in what follows we would like to limit our analysis to the process of emergence of the Thai middle classes. Specifically, we intend first to analyze the mobility patterns of the middle classes in the context of the Thai structure of stratification, and to examine whether or not the homogeneity hypothesis is well founded. We will then proceed to analyze the salient features of the social and political consciousness of each segment of the middle classes.

II. THE PROCESS OF EMERGENCE OF THE THAI MIDDLE CLASSES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

This section analyzes the structure of stratification in Bangkok, making use of the findings of a social survey conducted by the Institute of Developing Economies in 1994 (hereafter the "1994 survey").[8] Compared with the terminologies used in earlier discussions of the Thai "middle class," the concept of the elite middle class corresponds to the upper white-collar stratum, while the lower middle strata consist of firstly the old middle class (small proprietors of nonmanual or manual work), and secondly the routine nonmanual employees (Table III). In geographical terms, the analysis focuses primarily on metropolitan Bangkok, which is also the focus of most discussions of the Thai "middle class." In addition, we will occasionally refer to data about the farmers of the Northeastern and Northern regions, Thailand's traditionally poor regions, so as to highlight the features of the social classes in Bangkok.

A. *The Features and Mobility Pattern of the Middle Classes*

Table III compares the social and economic attributes of various social strata in Bangkok and those of farmers in Northeastern and Northern Thailand.[9] By comparing the urban middle classes with manual workers and farmers on the basis of this

[8] In this 1994 survey conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Developing Economies (by Hideo Okamoto, professor at Sophia University in Japan, and Tsuruyo Funatsu), 1,043 responses were obtained in Bangkok Metropolitan Area, 1,034 in local cities, and 1,053 in the rural areas. As explained in Funatsu (1995, 1997), who details the survey's procedure and other notices for use, the sampling was taken separately for Bangkok, local cities, and the rural areas, because the accuracy of ledgers differs significantly among these areas. It should also be pointed out that since the survey was designed to analyze environmental consciousness, the occupational prestige scores necessary for some analysis were not collected. As a result, we have to identify status by nominal occupational categories and other means, which causes inconveniences for our analysis of mobility patterns.

[9] The 1994 survey's data set reveals a significant regional gap between farmers in the Bangkok region

TABLE III

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF VARIOUS STRATA (MEAN FIGURES)

Stratum	No. of People	Birthplace		Father's Years of Schooling	Respondent's Years of Schooling	Percentage of University (or Junior College) Graduates	Monthly Personal Income	Monthly Household Income
		BMA (%)	Urban Area (%)	(Years)	(Years)		(Baht)	(Baht)
Bangkok Metropolitan Area (BMA):								
Upper white-collar	130	60.9	15.6	6.6	14.2	58.5 (21.5)	20,460	39,573
Old middle class:								
(Nonmanual)	90	66.3	6.7	3.1	7.4	9.0 (6.7)	10,940	21,705
(Manual)	37	64.9	10.8	4.2	8.2	10.8 (16.2)	10,288	27,694
Routine nonmanual employees	214	64.2	13.2	5.5	10.6	19.2 (22.9)	7,546	18,689
Working class	205	45.4	14.6	3.6	6.7	1.0 (2.5)	5,715	15,128
Farmers	11	90.9	9.1	3.2	5.5	0 (0)	10,020	14,444
Rural areas in Northeastern and Northern regions:								
Farmers	348	—	4.3	2.8	4.4	— —	1,931	3,704

Source: The 1994 survey.

Note: Out of 1,043 respondents in the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, those who were employed (687) were taken up for the analysis in this table. Area definition of Bangkok Metropolitan Area and the rural areas are the same as those in government statistics.

table, we will pursue the first objective of our analysis, namely, whether or not the hypothesis that the status of the middle classes are homogeneous can be empirically validated.

One index that differs sharply as between the middle classes and manual workers is birthplace. More than 60 per cent of those belonging to the middle classes are from metropolitan Bangkok, with the proportion from urban areas reaching close to 70 per cent if those from local cities are included. There is no denying that the Thai middle classes are very much urban based. We next conducted multiple comparisons of analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the mean years of schooling (of the respondent) and mean incomes (of the respondent and of the household) in order to examine the status differences of various urban strata. It was empirically confirmed that people in the upper white-collar stratum hold a significantly distinct social status among the middle classes, leading others, including the lower middle strata, both in terms of years of schooling and income ($p < 0.01$). However, the status of the old middle class (nonmanual) and that of the routine nonmanual employees, both be-

and those in the Northeastern and Northern regions. The gap can probably be ascribable to the fact that a large percentage of farming households in the capital region have side jobs with higher income, and to the differences in the types of agriculture practiced in the areas. However, farmers in the environs of the capital city are referred to only sporadically in the following discussion, due to the small size of the samples.

longing to the lower middle strata, have some aspects that cannot be explained in terms of "homogeneity" or "distinctness." For example, even though the old middle class (nonmanual) and routine nonmanual employees earn significantly larger individual incomes than workers ($p < 0.05$), the difference between their household incomes and those of manual workers are insignificant. On the other hand, when compared in terms of the number of years of schooling, the difference between routine nonmanual employees and those of the old middle class (manual) is insignificant, although the difference between the former and the old middle class (nonmanual) is significant ($p < 0.01$). In other words, even though the lower middle strata, who are grouped together with the upper white-collar stratum as middle classes, have attained an economic status distinct from that of manual workers, their status is not yet so homogeneous as that of the upper white-collar stratum either in terms of household income levels or years of schooling.

Let us identify characteristics of the Thai middle classes by examining the patterns of mobility, which can serve as a means for measuring the degree of class coherence, or the degree of "class structuration" (Giddens 1973, chap. 6). If we examine intergenerational occupational mobility (if we look at the relationship between the attained status of the respondent and the class of origin as determined by the occupational status of his/her father), we find that as is the case elsewhere in East Asia, more than half of the people who make up the middle classes in Bangkok are first-generation middle classes who have climbed to that status from other lower strata (Hsiao 1999, pp. 4, 10–12) (Table IV). As a matter of fact, "intermingling" between individuals of different class origins is very extensive, so that nearly half of the elites of the upper white-collar stratum have fathers below middle class status, while the proportion is over 60 per cent in the case of the old middle class (nonmanual) or routine nonmanual employees. It should be pointed out, however, that the pattern of "intermingling" among different class origins of the Thai middle classes displays two salient features. First, even though the farm sector has long occupied the largest share of the workforce in Thailand, the percentages of the middle classes who moved upward from the farming population are relatively small, 21.6 per cent in the case of upper white-collar (31.6 per cent in the case of routine nonmanual employees), and 37.5 per cent of the old middle class.[10] Second, and in contrast, even though urban manual workers account for just a little over 20 per cent of the workforce in the country as a whole (as of 1995), relatively large percentages (30.8 per cent and 20.5 per cent, respectively) have moved upward from the rank of urban

[10] The pattern of emergence of the middle classes in Thai local cities is essentially similar as that in Bangkok, in the sense that in both cases many of them consist of those who have risen from the urban lower classes, even though the percentage of those who have moved upward from the farmer class (in the father's generation) is slightly higher in local cities than in the capital. Although it does not make much rigorous analytical sense to compare data for Bangkok with national data for other countries of East Asia, middle class individuals of farm origin in the Republic of Korea occupy a

TABLE IV

INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY (IN BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AREA)

(Actual numbers)

		Respondent's Stratum						
		Upper White-Collar	Old Middle Class		Routine Non-manual Employees	Working Class	Farmers	Total
			Non-manual	Manual				
Father's stratum	Upper white-collar	20 (32.8) [16.7]	2 (3.3) [2.6]	5 (8.2) [14.7]	24 (39.3) [12.2]	10 (16.4) [5.2]	0 (0) [0]	61 (100)
	Old middle class (employed in white-collar jobs, but not in manual jobs)	3 (23.1) [2.5]	— — —	— — —	5 (38.5) [2.6]	5 (38.5) [2.6]	0 (0) [0]	13 (100)
	Routine non-manual employees	34 (26.4) [28.3]	27 (20.9) [34.6]	14 (10.9) [41.2]	38 (29.5) [19.4]	16 (12.4) [8.3]	0 (0) [0]	129 (100)
	Working class (inclusive of proprietors and employees)	37 (21.3) [30.8]	16 (9.2) [20.5]	6 (3.4) [17.6]	67 (38.5) [34.2]	48 (27.6) [24.9]	0 (0) [0]	174 (100)
	Farmers	26 (10.2) [21.6]	33 (12.9) [42.3]	9 (24.3) [26.5]	62 (3.5) [31.6]	114 (44.7) [59.1]	11 (4.3) [100]	255 (100)
	Total	120 (19.0) [100]	78 (12.3) [100]	34 (5.4) [100]	196 (31.0) [100]	193 (30.5) [100]	11 (1.7) [100]	632 (100)

Source: The 1994 survey.

Note: Figures in parentheses represent percentages in the direction of the row; figures in brackets represent percentages in the direction of the column.

manual workers (in the father's status) to the upper white-collar stratum and the old middle class.[11] The latter trend is also confirmed by the fact that 72.4 per cent of

much higher percentage of middle class members than in Thailand: 47 per cent of the new middle class and a much larger 62 per cent of the old middle class (see Arita's paper in this special issue). The percentages for Bangkok are comparable to those of Taiwan, where the agricultural population is much less than in Thailand. According to Hsiao (1999, p. 13), the corresponding percentages for Taiwan are 14 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively. It should be pointed out that the category of the routine nonmanual employees in this paper on Thailand corresponds to the marginal middle class in Hsiao's (1999) class scheme for East Asia.

[11] In the Republic of Korea, people who have risen from the working class constitute 7.4 per cent and 3.7 per cent, respectively, of the members of new middle class and old middle class, while in Taiwan the corresponding percentages are 10.1 per cent and 15.3 per cent, respectively (see Arita's paper in this issue and also Hsiao 1999).

people of working class origin (in terms of the father's status) have moved upward to the middle classes (in the respondent's status). We can conclude from the foregoing observations that one salient feature of the emergence of the Thai middle classes is the fact that upward mobility is taking place largely within cities, with ample chances for the next generation of urban manual workers rising to the middle classes through a channel of mobility internal to cities.

At this juncture, a question arises regarding the explanation of an apparently contradictory juxtaposition. On the one hand, once the status of the middle classes is attained, a class boundary becomes clear and stable, especially in the case of the upper white-collar stratum, which enjoys a distinct status from those of the other strata. On the other hand, the pattern of intergenerational mobility shows a high degree of fluidity. The key to understanding the coexistence of these two characteristics of the Thai middle classes seems to lie in two features: first the compressed economic development that has brought about a rapid increase in middle class occupations; and second the effect of educational credentials on status achievement. Table V summarizes the results of a multiple regression analysis, using the variables that are assumed to relate to status attainment as the independent variables, the respondent's personal income (representing the economic achievement) as the dependent variable (this estimation is valid because the mean values between social strata are significantly different statistically). The analysis shows that the important variables determining an individual's income are the years of schooling and the age cohort (with the beta coefficients taking very high values of 0.41 and 0.37, respectively). Moreover, these results are not affected by the effects of the birthplace, as the differences between Model 1 and Model 2 are only negligible.

From the above findings, we can say in summary that the effects of educational

TABLE V

REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING THE AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2
Sex (male = 0)	−0.157***	−0.160***
Age of the individual concerned	0.370***	0.371***
Father's years of schooling	−0.073*	−0.074*
Individual's years of schooling	0.414***	0.424***
Birthplace (rural area = 0):		
Bangkok		−0.068
Urban area		0.001
R^2	0.222***	0.225***
ΔR^2		0.003

Source: Tabulated by the authors on the basis of data from the metropolitan area collected in the 1994 survey.

Note: *** = $p < 0.001$; * = $p < 0.05$.

TABLE VI

YEARS OF SCHOOLING BROKEN DOWN BY AGE GROUP

(Years)

	Under 30	30 to 44	45 and Older
Upper white-collar stratum	14.30	14.91	12.55
Old middle class:			
(Employed in white-collar jobs)	7.94	8.77	5.30
(Employed in manual jobs)	12.14	9.71	5.11
Routine nonmanual employees	12.12	9.98	8.42
Working class	7.91	5.66	4.71
Farmers (in the capital)	—	5.33	5.60

Source: Tabulated by the authors on the basis of data from the metropolitan area collected in the 1994 survey.

credentials on status attainment have consistently been so significant as to nullify the effects of individuals' birthplaces, even though the patterns of status attainment of each age cohort are changing under conditions of rapid economic development. The results in Table VI confirm the relationship between these two variables (educational credential and age cohort): the younger age cohort requires much higher educational qualifications than the older age cohort for attaining the status of belonging to the middle classes, reflecting the fact that the pattern of mobility has changed rapidly in the process of compressed economic development. With the exception of the upper white-collar stratum, whose members, regardless of age, have completed at least upper secondary education,[12] the average educational qualifications for the lower middle strata for people 45 years or older used to be elementary or lower secondary education. However, for the younger age cohort, the average years of schooling of the same lower middle strata have become longer, in keeping with the increasingly strong link between middle class status and educational credentials.

The strong effects of educational credentials for the urban middle classes can also be explained by wide urban-rural gaps in educational opportunities and the concentration of employment opportunities within the capital reflecting Thailand's geographically uneven development. The enormous gaps in access to education between cities and rural areas deprive a large number of poorly educated children of the farm sector of the chances to seek upward social mobility, and limit the intergenerational mobility needed to become a member of the urban middle classes. It

[12] Under the present system, it takes twelve years to complete upper secondary education. When we confirm the levels of education (nominal category) using cross tables, 60 per cent of the upper white-collar stratum aged 45 or older are graduates of junior colleges or four-year universities, while members of the routine nonmanual employees of the same age cohort who completed only elementary education (42.4 per cent) and lower secondary education (24.2 per cent) add up to close to 70 per cent.

can be pointed out, on the other hand, that within the cities, where from the mid-1970s onwards educational opportunities for secondary and higher education began to open up to children of urban lower class families, a pattern of fluid, intergenerational status change took shape. In other words, the strong effect of educational credentials on the stratification structure of Thailand, coupled with uneven access to education at the entry level, has produced a "status raising effect" that makes it possible for anyone who has gained educational credentials, regardless of class of origin, to seek economically affluent status, overcoming the disadvantages associated with their social origins.

B. *Political and Social Consciousness and the Middle Classes*

Let us next turn to the second objective of this paper, and analyze the salient features of the sociopolitical consciousness of the middle classes. Here again, the characteristics of those Thai middle classes that share education-based homogeneity, despite "intermingled" social backgrounds, are seen to have some effects on their consciousness. Due to space limitations, we will confine ourselves to analyzing the middle classes' attitude toward two particular issues: the seriousness to which their members view the gap between the rich and poor; and the extent to which they genuinely support procedures for electing political representatives through democratic elections.

(1) Awareness of the "Disparity between the Rich and Poor"

Awareness of the "disparity between the rich and poor" is a matter of central concern in the controversy over the Thai "middle class." The assertion that the urban "middle class" is indifferent to this urban-rural disparity is one of the bases for supporting the view that the urban middle classes form an opposition to poor farmers. The 1994 questionnaire survey included a question asking the respondents to choose, from among six choices, the "most serious social problem faced by Thai society." The various social strata in Bangkok identified the "excessive wealth gap" as the third most serious social problem, following the "deterioration of the environment" and the "spread of corruption" (Table VII). This contrasts starkly with the fact that farmers in Northeastern and Northern Thailand viewed the "disparity between the rich and poor" as the most serious problem. This wide difference in opinions supports the idea that disparities are perceived differently in the cities and in the countryside. One might suppose that if the urban middle classes are indeed less sensitive to the disparity than other urban classes, the ratio seeing this problem as the most serious must have been smaller than that of the working class. In reality, however, it is only with regard to "spread of corruption," among the top three problems, that the middle class perceptions significantly differed from those of any other class ($p < 0.05$). In fact, the only variable which showed statistically significant differences in perceptions of the "excessive wealth gap" was age ($p < 0.05$).

Table VIII compares perceptions of the "excessive wealth gap" by people with different educational status, using the variables concerning "intermingling" of social backgrounds (namely, age group and birthplace), as control variables. It is evident from the table that in the case of university graduates (60 per cent of those be-

TABLE VII

THREE MOST SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY PEOPLE OF VARIOUS STRATA AND PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE CHOOSING EACH ITEM

(%)

Class/Stratum	Deterioration of the Environment	Spread of Corruption	Excessive Wealth Gap
Bangkok:			
Upper white-collar stratum	62.8	65.1	34.9
Old middle class:			
(Employed in white-collar jobs)	65.6	52.2	25.6
(Employed in manual jobs)	59.5	48.6	35.1
Routine nonmanual employees	61.2	55.6	32.2
Working class	63.4	45.9	29.3
Farmers (in the capital)	63.6	72.2	27.3
Rural areas:			
Farmers in Northeastern and Northern regions	45.1	41.1	52.3

Source: Tabulated by the authors on the basis of data of the metropolitan area collected in the 1994 survey.

Notes: 1. The other choices for serious social problems include: "things go well only for people from good families," "people are losing religious faith," and "people are becoming less respectful of elders."
2. The shaded column shows that the differences in the percentages of respondents' answers are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.

TABLE VIII

PERCENTAGES OF PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL STATUS WHO IDENTIFY "EXCESSIVE WEALTH GAP" AS ONE OF THE THREE MAJOR SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS

(%)

Educational Credentials	Broken Down by Birthplace			Broken Down by Age Group	
	Bangkok	Local Cities	Rural Areas	Under 30	30 and Older
No educational credentials/ elementary education	28.1	28.6	41.1	27.5	34.5
Secondary education	27.1	14.3	32.8	25.0	30.8
Junior college	21.4	23.8	33.3	18.2	32.8
University or above	35.7	37.9	35.7	36.9	34.7

Source: Tabulated by the authors on the basis of data from the metropolitan area collected in the 1994 survey.

Note: The shaded column shows that the differences in the percentages of respondents' answers are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.

longing to the upper white-collar stratum, as against 30 per cent in the routine nonmanual employees), people are considerably sensitive to the issue of income disparity, regardless of their age group and birthplace. This confirms the strong homogenizing effect of educational credentials. In contrast, in the case of junior college graduates (30 per cent of whom belong to the upper white-collar stratum, and 60 per cent to the routine nonmanual employees), perceptions of income disparity vary with age.

The foregoing results suggest that the homogenizing effect of educational credentials has had a limited impact on the social consciousness of the middle classes, and that the attitude of the middle classes toward specific social issues such as the "disparity between the rich and poor" is by no means monolithic.

(2) Middle Classes Attitudes toward Democratic Procedures

Next, we will examine the degree to which the middle classes are conscious of the importance of democratic procedures. This is an issue of political importance for Thailand, which until 1992 experienced a series of coups d'état that resulted in the appointment of new governments under pressure from the military. In the controversy concerning the Thai "middle class," it is usually argued that the urban "middle class" is generally in favor of "democratization," but is skeptical about the quality of votes cast by farmers (who are a numerical majority), and thus abhors the prospect of politicians elected from the rural areas holding a majority in Parliament (Anek 1995). As a matter of fact, the 1994 survey shows that when asked whether one agrees or disagrees with the statement that "the government should be established through elections only," the percentage of the elite upper white-collar stratum who answered in the affirmative was smaller than the percentages of those of other urban classes, thus confirming the elite's tendency to be skeptical about the importance of holding elections ($p < 0.05$). However, if the answers to the same question are reexamined to compare perceptions by the level of education (controlled by age group and birthplace which affect mobility patterns of the middle classes), it becomes clear that among university graduates (a majority of whom belong to the upper white-collar stratum), those from local cities or from rural areas tend to be more skeptical about elections than those from the capital (Table IX). It can be surmised, therefore, that the reality is not that the middle classes in Bangkok, because of their urban-centered view, are opposed to farmers' political participation. Rather, a segment of highly educated people, who are well versed in the working of politics in the rural areas, are reluctant to give unrestrained support to elections as democratic procedures. It should also be noted that among the different age groups, those 30 years in age or older show statistically significant differences in perceptions about this issue, depending on differences in educational background. However, a more detailed and rigorous analysis will be needed to verify this tendency.

TABLE IX

PERCENTAGES OF PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT EDUCATIONAL STATUS WHO AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT "THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ELECTED ONLY BY POPULAR VOTE"

(%)

	Bangkok		Broken Down by Birthplace		
	Under 30	30 and Older	Bangkok	Local Cities	Rural Areas
No educational credentials/ elementary education	88.5	91.3	88.7	88.7	94.2
Secondary education	90.6	87.2	89.2	90.0	88.1
Junior college	81.8	83.1	83.0	80.0	80.8
University or above	86.3	75.0	82.6	75.0	74.1

Source: Tabulated by the authors on the basis of data from the metropolitan area collected in the 1994 survey.
Note: The shaded columns show that the differences in the percentages of respondents' answers are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.

Our findings reveal that while the homogenizing effect of educational credentials has a significant influence on the political and social perceptions of highly educated people, their perceptions continue to be influenced to some extent by age groups and birthplaces, which reflect the "intermingling" process of the middle classes emergence. This suggests that a class theory–based approach, that assumes the political homogeneity of the middle classes on the basis of just a few economic indices and disparities, is of limited viability. In order to properly analyze social consciousness, it is essential to take into account more complex characteristics of the middle classes.

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE THAI MIDDLE CLASSES AND POLITICS FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1997 CONSTITUTION

In this paper, we have focused our attention on the process of emergence of the Thai middle classes, identifying the patterns of social mobility and looking into the effects of the classes' characteristics on their perceptions. Contrary to the conventional view, which regards the Thai "middle class" as consisting of urban-based homogeneous elites, our analysis has established the following two points: first, the process of the emergence of the middle classes has been characterized by "intermingling" among different social backgrounds but with similar educational credentials, and by the existence of channels for upward mobility internal to cities; second, under the strong effect of educational credentials, the middle classes have attained an economically distinct status, and are separated from other strata by very stable boundary lines. Furthermore, we have postulated a hypothesis that the above fea-

tures of the middle classes are closely related to the rapid, compressed, and Bangkok-centered pattern of Thailand's economic development.

By way of a conclusion, we would like to point out how our analysis, which attempts to capture the real image and attitudes of the Thai middle classes, can be employed as a means for understanding the political changes that have taken place in Thailand since 1997.

As we pointed out in the first half of this paper, within the political reform movement since the political change of 1992, the "middle class" has been regarded as an extra-parliamentary force that is critical of the established system. Moreover, this discourse about the "middle class" has itself become a factor to be reckoned with because of its influence on actual political and social developments. Subsequently, almost concurrently with the establishment of the 1997 Constitution, some segments of the middle classes (in particular, intellectuals) began to produce political leaders. Although limited in number, they paved the way for the advancement of the middle classes into the political arena, as they were appointed as members of committees or members of the Upper and Lower Houses, and became involved in the formation of policies and legislation processes.[13] Given the fact that some members of the middle classes have taken part in the newly established political system, and are trying to exercise their influence as political actors in a more direct manner, it will become all the more important from now on to analyze the political roles of the middle classes and these leaders.

In reality, however, the "middle class" after accomplishing its common purpose of establishing the new Constitution of 1997, which is said to reflect its ideas of "political reform," has up to now been without common ideals. Despite being in a position to play the leadership role in carrying out various policies or formulating complex plans in the wake of implementing the newly established political system under the Constitution, this class nowadays lacks a well-defined political orientation comparable to the former slogans of "reform" or "democratization" in the 1990s. This means that discourse based on the assumption of a coherent, monolithic middle class has ceased to be of any relevance to the world of Thai politics. Consequently, it is becoming ever more urgent to examine in a concrete way whether the middle classes themselves have actually been coherent. An important part of the research agenda for the future will be analyses of how the various characteristics of the Thai middle classes identified in this paper, such as their urban-centered nature, their nature as an elite stratum with good educational credentials, and the diversity in their

[13] Many of these political leaders are intellectuals who make frequent appearances on TV and in other media, and include the leaders of NGOs, corporate managers, university professors, lawyers, and medical doctors. These "political leaders" are active in developing collaborative relationships with lower classes on issues of a strongly public nature, such as the protection of the rights of the disadvantaged, decentralization and devolution of power from the central to local governments, and environmental conservation.

class of origin, will change as their strata become larger and begin to perform even more important roles in politics and society.

REFERENCES

Anderson, Ben. 1977. "Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, July–September: 13–30.

Anek Laothamathas. 1993. *Mob muethue: Chonchan klaang lae nakthurakit kap phathanakan prachathipatai* [A mob with cellular phones: The middle class, businessmen, and the development of democracy]. Bangkok: Matichon.

———. 1995. *Song nakhara prachathipatai: Neawthang kan pathirup kanmuang sethakit phua prachathipatai* [Two tales of democracy: New directions toward political and economic reforms for democracy]. Bangkok: Matichon.

Chalornphob Sussangkarn. 1992. *Towards Balanced Development: Sectoral, Spacial and Other Dimensions*. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute.

Funatsu, Tsuruyo. 1995. "Tai kankyō ishiki chōsa no jisshi keii" [The process through which an environmental awareness survey was conducted in Thailand]. In *Chūgoku, Tai kankyō ishiki chōsa no haikei to keii* [The background and process of environmental awareness surveys in China and Thailand], ed. Sigeki Nisihira et al. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies.

———. 1997. "Environmental Disputes in Thailand in the First Half of the 1990s—Movements in Urban and Rural Areas." In *Environmental Awareness in Developing Countries: The Cases of China and Thailand*, ed. Sigeki Nisihira et al. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies.

———. 2000. "Tai ni okeru chūkansō-ron" [Theories of the middle classes in Thailand]. In *Ajia shokoku ni okeru chūkansō-ron no genzai* [The present state of theories of the middle classes in Asian countries], ed. Tamio Hattori, Takashi Torii, and Tsuruyo Funatsu. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies.

———. 2003. "Tai no chūtō kyōiku kakudai to toshi-nōson-kan no gakkō kakusa" [The expansion of secondary education in Thailand: Urban-rural differences in schools]. Under review.

Funatsu, Tsuruyo, and Kazuhiro Kagoya. 2002. "Tai no chūkansō: Toshi gakureki erīto no seisei to shakai ishiki" [The middle classes in Thailand: The rise of the educated urban elites and their social consciousness]. In *Ajia chūkansō no seisei to tokushitsu* [The emergence of the Asian middle classes and their characteristics], ed. Tamio Hattori, Tsuruyo Funatsu, and Takashi Torii. Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies.

Giddens, Anthony. 1973. *The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.

Girling, John L. S. 1981. *Thailand: Society and Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

———. 1996. *Interpreting Development: Capitalism, Democracy, and the Middle Class in Thailand*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.

Hewison, Kevin. 1996. "Emerging Social Forces in Thailand: New Political and Economic Roles." In *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution*, ed. Richard Robison and David S. G. Goodman. London: Routledge.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, ed. 1999. *East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective*. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

Juree Namsirichai Vichit-Vadakan. 1979. "Not Too High and Not Too Low: A Comparative Study of Thai and Chinese Middle-Class Life in Bangkok, Thailand." Ph.D. diss., University of California.

Nithi Aewsriwong. 1993. "Wathanatham khong khon chan klaang Thai" [The cultural dimensions of the Thai middle class]. In Sungsidh and Pasuk (1993b).

Ockey, Jim. 1999. "Creating the Thai Middle Class." In *Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia*, ed. Michael Pinches. London: Routledge.

Prudhisan Jumbala, and Chantana Banpasirichote. 1999. "Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity." A research report submitted to Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei; Centre for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

———. 2001. "Thai Middle Classes: Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity." In *Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change and Democratisation*, ed. Abdul Rahman Embong. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

Suehiro, Akira. 1989. "Bankoku: Jinkō zōka, keizai shūchū, kōtsū jūtai" [Bangkok: Population growth, economic concentration, and traffic congestion]. In *Sekai no daitoshi, 6: Bankoku, Kuararumpūru, Shingapōru, Jakaruta* [Mega-cities of the world, vol. 6: Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and Jakarta]. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Suganya Hutaserani, and Somchai Jitsuchon. 1988. *Thailand's Income Distribution and Poverty Profile and Their Current Situations*. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute Foundation.

Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, and Pasuk Phonpaichit. 1993a. "Khamnam" [Introduction: The middle class and Thai democracy]. In Sungsidh and Pasuk (1993b).

———, eds. 1993b. *Chonchan klaang bon krasae prachathipatai* [The middle class and Thai democracy]. Bangkok: Political Economy Center, Chulalongkorn University.

Tamada, Yoshifumi. 2001. *Minshuka no kyozō to jitsuzō: 1990-nendai no Tai seiji* [Democratization in Thailand during the 1990s: Image and Reality]. A report submitted to the JSPS in acknowledgment of its Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research.

Voravidh Charoenlert. 1993. "Chonchan klaang kap hedkan prusaphakhom: Fai prachathipatai rue rat patikan?" [The middle class and May 1992]. In Sungsidh and Pasuk (1993b).