# URBANIZATION AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA: INFLUX CONTROLS AND THEIR ABOLITION

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### INTRODUCTION

HROUGH the use of taxation, land expropriation, and other such means, colonial control in Africa transformed the small self-sufficient farmers into wage laborers. In the urban areas these wage laborers were bound by restrictions on the form of work they could engage in and on the length of their residency, and it was common for them to return to their home districts where they continued to hold farmland. In the white-controlled Republic of South Africa this type of wage laborer was maintained right up until recently because of the country's apartheid system. A major factor for this was the restrictions on movement which state authority strictly enforced especially towards black Africans. Urbanization in South Africa was affected by these circumstances. This study will take up the particular aspects and characteristics of urbanization from the standpoint of the effects exerted by the apartheid system. It will then examine the trends which have taken place since abolition of the pass laws and restrictions on the influx of blacks into urban areas.

Earlier related research includes such works as that edited by David M. Smith which dealt with urban residents living under apartheid [29], and two other collections of works which dealt with urban problems during the changes that took place in the final years of the apartheid system, one edited by Mark Swilling et al. [34] and the other by Smith [30]. The latter points out that even under the apartheid system, urbanization progressed and this process gradually destroyed apartheid itself.

A work edited by Anthony Lemon [21] discussed apartheid in South Africa's major cities, and another edited by David Drakakis-Smith [9] detailed the changes that took place in urban administration. Another instructive piece is an overview done by Richard Tomlinson [35] that surveyed conditions during the 1980s.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Under the apartheid system the people of South Africa were divided into four classifications: white, colored, Asian, and black (the order being that set forth in government publications). The Population Registration Act which provided the legal basis for assigning everyone in the population to one of these four categories was abolished in June 1991.

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Using the foundation prepared by these previous works,<sup>2</sup> this study will analyze the effects that apartheid had on urbanization looking particularly at the relationship between restrictions on the movement of blacks into urban areas on the one hand and the maintenance of low-wage migrant labor and retention of farmland in home districts on the other.

## I. THE PROCESS AND PRESENT STATE OF URBANIZATION

## A. The Problem with Population Statistics

There are a number of problems peculiar to South Africa's population statistics. With the implementation of the Homeland Policy, four homelands became "independent" entities. These were Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), and Ciskei (1981) (see Figure 1). Under the policy the native reserves were divided by ethnic groups into ten (originally nine) areas, and local government administrations were set up under the watchful eye of the South African government which gradually promoted the growth of self-government in these homelands. These newly "independent states" were recognized by no nations other than South Africa which gave them all the formal trappings of independent states. One of the results was that the statistical figures for these "independent" homelands were removed from South Africa's statistics. Thus census figures up to those in 1970 were for the whole of South Africa, but in the 1980 census Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda were excluded, and in the censuses since 1985, Ciskei has also been excluded. Because of these changes in South Africa's borders, care needs to be taken when interpreting changes in the country's population statistics. These changes are also the reason for the complexity of Table I. Changes to the boundaries of urban areas are common everywhere, but repeated changes that alter the boundaries of a national population is most unusual.

But the above problem is not the only one affecting South Africa's population statistics. Population figures taken under a repressive system like that of apartheid can be rather lower than the actual figures. Particularly the census figures for the number of blacks living in the areas (commonly known as the "white areas") outside of the homelands are thought to be rather lower than the actual figures. Under apartheid people who ignored the regulations on movement and took up residency in other areas were regarded as illegal residents, and they were not counted in the census figures. And because the large cities exist in what were the former white areas, it is also impossible to get an accurate calculation of the urban population.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In addition to the already-mentioned works, there is also the article in Japanese by Mine [24] and another article by Hayashi [15].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Since the repeal of the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act in June 1991 which brought down the apartheid system, the term "former" is frequently attached when mentioning the white areas. But for the sake of simplicity the word "former" is used only in this first instance.




Fig. 1. The Provinces and Major Cities in South Africa during the Apartheid Period

Source: By the author.

Notes: 1. The scale of population is from the 1985 census.

Cape Town

2. The system of four provinces and a number of "independent" homelands under apartheid was reorganized into a system of nine regions in September 1004

Port Elizabeth

East London

"Independent" Homelands

Bophuthatswana

Ciskei

Venda

Yet another problem is what definition to use to designate urban areas. In the population censuses since 1980, the seats of local government administration have been defined as urban. In the 1970 census cities were regarded as those areas equipped with such urban facilities as running water and electricity, but this definition was changed.<sup>4</sup> Thus from a socioeconomic standpoint, the official census figures for the size and change of urban population have not reflected the actual figures. Because of the past limits placed on the movement of people, populations in the black homelands have become concentrated in the border areas adjacent to the white areas, but in the official statistics, these border areas are not categorized as urban areas.

Because of these various problems, a functional definition of urban area is now often used in South Africa. Areas having a concentration of population and where

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Concerning this modification, see Cilliers and Groenewald [5, p. 7].

TABLE I POPULATION SIZE BY RACE, 1904-85

(1,000 people)

					( ) E E
Year	Whites	Coloreds	Asians	Blacks	Total
1904	1,117	445	122	3,490	5,174
1911	1,276	525	152	4,019	5,972
1921	1,521	545	163	4,697	6,926
1936	2,003	769	220	6,596	9,588
1946	2,372	928	285	7,830	11,415
1951	2,642	1,103	367	8,560	12,672
1960	3,088	1,509	477	10,928	16,002
1970(1)	3,773	2,051	630	15,340	21,794
1970 (2)	3,759	2,039	630	11,891	18,319
1980(1)	4,221	2,459	748	13,135	20,563
1980 (2)	4,512	2,688	803	16,992	24,995
1985 (1)	4,569	2,833	821	15,163	23,386
1985 (2)	4,837	2,936	879	19,052	27,704
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Source: [33, Table 1.6].

- Notes: 1. The racial divisions, appellations, and order of listing are as those given in the government documents. This is also true for the other tables in this study.
  - 2. 1970(1), 1980(2), 1985(1), and 1985(2) are census figures under different national boundaries: 1970(1) are those for South Africa as a whole; 1980(2) are those for South Africa excluding Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda; and 1985(1) and 1985(2) are those for South Africa excluding Ciskei as well. 1970(2) and 1980(1) are those figures under the 1985 boundaries. 1980(1) and 1985(1) are the figures according to the censuses. 1980(2) and 1985(2) are the author's estimated figures.

a given level of urban functions can be found are regarded as cities. This functional definition is used by the Development Bank of South Africa for the figures it compiled on urban population (shown in Table II). This definition was originally put forward by the Research Unit for Sociology of Development, University of Stellenbosch. It classifies urban areas into three groups: urban, peri-urban, and semi-urban. Areas classified as "urban" are those which are regarded as urban in the government's census figures. Areas classified as "peri-urban" are those with a concentration of resident population which commutes to the "urban" areas to work or for other economic activities. Invariably these "peri-urban" areas border on the white areas, and they have experienced great population growth because the workers who commute to the white areas for their jobs have taken up residence in these border areas. "Semi-urban" areas are those areas other than "urban" and "periurban" areas that have a concentration of residential population of more than 5,000 people. The total population contained within these three classifications is considered to be urban population [12, p. 7]. With the end of apartheid and the establishment of a new government, it has now become possible to carry out highly reliable

TOTAL POPULATION, URBAN POPULATION, AND URBAN POPULATION RATIO TABLE II

11 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			19	1980			19	1985			19	1989	(alaca kacka)
12,344 11,949 24,293 14,222 13,533 27,755 15,725 15,020 30,745 16,093 1,530 2,623 1,1193 1,683 2,876 1,292 1,812 3,104 894 1,027 1,921 1,921 1,921 3,104 894 1,027 1,921 1,921 3,104 894 1,027 1,921 1,921 3,104 894 1,083 1,027 1,921 1,9		Male	Female	Total	Urban Pop. (%)	Male	Female	Total	Urban Pop. (%)	Male	Female	Total	Urban Pop. (%)
14,578       14,913       29,491       16,755       16,827       33,582       18,491       18,607       37,098         nition of "urban"**       6,749       6,308       13,057       53.7       8,056       7,456       15,512       55.9       9,113       8,435       17,547         6,749       6,308       13,057       53.7       8,056       7,456       15,512       55.9       9,113       8,435       17,547         6,749       6,308       129       4.9       71       81       15.9       142       158       300         108       131       146       277       15.9       142       158       300         117       125       242       35.4       128       136       147       283         117       125       242       13,874       46.4       8,393       7,828       16,222       48.3       9,482       8,841       18,322         201       10.2       11.203       10,570       21,573       10,2       11,73       364       48       46       90       1,841       48       46       90       1,341       48       46       90       1,341       48       46       90	Population: South Africa Transkei Bophuthatswana Venda Ciskei	12,344 1,093 666 156 319	11,949 1,530 845 225 364	24,293 2,623 1,511 381 683		14,222 1,193 811 191 338	13,533 1,683 930 269 412	27,755 2,876 1,741 460 750		15,725 1,292 894 218 362	15,020 1,812 1,027 307 441	30,745 3,104 1,921 525 803	
intion of "urban" a 6,749 6,308 13,057 53.7 8,056 7,456 15,512 55.9 9,113 8,435 17,547 60 69 129 4.9 71 81 153 5.3 81 92 173 108 131 239 15.8 131 146 277 15.9 142 158 300 117 125 242 35.4 128 138 266 35.5 136 147 283 17,038 6,637 13,674 46.4 8,393 7,828 16,222 48.3 9,482 8,841 18,322 25 23 23 23 89 136 15,67 11,198 68.8 635 10,370 21,573 109 125 234 8,9 136 156 292 10.2 170 194 364 109 125 234 8,9 136 156 292 10.2 170 194 364 108 594 1,083 71.7 567 631 1,198 68.8 635 706 1,341 34 32 66 17.3 37 40 77 16.7 44 46 9,395 8,972 18,367 62.3 10,696 10,083 20,779 61.9 12,378 11,670 24,048	Total	14,578	14,913	29,491		16,755	16,827	33,582		18,491	18,607	37,098	
60 69 129 4.9 71 81 153 5.3 81 92 173 108 131 239 15.8 131 146 277 15.9 142 158 300 117 125 242 35.4 128 138 266 35.5 136 147 283  7,038 6,637 13,674 46.4 8,393 7,828 16,222 48.3 9,482 8,841 18,322  effinition of "urban"b 8,542 7,984 16,526 68.0 9,688 8,967 18,655 67.2 11,203 10,370 21,573 109 125 234 8.9 136 156 292 10.2 170 194 364 1489 594 1,083 71.7 567 631 1,198 68.8 635 706 1,341 134 32 66 17.3 37 40 77 16.7 44 46 90 125 237 458 67.1 268 289 557 74.3 326 354 680 9,395 8,972 18,367 62.3 10,696 10,083 20,779 61.9 12,378 11,670 24,048	Urban population: (1) By the official de South Africa	sfinition of 6,749	3	13,057	53.7	8,056	7,456	15,512	55.9	9,113	8,435	17,547	57.1
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s,542 7,984 16,526 68.0 9,688 8,967 18,655 67.2 11,203 10,370 21,573 10,9 125 234 8.9 136 156 292 10.2 170 194 364 489 594 1,083 71.7 567 631 1,198 68.8 635 706 1,341 34 32 66 17.3 37 40 77 16.7 44 46 90 221 237 458 67.1 268 289 557 74.3 326 354 680 9,395 8,972 18,367 62.3 10,696 10,083 20,779 61.9 12,378 11,670 24,048	Total	7,038	6,637	13,674	46.4	8,393	7,828	16,222	48.3	9,482	8,841	18,322	49.4
221 237 458 67.1 268 289 557 74.3 326 90 9,395 8,972 18,367 62.3 10,696 10,083 20,779 61.9 12,378 11,670 24,048	(2) By the functional South Africa Transkei Bophuthatswar		of "urban" 7,984 125 594	<u>.</u>	68.0 8.9 71.7	9,688 136 567	8,967 156 631	18,655 292 1,198	67.2 10.2 68.8	11,203 170 635	10,370 194 706	21,573 364 1,341	70.2 11.7 69.8
9,395 8,972 18,367 62.3 10,696 10,083 20,779 61.9 12,378 11,670 24,048	Ciskei	221	237		67.1	268	40 289	557	16.7 74.3	326 326	46 354	08 08 08	17.1 84.7
	Total	9,395	8,972	18,367	62.3	10,696	10,083	20,779	61.9	12,378	11,670	24,048	64.8

Source: Compiled from [8, Tables 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1].

a The seats of local government administration plus the communities formed by commuting laborers and communities of over 5,000 inhabitants.

censuses of the population, but before this can be done, there has to be an established definition for the term "urban."

### B. The Course of Urbanization

Starting in the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, South Africa's urban population has grown rapidly and the particular features of its urbanization have taken form. The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) devastated the territories of Transvaal and Orange Free State causing an exodus of population from the countryside. The Dutch-descent Boer farmers who flowed into the cities at that time came to form the class of white urban poor.

Another even more important factor was the development of the gold mining industry on the outskirts of Johannesburg. This attracted foreign immigrants to the area. In 1841 only 130 immigrants arrived in the Cape Colony from England; between 1890 and 1913 the number of immigrants from England arriving in South Africa swelled to an average of 24,000 annually [17, pp. 11, 13]. Also attracted to work in the mines and on the docks were a growing number of black laborers. The number of black laborers working for the gold and platinum mining companies affiliated with the Chamber of Mines rose rapidly from 77,000 workers in 1904 to 191,000 in 1912.<sup>5</sup> Of the country's total urban population in 1911, the major diamond and gold mining centers accounted for 37 per cent while the four large port cities of Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, and East London accounted for another 23 per cent [3, pp. 14–17].

The outbreak of the First World War gave South Africa the chance to begin the process of import-substitution industrialization, and during the war steel production was started by the Iron and Steel Corporation. The rate of urban population growth brought on by industrialization peaked right after the Second World War when it reached nearly 5.3 per cent per annum (according to the official definition of "urban"). Thereafter, the rate of growth slowed because of a fall in the rate of blacks moving into urban areas [5, Table 4]. During the 1970s the growth rate of the rural population was high due to restrictions placed on the movement of blacks into towns and to the forced migration of people to the newly established black homelands. During the 1980s there was a marked outflow of population from the rural areas of the white areas. Between 1980 and 1985, 1.5 million people moved out of these rural areas. Over 0.5 million of these moved to rural districts in the homelands; the remaining nearly 1 million people moved into the peri-urban areas lining the homeland borders that faced the white areas [37, p. 19, Figure 10]. Developments since the late 1980s will be taken up later in this study.

The ratio of the different races living in South Africa's urban areas is extremely unbalanced. In 1980 the ratio of the Asian urban population was 89.8 per cent while

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In 1912, 66.1 per cent of the arriving immigrants were foreign laborers.

All races

Coloreds

Whites

Asians

Blacks

TABLE III URBAN POPULATION RATIOS BY RACE

(%)According to the According to the 1970 National Boundaries National Boundaries in Census Year 1911 1921 1936 1946 1951 1960 1970 1980 1980 1985 24.7 25.1 31.4 36.3 42.6 46.7 47.8 47.1 52.6 55.9 51.6 55.8 65.2 72.5 78.4 83.6 86.8 88.3 87.9 89.6

68.3

83.2

31.8

74.1

86.7

33.1

74.6

90.6

32.9

75.2

89.8

37.9

77.8

93.4

39.6

12.6 Sources: [33, Table 1.7] [5, Table 3].

46.7

43.2

45.9

30.0

12.5

53.9

66.3

17.3

58.1

70.3

21.6

1904

23.4

52.7

50.5

36.6

10.1

TABLE IV Urban and Rural Population by Race, 1980

64.7

77.5

27.2

				(	1,000 people)
	All Races	Whites	Coloreds	Asians	Blacks
Urban population:				· ·	
Cape Province	3,801 (100.00)	1,114 (29.30)	1,674 (44.05)	30 ( 0.80)	982 (25.84)
Natal Province	1,516 (100.00)	514 (33.93)	82 ( 5.41)	(/	319 (21.05)
Transvaal Province	5,926 (100.00)	2,105 (35.53)	207 ( 3.49)	112 ( 1.89)	3,502 (59.10)
Orange Free State	824 (100.00)	267 (32.39)	36 ( 4.37)	— ( —)	521 (63.24)
Black states	1,560 (100.00)	6 ( 0.36)	7 ( 0.45)	1 ( 0.07)	1,546 (99.11)
Total	13,626 (100.00)	4,006 (29.40)	2,006 (14.72)	744 ( 5.46)	6,870 (50.42)
Rural population:		***************************************	***************************************	****************	
Cape Province	1,291 (100.00)	150 (11.64)	552 (42.76)	2 ( 0.13)	587 (45.47)
Natal Province	1,161 (100.00)	48 ( 4.11)	9 ( 0.77)	65 ( 5.61)	1,039 (89.51)
Transvaal Province	2,425 (100.00)	257 (10.60)	22 ( 0.89)	3 (0.14)	2,143 (88.40)
Orange Free State	1,108 (100.00)	59 ( 5.35)	20 ( 1.81)	<b>—</b> ( —)	1,029 (92.84)
Black states	9,323 (100.00)	17 ( 0.18)	80 ( 0.86)	7 ( 0.08)	9,219 (98.88)
Total	15,307 (100.00)	531 ( 3.47)	683 ( 4.46)	78 ( 0.51)	14,016 (91.56)

Source: [5, Table 2].

Figures in parentheses indicate percentages. Notes: 1.

"Black states" refers to the "independent" black homelands under the apartheid

The figures of all races are not equal to the total figures of four races.

that for blacks was 37.9 per cent (Table III). This difference was attributable to the occupational and social class structure under the apartheid system. However, as was pointed out earlier in this study, the actual ratio of blacks in the urban population is rather higher than official figures indicate. Using the functional definition of urban area, the ratio for blacks in the urban population in 1980 came to 40 per cent when the peri-urban areas were included, and rose to 51.8 per cent when the semiurban areas were also included [12, p. 19]. The proportion of the urban population within the homelands in 1980 was 41.8 per cent [12, Table 2]. In 1985 the ratio of blacks in the urban population was 53 per cent [37, p. 20, Table 5].

The racial imbalance within the urban population can also be found in the different regions of the country. In the 1970 census more than 70 per cent of the country's population was black. Within the four provinces then existing under the apartheid system (at present there are nine provinces), the provinces where blacks were a majority making up over 50 per cent of the urban population were those of Transvaal and Orange Free State. The figure for Cape Province was 25.8 per cent, and for Natal it was 21.1 per cent. The largest racial group in Cape Province in 1980 was coloreds (44.1 per cent), and in Natal it was Asians (39.6 per cent) (Table IV).

## II. WAGE LABOR AND INFLUX CONTROLS

## A. Formation and Mobilization of Wage Labor

During the mid-nineteenth century contract laborers were brought in from India to work on the Natal sugarcane plantations, and this became the foundation for the later Natal Indian community. But it was the development of the mining industry following the discoveries of diamond deposits at Kimberly in 1867 and gold deposits on the outskirts of Johannesburg in 1886 that really stimulated the demand for labor. Because of the shortage of hired labor, Chinese laborers were brought in to work in the gold mines for a number of years after 1904. But there was opposition from white laborers, and this practice ceased after a short number of years. As a result black labor became the primary component of the labor force. But in the mining industry's early stages of development, it was unable to procure enough laborers from within South Africa, and workers were brought in from neighboring colonies, especially from Portuguese Mozambique.

However, the ratio of foreign laborers brought in from outside of South Africa gradually declined. A look at the ratio of laborers by place of origin who were working in the companies affiliated with the Chamber of Mines, which was set up by the leading gold and platinum mining companies, shows that in 1906 there were 54,000 workers from Mozambique which were 71 per cent of the labor force while 18,000, or 23 per cent came from South Africa. In 1936 the respective figures were 88,000 (28 per cent) and 166,000 (52 per cent),<sup>7</sup> a complete reversal of the ratios which had come about because of the industry's efforts to build up its labor force from among South African blacks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Concerning labor and colonial control in South Africa, see Ichikawa [18, Part 2].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> South Africa, Chamber of Mines, *Annual Report* (Johannesburg), various issues, quoted in Libby [22, Table 4].

The creation of this needed black labor force was carried out through forced labor, taxation, and land expropriation. By the Natives Land Act of 1913, blacks could no longer own land outside of the native reserves which made up only about 9 per cent of the total area of South Africa. There was little fertile farmland within these native reserves, and the development of black African agriculture was ignored, a situation which inevitably pushed blacks into the wage labor force. Nevertheless, there remained a shortage of labor in the mining industry until the 1960s, and the industry had to continue to depend on foreign labor. Under such circumstances one would have expected wages to rise, and it is surprising to learn that until the 1970s wages for mine laborers actually declined. The trend of the average annual wage of a black laborer went from 78 rand (in 1889) to 58 rand (in 1897) and to 57 rand (in 1911) [11, p. 19]. Even after 1911, when calculated in real wages (with the index in 1911 being 100), it stood at 100 in 1936, 89 in 1941, and 99 in 1969 [39, p. 46, Table 5].

The reason that low wages continued despite the shortage of labor was because the enterprises in the mining industry had joined together in forming a labor procurement system which until the 1970s maintained a wage agreement among the companies. The Chamber of Mines, established in 1887, set up a Native Labor Department in 1893 which was a specialized labor procurement organization designed to secure a stable supply of workers from Transvaal and Mozambique and to bring about "the gradual reduction of native wages to a reasonable level."

But another factor closely involved in the formation and maintenance of low-wage labor in South Africa was the existence of circular migrant labor, black laborers who migrated to urban areas to work, but because they were not allowed to remain permanently in these areas, they were compelled periodically to "circle back" to their native districts where these laborers retained homes and farmland. The existence of this form of labor obstructed the settlement of blacks in urban areas. It arose in response to the country's policy of racial segregation and its later more developed manifestation of apartheid.

## B. Circular Migrant Labor and Its Maintenance System

The history of this form of labor falls essentially into two broad phases, one before and the other after 1948 when an Afrikaner-controlled government under Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan came to power. The former followed policies of racial segregation while the latter followed policies of racial separation. Neither was essentially different from the other; the latter was a more developed form of the former. But it will be argued in this study that the maintenance and final break-

<sup>8</sup> According to the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, designated lands came to about 13 per cent of South Africa's total area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Transvaal Chamber of Mines, *Fifth Annual Report* (Johannesburg, 1893), p. 4A, quoted in Wilson [39, p. 3]. Concerning the procurement of labor and apartheid, see Ogura [25].

down of circular migrant labor in the earlier phase differed from that of the later phase.

During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), combat was concentrated in the two Boer states of Transvaal and Orange Free State, and the devastation suffered by these two territories caused a large flow of Boers and blacks into the urban areas. To counter the inflow of the latter, the Natives Land Act was passed. <sup>10</sup> This law prevented the settlement of blacks in towns and on fertile farmland, and South Africa's territory was separated into white areas and native reserves. But it was impossible for people living in the native reserves to be economically self-sufficient, and this played a role in creating circular migrant laborers.

By the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, local governments could secure land for use as residential areas for blacks, and purchase by whites was prohibited. This law compelled blacks to live in specified areas.<sup>11</sup> This became the basis for regarding blacks as temporary urban residents, and the native reserves became the producers of low-wage laborers while at the same time absorbing the excess black population not needed in the work force. For their part, black workers put up with being circular migrant laborers because being relegated by work regulations (the color bar) to performing unskilled labor or so-called uncivilized labor, they were not required to undergo the experiences and steady improvement expected of workers with skilled-jobs technical learning.<sup>12</sup>

However, the policy of maintaining low-wage circular migrant labor through racial segregation failed to achieve its expected ends. The rapid population growth and the shortage of land in the native reserves caused living standards to deteriorate which spurred the outflow of people. Meanwhile, the demand for labor created by the development of the manufacturing industry which grew up before and during the Second World War further stimulated the inflow of blacks into the cities. By the mid-1940s the black population in the cities had surpassed that of the white population, and paralleling the rising demand for black labor was a growing sense of crisis among white laborers and Afrikaners. The Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act passed in 1945 was clearly intended to deny blacks permanent residency in cities through restrictions on their movement into urban areas.

Under the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937, blacks were allowed to stay in cities for up to fourteen days while looking for work, and like the 1923 law, imple-

Already in 1893 in Orange Free State blacks were forbidden to own property in urban areas. Concerning regulations in urban areas applied against blacks before the formation of the Afrikaner-controlled Malan government in 1948, see Davenport [7].

However, the prohibition against blacks living in the white areas came with the Group Areas Act of 1950.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Laws which prohibited specific races from working in certain types of jobs included the Mines and Works Act of 1911 (and subsequently frequently revised) and the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956. These laws shut blacks out of a wide range of jobs. Regarding "civilized labor" and "uncivilized labor," see Hoshi and Hayashi [16, p. 130].

mentation of the new law was left to the discretion of local government authorities [10, pp. 4-8] with the enactment of the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, this period of stay was limited to three days (seventy-two hours). To remain in a given urban area longer than three days, a black had to satisfy one of the four following conditions: (1) he had to have lived in the urban area continuously since birth; or (2) had to have worked continuously for one employer in the urban area for a period of not less than ten years or had lawfully resided continuously in the area for a period of not less than fifteen years; or (3) had to be the wife, the unmarried daughter, or the son under the age of eighteen of any black mentioned in (1) or (2); or (4) in the case of any black not fulfilling the first three conditions, he had to have been granted permission to remain in the urban area by an officer appointed to manage a labor bureau. 13 A person satisfying one of these four conditions was categorized as a "Section Tenner" in accordance with Section 10 of the 1945 act. The stipulations of these four conditions such as the term "continuously" were for a long time rigidly interpreted and applied, and it was extremely difficult for a black to be granted new permanent residency in a city. Black workers were unable to satisfy the conditions of the law because they commonly had to return home on leave.14

Despite the restrictions on the movement of blacks into urban areas, the ratio of the white population in urban areas continued to decline. The practice of circular migrant labor based on racial segregation policies fell into crisis and teetered towards collapse. Economic conditions in the native reserves continued declining, and these areas were failing to fulfill their social welfare functions towards the circular migrant laborers. As a result blacks with permanent urban residence and those moving into the cities continued to grow in number. A major contributing factor behind this growing black urban population was the development of the manufacturing industry in Transvaal during the 1940s and its continuing demand for labor.<sup>15</sup>

Following the Second World War the marked increase in the desire among the colonized peoples of Africa for independence caused South African whites to throw their support behind the National Party, the political party of the Afrikaners who sought to maintain white dominance. This led to the formation of the first Afrikaner-controlled government in 1948 under Prime Minister Malan. This gov-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Paraphrased from the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945, Section 10 (1). For a more detailed discussion, see Duncan [10, p. 76].

<sup>14</sup> Even if children were staying with relatives in one of the homelands, and even if a circular migrant laborer returned only temporarily to his native district, he did not satisfy the second condition of Section 10 (1) (West [38, p. 17]). For the first condition to be applicable, a person had to show proof of birth and proof that his parents were permanent urban residents, but there were a large number of children born whose fathers were unknown. Regarding the difficulty of acquiring "Section Tenner," see Duncan [10, pp. 76–78].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> See Browett [3, pp. 17–20], for a discussion of these developments before 1948.

ernment passed a series of racial segregation laws and went on to set up the apartheid system centered on the formation of black homelands and their separate development from white-controlled South Africa. Under this system low-wage circular migrant labor was maintained and developed more than ever before.

The Group Areas Act of 1950 established racially separated residential areas in the cities and their surrounding districts. This act made it possible to racially demarcate and separate education, health and welfare services, and government administrations, but it was also meant to strengthen controls on the flow of blacks into the cities. Blacks were excluded from residing in the central areas of cities and made to live in crowded outer suburbs. Black laborers in cities who were working away from their families were confined to workers' hostels. The various laws designed to restrict the movement of blacks were generally know as "pass laws," and six million people were prosecuted for violating these laws during the ten years from 1965 to 1975 [38, p. 17].

The Homeland Policy was based on the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. Then in 1970 with the Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act, all blacks were obliged to affiliate themselves with one of the homelands, and in the following year the Bantu Homeland Constitution Act was passed legalizing the self-governing status of the homelands. This act was intended to bring about the separate development of whites and blacks in South Africa and represented the completion of the apartheid system. It deprived blacks of South African citizenship, restricted their right of permanent residency in the white areas, and divided them into two groups: a small group of blacks living permanently in the white areas and the remainder of the black population living in the homelands. These developments left most of the black work force as circular migrant laborers, and the aim was maintenance of white domination.

However, other than a very few exceptions like the mining industry in Bophuthatswana, the black homelands had no industry other than agriculture, and pressure to move out of the homelands was extremely high. Even the 1955 report of the government-organized Commision for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas (also known as the Tomlinson Commission) pointed out that it was impossible for the majority of the population in the homelands to make a living from agriculture. For the industrialization of the homelands, the report proposed the introduction of white capital and a border-area industries plan. This plan for promoting industries in the white areas bordering the homelands was intended to protect the white workers in the urban areas while relieving the acute employment problems in the homelands by having black laborers commute from their residences in the black homelands to jobs in the white border areas. <sup>17</sup> Thus the plan was

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For a discussion of these developments after 1948, see Browett [3, pp. 20-23].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Concerning the Tomlinson Commission report, see Hayashi [14, pp. 27–28]. Concerning the border industries plan and its significance, see Hayashi [13, from p. 166 onward, especially p. 193].

not one for having blacks migrate into white areas for work, but one to make it possible for employing blacks as commuting laborers.

In the above ways the restrictions on movement and the black homelands policy obstructed black acquisition of permanent residency in urban areas while at the same time making use of blacks as a labor force; they also contributed to achieving the not necessarily compatible objectives of developing capitalism in South Africa and maintaining white supremacy. The Wiehan Commission and Riekert Commission reports, released in 1979, both attempted to deal with this compatibility conundrum. The former called for acceptance of black participation in unions, and the latter stressed the need to abolish restrictions on the types of jobs blacks could engage in.

## C. Economic Dependency of the Homelands and "Frontier Commuters"

The black homelands' economic dependency on South Africa becomes apparent when a comparison is made between their GNPs and GDPs. The GNPs of the five self-governing homelands were on average 4.2 times greater than their GDPs during the 1980s [32, Vol. 1, Tables 58–59]. For the "independent" homelands the difference was less, but their GNPs were still 2.1 times greater than their GDPs [32, Vol. 2, Table 29]. This difference was due to the lack of any industry in the homelands other than agriculture, and also to the heavy dependence of their economies on migrant and "frontier commuting" laborers who worked in the white areas.

Not counting foreign laborers from neighboring countries, black laborers in South Africa could be broken down into four types: (1) those who worked within the homelands, (2) those who lived and worked permanently in the white areas, (3) those who were circular migrant laborers, and (4) those who were "frontier commuters," laborers who lived in the border areas of the homelands, and commuted across to the white border areas to work. Comparing the sex ratio in the homelands (in 1989), within the entire population of the four "independent" homelands, for every 100 females there were 77 males; for the population between the ages of 15-64, the ratio was 100 to 64; Bophuthatswana had the smallest sex-ratio imbalance, being 100 to 87 for the population as a whole and 100 to 82 for the population between 15 and 64 years old. 18 The reason for Bophuthatswana's smaller imbalance was because it bordered on South Africa's capital of Pretoria, and many of its resident laborers were border commuters. The rural areas of the homelands were impoverished, and this exerted a great deal of pressure on the population to leave the countryside. At the same time, however, the restrictions on movement along with the shortage of housing acted as major factors working against the inflow of blacks into the white areas. As a result there developed a concentration of people

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Calculated from Development Bank of Southern Africa [8, Tables 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1].

living in the border areas of the homelands from which workers commuted to the white areas.

The urban population in the homelands in the 1960s was extremely small, but from the 1970s it grew rapidly under the implementation of apartheid<sup>19</sup> which forced blacks to migrate out of the white areas, introduced a freeze on the construction of black family dwellings in the white areas, and brought about the development of border-area industries. That this growth of population came to be concentrated in the border areas of the black homelands was due to the peculiarity of urbanization under apartheid. The urban areas in the homelands lacked an economic base because they were different from ordinary urban areas. The ten largest towns in the homelands are all between four and thirty-five kilometers from the white areas; their production and consumption are carried out in the white areas; towns in the homelands are not tied in with their outlying districts; in other words these towns are for the economies of the white areas.

# III. ABOLITION OF INFLUX CONTROLS AND POST-APARTHEID URBANIZATION

## A. Population Movement since 1986 and the Trend of Urbanization

In April 1986 the infamous restrictions on movement known collectively as the pass laws were abolished. During the years prior to their abolition, there was heated debate over the effects that abolition would have, and there were expressions of fear that abolition would cause an explosive influx of population into the urban areas. Those who expressed this fear grounded their anxiety in a number of reasons: (1) the greater employment opportunities in the white areas would cause people to relocate to these areas; (2) there was the possibility that frontier commuters living in the border areas would also decide to move to new locations; (3) there was the possibility that the new migrants would bring their families along in the hopes of living together with them; and (4) restrictions on movement had curbed the influx of people into cities who otherwise would have relocated to urban areas, had restrictions not existed in the first place [12, pp. 24–29].

Against these could be posited the following counter arguments. Inhabitants in the black homelands had investments in the homelands, and they had their plans for their post-retirement life; abolition of the pass laws would not suddenly have an effect on these. The range of people suddenly affected by the chance to relocate would be limited to such people as those who had no access to land in the homelands or those like low-wage laborers working on white farms who had no hope for any future in the countryside. Frontier commuters would not necessarily move.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> For a detailed discussion of urbanization in the black homelands, see Smith, Oliver, and Booysen [31, pp. 95–101].

There was the high cost of housing and other daily expenses in the urban areas, and moving to another location would not necessarily change commuting time. Concerning the matter of migrants bringing along their families, given the unstable political conditions and other problems in the former black townships outside the homelands, there was no certainty that they intended to bring their families with them. Regarding the last point, it was possible to think that because the pass laws had held the movement of the population in check, their abolition would stimulate relocation, but people who had wanted to relocate had already moved into the homeland border areas and become frontier commuters, and they would not necessarily move out of the homelands with the abolitions of restrictions. For these and other reasons it was argued that abolition of restrictions on movement would bring no great influx of people into the cities.

Calculating from the figures in Table II, the average annual rate of urban population increase between 1980 and 1985 was 3.5 per cent under the official definition of "urban" and 2.5 per cent under the functional definition; between 1985 and 1989 the respective figures were 3.1 per cent and 3.7 per cent. If these percentages are not far off from the actual trend, they indicate that even a major systemic change like the abolition of restrictions on movement did not have much impact on the influx of people into the urban areas. Moreover, it is reasonable to think that included in this increase in urban population was the rather substantial number of heretofore unregistered residents who came to light after the abolition of restrictions. The number of such people was said to have been as high as seven million [28, p. 2] [20, p. 20]. This fact alone shows that despite the existence of controls on the movement of the black population, in reality the influx of people into the cities continued to take place. Apartheid did not impeded urbanization; rather it slowed its pace. Thus even restrictions on movement could not suppress the influx of people into the cities, and the concentration of population in urban areas continued to advance [26, p. 24] [35, p. 30].

With the passage in 1986 of the Black Communities Development Amendment Act, it became possible for blacks to own homes in the black community areas in the cities [34, p. 94]. This stimulated the entry of private enterprises into home construction in the black communities. The number of new houses built jumped from a mere 1,503 in 1984 to 45,000 in 1987 [35, p. 120]. However, even before the 1986 amendment act, it had become possible since the latter half of the 1970s for black to get housing with thirty-to-ninety-year leases which in effect made it possible for them to have homes. The background behind this development was firstly the growing difficulty of providing public housing because of the difficult state of public finances, and the government tried to get employers to carry the burden of housing construction; there was also the gradually advancing skill and technical level of black workers. South Africa's industrialization made it necessary to upgrade the quality of the black labor force, and through such reports as that by the

Riekert Commission, restrictions on the types of work that blacks could engage in were gradually relaxed. The result was that social stratification began to appear among black laborers, and in the course of dealing with these differences, a segment of these black laborers was able to acquire long-term home leases [27, p. 52] [31, p. 93].

The abolition of movement controls did not bring about any sudden explosive inflow of population into the urban areas. In 1991 the Population Registration Act was repealed completing the dismantling of apartheid, and South Africa is now going through a period of political transition. This transition period will last a number of years, and it is still too early to make any judgment, but a great many people are closely watching the course that post-apartheid South Africa is taking.

Will South Africa's cities gradually come to have the same urban problems that are plaguing the cities in other African and Third World countries? Acute shortages of jobs and rising unemployment, shortages of housing, and expanding slums, these are the phenomena of ill-prepared urban socioeconomic infrastructures that have been overtaken by the rapid growth of urban population, and they are common to all of the major cities in Africa. These phenomena did not materialized in South Africa's cities, but it was not because its cities lacked the makings for such phenomena. Rather it was the country's apartheid policies and the government's repeated forceful slum clearance operations that kept these phenomena from materializing. Meanwhile in the black homelands conflicting changes were being carried out. Factoring in these considerations, there is a high possibility that the problems common to the cities in other African countries could also materialize one day in the major cities of South Africa.

But South Africa and its cities also have particular conditions mitigating against the social and economic deterioration common to other African cities. Firstly, the ratio of South Africa's urban population is already extremely high. As a portion of its entire population and as a portion of the black population as well, South Africa passed through the peak of its urban population growth roughly during the 1970s. By 1980 the ratio of the black urban population had already surpassed 30 per cent (Table IV), but as noted earlier, by the functional definition the ratio had reached 51.8 per cent, and even in the homelands it stood at 41.8 per cent. Thus urban population growth in South Africa today is largely due not to the inflow of people but to natural population increase. This condition is very different from the situation in the other African countries since independence.

A second point is the multiple number of major urban centers that exit in South Africa. These include Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, and Durban, the first being a mining and manufacturing center, the second being the nation's capital, and the last two being big port cities. These give South Africa a dispersion of urban centers with differing economic functions, a condition that other African countries lack.

But there is another condition peculiar to South Africa which will affect the future direction of urbanization, and this is the legacy of apartheid. In the final section of this paper the auther would like to look at the impact of this legacy on urbanization.

# B. The Legacy of Apartheid and Factors Restraining and Stimulating Population Movement

There is now freedom of movement in South Africa, but there are two factors which will restrain movement over the short term. One is the shortage of black housing. This is not only due to the insufficient construction of housing that took place under apartheid, but also to the present economic slump which has greatly reduced housing construction. Under apartheid much of the black population became concentrated in the border areas of the homelands, and it is here that the possession of homes became general. People who had little choice under the old repressive system but adapting to living in these areas have now built up an established and ordered life-style which would be difficult for them to suddenly change. The second restraining factor is political instability. Prior to the April 1994 elections, not only was there violence between white conservative and black extremist groups, but there was also politically inspired violence among blacks themselves within the black communities. Complicated factors lay behind the latter, and the confrontations between the United Democratic Front (UDF) or the African National Congress (ANC) and the Zulu nationalist supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party have often been pointed out as major factors. There has also been the confrontations between urban black residents who hold permanent urban residency and new migrant workers who have left their families and moved into the urban areas. The presence of the security police, as some people have noted, has only intensified this violence.20 All of this fighting has been the fallout of the old apartheid system; and even if political violence should decrease, disturbances in the black communities will be a factor restraining the flow of population into the cities.

There are also a number of factors that will continue to restrain the movement of people into the cities. Before the abolition of restrictions, movement was largely that of people moving from the homeland rural areas to the border areas which, as already noted, furthered urbanization in the homelands. Living in these border areas and commuting to work has had a number of advantages. Rent is cheap; a worker can live with his family; and in places it is even possible to pursue the traditional practice-cum-occupation of cattle grazing. Moreover many possess homes and have other investments in these areas, and all of these make people hesitate to move to some other location. This is one factor restraining movement.

Another factor is that the homelands could become growth bases for tertiary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Concerning the fighting among fellow blacks, see Adam and Moodley [1] and Maake [23].

industries and provide a greater concentration of employment opportunities when compared with black townships in the white areas. Black townships within the large cities are often scattered. It means that the demand for the products and services that depend on the informal sector has also been diffused and not concentrated in any location. The long-existing restrictions on running businesses in the black townships also has impeded the growth of black enterprises and employment [2, p. 70, Table 3.1].

While the above-described factors will work to restrain the movement of people into the cities, there are also a number of factors at work that will stimulate the flow of people to the cities. A major one is the great difficulty for developing agriculture in the black homelands. The 58,500 white farming families cultivate 85 million hectares of land, an average of 1,438 hectares per family, while the area of arable land for a family in the homelands is a mere 0.2 of a hectare (in QwaQwa) to 1.5 hectares (in Transkei) [12, p. 7] [35, p. 158, Table 6.1]. If 2 hectares are needed to produce enough corn for the subsistence of one household, one sees quickly that there is extremely strong pressure pushing people out of the rural areas and into the urban work force. Land reform would help the development of small black farmers, but the latter depends highly on implementation of the former. With the power base of the new Mandela government built on the ANC whose support comes from the black urban communities, what sort of official agricultural policy will finally be forthcoming?

The influx of black laborers into the urban areas will not only come from the rural areas of the homelands. One-third of South Africa's black labor force is employed on white-operated farms [35, p. 167, Table 6.2], and it is possible that they will choose to migrate to the urban areas and enter the urban informal sector. In some cities former farm laborers make up a large number of the workers in the informal sector, and the trends exhibited by these migrant farm workers will be watched with keen interest by researchers in the field [6, pp. 136–37].

There has also been the already-noted impact of significant changes in labor policy carried out by the mining industry [19, p. 63]. With the need to upgrade the skill and technical level of the black labor force and the repeal of restrictions on the types of jobs blacks can do, the number of settled workers living with their families has increased. Meanwhile, expansion of labor procurement within South Africa in place of the use of foreign migrant labor has continued to advance, and this has further increased the number of black urban residents.

The South African economy is suffering from recession, but this has been mitigated by the psychological impact of heightened expectations contained in the country's political changes. The spread of black elementary and secondary education will stimulate a greater outflow of young blacks seeking employment and further education. As has been seen in other African countries, if there is no satisfactory progress in the development of agriculture and the rural areas, there will be an

increase in the number of school graduates and not farmers who leave the villages for the urban areas.

This section has discussed the factors restraining or stimulating the influx of people into the urban areas following the abolition of movement controls. But it is also necessary to consider the regional variations in these factors. In Cape Town, for example, because of its geographical situation, black laborers are by necessity settled residents and not frontier commuters. In Durban and Pretoria there are many frontier commuters, but in the former there has been a marked influx of laborers who have left their families in the homelands, and there have been numerous clashes with local-settled blacks, while in the latter the majority of black laborers have been urban residents for several generations. Thus there cannot be a single, uniform discussion of the factors involved in urbanization and the influx of people into South Africa's cities.

#### CONCLUSION

Alteration of the apartheid system that came with the abolition of movement restrictions did not suddenly lead to the influx of a large number of blacks into the urban areas. This was because even under restrictions movement had taken place, and people had devised ways of living and working that coped with the realities of restrictions. This study examined the factors both restraining and stimulating the future movement of population into the urban areas, but the trend will be for the urban black population to increase at a faster pace than it has in the past. Already as a result of this trend, it was shown that the level of urban indices has begun to decline. The shortage of housing and basic services is becoming more acute. The rate of house rent collection has worsened because of rent boycotts; meanwhile there has been a definite increase in the number of homeless [36, p. 12]. It is now necessary for South Africa to deal realistically with these problems. In this respect, the country is faced with the same urban problems that are plaguing the other African countries, and South Africa needs to take note of their experiences [4, p. 24]. However, the fact remains that compared with the rest of the countries of Africa, South Africa has achieved far and away much greater development in the area of basic material well-being and technology.

When dealing with urban issues, it is difficult to apply the developed-country/developing-country classification to South Africa. Moreover, the country has exceedingly complex ethnic problems and extreme differences in wealth and facilities from one locale to another, and in this respect South Africa exhibits in miniature the contradictions that plague the modern world. These same complex problems and extreme differences will also make the future course of urbanization and population movement in South Africa a complex process.

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