THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE IN JAPAN

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I. DOMINATION OF EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND IN EMPLOYMENT: PREFACING REMARKS

1. Education as a Tool for Modernization

The positive contribution of education to Japan's modernization and industrialization has frequently been pointed out.[1] The prudence of the Meiji government in concentrating its attention on education for the purpose of destroying the status system of the Tokugawa era, under which social position was determined by birth, is widely acknowledged. Education played the role of emplanting in the minds of a people who, under isolationism and feudalism, had been parochial in outlook an awareness of the nation and of a national ethic, as expressed in such slogans as *messhi hōkō* ("Country above self") and *chūkun aikoku* ("loyalty and patriotism"), and in the Imperial Rescript on Education. It was through a nationwide system of compulsory education that Japan was able to acquire an awareness of national unity. Thus, education was the most important instrument of nationalization, both psychological, ideological, moral and spiritual.

On the other hand, however, education was also the most powerful means for modernization of the state. Rapid absorption of the learning, techniques and systems of the advanced Western nations was an absolute prerequisite; for this, it was necessary to discover and promote as extensively as possible talented individuals capable of acquiring Western knowledge. If education opens doors without regard to status, and trains the capabilities necessary for modernization, then it is a most efficacious means for modernization. Thus, vocational education trains the personnel requisite for modernization from among the lower classes, while higher education per-

1 The most widely known examples are:
R. N. Bellah, *Values and Social Change in Modern Japan*, Asian Culture Studies, 3, Tokyo, ICU, 1962; M. B. Jansen, *On Studying the Modernization of Japan*, Asian Culture Studies, 3, Tokyo, ICU, 1962; H. Passin, *Society and Education in Japan*, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1965; R. K. Hall, *Education for the New Japan*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949; Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, *The Role of Education in the Social and Economic Development of Japan*, Tokyo, Ministry of Education, 1966.

forms the same function for the upper classes. The policies of modernization and industrialization, which were pushed forward under such slogans as "civilization and enlightenment," or "a prosperous nation and strong army," or "industry and enterprise," were made possible through education. As may be seen in the slogan "Japanese spirit, Western ability," educational specialization was interpreted as a harmonizing element, with compulsory education assuming the responsibility for nationalization, while vocational and higher education took on the responsibility for modernization. Thus it was asserted that the development of the capability to modernize would not bring Westernization of spirit or ideology—or "non-Japanization"; rather, it would intensify the strength of the state and through this thereby guarantee the spiritual independence of the Japanese.

2. The Formation of the Phenomenon of "Educational Backgroundism"

Since secondary and higher schools were established for the purpose of nurturing the personnel requisite for modernization, graduates of these schools naturally acted to promote modernization, and received preferential treatment from a society and a state which considered modernization to be necessary. For these individuals, education was the most certain means for achieving success; but because they were at the same time acting in principle for the state, this was no contravention of the ethic of "country above self," or "loyalty and patriotism." It was sufficient for them to assert that they possessed Japanese spirit while having Western ability. Advancement to a higher school was recommended not only for utilitarian but also for moral reasons. As it became widely acknowledged that graduation from a higher school was of sufficient utilitarian and moral value, it was inevitable that there should be a heightened popular desire for educational advancement.

Even today, this desire for educational advancement shows no sign of decline. One problem in Japanese education which has been pointed out by all writers is the fact that preparation for college entrance examinations dominates education from the high school level down, even extending into the home. Moreover, the entrance examinations in their present form are not a sufficient measure of an applicant's ability. This criticism has been ceasely leveled since the early Taishō years (1910's).[2]

At the root of this thriving desire for educational advancement are the established system and customs which lead people to feel that graduation from a higher school is advantageous in every way. Because of excessive veneration of educational background, it is not a person's quality, ability or

2 Cf. Kōichi Masuda, *Nyūgaku shiken seidoshi no kenkyū* (Research on the History of the Entrance Examination System), Tokyo, Tōyōkan shuppansha, 1961.

merit, as these have derived from his education, which are at issue, but rather what his academic background is. Once he possesses a prestigious academic pedigree, then all need for effort on his part ceases. In contrast, those who do not have such an advantageous educational background cannot look forward to a good position after graduation, and tend to suffer from an inferiority complex, feeling that no amount of effort will be of avail. In this lies the danger that education, which is to develop talented individuals, will instead come to squander individual talent. This might have been acceptable in an era in which the tempo of social change, for example the pace of technological innovation, was slow. But today, when the pace is swift, when there is a labor shortage, when there is severe interenterprise and international competition, there must be extensive reexamination of this system of formalistic respect for educational background.[3]

Thus, educational background or, more concretely speaking, the diploma, become the base for both formal and informal evaluation of the individual for his whole life, without reference to his ability or effort. These are also the bases upon which the individual is assigned financial remuneration and social status. This social habit and system of excessive respect for educational background is generally referred to as "educational backgroundism," which tends to be opposed to the principles of evaluation according to ability and effort, i.e., to the principle of meritocracy. Educational backgroundism is particularly irrational in cases in which there have been unequal opportunities for educational advancement, or in which education does not evaluate and train true ability and merit, or in which, moreover, the diploma has voice long after graduation.

Educational backgroundism takes two forms. The first is vertical, and is related to level of education. For example, graduation from college is esteemed in and of itself more highly than graduation from high school; graduation from high school, more than graduation from middle school. To differences in level of education are attached discrimination in opportunities for taking company entrance examinations, wages, and routes of promotion. The second form is horizontal, and is related to the type of school. From among graduates of the same level of school, those from certain specific institutions receive preferential treatment. For example, only graduates of certain top universities will be employed at certain places, and graduates of these schools will be promoted. There are differences in salary scale according to the faculty of the university in which the individual was enrolled.

3 A famous example is the best seller by Akio Morita, Vice President of Sony: *Gakureki muyō ron* (A Discussion of the Uselessness of Educational Background), Tokyo, Bungeishunjū, 1965.

The qualifications of graduates of part-time evening colleges are often not recognized.[4]

Under this system of educational backgroundism, those who are the possessers of a good academic pedigree tend to be indolent and have a vacuous sense of superiority, while those who do not have such a pedigree have a sense of hopeless inferiority. Concomitantly, there is born an emotional antagonism between the "haves" and the "have-nots." Again, only graduates of specific universities control certain organizations; and from this derives a phenomenon which may be discribed as a proprietary sense in an exclusive, feudal atmosphere.

3. The Function of Educational Backgroundism

Along with deficiencies outlined above, there are also good points to educational backgroundism and conditions which brought the inevitable creation and persistence of the phenomenon. There is no doubt that neither widespread desire for educational advancement, nor dissemination of education, nor through these the birth of abundant talent, would have been possible without excess respect to education, or irrational demand for diploma. Moreover, educational backgroundism exists parallel to the development both of the professions and the bureaucracy. One characteristic of the professions is high level education, and a demand for formal qualifications. This is testified to by the facts that in every country from early times, there have been departments which fostered the professions of law and medicine; and that these departments always have high prestige. It is inevitable, therefore, that university graduates should come to monopolize these professions. As higher education spreads, and as the kinds and number of personnel in the professions increase, formal educational background becomes a condition for entrance into each respective profession. In the case of Japan, who plunged precipitously down the road to modernization, this tendency was all the more pronounced because it was necessary for the schools to educate afresh all the members of the professions which assumed the responsibility for modernization—for example, the higher bureaucrats, university professors, engineers, doctors, teachers, and military men, etc.

Furthermore, it may be said that the domination of educational backgroundism in the bureaucracy and giant organizations is a virtual necessity. The bureaucracy frequently gives birth to professionals according to rank

[4] For a discussion of the function of higher education in turning out an educated elite in Japan, cf. Makoto Aso, *Erīto to kyōiku* (Education and the Elite), Tokyo, Fukumura shuppan, 1968; Hiroshi Mannari, *Bijinesu-erīto* (The Business Elite), Tokyo, Chūōkōronsha, 1965, and Yoshimatsu Aonuma, *Nihon nò keieisō* (Japan's Managerial Class), Tokyo, Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 1965); etc.

and division of responsibility. On account of its magnitude and the need for a rational framework, there is a tendency for the bureaucracy to undertake selection of applicants, internal assignment of positions, and evaluation of qualifications for promotion, according to formalistic, quantitative, comparative, objective criteria. There are, however, not that many criteria which are possessed by all men which are also capable of fine gradation. It is for this reason that age and educational background are criteria for evaluation, as they are possessed by every member of the bureaucracy. Thus, seniority and educational backgroundism dominate the bureaucracy. While both of these criteria are in certain ways opposed to the principles of meritocracy, it is at the same time possible for each individual to predict his future position according to criteria which he himself recognizes. We may see here the operation of the predictability of which K. Mannheim speaks. In particular, those individuals who are spoken of in R. Turner's "sponsored mobility" early cultivate within themselves the qualities appropriate for future executives; and this long-term training of executive candidates who were chosen at an early age may be said to be a valid educational pattern.[5] In addition, it is also possible that this system does away with futile competition based on vain ambition, preserves organizational unity and order, foresees the future of each individual according to the relevant criteria, and brings a sense of accomplishment, of contentment with one's present lot. Thus, educational backgroundism plays a positive role vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

4. School Cliques

"School clique" refers here to a group of individuals who look out for one another on the basis of identical educational backgrounds. Among the various school cliques is that based on the "same school," which derives from the emotional awareness of having been a fellow student with the other members of the group, with whom one passed the impressionable days of youth. The clique is formed through the relationships between teacher and student, patterned after that between parent and child; and between senior and junior, patterned after that between older brother and younger brother. Hence, as with the family, the tacit norm of mutual assistance and care dominates. Thus, looked at in terms of its characteristics the school clique is certainly emotional and familial, emphasizing total

5 K. Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952, pp. 244–247 and R. H. Turner, "Mode of Social Ascent through Education: Sponsored and Contest Mobility," in A. H. Halsey *et al.*, eds., *Education, Economy and Society; A Reader in the Sociology of Education*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.

interpersonal relations. A junior will, without making a distinction between the person and the position, work himself to the bone for his senior, while the senior will take his junior in charge and look after him in every possible way. In the cold, fragmented, superficial, businesslike bureaucratic society, relationships such as these provide security for the junior; and for the senior, a means for manipulating the organization through his junior. The senior can thoroughly train his junior. Thus, the relations which are based on the school clique are personal and communal, and the deep awareness of reciprocity is at the same time calculating and concerned with the profit which can be derived from it. The junior binds himself in this relationship because he believes that the senior will at some time or in some circumstance give him backing and protection. The senior, foreseeing this eventuality, dominates the junior.

When so examined, it is possible to understand why educational backgroundism, and in particular school cliques, are so conspicuous within the apparently modern bureaucracy and professions. Even on the basis of our survey,[6] educational backgroundism seems widespread among big business, government and the professions; hence a "complex" about educational background is widespread among the people who work in these areas. Within one large enterprise, this complex was found to be rare among those in higher ranking positions for whom the demonstration of merit is an easy matter, or among those technicians for whom evaluation of merit is simple.

Because it has been unavoidable that the development of society be accompanied by development of the professions and the bureaucracy, it has been inevitable that the significance of educational background increase. But loud voices have been raised against this, arguing that educational backgroundism is a contradiction of the principle of meritocracy. To reconcile this contradiction, it may be necessary to introduce the principle of evaluation according to merit into the schools, and particularly universities, which are the seed-beds of educational backgroundism. The question is however, whether or not Japanese universities would live up to this principle.

In order to clarify the function that educational background plays in the labor market, and to perceive the influence which it extends over individual careers and minds, I have conducted multi-faceted survey research over a number of years. What is presented here consists of a statement of the actual circumstances and problems connected with school cliques in the academic marketplace,[7] as drawn from my research.

6 The results of this survey were published in Michiya Shimbori, ed., *Gakureki* (Educational Background), Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, 1966.

II. THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE IN JAPAN

1. *Lifetime Employment: The Characteristic Career Pattern of University Professors in Japan*

For the purpose of analyzing the characteristics of career patterns of Japanese university professors, I undertook a comparative study based on unstratified random sampling using the *Who's Who* of Japan, England, America, Germany and France. This comparison was made possible through the selection of 1,000 professors who were about 60 years old representing every profession and country.

The most Japanese characteristic is that of lifetime employment. This is revealed in two ways. First, it may be seen in the phenomenon to which might be attached the name of lifetime employment of the student, or lifetime employment in terms of academic background. Second is lifetime employment of the professors, or lifetime employment in terms of career. Thus, university professors in Japan often spend their student days at one university only; and again, when they seek employment at a particular university, there is a tendency for this to involve long term, often lifetime, work at that school.

Among our sample selection were men who had enrolled in two different departments, and those who had also attended graduate school. But they had merely transferred within *one* institution and virtually without exception there was none who had attended two or more universities. This is not a particularly unusual phenomenon for Japanese, but in comparison with European and American professors this may be considered a unique characteristic. That is to say, the number of universities attended per person has been calculated as averaging 1.7 in England, 2.5 in America, 2.4 in Germany, and 2.0 in France. In contrast with Japan, where wandering from university to university on a quest for "university dragons" in the fashion of a knight-errant are non-existent, in America and Europe it is the exception, for university professors at least, to spend their student days at only one school.

It is said that nowhere is it harder to enter a university and easier to graduate than in Japan. At Japanese universities, there is a sense of gentleness and consideration which dominates, so that to dismiss a student once he has been accepted as a member of a group is difficult in terms of both

7 In addition to *Gakureki* cited above, see also *Gakubatsu* (Academic Clique), Tokyo, Fukumura shuppan, 1969, and *Nihon no daigaku kyōju shijō* (The Academic Marketplace in Japan), Tokyo, Toyokan shuppansha, 1965. What follows below is a revised and enlarged version of the author's "Nihon no daigaku kyōju shijō" (The Academic Marketplace in Japan), *Asahi jānaru*, Nov. 2, 1963.

psychology and the system. Or, looking at the opposite side of the situation, it is difficult to leave the university once one has entered.

The student is acquainted with only his university. The university knows only its own graduates. From this exclusive relationship between the two parties is born a sense of loyalty and devotion to one's school, and a gentle benevolence toward one's graduates. The clique arises. And the outside world too affixes to the graduate of one university the label of "graduate of that school."

One further characteristic of educational backgroundism in regard to university professors is the extent to which it concentrates on a specific university. Of our sample, for Japan, 38% of the total were graduates of the University of Tokyo, while 16% were graduates of the University of Kyoto. (The result of calculations of those above the rank of lecturer at four-year colleges—comprising 32,000 throughout the nation in 1963—shows the University of Tokyo with 25% and the University of Kyoto with 13% of the graduates. However, the above percentages remain valid if one remembers that in the *Who's Who* the majority of professors are of advanced age and were educated under the old system in which the former Imperial universities were even more dominant.) Thus, it is clear that certain specific universities concentrate on turning out professors.

In England and France, where there is a limited number of universities and, in particular, of institutions which focus on research, the degree of concentration is even more severe than in Japan.[8] In England, Oxford has 31% while Cambridge has 23%; and in France, Paris has a high 81%. In comparison, it is virtually impossible to see such a monopolistic tendency in America or Germany. In the latter two countries, the many old and new, private and public universities compete in turning out instructors.

Thus, the tendency for lifetime committment to appear as early as the undergraduate level in Japan is certainly pronounced. But career after graduation from the university is also characterized by lifetime employment, not less than educational career. Calculations on the number of times jobs were changed after first seeking employment after graduation, from the sample of each country, show that the average for Japan was 2.7; for England, 3.7; for America, 3.5; for France, 4.0; and for Germany, 3.7. Dividing the number of years up to the present by this number, gives the average number of years employment at one place. The figures are 12.2 years for Japan, 9.2 for England, 10.0 for America, 8.6 for France and 8.3

8 For details of conditions in England, see: Committee on Higher Education, *Higher Education*, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1963, Appendix Three, "Teachers in Higher Education."

for Germany.

Looking next at places of employment aside from universities, it is clear that in Japan, many work in government; in America, in the business world; in France, in the lycées and collèges. In the case of Germany, it is rare for an individual to transfer to a place outside the university. The calculations for transfer of employment among university professors alone show an average of 2.5 for England; 2.6 for America; 3.2 for France; 3.0 for Germany; and in contrast, 1.5 for Japan. No matter what figure, the number of times Japanese university professors change jobs is few; and in that fact we may see the characteristic of lifetime employment.

Moreover, the most pronounced characteristic of the career pattern of Japanese university professors is the relationship between the individual and the alma mater. Those who are employed by their alma mater account for 55% of the total; and the average number of years employment there is 19.1. Lifetime employees in general account for 37%, while lifetime employees at the alma mater are calculated at 25%. This means that this 25% spends its entire life from the time of entrance into the university at that school alone. It is a tranquil life, proceeding in order from student to research assistant to lecturer to assistant professor to full professor; but the process is monotonous, not stimulating. Moreover, these people are talented individuals who simply remain at the alma mater.

If one calculates the same values for America and Europe, there is no significant difference between the percentages of those employed by the alma mater in Japan and in other countries. However, the average number of years employed by the alma mater is 13 or less, far shorter than the case in Japan. The percentage of those employed for lifetime is 8% for England, 11% for America, 5% for Germany, and 6% for France; while the figures for lifetime employment by the alma mater in particular are 5%, 6%, 4%, and 5% respectively. Thus, Japan shows a high rate unexampled among the other countries. When one considers that professors in the other countries generally have a multiple number of alma mater, it is immediately evident how remarkably characteristic lifetime employment, especially by the alma mater, is in Japan.

The above discussion offers background concerning the professors who are sufficiently successful and well-known to be recorded in the *Who's Who*. As corroborating evidence of the phenomenon of lifetime employment of university professors in Japan, we may examine the composition by age of all university professors in Japan, at approximately a five year interval.

The only available materials are two surveys conducted by the Japan Science Council in May 1955 and June 1959. This material presents evid-

ence concerning the composition by age of teachers of the rank of lecturer and up at four-year institutions. The results of categorization according to rank (lecturer and assistant professor being grouped together as assistant professor), and according to whether the institution is national or public, or private, are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.



As may be seen clearly at a glance, the age pyramid in the case of the national and public universities remains virtually unchanged; the pattern merely shifts horizontally to the right every five years. In the earlier year, the number of full professors who were between the ages of 45 and 49 was predominant, and those from age 40 to 59 accounted for 84% of the total. In contrast, five years later, those between the ages of 50 and 54 formed the peak of the pyramid, while those from 45 to 64 accounted for 84.4% of the total. That is to say, the average age of a full professor increased five years over the five year interval.

It goes without saying that this testifies to the fact that at the national and public universities the market is stationary and there is little transferring—i. e., that there is a system of lifetime employment. The fact that the slope for the younger stratum of lecturers and assistant professors is steep is a phenomenon which, above and beyond the fixed market, shows there is a ceiling on rate of promotion to the rank of full professor due to the seniority system.

In the case of private universities, the trend which was seen in the national and public universities is not apparent. The rate of promotion at the private universities is rapid. From the diagram it is clear that both transfer within the market and supply from outside are vigorous, and that excessive concentration upon one age group is not so prominent.

Of course, the evidence given above does not directly prove that there is a trend for lifetime employment of professors at national and public universities; i.e., that a person devotes a lifetime of work to one school. However, it does at least demonstrate to a certain extent that within the market of the national and public universities lifetime employment does occur.

2. Rate of Inbreeding and Rate of Succession

It is clear that at least within the national and public universities, transfer (or change of post) is limited to within the institution and that, as a whole, there is lifetime employment. We may infer from other data that even horizontal transfer within the institution is becoming more rare as time passes.

We refer to the operational concepts which we are utilizing here as rate of inbreeding and rate of succession. The former refers to the percentage of professors, from the rank of lecturer and above, at a particular university who are graduates of that school. Rate of succession refers to the percentage of professors at a school who are graduates of other institutions, but with whose alma mater the employing school maintains close connections, thus giving rise to a kind of "pecking order" among a group of institutions in regard to employment of graduates of the schools involved. When one examines the 260 four-year colleges throughout the nation for 1962, one finds a sharply defined pyramid distribution in the rate of inbreeding, with the Universities of Tokyo (95.3%) and Kyoto (88.9%) at the top.[9] (Cf. Table 1.)

The rate of inbreeding is generally high among universities which have existed since before the War, in particular the former Imperial universities including Tokyo and Kyoto, private, medical, dental, and pharmaceutical schools, and those for religion and the arts. There is a strong tendency for cliquism, in the trend for the professorial ranks at a particular school to be filled by graduates only of that school. Professors who are graduates of the national universities monopolize 76.7% of the total academic market; if we limit the market to that for professors at the national universities, the rate reaches 94.6%. That is to say, the national universities limit their buying market to only graduates of the national universities and thus the so-called national university clique is formed. Moreover, because

9 Education in Japan has been greatly reformed in the postwar period. Under the old prewar system, the regular route to higher education proceeded along the path from six years of compulsory elementary education to five years of middle school, three years of high school, and three years of college. The old imperial universities were composite institutions with many departments and were of the greatest prestige; and even among the imperial universities, the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto have continued to hold a dominating position even to the present day. One other route to higher education was to go to a three year technical high school after completing middle school, and to become a technician or a teacher or to enter an enterprise as a middle rank technician. Under the postwar reforms, the two kinds of higher schools were merged on a regional basis to form a new university, while the original high schools, higher technical schools, and colleges became the various departments of the newer universities. Elementary education is now six years and middle school is three years—these two being compulsory; high school is three years and college is four years, while graduate school is from two to five.

Table 1. Distribution of Universities by Rate of Inbreeding

Rate of Inbreeding	Number of Universities
90–100	1
80–90	4
70–80	2
60–70	6
50–60	7
40–50	14
30–40	16
20–30	22
10–20	58
0.1–10	88
0	39
Unclear	3
Total	260

graduates of the national universities occupy 53.3% of the modest private university market, the majority of the graduates of the private institutions tend to remain at their alma mater. The high rate of inbreeding at the private universities perhaps represents an inevitable trend as a measure of self-defence and counterattack.

It is natural that schools which have a low rate of inbreeding should have to rely upon imports from outside their walls in order to fill up their professorial ranks. If, however, this market is monopolized by a certain specific university, then it is well to suspect the existence of a "succession clique." Of course, in this case as in the rate of inbreeding, the decisive factor determining whether or not a clique exists lies in the nature of the market—whether or not there is any freedom in the means and procedures of employing teachers. But universities with a high rate of succession tend to look to only one particular institution for their supply of teachers, and the analogy may be drawn that the employing university is a colony for whom the supplying university is the motherland. There is certainly a high degree to which universities, over half of whose faculties are drawn from among the graduates of one specific university, are subordinate in a chain of succession to the latter. We may think of those universities in which the number of graduates from a specific university on the faculty occupies from one-third to one-half as being of middle rank in the chain of succession, while those whose faculty is less than one-third, of lower rank. We have constructed the following table which classifies these universities according to the geographical distance between the colonial university and the mother university. (Cf. Table 2.)

The following facts clearly emerge when the rate of succession is

Table 2. Relationship between the Rate of Succession and the Geographical Distance

Degree of Succession	More than One-Half	One Half to One-Third	Less than One-Third	Total
Very Near (Same Prefecture)	37	38	29	104
Near (Adjacent Prefecture)	3	23	28	54
Far (Same Region)	2	7	27	36
Very Far (Other Region)	0	4	10	14

examined. There is a tendency for the rate of succession to decline over time, and for the operation of strong regional conditions to influence the rate. Each region presents the appearance of a conspicuous economic bloc. For example, universities in Hokkaidō are next in line to the University of Hokkaidō, while schools in Kyūshū are next in line to the University of Kyūshū. This kind of regional bloc is all the more conspicuous among the younger instructors. The rate of succession for the assistant professor level is higher than that for full professors among the universities in the prefectures in which the major universities are located. Universities which in terms of distance are located close to the major university are more easily subject to the control of the latter. Figuratively speaking, there is a tendency for a regional "Monroe Doctrine" to make headway as the colonial area gradually liberates itself from the motherland. And the tendency for the Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto to split the country in half and control the academic market will decline steadily from now on, and lead to the rise of "nuclear" universities in each region due to the limitation of supply to an absolute number.

In contrast with the decline of the rate of succession, there is a tendency for the rate of inbreeding to increase dramatically. As goes without saying, universities which supply their own faculty are limited and it is chiefly the older universities and those which, if new, have graduate schools, bear the burden of turning out professors. In fact, there are only fifteen universities which have produced 400 or more university professors. Again, as goes without saying, it is necessary for a university to be old in order for it to supply its own faculty. In other words, faculty inbreeding starts with the junior faculty and works up as time passes to the full professors.

For the purpose of examining the tendency toward inbreeding it is necessary first, to analyze the university in terms of its departments, because even within one university the age of the different departments differs; and next, to calculate the rate of inbreeding according to the period of establishment.

3. The Tendency toward Inbreeding: A Historical View

In terms of the history of higher education in Japan, there were two epochal eras of expansion: 1919, when the Provisional Council on Education expanded and upgraded the universities; and 1949, when the new university system was created. Because there is exactly a thirty year interval between these two, we have divided the period into ten year intervals and have classified the departments of the older universities according to the period of their establishment. The rates of inbreeding for these are given in Table 3.

Table 3. The Rate of Inbreeding of the Prewar University Faculties by the Period of Establishment

Period	1908	1918	1928	1938	1948
Number of Faculties	47	6	119	26	69
Number of Full Professors	1,052	156	2,601	696	1,476
(Those Graduated from Alma Mater)	(923)	(117)	(1,259)	(234)	(163)
Number of Assistant Professors	1,457	217	2,824	861	2,122
(Those Graduated from Alma Mater)	(1,282)	(188)	(1,871)	(491)	(931)
Rate of Inbreeding					
Full Professors	87.7	75.0	52.2	33.6	11.0
Assistant Professors	88.0	86.6	66.3	57.0	43.9

On the basis of this table the following fact is abundantly clear: that no matter how old the university, the rate of inbreeding among junior faculty has always exceeded the rate for senior faculty. That is, the older universities attempt to pack the younger faculty—lecturers and assistant professors—with graduates of that school. The old universities, in short, have a protectionist policy, and it is extraordinarily hard for a graduate of another university to join their faculty.

A second clear fact is that the more recently established the department, the more rapid the decline in rate of inbreeding of both junior and senior faculty. Among universities established fifty years ago,, approximately 90% of the faculty are graduates of the school at which they are employed. Among those established thirty years ago, the percentage becomes about 33% for full professors and more than 50% of the junior faculty; while at schools fifteen years old, 40% of the junior faculty is self-supplied. We can only be surprised at how rapidly the tendency for the older Japanese universities to supply their own faculty has progressed.

One additional fact which may be drawn from this table is that the differential between the rates of inbreeding of junior and senior faculty increase as we approach the present day. We may predict that even among the relatively newer universities, there will be a tendency for inbreeding to spread gradually to the full professor level when the present generation of

full professors retires. No matter how it is looked at, the tendency for inbreeding in departments which have developed from older universities will gradually become more pronounced from now on, and will lead these schools to assume an independent and proprietary structure. If we grant that it is difficult for graduates of other schools to find jobs in the departments of the older institutions—which have the best research facilities—then this means that the only place to which people who do not remain at their alma mater can go for jobs is the older professional school or newer university, whose research facilities are inferior.

Moreover, there is a tendency for a decline in the rate of succession which is dependent on the economic bloc. The increase in rate of inbreeding and the decline in rate of succession is signified in the difficulties of transferring to a new job. In essence, this means an increase in lifetime employment, and the degree to which the alma mater becomes the "end of the line" for university professors. Men who teach at their alma mater do not even attempt to leave the school until they reach retirement age and become a star professor emeritus at some other school. Likewise, professors from other schools do not come to the alma mater.

Table 4 presents calculations similar to those given above for the departments of the older professional schools and newer universities for whom the chief function is *not* the nurture of scholars, one part of which is the production of instructors. It is natural that we should find that the rate of inbreeding has fixed limits, with the exception of certain special fields for which there was no provision in the older universities, such as the performing arts and the merchant-marine.

Table 4. The Rate of Inbreeding of the Prewar Professional Schools and Newer Universities by the Period of Establishment

Period	1908	1918	1928	1938	1948	1958
Number of Faculties	29	24	53	25	84	209
Number of Full Professors	586	498	948	444	1,601	2,665
(Those Graduated from Alma Mater)	(100)	(82)	(82)	(39)	(70)	(68)
Number of Assistant Professors	739	581	1,229	480	1,930	6,007
(Those Graduated from Alma Mater)	(196)	(169)	(313)	(126)	(312)	(244)
Rate of Inbreeding						
Full Professors	17.1	16.5	8.6	8.8	4.4	2.6
Assistant Professors	26.5	29.1	25.5	26.3	16.2	4.1

Again, these schools are making great efforts to become self-sufficient, and the rate of inbreeding is higher in the longer established institutions. Likewise, the rate of inbreeding for the junior faculty stratum is already higher than the rate for the senior faculty. However, no matter how long

established a school may be, there is none for which the rate of inbreeding exceeds 30% and in general, it may be thought that the upper limit on the rate is 25%.

This may be looked at from a different point of view. When the tendency toward inbreeding is taken to its logical conclusion and the graduates of each university look for positions as prefessors, then only one-fourth of the graduates can be employed by their school, while the other three-quarters must look elsewhere. Moreover, the majority of this three-quarters is placed in the chain of succession of other presently influential schools. Of the 260 four-year schools throughout the nation, the number for which the rates of inbreeding and of succession are 50% or above is 50; while if we lower the rates to 33%, the number of schools becomes 164, or 70% of the total number of institutions. At these universities, over one-third to one-half of the faculty is occupied by graduates of one school. From this it is possible to see how inbred Japanese universities are.

But as has already been made clear, the rate of succession is continuing to decrease. In other words, the influential universities are continuing to lose the market over which they can exert control at will.

4. Seniority and the Chair System

There are mainly three methods by which empty chairs are filled in Japan's academic market. The first is *tokoroten*, or change of post within the institution, in which a person of lower rank on the faculty is promoted to occupy the vacant seat. The second, *tarai mawashi*, or "passing the bucket," is to invite a person from a university which is next in the chain of succession; his position will then be filled by a person in another university in the chain; and the latter, in turn, will be succeeded by someone from yet another school in the group, or by a recent graduate of yet some other institution. The third method, *amakudari*, or "descent from heaven," involves filling the empty chair with someone who is particularly prominent outside the school.

The first method is an internal operation of one particular school, and constitutes promotion based chiefly on the school clique. The second is an internal operation of the entire market of one group of universities, and constitutes transfer of posts based on the succession clique. The third is a means of advertising and increasing the university's prestige and authority, as well as functioning to utilize talent and relieve unemployment.

The third method of these is most conspicuous at the private universities, but even at these schools this method will probably decline gradually as progress is made toward self-sufficiency of supply at the prestigious

schools, and as a retirement system is put into effect. The second method will gradually become more difficult to use with the decline in the rate of succession. What remains, then, is the first method, of change of post within the institution. We may note that this appears as an increase in the rate of inbreeding. Change of post within the institution is one form of seniority, as a means of employing and promoting professors. There are a number of psychological and systematic factors which control this method. Two in particular may be mentioned here.

First, is the pyramid pattern of rank within Japanese universities, in particular the chair system.[10] As is well-known, the positions at a Japanese university consist of full professor, assistant professor, and lecturer. Under the chair system, the proportion of full professors to assistant professors, or to lecturers, is 1 : 1 and 1 : 2 at departments of medecine. Thus, there is a pillar-shaped pattern with the number of junior and senior faculty members parallel.

In order to ascertain the patterns in various foreign countries, we examined the sources for each country, especially the catalogues of the leading universities, and also made inquiries at the embassies and ministries or departments of education of each country. There are many difficulties involved in comparing countries like Japan, where the national university sets the pattern and where the staff is decided upon by law, with Western European countries where independence of action and diversity are entrusted to the university. However, one major characteristic is that whereas in Japan there are three and, in fact, really two levels of rank, in the Western European countries not only are there multiple levels; also, the structure of the ranks takes on a pyramid shape with a wide base and narrow apex, France being the sole exception.

For example, in England the ranks consist of professor, reader, senior lecturer, assistant lecturer, demonstrator, etc. The ratio between full professors and those of lower rank is 13 : 100 at Oxford, and 14 : 100 at London, a pyramid form with exceedingly steep slopes. In such instances as this where the higher ranking positions are scarce, it is natural that competition and evaluation on the basis of academic merit should be

10 The chair system as found in Japan took form in the prewar universities and even today is found at universities with graduate schools which derived from the old schools. For example, in the English Department the lecture course consist of Old and medieval English literature, modern English literature, American literature, etc. Each lecture course is given by one full professor and one assistant professor or lecturer. Each teacher is assigned his particular lecture course according to his specialty. Transferring to a related lecture course, or intervening in someone else's course is not permitted.

necessary for promotion. In instances where the pattern is pillar-shaped and the junior and senior ranks are parallel, automatic promotion in order is possible when a higher position becomes vacant. Thus, Japan's 1 : 1 chair system is an escalator guaranteeing promotion within the institution. However, in both business and government in Japan, this type of promotion or complete change of post within the institution is impossible, because of the pyramid shaped distribution of positions in these fields.

It would, perhaps, be better if it were possible to promote in order those of proven academic merit. However, in the chair system, each department is a pillar unto itself, and the 1 : 1 ratio is literally one person to one person. In Japan's universities, not only is the university as a whole a closed clique; but also the chairs are exclusive and within the university there are many narrow pillars erected which do not permit mutual criticism and communication. As a result, the chairs have given birth to feudal relations, the directions of research are rigid, and the development of new areas of learning is obstructed. But what should be pointed out in particular is the danger of a cycle of what might be termed "arteriosclerosis."

5. Arteriosclerosis

Let us illustrate this by a readily understood example. Let us assume that at present, a 40 year old professor and a 30 year old assistant professor are in charge of a particular chair. This chair is in the hands of two persons who have been newly promoted and are full of vigor. The atmosphere is one of great animation. After twenty years, however, the men are 60 and 50, respectively. There is grave danger that this chair will display the symptoms of arteriosclerosis. If we suppose that the professor retires and a 30 year old research assistant is promoted to assistant professor, according to the principles of the school clique, then this time the age differential between the two is twenty years. Thus, this chair has a ten-twenty year cycle of youth and old age.

It is not only for each chair that this kind of cycle may be seen. If within just one generation the professors are excessively rigid, such a cycle may be born in the university as a whole and in the academic world as a whole. In fact, if we examine the composition by age of teachers at the present day throughout the nation according to department, it is clear that this is not necessarily a groundless fear.

At the time of the survey which was carried out in 1962, there were fields in which there was a concentration of relatively younger teachers, and fields in which there was a concentration of relatively older teachers. The former included the faculties of medicine, the physical sciences and engine-

ering, etc. (The peak in each was between 35–39.) The latter included agriculture (50–54), and literature (45–49). In the future it is probable that after twenty years, those areas which now have a concentration of young men will come to have a concentration of elderly men. Is it truly desirable for the bearers of learning, the holders of the chairs, to contribute to this kind of cyclical youth and old age?

Age is certainly an important factor for those within and without Japan's universities. It is inconceivable that individuals suitable to be university professors should be concentrated entirely within one generation. Yet despite this, the conditions of lifetime employment, seniority and school cliques make it possible for an individual, regardless of his performance, ability and merit, to enter into the academic marketplace if he has not fallen into place in the age cycle.

The development of human talent is all very well and good. But the problem here is the use of this developed talent. From the point of view of the university, it is necessary that at the least the difference in age between professors and assistant professors holding a chair be, in general, established (usually 15–18 years); and also that the professors at the university and throughout the country not be overly concentrated within any one generation.

6. *The System of Guaranteed Tenure*

Along with the system of chairs, the early appointment to tenure positions is among the conditions controlling seniority which require study. In Japan, the position of lecturer is a tenure post and once appointed to it, the status of the individual is guaranteed for life. Thereafter, even if it is clearly evident that he is a person of no ability and who does no research, he will not be forced to retire. And not only that; he is also promised promotion through the system of *tokoroten*.

This guarantee of status to university professors is a significant condition guaranteeing freedom of research. But the problem in Japan is that tenure can be assigned too early.[11] It is impossible, at too early a stage, for an individual to accumulate sufficient publications for an objective critical evaluation of his ability. In Japan it is easy for vacancies to be created at the lower ranking positions through the various methods of promotion. As a consequence, even if a candidate were to be searched for on the open market, there would be a paucity of objective materials useful for a comparative evaluation of the many young candidates. Given this

11 For a discussion of tenure, see: C. Byse and L. Houghin, *Tenure in American Higher Education*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1959.

situation, due consideration for the lifetime employment of the student means that preference is shown to the graduates of the school in question, as they are the best known.

It is, yet again, the chair system which exacerbates this condition. Because of a system in which the only person who is truly capable of evaluating the student is the professor who holds the chair, in point of actual fact this person alone becomes the one to recommend and decide on employment for the student. This may well be the major cause of the uniquely feudal beneficent atmosphere of Japan's universities.

At what point should a person receive tenure? At the same time that positions are assigned according to ability and effort, freedom of research is also guaranteed, as noted above. Given these points, tenure becomes a difficult problem. The American Association of University Professors has concluded that it is appropriate for the first seven years after appointment to the rank of instructor to be considered probationary. It is usual for tenure to apply from the rank of associate professor. In Germany the rank of private docent is also probationary; and most people are still in this position even after passing 40. According to the materials available to us, Taiwan is the most severe—every year even full professors take examinations and renew their contracts. In Finland there are eight levels of rank, and tenure applies only to the uppermost rank of full professor.

7. The Freedom to Not do Research

There is the danger that, given the circumstances outlined above, the "freedom of research" enjoyed by Japanese university professors may degenerate into "the freedom to not do research." I utilized the methods of Reeves, Lazarsfeld and Berelson in searching for a pattern.[12] Selecting as an example—which should by no means be taken as representative—the entire faculty of a four-year professional school, I examined the research and publications of the faculty for a five-year period.

The faculty of the school chosen, a college of education, consisted of 661 individuals. To the extent that I was able to determine after looking up each individual in at least the most common bibliographic sources,[13] of the total almost one-fourth, or 178 individuals, had not published or otherwise presented a single item.

12 F. W. Reeves *et al.*, *The University Faculty*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1933; P. Lazarsfeld and W. Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1958, pp. 7–11, 402–407; B. Berelson, *Graduate Education in the United States*, New York, MacGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 127–128.

13 For books, I checked the *Shuppan nenkan* (Publishers' Annual); for articles, the National Diet Liberary's *Zasshi kiji sakuin* (Periodical Index); and for addresses the programs of academic associations.

Furthermore, I looked at the active members of academic associations and professional organizations as an index to estimate the sense of responsibility and belonging to the academic world, and the degree of sense of commitment to one's own area of specialization. The result shows that one out of every ten, or 68 individuals, were not connected with either group and, moreover, had maintained silence over the five-year period.

To say that these people enjoy the "freedom to not do research" is certainly an overstatement. It may perhaps be that they do research, but simply do not announce their results. Perhaps they are not fortunate enough to have an opportunity to publish. Perhaps they are too entirely devoted to education, and the results of their work are aired only in the classroom. Perhaps a true piece of scholarly effort is not created within such a short period of time as five years. Perhaps it is, rather, the article dashed off for "popular enlightenment" simply to make money that is the evidence of "the freedom to not do research." Thus it may be predicted that there will be many objections and doubts offered to this interpretation.

But the problem remains that in the event that a university professor who (as an officially appointed scholar) does not announce officially his research within a fixed time, has become an idler. Indolence is not evidence of incompetence, but we can at least say that conditions which permit indolence are present within Japan's universities.

What sort of person is this idle man? Classifying the 661 members of the faculty of the school under study according to their alma mater, shows that 28.9% are graduates of the University of Tokyo; 22.9% are from the Tokyo University of Education; 18.6% from the University of Hiroshima; 12.4% from the University of Kyoto; 6.0% from the Universities of Kyūshū and Tōhoku, with the remaining 11.2% from other schools. (Graduates of the Universities of Kyūshū and Tōhoku were placed in one group on account of similarities in the age and character of the schools, as the absolute number from each school respectively was small.) Aside from the fact that a large percentage of idlers were from "other schools," there was no perceptible distinction based on alma mater. Again, there was absolutely no difference between those who are employed in universities in the Tokyo area, which is replete with opportunities for and stimuli to publishing, and those employed at other universities elsewhere.

That is to say, an idle man is idle no matter from what university he has graduated, no matter where the university is at which he works. A major circumstance giving rise to a non-productive teacher is the character of the university at which he is employed. There is a tendency for universities which do not have affiliated graduate schools to turn out three

times as non-productive teachers as universities with graduate schools, and for private universities to turn out twice as many as the national and public schools. However, here it is necessary to consider that there are many instances in which the private universities welcome retired professors from the national universities. Age is yet another conspicuous condition. As may be seen in Table 5, the number of non-publishing professors increases dramatically as the age exceeds 56.

Table 5. Age Distribution of Non-publishing Professors

Age	Total Number	Almost Never Published	%	Never Published	%
-30	11	3	27.3	1	9.1
31–35	56	8	14.3	2	3.6
36–40	77	19	24.7	2	2.6
41–45	83	9	10.8	2	2.4
46–50	118	25	21.2	7	5.9
51–55	138	34	25.4	8	6.0
56–60	88	32	36.4	13	14.8
61–65	34	14	41.2	5	14.7
66–70	23	11	47.8	8	34.8
Unclear	37	23		20	
Total	665	178	26.8	68	10.3

Turning now to the rate of registration in academic associations and professional organizations, there is one noticeable fact. The rank order for both is identical: Tokyo University of Education, Hiroshima, Kyūshū-Tōhoku, University of Tokyo, and others. A consideration of the social influence and history of these universities as a group suggests that perhaps, in terms of the conditions which pertain under cliques, the awareness of the clique and the form which the clique assumes differ between universities at which graduates cannot assert authority without forming a unified group, and universities which already have an inflexible constituency—or again, at which the graduates are too numerous to create a unified group. And one might even make the uncharitable interpretation that these occur in that older.

Although the discussion above has presented conclusions relating to non-productive professors, much the same can be said in reference to the competent. There is no room here to go into a detailed explanation; however, there is no perceptible statistical difference by university in terms of quantity of publication, and there is also no recognizable difference between national and public universities or private universities in terms of place of employment. However, men who work at the universities in the Tokyo area publish once again as much as those who belong to universities else-

where in the country; and the same is true of professors at universities with graduate schools in comparison with professors at universities without graduate schools. Here too there is a conspicuous decrease in the rate of publication over age 56.

It goes without saying that there is a great variety in the nature and kinds of professional contributions made by university professors. Because it was completely impossible to discriminate among the nature of these contributions, we have assigned a point value according to kind. Although it is difficult to assess the degree of academic merit itself, it may be that at least the degree of effort and activity can be expressed. This research model provides no evidence to support the assertion that there is no contradiction between the clique and meritocracy on the basis of the reason that the graduates of a particular university are outstanding. But the university from which one graduated and that at which one is employed play a large role in achievement over and above a set limit. Opportunity is a major condition, and opportunity is controlled by social influence.

In our research model, for example, we took the authors of articles in nine lecture series which cover the entire field of education, and examined the connections between them and the editors of the series. Of the authors, 69.7% were graduates of the same university as their editors; 37.9% were employed at the same university as the editor; while 34.0% had both graduated from and were employed at the same university as the editor. This means that opportunities for activity are greatly limited insofar as there is neither kind of relationship with the editor, who is the one to wield social influence.

The discussion presented above has suggested that there are a number of problems inherent in the academic marketplace in Japan. A veritable mountain of conditions has accumulated which should be examined in order to deal with the three most basic problems: first, the liberalizing of the academic marketplace; second, awarding appropriate positions to those of true academic ability; and third, enabling true ability to be freely displayed and thereby enlivening and stimulating research on Japan's university campuses.