Politicisation of the Appointment and Removal of Judges in a Declining Democracy: The Case of Bangladesh
by Noriyuki Asano and Kazuki Minato
In Bangladesh, the judiciary has adjudicated important political issues, particularly cases of constitutional amendments. On the other hand, the judiciary has been utterly politicised against a backdrop of deep-seated antagonism and mistrust between the two major political parties. Although the related literature tends to focus on either the judicialisation of politics or the politicisation of the judiciary alone, this paper argues that politicisation and judicialisation have coexisted and the relative importance of these two factors can change depending on the type of issue dealt with by the judiciary. Accordingly, this paper takes up the latest constitutional amendment case as an example, in which the Supreme Court struck down a significant constitutional change in the procedure for the removal of judges. In so doing, we demonstrate that, while judicial appointments had been deeply politicised for decades, judges across the political spectrum were very keen to uphold judicial autonomy vis-à-vis the executive branch. However, as the current regime has become increasingly authoritarian after "landslide victories" in general elections in 2014 and 2018, it seems more likely that the politicisation (and possibly the subjugation) of the judiciary has played a dominant role in recent years.
Keywords: Bangladesh, judicialisation of politics, appointment and removal of judges
Please note that discussion papers are works in various stages of progress and most have not been edited and proofread and may contain errors of fact or judgment. Revised versions of these papers may subsequently appear in more formal publication series. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). The IDE does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included and accepts no responsibility for any consequences arising from its use.