Electoral Volatility in Turkey - Cleavages vs. the Economy
Occasional Papers Series
No.41
■ Electoral Volatility in Turkey - Cleavages vs. the Economy
■ HAZAMA Yasushi
■ Published in 2007
Two types of volatilities—cleavage-type volatilities based on social cleavages and retrospective-type volatilities based on voter punishment of the incumbent—are analyzed using separate regression models. The results demonstrate, first, that deep social cleavages once increased electoral volatility but that since the 1990s, they have begun to stabilize voting behavior. Second, electoral volatility as a whole nonetheless remains high because of a growing trend toward retrospective voting. Low economic growth and high unemployment are the major reasons for this.
The apparent instability in the party system stems not from a lack of representation in parliament of major social groups but rather from poor government performance. Persistently high electoral volatility thus does not necessarily indicate an absence of party system institutionalization. This current phenomenon in Turkey appears to be analogous with the world trend toward declining trust in government and growing trust in democratic and party systems.
CONTENTS
List of Tables and Figures / Yasushi Hazama
Acknowledgments, Abbreviations for Political Parties / Yasushi Hazama
Introduction / Yasushi Hazama
1 Empirical Theories of Electoral Change / Yasushi Hazama
2 Studies of Electoral Behavior in Turkey / Yasushi Hazama
3 Conceptualization and Methodology / Yasushi Hazama
4 Turkey as an Electoral Democracy / Yasushi Hazama
5 From Mobilized to Autonomous Voting / Yasushi Hazama
6 Social Cleavages and Volatility / Yasushi Hazama
7 The Disruption and (Re)creation of Party-Cleavage Linkages / Yasushi Hazama
8 Micro-Level Evidence for Retrospective Voting / Yasushi Hazama
9 Retrospective Voting at the Macro Level / Yasushi Hazama
Conclusions / Yasushi Hazama
Appendixes / Yasushi Hazama
Bibliography / Yasushi Hazama
Index / Yasushi Hazama