DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE TAIWANESE AND KOREAN POLITICAL REGIMES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

THE purpose of this paper is to compare the autocratic political regimes which carried out the industrialization of Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) in the postwar period (leading to their eventual emergence as NIEs) and also to compare their respective democratization processes. In comparative political science the type of industrialization-oriented autocratic regime characterizing the two states is usually referred to as an authoritarian regime. While both belonged to the Western camp during the international political antagonism of the cold war and had constitutions and parliaments characteristic of a democratic state, the two states actually excluded the masses from political participation by relying on the force of the military and the political police. Both launched political democratization processes in the second half of the 1980s. In Korea this process was completed with a directly elected president coming to power after an interval of thirty years while in Taiwan the direct election of a president in March 1996 came as the finishing touch to its transition to democracy.

Comparison obviously implies a large measure of commonality between the two states. Both have suffered from the division of their countries. Both became anticommmunist military outposts during the cold war in Asia. In both territories, anticommmunist autocratic regimes were established which carried out industrialization. In both, the regimes were democratized following successful industrialization. The two states thus shared commonalities in the roles they played in postwar international relations as well as in the general framework and timetable of political and economic development. In addition, both experienced Japanese colonial domination in the prewar period. From a world historical perspective, they represent the most recent cases of West European–type modernization in the sense that social transformation caused by industrialization resulted in the introduction of democratic systems. Japan in fact was an earlier case of this type of modernization. But Korea and Taiwan telescoped the one hundred years of Japanese modernization into twenty to thirty years. They experienced a “multi-layered telescoped modernization” (Masumi 1993, p. 56) where the anticommmunist authoritarian regimes...
played a dual role—facilitating industrial takeoff and promoting rapid industrial growth. In the Japanese case, the first role was played by the early Meiji government and the second by the postwar Liberal Democratic Party government. In the present article, as in others in this volume, the aim is to describe the postwar experiences of the two states looking particularly at their differences. The modernization processes of the two states were conditioned by two factors, one internal and the other external. The internal factor was the strong popular desire to get rich and be free—an urge aroused in East Asia under the impact of the West, the same urge that characterized the Japanese modernization drive in an earlier period. The external factor was the cold war that shaped the global postwar situation. Conditioned by the cold war, postwar Taiwan and Korea, in their quest for freedom and wealth, were constrained to choose either freedom or wealth. Nonetheless, they unrelentingly pursued both and at last achieved both. But just when the two goals came within reach, the cold war that had conditioned the development of these two states disappeared as the dominant international regime. The cold war had worked as a protective shield for the two states which had been born into the chaotic postwar world. With the demise of the cold war, their newly born democratic regimes were faced with new challenges they had never experienced. Thus we are at a stage of history where we need to examine the distinct characteristics of the experiences of the two states, rather than focusing on their commonalities if we want to predict the future orientation of their political and economic development.

One immediately noticeable difference in the patterns of political development in the two states is political stability. Korea experienced a larger swing in the political pendulum than Taiwan, ranging from the establishment and entrenchment of an authoritarian regime to its modification and democratization. In Taiwan, the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China, KMT) has stayed in power to this day, ever since the Chiang Kai-shek regime moved to Taiwan in 1949. In Korea the constitution has been revised nine times since the Republic of Korea was inaugurated in 1948, and the current civilian government established in the 1990s, which is the first civilian government in thirty years, represents the country’s Sixth Republic.1 The first step in Korea’s process of democratization was the introduction in 1987 of the direct election of the president. As a result of the election that followed, an opposition leader who had championed democratization assumed the presidency, although it came about through the merger of his party with the former government party. This forced the retirement of the incumbent who had come from the military. This realignment of political parties brought a reorganization of the country’s political structure. In Taiwan, democratization progressed more slowly.

1 “The miracle on the Han River” occurred nevertheless. The post–Korean War instability of Korean politics was not as serious as to put a brake on the post-takeoff industrialization of the country. This political feature differentiates the East Asian NIEs from the Latin American NIEs.
Although an opposition party was formed in 1986 and the decade-old Emergency Decree was lifted in the following year, it was only in the summer of 1994 that a system for directly electing the president came into being as the last step in the democratization of the government, and it was finally implemented in the spring of 1996.

In the remainder of this study, I intend to compare the nature of the industrialization-oriented autocratic regimes of the two states as well as the nature of their democratization processes. I do so with the following two points in mind. Generally, comparative studies are conducted (1) to draw some theoretical lessons and/or (2) to gain a better understanding and a clearer picture of each of the objects compared. The best would of course be to fulfill the two goals simultaneously, but that would not be easy. As a specialist in the study of Taiwan politics, this author is not versed enough in the Korean situation to do both. The purpose of this paper therefore is to obtain a clearer picture of the Taiwanese case by comparing it with that of Korea, with emphasis placed on the analysis of Taiwan.

I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO AUTOCRATIC REGIMES

A. The Timing of Their Establishment and the Nature of Their Organization

The political structure that promoted industrialization was controlled in Taiwan by the KMT government headed by Chiang Kai-shek and later his son Chiang Ching-kuo and in Korea by the military government headed by Park Chung-hee. The Taiwanese regime was an autocratic anticommunist government formed by the KMT forces which, following their military defeat, had fled from mainland China together with more than 1 million military personnel and civilians. This government was established under U.S. patronage which was resumed after the outbreak of the Korean War. The autocratic Korean government originated in a military group that gained strength as a new elite group exploiting the political turmoil under civilian governments during and after the Korean War. The Park government was established in a military coup d’état in 1961 which overthrew the Chang Myon government.

The autocratic regime in postwar Taiwan was transplanted rather than established. The state structure was organized around the KMT, and the KMT was ruled by the charismatic leader (lingxiu), Chiang Kai-shek. Weakened by military defeat on the continent, the KMT state structure including the military was physically transplanted to Taiwan. Through the reestablishment of Chiang’s prestige as the lingxiu and the reorganization of the KMT (1950–52), Taiwan succeeded in securing for itself a niche of survival in the U.S. containment strategy. In a short period of time it grew into a party state which, in spite of its democratic constitutional facade, was controlled exclusively by lingxiu-loyal KMT members who adminis-
tered all the state sectors and the military. Under this party-state system, the technocrats who had arrived from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek began to manage the economy right from the economic rehabilitation phase. This party-state system was an anticommunist autocracy and a product of the Chinese civil war and the cold war. It served as the body to promote Taiwan’s NIEs-type industrialization which was characterized by export-oriented industrialization.

The period during which the autocratic regime was established in Taiwan coincided with the period of McCarthyism in the United States. Though the United States certainly was wary about being dragged into a total war against China by Chiang Kai-shek’s die-hard obsession with military rollback on the continent, still the U.S. government at that time seldom tried to bind the KMT’s hands by advocating human rights and other considerations as did later U.S. administrations (particularly the Carter administration).

The autocratic Korean regime came into being through a different process. The Korean military grew faster than any other sector during the Korean War. It pushed its way into the power structure through its 1961 military coup, and from there penetrated and eventually dominated the public security sector, development sector (administration), and the legitimacy sector (parliament and political parties). It was not a military junta–type government as was frequently seen in Central and South America in the 1970s in the sense that the government was not under direct institutional control of the military. It was a government controlled by military men who took off their military uniforms and became civilians. But they maintained their political power by relying on the military as their ultimate recourse. In this sense it was a quasi-military government (Kim 1993, p. 126). Unlike in Taiwan, no autocratic political party pervasively controlling the administrative structure was organized. Instead the Korean military elite organized government parties using intelligence agencies and the police (Park Chung-hee’s Democratic Republican Party and Chun Doo-hwan’s Democratic Justice Party). These parties concerned themselves only with the legitimacy sector and were merely tools of the quasi-military regime to restrain opposition parties. The Park government delegated strong powers to economic technocrats, and the military men who transformed themselves into the power elite soon started to rely on economic development as one of the major sources of legitimacy for their rule. Unlike in Taiwan, power changed hands frequently in Korea though the autocratic regime itself remained unchanged. The regime always functioned as the main promoter of NIEs-type industrialization. In other words, despite quite unstable social and political processes, Korea managed to create a domestic environment under Park Chung-hee and his successors that was conducive to NIEs-type industrialization.

The military’s coups and intrusions into the administration of Korea were unpopular in the United States as they appeared as an aberration from the political system which the U.S. military administration had wanted to implant in the country
in the immediate post-World War II period. The United States supported the Park Chung-hee government only reluctantly out of Asian cold war necessity.

B. Students, Workers, and the Political Elite

Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Taiwan with more than enough personnel to fill the ranks of the state structure. At the same time local Taiwanese society was unable to organize itself politically following the crushing of its major rebellion against the KMT (February 28 Incident) in 1947 and the rampage of white terror in the first half of the 1950s. The postwar state of Taiwan was thus established in the midst of two major waves of state terror against Taiwanese society. In this sense, the regime set up by the KMT can be characterized as a quasi-conquering state in its relationship to Taiwanese society.

Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, at the time of the establishment of their autocratic regime, had no local forces of significance with whom they had to share central state power. It was enough for the KMT to accommodate such forces only at the local level. Taking advantage of the social transformation in the countryside following the KMT land reform that wiped out the landlord class, the KMT reorganized the Farmers’ Association (the official farmers’ association formed during Japanese colonial rule) to place it securely under KMT influence. Also prefectural and municipal elections took place through which the KMT succeeded in dividing local forces and bringing them under its control. The need for party approval of local candidates was effectively used for this purpose. It was only in the 1970s that the KMT allowed, or felt the need to allow, the locally elected political elite as well as those in the local Taiwanese (benshengren) elite who were highly educated and already absorbed into economic bureaucracies to join the central power elite, although only with marginal status. The powerful party-state regime thus came into being with an “ethnically” dualized political power structure firmly built in—local Taiwanese (benshenren) in the local administration and mainlanders (waishengren) in the central administration (Wakabayashi 1992, pp. 119–24).

2 The February 28 Incident in 1947 was a mass rebellion against the KMT that occurred shortly after Taiwan became free from Japanese colonial rule. Frustrated by galloping inflation, increasing unemployment, and suffering from the chaotic situation caused by the incompetence and lack of discipline of KMT government officials and soldiers dispatched from the Chinese mainland, masses of people first rioted in Taipei, followed by people in all other cities all over the island. Intellectuals joined the riots demanding reform in the provincial administration. The riots were ruthlessly repressed by military troops Chiang Kai-shek landed a week later. It is said that eighteen thousand to twenty-eight thousand people were killed by the military. Many members of the local Taiwanese elite including anti-Japanese activists during the colonial period were killed in the repression. During the riots, many mainlanders were beaten by local Taiwanese while local Taiwanese were brutally repressed. This incident thus became the historical source of the provincial registry contradiction of later years. For details of the February 28 Incident and white terror, see Wakabayashi (1992).
Let me now examine the relationship between the KMT government and the social sectors. From the early days of KMT rule the students were brought under KMT control using the political police and KMT organizations that penetrated campuses as well as military personnel who provided military training. Depoliticization of students up to the high school level was the task of the Anticommunist National Salvation Youth Corps headed by Chiang Ching-kuo. Under these circumstances, students failed to play a political role as a social force until the 1990s when political activities were allowed. To control workers the KMT created a unitary corporatist system during the 1950s that co-opted and integrated workers organizations into the Taiwanese Provincial Federation of Labor. “Labor peace” thus characterized Taiwanese politics, a feature that has sharply distinguished Taiwan from Korea.  

Korea did not have the dual-structured local-versus-central political elite that existed in Taiwan. In Korea the military elite which formed the autocratic regime was a new force in society. Park Chung-hee himself was born into a poor farming family and had to work his way up studying under adversity. Generally, the military elite came from middle or low social strata of Korean society, and they climbed the ladder to prominence within the organization of the military which was itself an entirely new body within Korean society. Besides, the very idea of military men as a power elite was startlingly new to the Korean political culture of civilian supremacy, and therefore had the effect of breaking down the old barriers and introducing new social dynamism (Kim 1993, p. 52). But precisely because of this, the rise to power of the Park Chung-hee’s “revolutionary force” provoked vehement opposition. By the time of Park’s coup, the postwar Korean state had experienced more than fifteen years of fretful politics under the dictatorship of Syngman Rhee. Though the left was harshly repressed as a consequence of Korea’s confrontation with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), political parties organized by influential personalities belonging to various social sectors of Korean society became deeply entrenched in national politics. Opposition parties—the Democratic Party, the New Democratic Party, and the New Korea Democratic Party, among others—carried on their activities, each with a certain measure of integrity, for the popular cause of achieving democracy against military rule. These parties were able to achieve this objective despite their generally conservative social and economic ideologies, fierce intra-party personality rivalries, and the frequent splits and mergers that characterized them.

During the cold war, the masses in both Taiwan and Korea were excluded from politics and depoliticized in the name of anticommunism. But probably reflecting Korea’s tumultuous pre–military coup politics, a broader range of political mobili-
zation occurred in that state than in Taiwan. After Park’s revolutionary force staged its coup, it had to face the students who had the “glorious tradition” of spearheading the April 19 Student Revolution that smashed Syngman Rhee’s dream of perpetual dictatorship. There were also the workers and their unions which had accumulated struggle experience since liberation. The Korean military government used the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and labor legislation vesting powers of control in the state to create a unitary trade union system centered on the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, which served as a corporatist device to control and co-opt the workers. But this success was only achieved by crashing the militant labor movement that had been gaining increasing autonomy from the yellow unionism set up under Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship. Even after the new unitary union was established, the government could not prevent the emergence of independent action by workers. In every political crisis, workers asserted themselves in the workplace and street, sometimes linking up with Christian initiatives, student movements, and the democratization efforts of opposition parties (e.g., the activities of the Korean Christian Action Organization [KCAO] and the occupation of the headquarters of the New Democratic Party by female workers of YH Trading Co.).

Korean political culture is characterized by a “vortex type” (Henderson 1968, p. 5), meaning that all the forces are racing in a vortex and absorbed by the unitary center, Seoul. In this political culture, party politicians and students had existed in the political center, Seoul, long before Park’s revolutionary force took power. The invasion of the legitimacy sector by the military elite led to the consolidation of these preexisting political forces into opposition against it. Unlike the lingxiu-loyal KMT elite in Taiwan, the Korean revolutionary force could not afford maneuvering to separate the central from the local administration to facilitate the co-optation of opposition forces. (In fact, elections of heads of local administration and members of parliament were suspended from 1961.) In this setting, sporadic explosions of political feuding and antigovernment street protests became endemic to Korean politics even though these were met by the truncheons and tear gas of the military government.

In other words, the autocratic regime of Korea, right from its beginning, had to face an opposition elite at the central government level. It also had social forces as potential adversaries who lost no time in taking to the street should the government show any weakness. On human rights issues, the church was also ready to take action. (In this respect, Taiwan had the same problem.) The Taiwanese regime found itself in a Korea-like situation for the first time in the 1970s when it faced an external crisis in the wake of the United States–China rapprochement. In this crisis, the “permanent parliament” system was modified by the introduction of the sys-

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4 According to the Constitution of the Republic of China (enforced in December 1947), the representatives, or the members, of the three central bodies, namely, the National Assembly (electing...
tem for “electing additional members.” Taiwan’s opposition elite emerged at that
time out of the new middle class spawned by the industrialization process already
well under way. But students and workers as social groups were yet to take action.

II. DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES

A. Political Rifts and Political Contents of Democratization

In the immediate postwar period following liberation from Japanese colonial
rule, the Taiwanese and Korean societies became politically activated. But under
the anticommunist autocratic regimes that came into being in the course of the
division of the countries, both societies were forcibly depoliticized. The conflicts
that occurred under the autocratic regimes shaped the particular political cleavages
that characterized the two states throughout most of the postwar period. The political
rifts thus generated in the two states reflected the processes that formed the
respective autocratic regimes as well as the characteristics of these regimes. When-
ever political conflicts arose in the two states, they opened these rifts which shook
the authoritarian regime. The specific patterns of the political rifts in the two au-
thoritarian regimes defined the political contents of their democratization pro-
cesses.

Following Choi (1993), I selected three coordinates for comparing Taiwan and

the president and vice president), the Legislative Yuan (adopting laws, deciding the national bud-
get, and approving appointment of the head of the Executive Yuan), and the Control Yuan (im-
peaching public functionaries) are regarded as the elected central representatives of the public will.
The three bodies taken together are considered to be Taiwan’s equivalent to the parliament in
European countries. The elections of these representatives of public will were conducted from
1947 through 1948 in the midst of the civil war in all regions of China except those under Commu-
nist control. On the basis of the election results at that time, the central government structure was
organized, including the election of the president and vice president. The KMT government thus
formed adhered to this form of government as provided by the Constitution of the Republic of
China even after it moved to Taiwan. It was decided then that the parliamentarians and other
officers elected in 1947–48 were to continue to exercise their powers until another national election
covering the whole of China was held. Thus, the permanent parliament composed of irreplaceable
representatives, only a few of them having effective constituencies, came into being. When Chiang
Ching-kuo became the chief of the Executive Yuan in 1972, which virtually established his con-
trol, he increased the seats for Taiwan to be filled by regular elections. This measure was intended
to resolve the problem of aging representatives and consolidating the base of the government of
Taiwan to meet the external crises following Taiwan’s withdrawal from the United Nations. This is
the background of the election of additional members.

5 Choi (1993, pp. 145–97) describes three political rifts in Korean politics: (1) autocracy versus
democracy, (2) economic fairness versus economic development, and (3) people-oriented national
unification versus conservative national unification. He stated that in the early post-colonial period
political conflicts flared up along the lines of all three rifts. After the First Republic was established
and the left wiped out, rifts (2) and (3) expanded as the regime used the military to force itself on
the people and strengthened its ideological control. In this paper I borrowed Choi’s coordinates of
analysis with partial modification.
Korea, namely, (1) the coordinate of political regimes (authoritarianism versus democracy), (2) the coordinate of social cleavages, and (3) the coordinate of national unification doctrine. Different types of antagonisms existed over each of the three issues in the two states, and the political contents of democratization were accordingly determined.

1. **Political regimes**

As stated earlier, the most salient organizational feature of the Taiwanese authoritarian regime is its party-state character. The contradiction between authoritarianism and democracy in Taiwan therefore assumed the form of antagonism between the KMT and the anti-KMT forces. The political forces that sought their political resources outside of the party-state system first voiced criticism of the KMT in local election campaigns, and then in the narrow political arena connected with the election of additional members to the parliament. They did so carefully, constantly testing the outer limits of the KMT’s tolerance. Democratization under the party-state system first and foremost implied the formation of a new opposition party in order to break the KMT’s proclaimed monopoly on national politics (a ban on the formation of political parties other than the KMT). In the 1960s local anti-KMT personalities who called themselves nonpartisan succeeded in securing representation in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. In the 1970s a small group of democracy promoters who dubbed themselves “party outsiders” (tangwai) advanced not only into local assemblies but also into the national parliament. These forces, supported by new political journalism (tangwai journalism), coalesced through cooperation in election campaigns. Finally, the tangwai forces succeeded in forming the first opposition party under KMT rule, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), during the latter half of the 1980s.

The most remarkable organizational characteristic of the Korean quasi-military authoritarian regime was the political rule of Park Chung-hee’s revolutionary force and their successors (the “new military,” e.g., Chun Doo-hwan). The democratic movement sought to rectify the distorted political system by compelling the military men who had become the political elite through coups to withdraw from politics. The major task of the democratic forces was not to form a new opposition party, but to continue to apply effective pressure on the government for democratization, sticking to an unambiguous position of opposition and resisting the carrot-and-stick tactics used by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (later, the Agency for National Security Planning) and other agencies of the military government. In this struggle the “two Kims” (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) functioned as the symbols of the Korean democratization movement.

2. **Social cleavages**

In Taiwan and Korea class politics (leftist political forces and their ideologies as
well as the politicization of workers) was harshly suppressed. For this reason, despite democratization and the activation of labor movements, class parties failed to take root in parliamentary politics. In both states the stage in the development of parliamentary politics where socialist parties advance into parliament and thereby transform the parliament itself as well as themselves (“second stage of West European-type parliamentary politics” [Masumi 1993, p. 56]) is unlikely to be reached. The absence of this stage certainly should be seen as the consequence of the cold war and NIEs-type industrialization on the Taiwanese and Korean political systems.

But the exclusion of the masses by the Taiwanese and Korean authoritarian regimes, while successfully containing class politics, generated other social antagonisms which were not related to class division but could easily become politicized—“provincial registry contradiction” in Taiwan and “regional conflicts” in Korea. These were the major contradictions that served as the basis for political mobilization in the democratization process, shaking the two authoritarian regimes to their foundations.

The provincial registry contradiction in Taiwan refers to the “ethnic” tensions between the local Taiwanese who had been residing in Taiwan since before Japan’s defeat in the war and the mainlanders who arrived after Japan’s defeat (their population ratios were six to one). Not that the two segments of the population clashed head-on. Rather the tension arose from the inequality between the two in their relationships with the party-state system set up in postwar Taiwan, or the “Republic of China.” Historically, the local Taiwanese remembered the harsh and cruel repression of the February 28 Incident while the mainlanders had memories of the war against Japan as well as the civil war against the Communists and of their defeat in the latter. Politically, this inequality resulted from the mainland elite’s monopoly on the strategic official posts of the KMT, state administration, military, and public enterprises as well as in the national parliament. The registry of “native place” shown on one’s ID card (the registered native place corresponded generally to one’s father’s native place) worked adversely against the local Taiwanese as it was used as the basis of a quota system in examinations for public service (the quota favored the holders of mainland province registry and discriminated against those with Taiwan Province registry). Ideologically and culturally the ossified anticommunist Middle-Kingdom ideology was imposed on the Taiwanese who were compelled to use Mandarin while the use of the Taiwanese vernaculars, Minnan and Hakka, were suppressed. Similarly, the generations who had received Japanese education were marginalized. All these inequalities originated in the quasi-conquering nature of the rule of the “Republic of China” over Taiwan.

The demand for democratization was superimposed over the demand for the removal of inequalities in the provincial registry which in turn politicized the provincial registry contradiction. In other words, the provincial registry contradiction
served as an important factor generating democratic dynamics. Behind the demand for democratization was the strong popular repulsion against the unequal distribution of political resources (power) which was justified by provincial registry practice.

The same repulsion was also shared by local Taiwanese within the KMT. The local elite groups within the KMT had long been relegated to marginal positions within the party. With the progress of democratization, Taiwanization occurred in two directions.

The first was toward the expansion of the arena of political competition as exemplified by the abolition of the ban on political parties other than the KMT, and the introduction of public elections for the president of Taiwan Province as well as the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung (who had been appointed by the central government previously). Thus, the opposition party DPP, strongly Taiwanese from the beginning, obtained posts in the parliament, local assemblies, and other public organizations while the publicly elected elite (in the parliament) increased their influence within the ruling KMT.

The other direction was toward the rise of local Taiwanese within the KMT itself. With the shifting alignments of contending elite factions, the local Taiwanese faction came to the fore. Faced with the diplomatic crises of the early 1970s (the United States–China rapprochement, Taiwan’s forced withdrawal from the United Nations, and the breakdown of diplomatic relations with major countries), Chiang Ching-kuo chose to introduce “additional members” into the parliament and began to appoint members of local elite groups to important party and government posts (excluding key posts in the military, foreign service, and finance) in order to strengthen his local power base. Chiang made other important decisions such as legalizing opposition parties and lifting the Emergency Decree before he died in 1988. Lee Teng-hui, a local Taiwanese earlier appointed KMT vice president, succeeded Chiang as the president of the “Republic of China.” This immediately kicked off a power struggle within KMT between the mainstream (pro-Lee) faction and the non-mainstream (anti-Lee) faction. Lee Teng-hui got the upper hand over his opponents by promoting democratization, and succeeded in consolidating the victory of the local Taiwanese by appointing a Taiwanese as premier of the Executive Yuan (prime minister) and as party secretary-general. The elite mainlanders who had filled major posts under Chiang were either co-opted or demoted while many anti-Lee KMT parliamentarians, mainly young Legislative Yuan members, walked out and established the New Party. Those anti-Lee elements who chose to remain in the KMT joined right-wing intellectuals in forming a political group, the New Alliance Association (Xintongmenghui). The fact that the non-mainstream faction was able to form a party is due to the political freedom acquired through democratization. But the New Party, as the slogans it adopted at its inauguration (August 1993) show, is a party of the mainlanders operating within the provincial
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registry framework, rather than one of the general public transcending the registry barriers. Against this background, democratization so far has not removed the provincial registry contradiction itself, but has only alleviated it by institutionalizing the contradiction into the multi-party political system. But as long as the People’s Republic of China keeps its pressure on Taiwan for national unification, the provincial registry contradiction, which affects the Taiwan independence issue, is likely to remain a factor of instability in Taiwan politics.

The regional conflicts in Korea have their origin in the unequal development between Kyongsang Province and Cholla Province in the process of economic development since the 1960s as well as special central government favor granted to the former in the recruitment of elite bureaucrats. The Park Chung-hee government’s blatant predilection for Kyongsang Province in development programs and staff recruitment compounded the sense of victimization and alienation on the part of the people of Cholla Province. Discrimination against Cholla Province by Park Chung-hee was one of the major causes for the Kwangju Incident in May 1980 though the incident itself occurred after Park’s death (Kim 1993, p. 486; Choi 1993, pp. 196–97). The antipathy of Cholla citizens as well as Seoul residents from Cholla Province toward the Park government, overwhelmingly staffed by people from Kyongsang Province, created a solid base of support for the charismatic political leader Kim Dae-jung, a native from Cholla Province. In elections this antagonism was one of the factors that shook the foundations of the authoritarian regime.

Democratization forced the military, the main force of discrimination against Cholla Province, to step down from the political stage, which removed the basis of regional conflicts. The June Struggle of 1987 brought about a system whereby the president was elected by direct public vote, and the Roh Tae-woo government that came to power under this system decided to liquidate the Fifth Republic. A review of the Kwangju Incident was also carried out.

But as is well known, two national elections held under the Sixth Republic showed that the patterns of voting in different regions are still extremely lopsided: regional votes are cast overwhelmingly for candidates from the region concerned, indicating that democratization has not immediately led to the removal of regional conflicts. Even today the antipathy of the Cholla people against discrimination continues to be mobilized and organized into support for Kim Dae-jung and his party while Kim Dae-jung is still the most powerful symbol of self-sacrifice for democratization. This remains an important political factor in Korea. The resolution of regional conflicts will largely depend on how Kim Dae-jung will actually behave in the future and whether the program of the Kim Yong-sam government to remove regional disparity is successful.

Should unification with the North become a reality, Korea will have to deal with a far more serious regional disparity between North and South. The new demo-
cratic regime will then be faced with this major challenge. Both Taiwan and Korea thus are burdened with heavy tasks derived from the previous autocratic regimes and the division of the countries.

3. Unification doctrines

Taiwan and Korea are both parts of divided nations. In both the anticommunist autocratic regimes strictly prohibited their citizens from establishing contact and communication with the other part of the divided country and nonofficial discourses about unification doctrine were subject to censorship and strict regulations. With the onset of democratization, however, public speech about various unification doctrines complete with their respective political and social transformation plans surfaced in both states. Political cleavages within the controlling elite over the matter of unification also came into the open in both states.

But similarities end there. In Korea political unification of the nation is taken for granted as the shared goal upheld by the governing establishment and opposition alike. But in Taiwan, discourses on “Taiwan nationalism” calling for a sovereign Taiwanese state appeared and developed as democratization progressed. 6

When the United States cut diplomatic ties with the “Republic of China” in Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China toward the end of the 1970s, the tangwai forces panicked at the prospect that Taiwan’s fate might be decided for a third time over the heads of its residents (the first time being the cession of Taiwan to Japan with the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and the second time being the return of Taiwan to China in 1945). This pushed to the fore the call of Taiwan’s residents for self-determination and the decision of Taiwan’s future by the Taiwanese people themselves. This call became accepted by many people in the course of several ensuing elections and was adopted by the program of the DPP, which was founded in 1986. Elaborating the call further, the DPP included in its program the independence of Taiwan by plebiscite (stating that the DPP will strive for the establishment of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan if this goal is supported by a plebiscite). When the party was founded in 1986, President and KMT Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo banned any advocacy of Taiwan independence and approved the party on condition that it did not go against this ban. The democratization movement proceeded to

6 Behind this difference lies the difference in the modality of colonization and country division in modern history (Taiwan: colonization as cession from being a part of Chinese territory and the state as a transplanted political regime from the Chinese mainland as a result of civil war; Korea: the colonization of the whole territory of the Korean dynasty and division of the country originating in the occupation of two parts of the territory by two major antagonistic powers) and geopolitical differences (Taiwan: isolated land and population, isolation from the international community, and separation from the continent by the straits; Korea: North and South are about equal in geographical size and population, and the South is economically superior to the North). For socio-historic analysis of the reasons why Taiwan nationalism emerged, see Wakabayashi (1994b).
demand the retraction of this ban as one of its campaign goals. Facing mounting pressure from students and intellectuals, the government during 1991 and 1992 abolished and/or amended laws and regulations that could incriminate persons for treason on the basis of their speech, such as the Statutes for the Punishment of Insurrection and Article 100 of the Criminal Code. Speech in favor of Taiwan independence was thus fully legalized, and organizational activities to promote independence also became free unless they involved violence.

With these measures, the discourse on Taiwan independence acquired a legal status in Taiwan equal with that on unification. Further development took place with the election of the full Legislative Yuan toward the end of 1992, and in the election the opposition DPP made a big leap forward by securing one-third of the assembly seats. The group that openly advocated Taiwan independence (though through a plebiscite) at last established itself as a sizable parliamentary force. Since then, “independence versus unification” has become the major line of ideological division involving all political forces in Taiwan. In the context of the provincial registry contradiction, the DPP’s leap forward also signified empowerment of the local Taiwanese in their relations with the mainlanders. Riding on this momentum, Lee Teng-hui succeeded in ousting non-mainstreamer Hau Pei-tsun from the prime minister’s post and appointing a local Taiwanese as KMT secretary-general. With these steps Taiwanization of the KMT gained further momentum. Since that time, Lee Teng-hui has begun to adopt a political stance close to that of the DPP on diplomatic issues (Taiwan’s re-affiliation with the United Nations and “holiday diplomacy” with frequent visits of Taiwan leaders to countries without diplomatic relations with Taiwan), continental policy (“a sovereign and independent Republic of China” as a political entity equal in status to the People’s Republic of China, and a “staged approach toward two Chinas”), and Taiwan’s internal integration (Taiwan as a “living community”). Lee Teng-hui also earned Beijing’s indignation by expressing his sentiment as a Taiwanese of the wartime generation who was tossed about by East Asian modern history (“the sorrows of life of a person who was born as a Taiwanese”) in a dialogue with Japanese writer Ryōtarō Shiba. These are some of the indications that Taiwan nationalism is now becoming a semiofficial ideology under the impact of democratization in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the KMT is hardly likely to abandon its goal of unification, particularly as long as the Taiwanese economy continues to develop closer trade and investment relations with mainland China, and as long as the Beijing government remains vehemently opposed to Taiwan independence, threatening to use arms if necessary. The unification versus independence polemic therefore is likely to remain a sensitive political issue dividing Taiwan and affecting a whole range of issues from diplomacy to internal integration.

The unification issue in Korea is not as prominent as in Taiwan. Under the Roh Tae-woo government and at the early stage of democratization, activists from de-
mocratization and student movements dared to visit the North defying security regulations and government policy. But such activities have since subsided. The unification issue will certainly remain a divisive political issue even under the democratic regime, but its ideological character is likely to be largely lost in Korea.

B. Modalities of Democratization Processes

Taiwan and Korea share the following similarities in the modality of democratization: (1) opposition elite groups grew (Taiwan) or survived (Korea) taking advantage of the limited political areas opened up by elections which the authoritarian governments were compelled to hold for various reasons; (2) the opposition elite, in critical periods of regime shifts, succeeded in mobilizing the urban population including the middle class into street politics, thus applying effective pressure on the power holders, and (3) in the crises thus generated, the incumbent power holders became split over how to cope with the crises.

But there are notable differences between the two states as to how initiatives of the ruling and opposition elite were displayed. Huntington (1991, chap. 3) identified three types of democratic transition concerning power relationships between the governing coalition and opposition. These are: (1) the governing coalition remains preponderant even when it is shaken by a crisis, (2) the opposition becomes preponderant, and (3) neither side can dominate the other. There are correspondingly three democratization models. The first is the “transformation model” where the governing coalition is preponderant over the opposition. In this model the reformers within the governing coalition start a change by taking the initiative for liberalization, defeating the diehards (who oppose any reform or transition to a new system); then democratic reformers (favoring transition to democracy) take the lead over the liberal reformers (who advocate a certain measure of liberalization and a partial opening of the authoritarian regime in order to maintain the basics of that regime) to complete the transition to a new regime. The second is the “replacement model” where the opposition gains strength vis-à-vis the governing coalition which refuses to accept any reform, and overthrows the regime to bring about a democratic regime. This is a model close to a revolutionary model. The third is the “transplacement model” where neither side is strong enough to dominate the other so that the democratic reformers and democratic moderates (who aim to achieve only a transition to democracy, unlike revolutionary extremists pursuing goals more radical than transition to democracy) jointly take the lead in arranging negotiations and compromise to facilitate the transition to a new regime. Taiwan’s democratization process so far has followed the transformation model while Korea’s the transplacement model.

7 Wakabayashi (1994a) ordered and described the political process of Taiwanese democratization using Huntington’s argument (1991).
In Taiwan all the major decisions in favor of transition to a democratic regime were made by the top leader of the government without the direct participation of the opposition elite, though it is true that the decisions were made under pressure from the opposition elite and street action it had organized. Chiang Ching-kuo decided on his own to permit the formation of opposition parties, lift the state of emergency, and let permanent parliament members retire. Likewise, it was Lee Teng-hui who decided to convene the National Affairs Conference in which opposition leaders were invited to participate, to implement a constitutional reform, and to introduce the direct election of the president. Because of this formula, reforms in Taiwan’s political systems have made slow progress. In fact, it took about five years before Chiang’s decision on liberalization and permanent parliament reform materialized with the dissolution of the permanent parliament. This period of transition was studded with Chiang’s death, Lee’s succession to power, and the aggravation of KMT factional infighting. After the death of the strongman Chiang whose high prestige had affected all sectors of the state, no important decisions could be made without causing intra-party struggles. Only as late as the summer of 1994 was the direct presidential election agreed upon. This was carried out in the spring of 1996. This author once referred to the Taiwanese democratization process as “democratization in installments” (Wakabayashi 1992, p. 17). Though it had to abandon the political monopoly it held during the party-state period, the KMT could not be forced to give up its struggle to stay in power in competition with other groups. The KMT is trying to successfully meet challenges of elections by relying on its heritage of economic success and social control. Taiwan thus will keep the imprint of its ancien régime for quite a time to come.

In Korea major decisions concerning transition to a democratic regime were made through consultations between the opposition elite and the newly emerging democratic reformer elite in the governing coalition, under pressure from the opposition elite and its mobilized mass action in the streets. In the midst of the popular upsurge in June 1987, the government accepted the direct election of the president as demanded by the opposition. Following the ensuing consultation between the ruling and opposition parties, the constitution was swiftly revised. As early as December of the same year, the direct presidential election took place, normalizing the country’s political system. Four years later, in 1992, Kim Young-sam, an opposition leader having a long record of confrontation with the authoritarian regime, stood as a presidential candidate from the Democratic Liberal Party, a party established by the merger of the former ruling and opposition parties, and was successfully elected to presidency. Popular demand for a civilian government was thus satisfied.
CONCLUSION

In this study, I have compared a number of aspects of the Taiwanese and Korean authoritarian regimes and their democratization processes in order to elucidate more clearly the developments that have taken place in the evolution of democracy in Taiwan in particular. The picture that emerges shows that the controlling regime in Taiwan was more preemptive than the Korean regime in its attempt to maintain political stability, and the democratization processes in Taiwan was slower and more faltering than in Korea.

Korea has had a better external environment than Taiwan and has been successful in securing political support from the international community and international legal recognition as indicated by a series of recent events—the hosting of the Olympic Games, establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (Russia) and China, and affiliation with the United Nations simultaneously with North Korea. Taiwan has made its presence felt in the international community by active overseas investment and President Lee’s “flexible” and “realistic” diplomacy. Also Taiwan’s achievement in democratization, in sharp contrast with China’s suppression of democracy in the Tienanmen Incident, is appreciated by the international community, particularly by the U.S. Congress. But Taiwan suffers from the failure of its newly acquired international reputation as a budding democracy to bring it any increased legal recognition within the international community, even after Lee’s recent successful visit to the United States. It is possible that Taiwan’s public opinion, frustrated with this situation, may lean further toward Taiwan nationalism, which may provoke China and lead to a tense Taiwan-China relationship. If this vicious cycle were to break loose, an unfortunate trade-off relationship could arise between democratization and unification.

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