

A. HISTORICAL VIEW OF ARGENTINE NEUTRALITY DURING WORLD WAR II

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INTRODUCTION

IT IS WELL KNOWN that Argentina adhered to neutrality during most of World War II, denying its cooperation to the other American states in their fight against the Axis. Argentina was the last Latin American country to break diplomatic relations with the Axis which it did in January 1944, reluctantly declaring war against Germany and Japan in March 1945, with the war nearly over.

Since the United States championed Inter-American cooperation against the Axis, Argentine neutrality brought about confrontation with the United States, in which Perón appeared as the defender of Argentine nationalism. Perón's slogan in the 1946 campaign for president was "Braden or Perón." In other words, the anti-Americanism of neutral diplomacy lay a base for the birth of Peronism. One possible reason why Argentine neutralism has caused so much interest among intellectuals is that it is so closely connected with the appearance of Peronism.

It is natural then that any interpretation of neutralism will be closely linked to that of Peronism. A group of scholars who think that Peronism was a kind of fascism tend to attribute neutrality to the fascist-like tendencies of the military government (cf. [13, p. 12]). The first and most important document with such an interpretation is the so-called *Blue Book* [62] published by the Department of State in 1946 with the purpose of denouncing Perón as a fascist. Although the military government denounced many accusations in the *Blue Book* as false [5], it seems to have influenced not only American but Argentine scholars in their interpretation of neutrality.¹

On the other hand, those who contend that Peronism is a nationalist and not a fascist movement claim that the neutral policy was an expression of nationalism.² Before and during World War II, the United States increased her influence over Latin America by consolidating the system of Inter-American cooperation against the Axis, so a neutral policy was the only way that Argentina could resist American expansion into the region.

A third hypothesis attributes the neutral policy to the British intentions to keep Argentina out of the American sphere of influence. As is well known,

¹ The most remarkable example was Mecham [36]. Among the Argentine writers, we can cite Sanmartino [52].

² Such an interpretation is given by Ramos [45] and Smith [55].

Argentina had such close economic links with Great Britain since the nineteenth century that she was sometimes called "the sixth dominion." Argentina's traditional policy was to oppose the Pan-American movement which might hurt Anglo-Argentine economic relations.³ Moreover, Anglo-Argentine relations were strengthened in the 1930s and 1940s because of the Roca-Runciman Pact of 1933. So, we can suppose that Argentina adopted a neutral policy in order to check Pan-Americanism and maintain traditional ties with Great Britain. If this hypothesis is supported, it will raise some questions concerning neutrality; viz., how does this pro-British tendency reconcile with the pro-German tendency of the first interpretation? Also how does a pro-British tendency reconcile with nationalism which the second interpretation supposes to be the main factor in neutrality? The aim of this paper is to re-examine the third hypothesis and answer these questions throwing some light on the appearance of Peronism in a diplomatic context.

I. THE ROCA-RUNCIMAN PACT OF 1933

In many ways, the 1930 revolution was a turning point in modern Argentine history. First, it ushered in military intervention in politics till then uncommon in Argentina, where civilian control had been maintained since 1862. Secondly, it brought the landowning oligarchy back to power. Because of rapid growth in the livestock industry and agriculture in the latter half of the nineteenth century, an elite class composed principally of cattle ranchers had been formed in the 1880s [48, pp. 167-83]. This minority class had such a decisive influence in politics that it was often called the "oligarchy." Although the oligarchy had to turn power over to the Radicals who were more democratic in 1916, they regained power in 1930 through revolution and restored the electoral fraud of the type which had permitted them to retain power until 1916. That the cattle ranchers increased their influence after the revolution is known from the fact that the Rural Society, the most important association of the landowners, occupied five seats including the vice-president out of ten in the Uriburu cabinet (1930-32) and five including the president and the vice-president in the Justo cabinet (1932-38) [56, p. 49].

The year 1930 was a turning point for Argentina from an economic viewpoint too, because it marked the end of the period of prosperity based on an "economy of primary-export" [20, p. 12] and the effects of the world depression on the Argentine economy were deepening day by day. Still worse, the British government adopted the Imperial tariff in the Ottawa Conference of July-August 1932. This was a heavy blow to the Argentine economy, especially to the cattle ranchers, because England was the best customer for Argentine beef. For example, 99 per cent of chilled beef, the main product of the ranchers, was sent to the United Kingdom [15, p. 15]. As one British official report said, the United Kingdom

³ McGann made an excellent analysis of the pro-British and anti-American diplomacy of Argentina during the first period of the Pan-American movement [35].

market "might almost be described as the world market" from the Argentine point of view [25, p. 14]. Since the Ottawa Conference meant the exclusion of Argentine goods from this "world market," it is no wonder that the landowner oligarchy was highly preoccupied with the Imperial tariff system. In October 1932, a directive of the Rural Society asked the Justo government to reach a commercial agreement with Great Britain [17, p. 17]. Partly in response to the petition and partly to repay a visit by the Prince of Wales, the Justo government sent a mission to Great Britain in January 1933. The head of the delegation was Julio A. Roca, Jr., vice-president, accompanied by Miguel Angel Cárcano and Guillermo Leguizamón. Technical advisers were Raúl Prebisch, Carlos Brebbia, and Aníbal Fernández Beiró. It is worthwhile to note that the principal members of the mission belonged to the Rural Society. In the negotiations, which continued from February to April, evidently, the Argentine position was weaker than the English because Argentina had to ask for a share of the British beef market and Great Britain required important concessions for British capital and goods in exchange for assuring markets for Argentine beef. At that time especially the British complained of the blockage of sterling by the Argentines and feared that the export of British manufactured goods to Argentina might continue to decline in growth of Argentine industry and competition with American goods [63, p. 329]. So, the British tried to resolve these problems in their favor, giving Argentina some concessions on beef. Consequently the final treaty signed on May 1, 1933 by Roca and Walter Runciman, president of the Board of Trade, was much more favorable to Great Britain than to Argentina. As one American economist says, "Seldom in Latin American history, in fact, were the implications of economic imperialism so nakedly revealed" [23, p. 421] as in the Roca-Runciman Pact.

The main features of the Pact were: (1) The United Kingdom would guarantee Argentina a fixed share in the British market for meat. (2) The United Kingdom would give a 15 per cent quota for Argentine meat-packing, and 85 per cent for British and American in meat imports. (3) Argentina agreed to use all her sterling exchange principally to service debt to England. (4) Argentina would place no tariffs on tax-free goods such as coal, and impose no new tariffs. In return, the United Kingdom would not levy new tariffs on agricultural products. (5) The Argentine government would give "benevolent treatment" to British capital invested in the country [6, pp. 1987-91].

These provisions show clearly that Argentina gave more concessions to England than what it received. First, although Argentina got a share in the British market for her meat, the agreed quota was not satisfactory, because British imports of chilled beef were to be held at 1932 levels, one of the lowest points in nearly a decade for Argentine exports [56, pp. 140-41]. Second, for the first time the Argentine government officially accepted British control over the distribution of meat exports for the meat-packing enterprises. Since 1911, the United Kingdom had regulated imports of Argentine beef by fixing the distribution among English, American, and Argentine companies [44, pp. 88-93]. But the Argentine government never accepted this system because they believed that they should regulate their own exports to England. In the Roca-Runciman Pact, however, the Argen-

tine government not only recognized this system but agreed that Argentine enterprises would have only 15 per cent of the total meat export to Great Britain. This shocked Argentine medium and small-scale cattle ranchers because their long-cherished desire to establish their own meat-packing house was almost destroyed. Third, when Argentina accumulated a surplus in her balance of payments with Great Britain, Argentina had to use it principally to fulfill the service debt to Great Britain. As Argentina had always used it to buy from the United States before, this restriction on the use of sterling meant a reduction of American exports to Argentina. Fourth, Argentina gave more tariff concessions to England than the reverse, and as a result, British imports to Argentina increased more than did Argentine exports to England after the ratification of the Roca-Runciman Pact [17, pp. 47-48]. Since Great Britain's exports to Argentina were mainly manufactured goods, the increase of British exports due to tariff concessions must have impeded the growth of the embryonic Argentine manufacturing industry. Finally, the Argentine government promised "benevolent treatment" to British capital, meaning that the Argentine government would give special treatment to British-owned tramways and railways whose profits had dwindled at the time [38, p. 66]. In short, the Pact gave Argentina almost the same status as the British dominions. Sir Herbert Samuel said before the House of Commons, "Being in fact a British colony, it is convenient that Argentina should be incorporated into the Empire" (cited in [45, p. 406]).

Why did the Argentine government choose an alternative meaning increased dependence on Great Britain at a time when some Latin American countries were beginning to move toward economic independence?

First, the power of the Justo government was fundamentally based in the support of a landowning oligarchy. Their main concern was to maintain Argentina's meat export. They had no interest in development of Argentine manufacturing. This oligarchy feared that an increase in manufacturing would reduce the import of British goods, thus reducing the export of Argentine meat to Great Britain. In this sense, it is safe to say that the Roca-Runciman Pact expressed most nakedly the interests of the landowning oligarchy. As is often pointed out, Latin American diplomacy is directed by a small elite [7, p. 5], and the Pact is an eloquent example. But instead of trying to maintain the level of meat export through the Roca-Runciman Pact, why did not the Justo government do so by finding new markets in other countries? Why did it not select this alternative?

The reason may lie in the fact that the land oligarchy had a strong sense of reliance upon Great Britain. This sense had been cultivated in Argentina since Great Britain had helped the country financially in the 1820s. In 1887 Julio Argentino Roca said,

Argentina will never forget that the conditions of progress and prosperity in which it finds itself at this moment, is owed in great measure to English capital. (cited in [35, p. 114])

The reliance upon Great Britain intensified in the twentieth century, because Argentina's prosperity depended more and more upon export to Great Britain

and British investment. Soon after the signature of the Roca-Runciman Pact Julio A. Roca, Jr. said,

Now we are able to fortify the traditional ties between Argentina and Great Britain, because this is the first country that recognized our independence, the first that signed a treaty of peace and friendship with us, and the country which gave us the necessary money to work with when our country was still in the chaos of its formation. [43, May 4, 1933]

On another occasion Roca pointed out that common feeling, sentiment, and taste existed between the two countries, based on "a coincidence of interests between the Argentine producers and the British producers" [60, Feb. 16, 1933]. This coincidence might best be described as the relationship between Argentine cattle ranchers and British industrialists; or in other words, between the "peripheric" country and the "industrial" center in Raúl Prebisch's terms. It was evident that there were only two ways that the "peripheric" country could move in the face of an economic crisis such as that of 1929: economic independence from the "center" or deepened dependence upon the "center." Because of the strong sense of reliance upon Great Britain, the cattle ranchers and the Justo government chose the second.

It should be noted, however, that such a sense of reliance was shared by the majority of the Argentine people. The CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo), the most important labor organization, formed in 1930, uttered no protest [56, p. 166], the Unión Industrial, the organization of industrialists, protested against the Pact, but finally accepted it probably because they thought it would reduce imports from the United States [56, p. 166]. In their declaration against the Pact, the Unión Industrial also recognized that "the British contribution is the cornerstone of Argentine progress" (cited in [16, p. 134]). The wheat farmers supported the Pact welcoming a British pledge not to raise the tariff on agricultural products [56, p. 167]. Although some military men were against the Pact, they did not protest [42, p. 100]. The only firm opposition came from small and medium-sized cattle ranchers who had wanted to establish their own meat-packing house, but also knew very well the importance of the British market for Argentine meat. In short, the great majority of the people were convinced that Argentina, which was dependent upon meat, could not prosper without the British market. Ysabel Rennie said, "not only the estancieros and members of the Sociedad Rural but the city merchant, the industrial worker, and the government bureaucrat identify their country's prestige with its livestock. For Argentina, therefore, the possible closing of the British market to Argentine meat [referring to the Ottawa Conference] was as much a moral as an economic blow" [46, p. 249].

Under such circumstances, the Pact passed Congress rather easily in July 1933 although the Socialist and Democrat Progressive parties criticized it on the ground that it was too humiliating. The Pact was renewed in December 1936, with certain modifications and continued in force until the middle of the 1940s. Based on the Pact, the Justo government tried to repair the national economy and strengthen, through electoral fraud, the political power of the landed oligarchy

who had formed the "Concordancia" or the conservative coalition in 1931. As time went on, some protest against the excessive dependence on Great Britain was made by some intellectuals, such as the Irazusta brothers and the Radicals who formed FORJA (Fuerza de Orientación Radical de Joven Argentina) in 1935 [29] [30] [53]. But all their protests could not change the basic political system characterized by dependence upon Great Britain and control of politics by a small landed oligarchy through electoral chicanery. Our next question then should be, how did such dependence upon Great Britain affect the United States-Argentine relationship in the 1930s?

II. ARGENTINE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIPLOMACY IN THE 1930s

The Roca-Runciman Pact which deepened Argentine dependence upon Great Britain inevitably meant some Argentine isolation from the United States, since the United States and Great Britain were competing for the Argentine market at the time. Of course, Britain had had overwhelming influence in the Argentine economy since the nineteenth century, but U.S. expansion into Argentina was remarkable in the twentieth century especially in the period after World War I. For example, while the value of British export to Argentina increased only 36 per cent from 1913 to 1928, that of the United States increased about 300 per cent in the same period [24, p. 21]. While British investment was fixed between 1923 and 1927, U.S. investment increased about 250 per cent in the same period [41, p. 9]. Although British dominance in investment did not change,⁴ no doubt the British position was gradually undermined by the United States. Signed under such circumstances, therefore, the Roca-Runciman Pact tended to check American expansion in favor of British. Restrictions imposed upon the use of sterling balances accumulated by the Argentine government and the benevolent treatment given to British capital particularly helped the British to win in the struggle with the United States. Understandably, the U.S. Department of State criticized the Pact as "an undue burden on American business interests."⁵

The anti-American tendency shown in the Roca-Runciman Pact existed in Argentina since long before, especially among the cattle-raising oligarchy. Their anti-Americanism beginning around 1889 was principally manifested as opposition to the Pan-American movement. One reason for opposition was that the United States, with its big livestock industry, was a competitor in the world market. Also in another way of looking at it, Argentina could not establish the kind of "peripheric-center" relations with the United States that existed between Argentina and Great Britain. Therefore the cattle ranchers could not expect anything

⁴ In 1926 the distribution of foreign investments in Argentina was as follows: Great Britain, 53.5 per cent; United States, 15.3 per cent; and France, 10.9 per cent [19, p. 78].

⁵ Acting Secretary of State to Chargé in Argentina (White), June 5, 1933 [61, 1933, Vol. 4, p. 739].

from economic cooperation with the United States. On the contrary, such cooperation might threaten the commercial relationship with Great Britain. Roque Sáenz Peña, heading the Argentine delegation at the first Pan-American Conference, criticized the U.S. plan to set up an American free trade area on the grounds that it would start a war between the American continent and Europe (cited in [35, p. 156]). Another reason why the landed oligarchy opposed Pan-Americanism was that they felt it would undermine Argentine leadership in South America. Because of rapid economic growth in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Argentina became one of the five richest countries in the world [64, p. 186] at the beginning of the twentieth century, and the ruling class were firmly convinced that Argentina was the greatest country in South America. The only threat to this superiority that they perceived was the United States and its Pan-American movement. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, a son-in-law of Sáenz Peña and a member of the Rural Society, said in 1911,

The policy of the United States is to bar Europe economically and politically from Latin America. Argentina, the first country of that region, must direct its energy to drawing Europe closer, thus establishing a balance with the Pan-Americanism of the Anglo-Saxon. (cited in [35, p. 295])

Here we see the very important notion that Argentina should check Pan-Americanism through cooperation with the European countries. So, it is safe to say that, maintaining close relationships with Europe, particularly with Great Britain, was not only a means to satisfy the economic interests of the landed oligarchy but also a method of maintaining Argentine supremacy in South America.

It is very natural, therefore, that Saavedra Lamas opposed the Pan-American movement so strongly while in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1932 to 1938. Moreover, he felt it urgent to resist the Pan-American movement since the United States was strengthening ties with the Latin American countries in the Good Neighbor policy of the 1930s.

The first Pan-American Conference in which he confronted the Americans as foreign minister was the Montevideo Conference of December 1933. It seems that the Roca-Runciman Pact signed in May and the incorporation of Argentina into the League of Nations in September strengthened Saavedra's resistance to the Pan-American movement. In fact, in November, he indicated his willingness to limit the subjects under discussion to judicial problems⁶ and exclude those of a political nature. But when the conference opened, his attitude toward Cordell Hull was very cordial, the conference ending in a friendly mood. Hull attributed the success of the conference primarily to the cordial cooperation of Saavedra Lamas [27, Vol. 1, pp. 322-37], and some scholars called the conference "the United States-Argentine honeymoon" [15, p. 48].

It should be noted, though, that his cordial attitude did not mean an acceptance of Pan-Americanism. In his address before the conference he said,

⁶ Ambassador in Argentina to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1933 [61, 1933, Vol. 4, p. 39].

I insist that Pan-Americanism aspire to be universal, because it hovers to become the personality and expression of these enormous Americas, with their unlimited horizon . . . without ancestral hatred or racial divisions. [50, p. 103]

Universalization of Pan-Americanism was clearly a concept opposed to that of regional solidarity which Hull expected. This was one of the great differences in thinking between Hull and Saavedra Lamas at the Montevideo Conference, but this difference did not surface because the United States proposed no plan which might lead directly to regional solidarity. On the contrary, the United States recognized the principle of non-intervention, though with some reservations, and promised tariff reductions. Both of these were principles that the Argentine government had tried to get the United States to comply with in the 1920s.⁷

Moreover, Hull tried to court friendship with Saavedra Lamas by supporting Lamas's anti-war pact, since the pact was received with very little enthusiasm by other Latin American countries [12, pp. 133-34]. In short, the conference was an American-Argentine honeymoon, not because Saavedra Lamas supported Pan-Americanism but because Hull made many concessions to Latin America and Saavedra Lamas in particular.

At the December 1936 Buenos Aires Peace Conference, however, American policy shifted to a more aggressive tack, with the proposition of establishing a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee. This change in American policy brought strong opposition from Argentina [2, p. 73], especially from Saavedra Lamas who felt that such a committee would cut into the role of the League of Nations of which he had been president since September 1936. His opposition to Pan-Americanism came not only from personal preference for the League but also from the traditional attitude of the cattle oligarchy. At the conference he re-emphasized traditional ties with Europe, "with which we have so many commercial relations, and where lie the origins of our culture . . . with its rich nest of doctrines, education, capital, and people" [50, p. 185]. In short, Saavedra Lamas opposed a permanent organization of Pan-Americanism because it might hurt traditional ties with Europe. At the conference, he proposed a plan that would include Inter-American cooperation within the League of Nations and consultation through regular diplomatic channels [40, p. 391]. Hull's and Saavedra Lamas's plans could not be easily reconciled in spite of their long discussions in which "some sharp words were exchanged" [27, Vol. 1, p. 499]. At any rate, Hull's original plan was not approved at the conference because of Saavedra Lamas's strong opposition.

While he opposed any progress in Pan-Americanism, Saavedra Lamas tried to maintain a cordial relationship with Great Britain. In 1936, the Roca-Runciman Pact was renewed and the Argentine government signed contracts for one cruiser and seven destroyers to be constructed in Great Britain [66, p. 14]. But, when the United States announced a proposal to lease six naval vessels to Brazil the

⁷ Argentina's opposition against U.S. policy at the Havana Conference of 1928 was particularly strong. See [14].

following year, Saavedra Lamas protested so vehemently that the lease was abandoned [43, Aug. 13, Aug. 16, Aug. 20, 1937] [18, pp. 100-108], which was another victory for Saavedra Lamas over Inter-American cooperation.

If such anti-American and pro-British diplomacy as that of Saavedra Lamas favored the interests of the landed oligarchy, we would suppose that José María Cantilo, Saavedra Lamas's successor, would have taken the same line [55, p. 52], since he was also a member of the Rural Society and a great admirer of European culture. While he was in the Foreign Ministry during the Robert M. Ortiz administration (1938-40), he showed an obstructionist attitude in the Pan-American conferences. The first occasion was the eighth Pan-American Conference meeting in Lima in December 1938, in which Cantilo left the conference two days after he made the inaugural address, emphasizing Argentina's traditional ties with Europe [43, Dec. 11, 1938].

On the other hand, Hull thought that the time had come for solid Inter-American cooperation, because "the danger to the Western Hemisphere was real and imminent" [27, Vol. 1, p. 602]. He proposed that the conference approve a declaration against the threat from non-American states and for regular meetings of foreign ministers of the American states [27, Vol. 1, p. 607].

The Argentine delegation opposed these proposals so vehemently that the conference reached a stalemate. Hull called the conference "as among the most difficult of my career" [27, Vol. 1, p. 605]. At the Lima Conference, however, President Ortiz showed a very friendly attitude toward the United States, instructing the delegation by telephone to accept the American proposal. Almost the same type of confrontation was repeated in the first meeting of the foreign ministers in Panama in September 1939. Cantilo at first thought that such a meeting should be held at a more productive time than that of the outbreak of war in Europe [10, p. 93], and instructed Leopoldo Melo, head of the Argentine delegation, to oppose the "security zone" within the Western Hemisphere. This time too, Ortiz ordered the Argentine delegation to support the American plan in the final stage of the conference. In the second meeting of foreign ministers in Havana, July 1940, Leopoldo Melo once again opposed the U.S. proposal to establish a provisional administration of European colonies in America although he finally accepted it in accordance with the instruction of President Ortiz who then had practically retired from office [27, Vol. 1, p. 826].

From this brief description, it is evident that the obstructionist policy against Inter-American cooperation was being continued by Cantilo. But it is also evident that President Ortiz tried to keep a closer relationship with the United States. Sumner Welles, who was irritated by the obstructionist tactics of the Argentine government, appreciated Ortiz highly [64, p. 191]. Why did Ortiz, also a member of the Rural Society, try to make different policy than that of his foreign minister?

There are at least two reasons. One was that the United States had become more important to the Argentine economy with the decline of European trade [1, p. 283]. It was not wise for Argentina to adhere to a traditional pro-British commercial policy in the new situation. The other reason is connected with

domestic policy. Although Ortiz was elected president through fraudulent elections in 1937, he wanted to restore democracy and honest elections to the country. This was possible only through the support of the Radicals making him keep somewhat aloof from the landed oligarchy. His diplomacy also had to be shifted from a pro-British and anti-American stance desired by the landed oligarchy to a pro-American one which the Radicals wanted.⁸ Ortiz's proposal for cooperation with the American states made in April 1940 and based on a declaration of non-belligerency was his last effort to strengthen democratic groups within the country.⁹ All this, however, aroused strong opposition from the Concordancia and the non-belligerency proposal was not only opposed domestically but received no support from the United States. Disillusioned and ill, Ortiz turned the presidency over to vice-president Ramón Castillo on July 3, 1940. The pro-British and anti-American diplomacy of the landed oligarchy was maintained until 1940 in spite of Ortiz's efforts.

The question arises now as to whether the neutral policy during the war (1941-45) was a simple prolongation of such a policy.

III. NEUTRAL POLICY OF THE CASTILLO GOVERNMENT

The elevation of Castillo to the presidency pleased the majority of the landed oligarchy, since they disliked Ortiz's attempts to democratize the country. Although Castillo himself was neither a landowner nor a member of the Rural Society, he allied with the landed oligarchy in order to strengthen his political power and check Ortiz's remaining influence. At that time, however, the European situation became critical with Hitler's continued successes, and many feared that sooner or later the British might be defeated [10, p. 107]. In such a situation, there were two reactions among the landed oligarchy. One group which strongly sympathized with Great Britain took the position that Argentina should make her pro-Allied attitude clear. On June 6, 1940, there appeared one pro-Allied organization called the *Acción Argentina* whose main slogan was cooperation with other democratic countries to maintain democracy both internally and externally [21]. It not only appreciated the contribution made by Great Britain to Argentina's greatness but also called for Inter-American cooperation against fascism [21, p. 342 and *passim*]. The fact that some leading members of the Concordancia who adhered to pro-British diplomacy in the 1930s such as Saavedra Lamas, Cantilo, and ex-president Justo were part of this movement [21, pp. 267-69] shows clearly that wartime neutrality was not a mere prolongation of 1930s diplomacy.

⁸ Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to Secretary of State, January 29, 1940 [61, 1939, Vol. 5, p. 295].

⁹ For the non-belligerency proposal, see Tulchin [59, pp. 571-604]. Although Cantilo was almost always an obstructionist in his attitude against Pan-Americanism, he supported this proposal for non-belligerency. But, since it received strong opposition in the Congress and in the country at large, he felt defeated and took the same obstructionist attitude at the Havana Conference held in July 1940 [40, pp. 403-4]. But he acted in favor of the Allied cause after Pearl Harbor.

The other group within the landed oligarchy wanted Argentina to be neutral, maintaining close economic relations with the United Kingdom. This group reasoned that if Argentina remained neutral, meat exports to Great Britain would be transported safely not being impeded by German ships. Even if Britain were defeated, if Argentina remained neutral, Germany would be their best customer. As we have seen before, Pan-Americanism remained unattractive to this group, because it did not facilitate Argentine meat sales to the United States.¹⁰ Only days before the Havana Conference, the cattlemen asked the government not to make any compromise limiting Argentina's freedom to sell meat to Germany [59, pp. 599-600].

That the second-type cattle ranchers were by far numerous can be gleaned from the memoirs of Sir David Kelly, British Ambassador in Argentina during the war. He recalls that,

Whilst the smart society [composed principally of the landed oligarchy] in general backed the neutrality of the Castillo government only a few of them were pro-German, the vast majority were thoroughly pro-allies and especially pro-British in their sympathies. [33, p. 287]

In short, many cattle ranchers wanted a pro-British but neutral and anti-American diplomacy. Acting President Castillo tried to gain support from this group, partly because Castillo preferred neutrality due to his dislike for democracy, and partly because a neutral policy would separate Justo, the most influential but pro-Allied military man, from the landed oligarchy the majority of which had preferred neutrality.

At any rate, the Castillo government took a very strict neutral policy since Julio A. Roca, Jr., pro-Ally foreign minister, resigned in January 1941. In addition, the neutral United States was becoming more and more pro-Allied and this was increasing the Nazi threat to the Western Hemisphere. The United States took several measures to bring Argentina closer to Western Hemisphere cooperation during 1941, such as lifting restrictions on imports of Argentine beef in March, proposing to initiate the negotiation for Lend-Lease Aid in July and signing the Reciprocal Treaty on October 14, 1941. But these measures failed to produce positive results. The reciprocal treaty which Hull considered "a major step forward" [27, Vol. 2, p. 1140] in hemisphere cooperation had no effect on Argentine diplomacy, because just a week before the signing, Castillo said,

In such a country as ours, where many workers have settled from various parts of the world . . . it is our duty to give everybody peace and assure him faithful and strict fulfillment of our neutrality. [43, Oct. 8, 1941]

Although the Castillo government could resist diplomatic pressure from the United States, its domestic and foreign policies were attacked severely by opposition parties in the Congress and by the *Acción Argentina*. Such internal

¹⁰ Such ideas held by the cattle ranchers can be seen in Josephs [32, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii]. See also Bagú [8, p. 90].

opposition led Castillo to seek support from pro-Axis military men. Although we do not know what the precise percentage of such groups were within the Army, according to one study, about 20 per cent of the military men at the outbreak of war in Europe were pro-Axis [65, p. 304]. This group was a rival of the Justo faction within the military, so naturally Castillo, who wanted to consolidate his power by reducing Justo's, aligned himself with the pro-Axis military. In October 1941, these military men promised to support Castillo on the condition that he would accept some demands they had prepared; one of these being that he must maintain neutrality [42, pp. 159-60].

So, we can say that Castillo's neutrality was backed principally by a majority of the pro-British and anti-American landed oligarchy and the pro-Axis military. It is noteworthy that both groups supported the neutralist policy for different reasons. The former preferred neutrality because it gave them a greater opportunity to export to Great Britain. The latter supported neutrality because of their sympathy for Germany. The trouble was that Germany and Great Britain were at war, and Castillo's neutralism was based upon an alliance of contradictory forces. Although we do not know which force influenced Castillo's policy more, we should examine to what extent the pro-British thinking of the cattle ranchers affected neutrality.

Before Pearl Harbor, United States-Argentine relations were in a high state of tension, and Argentina maintained its close relations with Great Britain. As neither of the two renounced the Roca-Runciman Pact, it was still in force after December 1939, when it was scheduled to expire. Meat contracts were signed between the two countries in August 1940, and in September 1941 [34, p. 218]. The importance of the British market for Argentine beef did not change under the Castillo administration. The United States' attempt to draw Argentina into hemispheric cooperation failed in part because Argentina adhered to traditional ties as enunciated in the Roca-Runciman Pact. Even when the reciprocal treaty was signed in October 1941, the Argentine foreign minister sent a note to the American government to the effect that

the inability of Argentina to convert freely into dollars the proceeds of sales to the United Kingdom makes it impossible for the Argentine government to extend full non-discriminatory treatment to the trade of the United States of America. (cited in [65, p. 228])

Although Argentina assured the United States in the same note that she would give the fullest possible non-discriminatory treatment within "the practical limitations imposed by the existing payments arrangements in effect between Argentina and the United Kingdom" (cited in [65, p. 228]), it was evident that the Argentine government wanted to maintain its special economic relations with Great Britain. Argentina's policy pleased the British government, which wanted to keep Argentina as its last zone of influence in Latin America. Indeed, Argentina, which provided 33 per cent of the total South American trade [10, p. 96], was of vital importance to British foreign trade. In 1939, 38 per cent of British investment in Latin America was in Argentina [47, p. 286] and British exports to Argentina

in 1935 exceeded the total to the rest of the countries in South America [26, p. 32]. Moreover, during World War II, 30 per cent of meat consumed in England was supplied by Argentina [37, p. 11]. In short, Great Britain, at war from September 1939, needed Argentina more than ever to maintain its food supply during the war and welcomed Argentina's neutrality because it was safer to maintain Argentine imports without provoking reprisal from the Axis and also because it could check American expansion in Argentina. In this sense, there was a great difference between the United States and Great Britain in their policies toward Argentina.

The difference between the two policies become more evident when war began between the United States and Japan. While the United States asked for immediate cooperation among the American states as stated in the Havana Declaration, Great Britain indirectly requested Argentina to maintain neutrality by nominating Argentina as the country to represent her interests in Japan.¹¹ Naturally Norman Armour, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina criticized this British policy as "a prime mistake" [61, 1941, Vol. 6, p. 58]. Although the British plan was not carried out,¹² Argentina made a distinction between the United States and Great Britain in her foreign policy declaration of December 9, 1941; namely, the Argentine government declared the United States non-belligerent, but it also manifested its intention to be strictly neutral only in the war between Great Britain and Japan [3, p. 55]. The declaration of non-belligerency meant that Argentina would give the United States the same rights as a neutral country such as free passage within territorial waters, so Argentina shifted from a strict neutrality to a pro-American stance. But, this favor was not given to Great Britain. Not because Argentina favored the United States more, but probably because Argentina was ready to accept the British proposal that Argentina would handle British interests in Japan. So, the December 9 declaration was in reality traditional pro-British and anti-American diplomacy.

Thus, the United States requested the Argentine government to take more concrete steps than the non-belligerent declaration in the Third Conference of Foreign Ministers in Rio de Janeiro, 1942. It is needless to talk about the meeting in detail here, but Argentine Foreign Minister Enrique Ruiz Guiñazú did not accept a declaration which required severance of relations with the Axis. Argentine and Chilean opposition to the declaration brought the conference to a stalemate, which was finally relieved by approving a compromise declaration only recommending that each American state break off diplomatic relations with the Axis. But this declaration did not affect Argentina's foreign policy, and soon after the Rio Conference Castillo declared "Argentina will not enter the war, nor break her ties with the Axis" (cited in [21, p. 357]).

After the conference, the Castillo government consolidated its neutrality, ignoring the demands for a break made by the Radicals, Socialists, Acción

¹¹ Memorandum of Telephone by Adviser on Political Relations (Duggan), December 8, 1941 [61, 1941, Vol. 6, p. 58].

¹² According to the list of representatives of enemies' interests published by the Japanese Foreign Office, May 20, 1942, Switzerland represented British interests in Japan.

Argentina, and some important newspapers such as *La Prensa* (e.g., [43, Jan. 28, 1942]). In September 1942, when the Lower House passed a resolution calling for severance of relations with the Axis, the government likewise ignored it. United States pressure against Argentine neutrality increased in 1942. In October, Sumner Welles officially criticized Chile and Argentina for still maintaining diplomatic relations with the Axis in spite of their approval of the Rio resolution. In February 1943, the United States began to take restrictive measures in trade with Argentina [40, p. 425], increasing the tension between the two countries.

In contrast, friendly relations were maintained between Great Britain and Argentina under the Castillo government. David Kelly, British Ambassador in Argentina, moved on the assumption that the Castillo government was not pro-German [33, p. 289], and Foreign Minister Ruiz Guiñazú did not conceal his sympathy for Great Britain as "an assiduous cooperator in our progress," although he criticized Pan-Americanism as "imperialism." Moreover, he justified neutrality on the ground that it favored trade between Argentina and the Allies [49, pp. 15, 21, 29]. In fact, during the war Argentina increased her export to Great Britain from an amount valued at 308 million pesos in 1941 to 620 million pesos in 1943 [44, p. 185], due in part to the neutral policy. Thus, it is safe to say that the neutral policy of the Castillo government had almost the same character as 1930 diplomacy in the sense that it also was based on pro-British and anti-American sentiments of the landed oligarchy and it favored their interests and those of Great Britain.

The United States, however, could not permit Great Britain to be favored by Argentine neutrality. The United States was irritated by rumors circulating in Argentina that the British government supported neutrality. Although we know that the British government wanted Argentina to remain neutral, it could not continue to support it permanently, because Anglo-American collaboration might be hurt. Furthermore, what Great Britain needed most at the first stage of the war was the help of the United States, so Great Britain could not afford to irritate the Americans over Argentine problems, although this of course did not mean that the British wanted to forsake the Argentine market. On the other hand, using the advantage given to them by the war, American business interests wanted to get into Argentina. Kelly explained this complicated situation as follows.

It inevitably followed that the Americans hoped to play off the British interest against the American, and the Americans were obsessed by the suspicion that the British were for commercial reasons secretly supporting the Argentine regime. This conflict between local British interests and the overriding requirements of Anglo-American cooperation was the source of constant frustration. [33, p. 289]

When the United States asked the British government to take a harder stand against Argentina in December 1942 [27, Vol. 2, p. 1409], the British had to give priority to Anglo-American cooperation and stated that they deplored Argentine neutrality in an official announcement made on December 31, 1942.¹³

¹³ For the text of the British government statement see [43, Jan. 1, 1943].

In addition, the British government suspended the meat contract beginning in January 1943 [37, p. 9].

Although the Argentine government rejected the British statement as an action which "should not correspond to friendly relations between two peoples" [4, p. 69], suspension of the meat contract immediately affected the cattlemen. The Rural Society expressed anxiety in its annals of February 1943:

Our livestock industry is in a fully progressive evolution as a result of trying to meet the ever-increasing demand for meat from Great Britain. Now it suffers an uncertain period because of the delaying of the new contract with respect to meat. This delay not only hurts our interests as producers but also hampers a constant supply to satisfy the British necessities. [57, p. 127]

Under these circumstances, the Concordancia began to shift from neutrality toward severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis. Both the fact that Ruiz Guiñazú made the first public anti-totalitarian statement in May 1943,¹⁴ and that Robustiano Patrón Costas was nominated as presidential candidate of the Concordancia for the September 1943 elections can be taken as signs of the change of policy of the Concordancia, because Patrón Costas was generally considered a rupturist.¹⁵

But the pro-Axis military group which had supported Castillo did not permit this change. Moreover, they increased their influence since the War Ministry was presided over by their leader, Pedro P. Ramírez since November 1942. Their efforts were also helped by a military lodge called the GOU (Grupos de Oficiales Unidos) probably formed in 1942. On June 4, 1943, when the Concordancia, or National Democratic party, was scheduled to nominate Patrón Costas as a presidential candidate, the Army intervened and overthrew the Castillo government. This tends to show that Castillo's neutral policy was backed principally by the landed oligarchy. When they began to doubt neutrality, Castillo's neutrality also began to vacillate. If one supposes that Castillo's neutral policy was backed principally by the military, it is difficult to explain why Castillo wanted to nominate Patrón Costas who would certainly provoke their opposition.

IV. NEUTRAL POLICY OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ANGLO-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

Although we cannot explain the revolution of June in detail here, two important points should be noted. First, the pro-British and anti-American landed elite was driven out of power by the pro-Axis military men because of their own increasing divergence of opinions on neutrality. Thus, the military became antagonistic to the landed elite and seized power through coup d'état [31, p. 150]. Second, the nationalists, who were opposed to British domination over the Argentine economy, supported the revolution. One example was the support of

¹⁴ Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to Secretary of State, May 5, 1943 [61, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 416].

¹⁵ Although there are some dissident opinions on this [42, p. 180], no doubt he was considered rupturist by the neutralists. See Sánchez Sorondo [51, p. 243].

the FORJA which had since 1935 severely criticized Argentina's economic dependence upon Great Britain. The FORJA said on June 4, 1943,

The overthrow of the "regime" is the first stage of a reconstruction of nationalism and an authentic expression of sovereignty. (cited in [30, p. 101])

Other civil organizations such as the Governing Board of Argentine Nationalism, the Argentine Civic Legion, and the Argentine National Patriotic Union also came to support the revolution [11, pp. 223-24]. All of these organizations were characterized by admiration for the Axis and dislike of Great Britain. For example, the National Patriotic Union had demanded nationalization of British-owned public utilities [65, p. 179]. Anyway, it is evident that the military government was not connected with cattle interests nor did they have the pro-British tendencies characterizing Argentine diplomacy during 1930-43. Then, what were the reasons for military government neutrality?

Although it is very difficult to define the cause of military neutrality, no doubt their pro-Axis feeling was an important cause. The GOU's members especially strongly sympathized with the Axis, although this does not mean that the GOU was an agent of the Nazis or that it collaborated with Germany as stated in the *Blue Book*. Juan Domingo Perón, one of the more prominent leaders of the GOU, said "I will imitate him [Mussolini] in everything except his mistakes" (cited in [19, p. 15]). The leaflet probably circulated among the military men on June 4 contained the following [11, pp. 47-49]. (1) World War II gave us a lesson that the era of the nation is being superseded by the era of the continent. Germany will unite the European continent. (2) In South America we must make our position as guardian not only possible but unquestionable. (3) To realize this objective, we must establish military government, eliminating civilians from the government and continuing to arm the country. (4) If we can subordinate the neighboring countries to our control, such as Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile, "the South American continent will be ours" because Brazil will be on our side in such a case.

Although the authenticity of the leaflet is doubted by a recent study [42, p. 196], there is nothing concrete that will prove it false. Moreover, the military government afterwards acted basically along the outline of the document and it was a well-known fact that the Argentine Army had been trained in the German fashion. So we can safely suppose that with the strong pro-German sympathies of some military men they would oppose any rupture with the Axis.

These military men naturally tried to continue the neutral policy in the newly built government after the June revolution. But this time the pro-Allied group within the Army opposed neutrality. Although this group was losing influence after Justo's death in January 1943, no one could ignore its existence. Pro-Allied military men also participated in the revolution of 1943 but this was due to their lack of confidence in the civilian government which had not been able to provide necessary armaments. Their disappointment with the Castillo government had been on the increase particularly due to the amount of the lend-lease aid Brazil had received to build up her military power.¹⁶ In the face of the military threat

from Brazil, the pro-Ally group felt that it was necessary to break off relations with the Axis and to receive arms from the United States. The pro-Axis group led by the GOU wanted to maintain neutrality and get arms from Germany. The internal strife between the two government groups caused a lot of confusion in foreign policy. For example, the pledge to the Nation by President Ramírez on June 7, 1943 called for "inter-American cooperation" and "maintenance of neutrality" [43, June 8, 1943]. It was evident that these two policies could not get along together under circumstances in which the only way for Argentina to show her willingness to cooperate with other American states was to break off relations with the Axis.

This internal struggle was a victory for the pro-Axis factions at first. On June 7, pro-Allied President Arturo Rawson was replaced by Ramírez, a member of the GOU. On September 9, Foreign Minister Segundo Storni, a well-known rupturist, was removed from office. In October, three ministers favoring a break in Axis relations also resigned. In November 1943, Foreign Minister Alberto Gilbert affirmed that Argentina's foreign policy was one of "complete and absolute neutrality."¹⁷

One important reason why the neutralists won the struggle was that they could justify their position with the nationalistic argument that the only way to maintain national sovereignty in the face of external pressure was to maintain neutrality. In the *Noticias* of July 18, 1943, the GOU said,

Every enrollee in the work of G.O.U. must know and feel that our neutrality is *the symbol of the National Sovereignty* in the face of the foreign pressures and that it constitutes neither adherence to nor repudiation of either of the sides in the struggle. (cited in [42, p. 219])

This kind of appeal to the people's nationalistic sentiment was successful because United States' pressure on Argentina's neutrality became more apparent soon after the revolution of June. On June 18, 1943, Hull instructed Armour to ask the Argentine government to take fourteen steps, including a break in relations with the Axis, severance of commercial and financial relations with the Axis, and vigorous and effective control of subversive activities.¹⁸ When Foreign Minister Storni asked for military aid in a letter, Hull rebuffed his petition so severely that Storni was forced to resign, unable to resist accusations that he had defamed the national honor [32, p. 180].

Although United States' pressure strengthened the neutralist position within the country, the continuity of neutralism inevitably caused Argentine isolation not only in the Western Hemisphere but in the world. To prevent such isolation, the junta tried to make contact with the German government for military aid, establish an anti-American bloc in South America and maintain close economic relations with Great Britain. As we have examined neutrality in terms of relations with Great Britain, we will now examine in detail how Anglo-Argentine

¹⁶ Brazil received three-fourths of the American lend-lease aid to Latin America [58, p. 338].

¹⁷ Ambassador Armour to Secretary of State, November 26, 1943 [61, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 464].

¹⁸ Secretary of State to Ambassador in Argentina, June 18, 1943 [61, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 417].

relations influenced the neutral policy of the military government.

The revolution of June must have been a shock to Great Britain because of its nationalistic aspects, and because of its anti-British tendencies. For example, in an official statement made on September 26, 1943, the British government said among other things,

The naturally friendly sentiments of the British people towards Argentina are also affected by the treatment which British interests receive in that country. [60, Sept. 27, 1943]

As mentioned before, Argentina was of prime importance to the British war economy, so the British government had to make every effort to maintain the Argentine status quo and check any leaning towards the Axis. For this reason the British government appeased the military government while the United States took a very intransigent attitude. The fact that the Anglo-Argentine meat contract suspended in January 1943 was resumed in August can be interpreted as a sign of appeasement, because it was very favorable to Argentina [54, p. 206]. In the following month, an egg contract was also signed between the two countries. When the United Kingdom was asked to join the United States in a general embargo against Argentina, Great Britain argued that "Argentina might be driven in retaliation to create difficulties over meat supplies for the United Kingdom."¹⁹

The junta also welcomed the British appeasement, because it would prevent Argentina from being isolated in the world and also satisfy the cattlemen's interests. When the meat contract was signed in August 1943 the president of the Rural Society expressed his satisfaction [32, p. 125]. Even when the British government spoke against Argentina's maintaining diplomatic relations with the Axis on September 26, 1943, the Argentine government assured in very friendly terms that "no harm would come to the interests of Britain or of any other nation with capital invested in Argentina" [60, Sept. 29, 1943]. In short, the government tried to separate its British and American relations maintaining good terms with the former to resist the pressure of the latter. From this we can see, that the anti-British nationalism expressed in the June revolution was gradually disappearing. García Lupo summarizes the process as a "nationalist revolution whose aim was to redeem important sectors of public services from British domination and modify the classic commercial scheme which had connected the country with Great Britain, [it] discovered in the process [of economic nationalism] that it needed to re-connect with Great Britain . . . to defend itself from the colossal aggression of the United States" [22, p. 89].

This policy of maintaining good relations with Great Britain became more important in 1944, because it was evident by the end of 1943 that the other two above-mentioned measures could not produce satisfactory effects that the military government expected. The plan to get military aid from Germany failed because an Argentine agent sent to Germany, Osmar Alberto Hellmush was arrested in Trinidad in November 1943. The second measure, a plan to form an anti-

¹⁹ Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to Secretary of State, November 5, 1943 [61, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 507].

American bloc in South America also failed, because the new Bolivian pro-Axis government, formed after the revolution of December 20, 1943, with aid from the Argentine government, was not recognized by the other American states. It was evident that even though Argentina could ferment revolution in other states, those states would probably not be recognized. Moreover, the United States, aware of Argentina's intervention in the Bolivian revolution, pressed the Ramírez government to break off relations with the Axis, and threatened that if Argentina maintained neutrality it would make known the details of Argentina's intervention in Bolivia. Unable to resist this pressure, the Ramírez government finally ended recognition of the Axis on January 26, 1944. This change in foreign policy brought strong opposition from the neutralists in the Army, led by Perón [62, p. 26]. In the face of this opposition President Ramírez resigned on February 28 and was replaced by Edelmiro Farrell, a close friend of Perón. The new government informed the German government that the breach in relations was of little significance because it had been forced by United States' pressure [62, p. 26]. To maintain neutrality without being isolated, the new government needed, among other things, British support and tried to get it. This policy created tension between the United States and Britain in 1944.

When the United States became aware of the resignation of Ramírez, it adopted a non-recognition policy towards the Farrell government, because, according to Armour, non-recognition by all American states and by Great Britain, "would not only make [the Farrell government's] continuance difficult but would certainly encourage internal elements in opposition to it."²⁰ In other words, Armour proposed non-recognition as an effective means to overthrow the government. Hull also knew from the Bolivian experience that it was effective [27, Vol. 2, p. 1398]. Anyway, the State Department was impatient with the Argentine situation, fearing that if war ended without Argentina's full cooperation, it would be difficult to achieve Inter-American cooperation in the postwar period.²¹

On the other hand, Great Britain began to acquire new understanding of Argentina's importance for the British economy not only during the war but after. Especially, since Great Britain was expected to suffer from economic crisis after the war, it was most important that close relations be maintained with Argentina. Under such circumstances, there were two divergent views of Argentina in Great Britain. One group led by Winston Churchill stressed Anglo-American collaboration, and believed that the British government should go along with the United States' requests with respect to Argentina. Churchill instructed Foreign Minister Anthony Eden on February 27, 1944,

When you consider the formidable questions on which you may have difficulty with the United States, oil, dollar balances, shipping, policy to France, Italy, Spain, etc.,

²⁰ Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to Secretary of State, February 25, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 253].

²¹ It must be noted that United States Argentine policy was conditioned not only by the necessity of checking fascism in the Western Hemisphere, but by considerations of the postwar Inter-American cooperation. Such a view can be seen in Armour's telegram. Ambassador in Argentina to Secretary of State, July 13, 1943 [61, 1943, Vol. 5, p. 436].

I feel that we ought to make them feel we are friends and helpers in the American sphere. [67, p. 413]

The other view was that held by some members of Parliament and business circles. The *Economist* of August 5, 1944 said, "Great Britain has shown that she is ready to make any necessary sacrifice for the victory but not necessarily for the extension of Washington influence to Cape Horn" (cited in [55, p. 142]).

When the Farrell government was formed, the British government wanted to recognize it in expectation that it would carry out a policy of cooperation with the Allies [67, p. 413]. But Great Britain finally adopted the U.S.-influenced policy of non-recognition, giving priority to Anglo-American cooperation. At that time, however, the war was approaching its end and the British need for American aid was gradually declining, so Great Britain would be more on her own in policy towards Argentina. The Farrell government also wanted the British to have a different attitude toward Argentina from that of the United States. Especially War Minister Perón, the key member in the Farrell cabinet, tried to formulate a pro-British and anti-American diplomacy that would distinguish Great Britain from the United States. That Perón was favorable to the British is known from the fact that the British proposed a plan to the United States in April 1944 which would encourage Perón in his struggle with Luis Perlinger, Interior Minister.²² The American Ambassador Armour, did not think it would make any difference if Perón eliminated the extremists within the government (Perlinger was their leader) or worked with them to continue the non-recognition of the United States.²³ Thus, the victory of Perón over Perlinger on July 8, 1944 with the latter's withdrawal from the cabinet must have pleased Britain but not the United States.

Although the Farrell government was antagonistic to America from the beginning, it needed United States recognition to strengthen its domestic position. The United States wanted the Farrell government to change its basic foreign policy²⁴ in order to receive recognition from the United States. These conditions were not accepted by the Farrell government, so Perón's negotiations with Armour for recognition failed at the beginning of June.²⁵ Realizing that it was impossible to get recognition, the Farrell government took a more definitely anti-American policy. One example of how far this went was the speech Perón made on June 10, 1944 at the University of La Plata, in which he said: (1) It makes no difference to Argentina whether the Allies win or not; (2) The precondition of peace is armament, so Argentina must arm herself; (3) Industrialization, especially the establishment of heavy industry, is indispensable for defense strength [39, pp. 54-69].

This declaration shocked Hull, who called it "the most significant pronounce-

²² Secretary of State to Ambassador in Argentina, April 3, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 266].

²³ Ambassador in Argentina to Secretary of State, April 13, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 266-69].

²⁴ Secretary of State to Ambassador in Argentina, May 18, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 272].

²⁵ Ambassador in Argentina to Secretary of State, June 3, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 276-78].

ment of government policy"²⁶ yet heard and recalled Ambassador Armour on June 27, 1944. In return, the Argentine government recalled Ambassador Adrian Escobar from the United States on July 26 and Perón intensified his attack against American policy, behaving as if he were the true defender of national sovereignty. It seems that his nationalistic appeal to the people was successful particularly among labor. The CGT had been against neutrality since the beginning of the war, but shifted to support it in August 1944, claiming that neutrality does not mean opposition to or isolation from the democratic countries, it is simply a policy of support for the government against foreign pressures which might frustrate the national will (cited in [9, p. 79]).

Appealing to the nationalistic sentiments of the people, Perón lost no time in strengthening Argentina's ties with Great Britain. His pro-British and anti-American policy became more evident after the recall of Ambassador Armour. While Argentina recalled her ambassador in the United States in reprisal, she did not recall her ambassador from the United Kingdom when British Ambassador Kelly was recalled. The British ambassador's recall was a result of the inability of the British government to resist United States' demands [67, pp. 413-15]. According to Kelly, Perón assured him before he left that British railway interests would be protected [33, p. 306]. A new Anglo-Argentine meat contract signed in October 1944 got rid of fears within the British government that the withdrawal of the ambassador would affect renewal of the meat import contract.²⁷

Such close relations between the two countries reduced the effects of economic sanctions which the United States imposed on Argentina. Although the United States began to restrict the export of goods to Argentina in August of 1944 and gradually increased the number of prohibited goods²⁸ these measures failed to produce their expected results, because Great Britain did not adopt the same policy. As Great Britain had stronger influence over Argentina's economy, it was evident that American policy could not succeed without British cooperation. Therefore, the United States frequently urged the British government to join in the economic sanctions against Argentina, but the latter always refused on the ground that the Argentine economy was very important to the British. This was because, according to information received from the Foreign Office to the U.S. government,

The economic systems of the United Kingdom and Argentina, on the other hand, are complementary and have for generations been closely interdependent. We are unable adequately to supply our dense industrial population with food and raw materials from our own resources and those of our Dominions.²⁹

²⁶ Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics except Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, June 22, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 319].

²⁷ Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to Secretary of State, June 25, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 327].

²⁸ Secretary of State to Ambassador in the United Kingdom, August 1944, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) [61, 1944, Vol. 7, pp. 344-48].

²⁹ Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to Secretary of State, December 4, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 368].

In other words, Great Britain could not lose Argentina because it was her "peripheric country" as envisaged in the Roca-Runciman Pact. The junta, on the other hand, tried to maintain Argentina's traditional ties with Great Britain in order to resist American pressure. Under such circumstances, it was evident that the United States could not continue its intransigent policy towards Argentina for ever. As early as December 16, 1944, the Chargé (Reed) in Argentina informed the State Department of the negative effects of American policy.

No nation today enjoys less popularity in Argentina than the United States, a reputation purchased with no critical effect upon the Argentine economy, with a decided psychological and material increase in the local British position and with grave prejudice to present and future American business.³⁰

Although Hull attributes the failure of his Argentine policy to the lack of British support only [27, Vol. 2, p. 1419], there is no denying that Argentina's pro-British policy was a cause in preventing Hull from carrying out his plans. The new secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, recognized the error of United States' policy and reached an agreement with Argentina in early 1945. On March 27, Argentina declared war against Germany and Japan, and ratified the Declaration of Chapultepec. Although it legally meant the end of neutralism, it did not necessarily mean the end of pro-British and anti-American diplomacy, because Perón continued this policy under his own administration. One example of his pro-British diplomacy was the fact that Perón himself accepted the continuity of the Roca-Runciman Pact. The Argentine Foreign Minister declared on March 13 and 19, 1947,

My government agreed on the prolongation of the terms of the Pact [Malbrán-Eden Pact which was a slight modification of the Roca-Runciman Pact] beginning in January this year. [6, p. 2113]

Although the Malbrán-Eden Pact was replaced by the Andes Treaty in 1948, this new pact also gave British firms a kind of preference for acquisition of materials [17, p. 134]. These examples show clearly that Perón's government, unquestionably the most nationalistic in Argentine history, inherited the spirit of the Roca-Runciman Pact which has been repudiated by many as a most humiliating pact. This contradiction is due to the fact that the military government had to rely upon Great Britain to confront the United States in maintaining neutrality.

CONCLUSION

Argentine neutrality during World War II has often been interpreted as a manifestation of the fascism which conquered Argentina. The *Blue Book* gives very important evidence for such an argument. Another argument contends that neutrality was an expression of Argentine nationalism later to crystalize into Peronism.

³⁰ Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to Secretary of State, December 16, 1944 [61, 1944, Vol. 7, p. 375].

This paper approached the problem within the frame of reference of Argentine relations with Great Britain. This permits us to form some conclusions. First, the neutrality of the Castillo government was principally conditioned by pro-British and anti-American tendencies of the landed elite and it satisfied that elite's interests most. Second, the motives for neutrality in the military government (1943-45) were different because of the junta's pro-Axis ideology and aloofness from the interests of the landed elite. But the military government still felt it necessary to rely upon Great Britain to resist the United States' in their attempts to maintain neutrality. It follows, therefore, that pro-British and anti-American diplomacy repeated itself even under the military government.

This fact formed some of the nationalistic characteristics of the military government. Although the military government formed after the June revolution was the most nationalistic government that Argentina had ever produced, it did not try to fundamentally modify Argentina's economic dependence upon Great Britain. The government limited itself to criticizing United States' pressure in demonstrating its nationalism. No doubt the nationalism of the military government was opportunistic.

More important is the fact that this type of nationalism was inherited by the Perón administration (1946-55). Our analysis reaffirms the version of some scholars that Perón's diplomacy was basically the same as that of the 1930s in its pro-British orientation (for example [15, pp. 183-95] [28]). This pro-British character of Perón's government was traced to the belief that it was necessary for the military government to confront the United States. But, moreover, it is possible to suppose that Perón himself could not be completely free from the sense of reliance upon Great Britain which had spread through the Argentine people in the 1930s. In fact, in a speech made in September 1946, he did not conceal his admiration for the contribution of British capital to Argentine progress [28, p. 56]. Although nobody can ignore Perón's efforts to acquire economic independence during his administration, we must also recognize that these efforts were made within the framework of traditional ties between Great Britain and Argentina. Consequently, as England declined as the "industrial center" in the postwar period, Argentina declined as her periphery. This may have been a logical consequence of pro-British and anti-American neutrality initiated by the landed oligarchy and carried on by the military.

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