

# CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

—Steps toward the Recovery of Its U.N. Seat—

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**T**HE INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES surrounding China are changing at a rapid pace. In the U.N. General Assembly in the autumn of 1971, the Albanian resolution "to seat China and expel Nationalist China" was approved by an overwhelming majority. The fiction retained for the past twenty-two years that the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan with a population of 14 million represented the Chinese mainland of 800 million has now finally collapsed.

It is certain that the joint announcement made in Washington and Peking in mid-July of the scheduled visit to China by U.S. President Richard Nixon, which touched off reverberating echoes throughout the world, played a part in destroying this fabrication.<sup>1</sup> However, the flexible foreign policy taken by China after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution played a more important part in the recovery of her U.N. seat. Here, I would like to look back on Peking's record in foreign policy from the end of the Cultural Revolution until its entry into the world body with the aim of understanding the background of the scheduled Sino-American summit talks.

## I. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES

China's foreign policy line has been regulated by the political report delivered by Vice-Chairman Lin Biao to the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969. The report stated that the "foreign policy of our party and government is consistent" and revealed three foreign policy principles: (1) "to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism," (2) "to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations," and (3) "to work for peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and to oppose the

<sup>1</sup> This article was written in October 1971. Since then, China began her activities in the United Nations, U.S. President Nixon visited China, and a joint communique issued in Shanghai. New developments like these might have had to be added here, but the writer felt no need to do so, because the principle of Chinese foreign policy studied in this article has consistently been maintained throughout the country's diplomatic process.

imperialist policies of aggression and war" [9, p. 41].

These three principles are in form the same as the "General Line of Foreign Policy" put forth by Liu Shao-chi on the occasion of the celebration on June 30, 1961 marking the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, but we should note that, since the Liu Shao-chi line was severely criticized during the Cultural Revolution, the new line, though the same in form, has been changed in substance. Overlooking this fact will lead to the mistaken impression that Peking's new foreign policy is "a return to the Liu Shao-chi line."

Liu Shao-chi's foreign policy line was strongly attacked as the line of "capitulation to imperialism, revisionism and reaction and suppression of revolutionary movements in various countries" [9, p. 38]. In specific terms, Liu Shao-chi was criticized for stressing the danger of escalation by the United States in the Vietnam War during the height of the war in 1965 and seeking a joint action with the Soviet Union as well as for exercising big-power politics in an attempt to force national liberation movements and Communist parties of other nations whose regimes China supported to submit to and compromise with their regime. (Indonesia and Burma are two examples.)

The political report cited as current features of the world situation a progress of armed struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, an advance of revolutionary mass movements at the "heart" of capitalism and a deadlock of both American imperialists and Soviet social-imperialists in the collusion and struggle to gain bigger shares for each superpower. On the occasion of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the forces of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations in 1968, Premier Chou En-lai called the action "exactly the same as Hitler of the past in his aggression against Czechoslovakia and U.S. imperialism of today in its aggression against Vietnam," and termed the ruling clique of Soviet revisionism as "social-imperialism and social-Fascism" [3, p. 31]. However, the Soviet leadership group was for the first time formally designated as "social-imperialists" in the political report.

Moreover, when the report pointed out the four greatest contradictions existing in the present world it attached the most importance to:

- (1) the contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and *social-imperialism* on the other.

The other three are:

- (2) the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries;
- (3) the contradiction between imperialist and *social-imperialist* countries and among the imperialist countries; and
- (4) the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and *social-imperialism* on the other. (italics added) [9, p. 37]

"The existence and development of these contradictions," it went on, "are bound to give rise to revolution."

Starting from this view on the world situation, the report quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying, "With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibili-

ties: One is that war will give rise to revolution and the other is that revolution will prevent the war" [9, p. 37]. This remark launches a frontal attack on the Soviet leadership's idea of a choice between "war or peace." Mao's idea is that if a world war should occur, it would hasten world revolution. But if, on the contrary, revolutions and people's wars break out in various nations, they will weaken imperialism and social imperialism and prevent a world war. Not the slightest evidence of a cooperative attitude toward Russia can be found in this position.

Concerning the danger of China becoming a big power, the report stressed:

We firmly pledge that we the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people are determined to fulfill our proletarian internationalist duty and, together with them [genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations, the broad masses of the proletariat and revolutionary people and friendly countries, organizations and personages] carry through to the end the great struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction. [9, p. 36]

Following, the political report introduced a remark that Mao Tse-tung had made in October 1968:

We have won great victory. But the defeated class will still struggle. These people are still around and this class still exists. Therefore, we cannot speak of final victory. Not even for decades . . . the final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people at home, but also depends on the victory of the world revolution and the abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man on the whole globe, upon which all mankind will be emancipated. [9, p. 31]

This statement is to call attention to the danger of attempting success in a socialist revolution only within China while neglecting the realities of the world revolution and also is to express a warning against the idea of trying to subordinate the interests of other nations' revolutionary forces to the interest of the Chinese on the basis of "socialism in one country."

The report went on to point out:

We have always held that the internal affairs of each country should be settled by its own people. The relations between all countries and between all parties, big or small, must be built on the principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. [9, p. 41]

And again,

To safeguard these Marxist-Leninist principles, the Communist Party of China has waged a long struggle against sinister great-power chauvinism of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. This is a fact known to all. [9, p. 41]

These criticisms of big power chauvinism ultimately developed into the declaration made in the joint editorial published on New Year's Day, 1971, in *Jênmin jihpao*, *Hungch'i*, and *Chiehfang chiün pao* to the effect that China will never become a superpower under any circumstances [1].

The above principles of Chinese foreign policy even today remain unchanged, but the international situation has radically changed. The tension between China

and Russia, which at one time was reported on the verge of a full-fledged armed confrontation, has eased off a little since the bilateral border talks began in October 1969. A coup d'état expelled Prince Sihanouk from Cambodia in March 1970, and the U.S. troops and South Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia in May. The antiwar movement also mounted in the United States.

Under these conditions, Chairman Mao Tse-tung issued on May 20, 1970, a statement titled "People of the World, Unite and Defeat the U.S. Aggressors and All Their Running Dogs!" The statement in its opening declares:

A new upsurge in the struggle against U.S. imperialism is now emerging throughout the world. . . . The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today. [11, pp. 8-9]

This view of Mao Tse-tung suggests that, due to mounting revolutionary movements all over the globe, the main motif of the present world is that "revolution prevents the war." Therefore, the possibility of a world war has now diminished even more than it had at the time of the Lin Piao report. The mounting revolutionary movements of the world include: (1) the anti-U.S. national salvation struggles of the peoples of three Indochinese nations; (2) the armed revolutionary struggles of the peoples of Southeast Asian nations; (3) the struggles of the peoples of Japan, Korea, and Asia to oppose the revival of Japanese militarism; (4) the struggles of the Palestine and Arab peoples against the U.S. and Israeli aggressors; (5) the national liberation struggles of the peoples of nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; and (6) the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of North America, Europe, and Oceania.

Two points worth noting in Mao's statement are that it makes no mention of Soviet revisionism or social-imperialism and that it spares a paragraph for the rising movement of the revolutionary masses in the United States saying, "The Chinese people resolutely support the revolutionary struggle of the American people" [11, p. 8]. In this latter comment we can see the starting point of the "people's diplomacy" in which an American table tennis team was invited to Peking initiating the round of "ping-pong diplomacy."

Another important thesis related to China's foreign policy line since the Cultural Revolution was written by Mao Tse-tung in 1945 under the title of "On the Chungking Negotiations" [10]. Putting aside a discussion of its contents for the time being, here I would only like to point out that this document has been redesignated as essential study material for all Chinese since the Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress.

Having now briefly reviewed the principles of Chinese foreign policy and their view of the world, I would next like to turn to the post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy in more detail, dividing it timewise into three phases. The first is the period from the Communist Party Congress in April 1969 till the spring of 1970; the second from the spring of 1970 to the spring of 1971, and the third from the start of the "ping-pong diplomacy" up to the present.

## II. PERIOD OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The first period was featured by positive Chinese efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Just before Peking was about to reactivate its diplomatic activities, an armed clash broke out between the Soviet and Chinese border guards on Chên-pao (Soviet name: Damansky) Island, an isle in the Ussuri River in Heilungkiang Province in March 1969. This was followed by spreading clashes from the border area along the Amur River to the western frontier in the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in April.

At this point the political report to the Ninth National Congress called the people's attention to the need for preparations for possible war, saying:

We must on no account relax our revolutionary vigilance because of victory or ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large-scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war and against their launching a war at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and against their launching a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared. Chairman Mao said long ago: "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack." [9, p. 42]

The Chinese Foreign Ministry lodged protests on five occasions (June 6 and 11, July 8, August 13 and 19) against violations of the Chinese eastern and western borders by Soviet troops. This made it clear that the Sino-Soviet conflict had expanded to all the border areas between the two nations to the degree where a major clash could break out anywhere anytime. An armed encounter which occurred in T'iehlieh'ot'i in Yümin County, Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region was reportedly a major military clash with the Soviet side mobilizing two helicopters and scores of tanks and armored vehicles. Around the time of this clash, the Soviets threatened the Chinese by massing troops near the frontier zones and deploying missile units in Mongolia. The Chinese, meanwhile, organized massive demonstrations every day protesting Soviet revisionism and began nationwide preparations for a war.

The degree of tension between the two Communist giants at the time was reflected by the rumors circulating that summer that the Soviets would launch a sudden air or missile attack on the Chinese capital of Peking or on the Chinese nuclear testing grounds near Lake Lop Nor, western China. Considering that a joint thesis published in *Jênmin jihpao*, *Hungch'i*, and *Chiehfang chiün pao* six months later (April 22, 1970) charged that the Soviet Union was making a "nuclear blackmail" against China, the Chinese leaders apparently were seriously anticipating the danger of a Soviet attack.

The crisis of full-scale confrontation between the two nations was averted, however, by a talk between Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and Russian Premier Alexei Kosygin at Peking Airport on September 11, 1969. On his way back from attending the funeral services for the late North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh, Premier Kosygin had offered to visit Peking, but the Chinese at first rejected his request. Due to time requirements, Premier Kosygin first went to

Dushanbe, capital city of Tadzhikistan, and there he was informed of the Chinese acceptance of his visit. He then flew the long distance of 4,300 kilometers into Peking Airport to meet Premier Chou. It was a dramatic turning point for Sino-Soviet relations. Since that time no armed border clash between the two nations has been reported. On October 7 the Chinese Government issued a statement disclosing that Peking had made a proposal to Moscow to establish an agreement between the two nations to avoid armed clashes, and the delegations of the two nations, represented by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov, began border talks on October 20.

The Chinese have so far on two occasions criticized a lack of sincerity on the Soviet side in the border talks through the pro-Peking newspaper *Takungpao* in Hongkong. But despite several suspensions—due to Soviet delegate Kuznetsov's attending the Supreme Soviet, his illness and his replacement as the head of the Soviet delegation by Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev (August 15, 1970)—the bilateral talks have continued and today work as a deterrent against clashes between the two nations.

The slogans announced on September 16, 1969 for that year's National Day celebration included the phrase "Overthrow Soviet revisionism and social-imperialism," but the words "Soviet revisionism" were dropped the night prior to the celebration. A speech delivered by Chou En-lai on the eve of the celebration, another delivered by Lin Piao on the day of the celebration, and a joint editorial of the three major publications in China including *Jênmin jihpao* did not contain any criticism by name of the Soviet Union. This indicates that Peking decided on a new policy toward Russia during the two weeks between September 16 and the National Day. The possibility is that at this point in time the Chinese decided to regard the Soviet Union not as a socialist nation but as a "country having a different social system" and, while continuing their ideological criticism of "revisionism," in nation-to-nation relations with the Kremlin, Peking has since been seeking "peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five principles." This was proven after the arrival of Soviet Ambassador Vasili Tolstikov in Peking on October 10, 1970 by the congratulatory telegram sent to Moscow by China on the occasion of the anniversary of the Soviet Bolshevik Revolution on November 7 of the same year. It was signed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and State Council of China and addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Soviet Council of Ministers.

The telegram declared: "China has hitherto held that the difference in principles between China and the Soviet Union should not prevent our two nations from maintaining and developing normal relations with each other on the basis of the five principles." In other words, China removed the Soviet Union from the category of "socialist countries" (under the first of three principles given in the section, "China's Foreign Policy Principles") with which to "develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation on the principle of proletarian internationalism" and included it in the category of "countries of different social systems" with which to "work for peaceful coexistence on the

basis of the five principles." After the arrival of Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsin-ch'uan in Moscow in November, despite the severe ideological confrontation still remaining, nation-to-nation relations between Peking and Moscow began to move toward stability.

Even while working for a detente with Russia, China forwarded the policy of "preparing for war" on a full scale and for about a year launched a campaign to dig air-raid shelters in major cities throughout the country. It has been reported that government offices, factories, and schools are now able to move underground within twenty-four hours. In the economic field also, attempts have been made to realize regional self-sufficiency in steel, coal, and machinery, to decentralize industry and to develop local enterprises. This also was closely connected to preparations for war.

On the other hand, in a feint to the Soviets, China decided in late December 1969 to resume ambassadorial-level talks with the United States and opened the 135th session on January 20, 1970, followed by the 136th session on February 20. The Chinese, however, refused to hold the 137th meeting scheduled for May 20 objecting to the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops in late April, and since then the bilateral talks have remained suspended.

### III. STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS WITH KOREA AND INDOCHINA

Features of the second period (from the spring of 1970 to the spring of 1971) were strengthening of relations of solidarity with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and other national liberation forces in Indochina.

China's relations with North Korea, which had deteriorated to a low level during the Cultural Revolution, began to improve with the visit to Peking by Ch'oe Yong Gön, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea, on the occasion of China's National Day in October 1969. The relations were fully restored with Premier Chou's visit to Pyongyang on April 5-7, 1970. Korea was the first foreign country to receive a goodwill visit by Premier Chou after the Chinese had held the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969 which concluded the Cultural Revolution. There were several important factors in Premier Chou's Korean visit.

First, there was the problem of how to cope with Japanese militarism which was reviving under the "positive protection of U.S. imperialism." In the background was the common acknowledgment between Peking and Pyongyang that "Japan-U.S. military collusion" was advancing under President Nixon's new Asia policy, the Nixon Doctrine, and the visible proof of this collusion was the promotion of cooperation between Japan and South Korea as well as Japan and Taiwan.

At the time, Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade negotiations were going on in Peking and the Chinese, in political talks with Japanese negotiators, had clarified Peking's policy toward Tokyo for the 1970s. Acting on the assertion that Japan,

already emerging as an economic superpower, was reviving militarism through military collusion with the United States, the new Chinese policy was aimed at blocking Japanese militarism. The Sino-Japanese trade talks had rough going due to differences between the two sides in acknowledging the "revival of Japanese militarism." Under the circumstances, Premier Chou's visit to Pyongyang provided a good opportunity for China and Korea to express their basic solidarity on their policy toward Japan for the 1970s.

The second factor was the new developments in the Indochinese situation. A deadlock of the Paris peace talks on the Vietnam War, an escalation of hostilities on the Plain of Jars, interference in Laos by Thai troops, and a coup d'etat in Cambodia in March 1970, resulting in the ouster of Prince Sihanouk and his exile in Peking—these developments clearly indicated that the end of the war in Vietnam would not be brought about only by solving the problems between North and South Vietnam but should be accompanied by the solution to problems among all three Indochinese nations, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

Prince Sihanouk issued a "five-point proclamation" titled "Message to Her Majesty the Queen, the Khmer Bonzes, and People" declaring, in essence, (1) the invalidity of his dismissal as head of state and rejection of the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia, (2) formation of a National United Front of Kampuchea and National Liberation Army, and (3) guerrilla warfare in the jungles against the Lon Nol government. The announcement of this five-point declaration through the Chinese official news agency, New China News Agency (NCNA), on March 23, 1970 demonstrated Peking's tacit support [14, p. H2]. The problem was when, where, and how China would give its formal support to the statement. That chance came when Premier Chou called at Pyongyang.

The extension of China's formal support to Sihanouk meant a sentence of death to peaceful coexistence with the Lon Nol government, because Peking gives priority to the principle of "supporting and assisting the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations" over the principle of "peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems on the basis of the five principles." China's support of Sihanouk clarified the fact that the three countries of Indochina had become a place of confrontation between the liberation forces and pro-American forces. China had long been contending that the firm armed struggles of South Vietnamese and Laotian peoples against the United States can force the ready withdrawal of American imperialists. At this juncture, the "struggles of the Cambodian people" were added to the former two fronts.

The third factor involved that the Chinese had taken into consideration was the impact of improved Sino-Korean relations on the Soviet Union. This significance of Premier Chou's Korean visit was made clear in the China-North Korea joint communique issued with Korean Premier Kim Il Sŏng. According to the communique, as reported by NCNA on April 8, the Korean side hailed for the first time "the Chinese people, who, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its leader and Comrade Lin Piao as its deputy leader, have smashed the schemes of imperialism and modern revisionism for capitalist restoration and victoriously carried out the great proletarian cultural



revolution," while the Chinese side congratulated "the Korean People . . . led by Korean Workers Party headed by Comrade Kim Il Söng, giving full play to the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and vigorously unfolding the chullima (winged horse) movement" [7, p. D2]. Probably the most significant point of the communique was that in their observations on the world, both sides agreed that the situation at the time was "favorable to the revolutionary struggles of the people of the world and unfavorable to imperialism, modern revisionism and the reactionaries of various countries" [7, p. D3]. "Modern revisionists," of course, meant the Soviet leaders. The document made Korea's closeness to China very clear.

The communique continued by noting that both parties agreed that (1) American imperialists were encouraging Japanese militarists and their lackeys to let Asians fight each other and expanding aggression against Asian peoples, and that (2) Japanese militarism had already revived and become a dangerous force in Asia. Implicitly criticizing the Soviet Union, it said, "Failure to see the dangers of Japanese militarism and fraternization with Sato government means encouraging Japanese militarist expansion abroad and strengthening the U.S. imperialist position in Asia" [7, p. D4]. The communique adopted in its entirety a contention of the editorial in the *Rodong shinmun* (the organ of the Korean Workers' Party) on March 29, 1970 that "the attitude toward Japanese militarism today is a question of basic stand showing whether or not one fights resolutely against the policies of aggression and war of imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism, whether or not one truly wants peace and security in Asia . . ." [13, p. D9].

Meanwhile, praising Korea's self-reliant national economy and its progress to the status of an advanced socialist country backed up by an integrated people's defense system, the Chinese acknowledged that "the forcible occupation of South Korea by U.S. imperialism and the U.S. imperialist policy of aggression are the basic obstacle to the reunification of Korea and the constant source of war there," and gave total support to the "correct policy of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the reunification of the fatherland . . . and realizing the reunification of the country by Koreans themselves . . ." [7, p. D4]. The both sides also confirmed that "the current struggle against Japanese militarism is a part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism as well as a struggle for the defense of peace in Asia and the world" [7, p. D4]. It added that the two sides "express their determination to further strengthen their common struggle against Japanese militarism while carrying on the struggle against U.S. imperialism." In this respect, the communique might be taken as a declaration of the formation of an anti-Japan united front. The joint communique commonly demanded the withdrawal of U.S. and South Korean troops from Vietnam, accused the U.S. forces of armed intervention in Laos, criticized the Cambodian coup d'etat, supported Prince Sihanouk's five point proclamation and endorsed the struggle in Japan for the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The document backed up these assertions by proposing to strengthen "the blood-cemented militant friendship and friendly unity between the Chinese and Korean peoples" [7, p. D3].

After the communique, personnel exchanges between the two countries became brisk. On the occasions of the twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the Korean war on June 25 and the twentieth anniversary of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's blockade of the Taiwan Straits on June 27, China dispatched a mission to Pyongyang headed by Huang Yung-shêng, member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, while Korea sent to Peking a delegation led by Pak Song Ch'ol, member of the Korean Workers' Party Presidium and Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister. Both teams attended commemoration ceremonies held in each other's capital. A Korean military delegation headed by O Jin U, member and secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee Presidium and Chief of the General Staff of the People's Army, visited China in late July. Again, a Chinese people's friendship mission led by Tsêng Ssü-yü, Commander of Wuhan Military District, attended celebrations held in Pyongyang in late October to mark the twentieth anniversary of the participation of the Chinese People's Voluntary Army in the Korean War. Thus were Sino-Korean relations restored to a honeymoon period.

In other fields, the clarification of the Chinese Support for Prince Sihanouk and his five-point proclamation contained in the Chinese-Korean joint communique released at the time of Premier Chou's visit to Pyongyang helped to solidify China's relations with the three Indochinese countries. In response to a call from Prince Sihanouk to form a united front of the three Indochinese peoples, a summit conference of the three Indochinese nations was held at some place in Chinese territory near the border between China, Laos, and Vietnam on April 24-25, 1970. Attending were Prince Sihanouk, President of the National United Front of Kampuchea, Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Pathet Lao, Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, and Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam.

A joint declaration of the conference called on "the three peoples to strengthen their solidarity and wage a heroic and tenacious fight, to overcome all hardships and accept all sacrifices with a firm resolve to defeat the U.S. imperialists and their agents . . ." [5, p. K7]. A point to be noted in the joint declaration is, "Proceeding from the principle that the liberation and the defense of each country are the business [*sic*] of its people, the various parties pledge to do all they can to give one another reciprocal support according to the desire of the party concerned and on the basis of mutual respect" [5, p. K8]. This declaration of the formation of an international anti-American united front differs greatly from the conventional joint front. Chinese Premier Chou also joined and conferred with the Indochinese leaders after the summit meeting had concluded, thereby demonstrating "militant friendship and friendly unity" among the peoples of the three Indochinese countries and the Chinese people. This indicated to the whole world that China's relations with Indochina had made good progress. After the U.S. and Saigon Government forces invaded Cambodia in April 1970, thereby expanding the war throughout Indochina, Chinese support for the Indochinese peoples became more ardent. As soon as Prince Sihanouk established the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in Peking on May 5, China and

North Korea recognized his government in exile. Thus, with China as the "great rear area," a broad liberation struggle zone was established ranging from Pyongyang in the east and Peking in the north through Samneva of Laos and Hanoi to the jungles of South Vietnam and Cambodia.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, continuous support for the Lon Nol regime and failure to take any explicit attitude toward the Cambodian question no doubt caused Moscow's influence over the Indochinese area to be greatly weakened.

China cancelled the 137th round of U.S.-China ambassadorial talks scheduled for May 20, 1970 on the basis of the American troops' penetration into Cambodia, and a statement by Mao Tse-tung was issued on the same day calling on all the peoples of the world to form a united front against the United States. The next day, a mass rally of hundreds of thousands of people was staged in front of the T'ienanmên with Prince Sihanouk playing the leading role. Kuznetsov, chief of the Soviet delegates to the Sino-Soviet border talks, was among those invited onto the rostrum of the gate. Prince Sihanouk has continued his stay in Peking, and his Royal Government of National Union established in the "Friendship Hall" in the western part of the Chinese capital has been busy conducting diplomatic activities in the city.

North Vietnam Vice Premier Nguyen Con, then visiting Peking, signed the 1971 Sino-Vietnamese economic and military assistance agreement on October 6, 1970 together with Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien for China. This was the first time that Chinese military aid was included in an explicit form in such an accord, showing that China as the "great rear area" was extending a powerful helping hand to North Vietnam.

With the U.S. surprise attack on the prisoners' camp at Sontay in suburban Hanoi on November 21, the partial resumption of the air bombing of the North under the excuse of "protective reaction" and the American and South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in February and March 1971, the relationship between China and Indochina grew closer. When the Workers' Party and the Government of North Vietnam announced an emergency call to step up war preparations on December 10, 1970, China immediately followed suit with a joint statement of the Communist Party Central Committee and the Government on December 13. The statement expressed for the first time China's support for the "ten-point over-all solution" (May 8, 1969) and the "eight supplementary points" (September 17, 1970) submitted to the Paris peace talks by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam as indicating the "correct way for the settlement of the Viet Nam question" [17, p. A3].

After the U.S. and South Vietnamese troops began invading Laos in early February 1971, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued statements on February 4 and February 8, and the Chinese Government followed with a statement on February 12. The February 12 statement declared: "The Chinese people will take *all effective measures to give all-out support and assistance to the three peoples of Indochina* so as to thoroughly defeat the U.S. aggressors and their running dogs" (italics added) [18, p. A2].

Further, Premier Chou En-lai accompanied by Yeh Chien-ying, a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission under the party's Central Committee who was intimately involved with Indochinese affairs, visited Hanoi on March 5-8. The joint communique issued at this time between the two nations' parties and governments declared:

Should U.S. imperialism go down the road of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina, the Chinese people are determined to take all necessary measures, *not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices*, to give all-out support and assistance to the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples for the thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors. (italics added) [6, p. K24]

Another noteworthy point of the document is its support not only to the aforementioned "ten-point over-all solution" for the war by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam but also to the "five-point political solution" proposal (March 6, 1970) of the Pathet Lao and the five-point proclamation (mentioned above) of Prince Sihanouk. This emphasized that a solution to the Vietnam war was not possible but with an overall solution to the conflicts within the three Indochinese countries. Relations between China and Indochina have in this manner increasingly grown stronger.

#### IV. IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST EUROPE

Another feature of this period is the rapid improvement of China's relations with East Europe, Asia, Africa, and West Europe.

In relations with East European countries, ties with Albania were strengthened by the signing in Peking on October 16, 1970 of an agreement between Abdyl Kellezi, Chairman of the Albanian State Planning Commission, and Li Hsien-nien, Deputy Premier, to extend long-term interest-free loans to Tirana. Another agreement for barter trade in 1971-75 was also signed between Albanian Commerce Minister Kico Ngjela and Li Ch'iang, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. These agreements were not actually evidence of a new development as the two nations already enjoyed close relations with each other, but Peking's moves for closer ties with Rumania and improved ties with Yugoslavia were a new development. When the Chinese hailed Bucharest's "independent line of self-reliance" and gave their support to the three Indochinese countries, especially the quick recognition for the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, Rumania responded by dispatching its No. 2 man, Bodnaras, Vice President of the State Council, to Peking in June 1970. In July Rumanian Defense Minister Ion Ionita visited China. When Rumanian Deputy Premier Gheorghe Radulesu visited Peking in November, an agreement to give long-term interest-free loans to Rumania was signed between the two nations.

Relations with Yugoslavia were normalized by China's first reception for twelve years in Peking of a Yugoslavian Ambassador, Bogdan Orescanin, and by the dispatching of their own ambassador, Tsêng T'ao, to Belgrade in mid-August. This normalization of ties, despite ideological differences, was possible on the basis of the "five principles." Steps were also taken to expand mutual

trade and open a regular cargo ship service between the two nations. What in particular has attracted the attention of observers was a speech delivered by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ch'iao Kuan-hua at the reception held by Yugoslavian Ambassador Orescanin on the occasion of Yugoslavian National Day on November 27, 1970. Ch'iao at that time stated that the five principles should be applied to all nations regardless of whether their social systems are the same as that of China or not. This was the first time that China had clarified the five principles would cover all nation-to-nation relations regardless of a nation's social system. In conjunction with the aforementioned congratulatory message sent to Moscow on the anniversary of the October Revolution, it now became much clearer that under the Chinese policy the "five principles" could be applied in relations with a country which China no longer regards as socialist. On the basis of this stand, China sent ambassadors to Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland in August and East Germany in September 1970 to normalize relations with these East European countries.

In relations with Asian nations, Kuo Mo-jo, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Congress Standing Committee, attended the wedding ceremony of the Crown Prince of Nepal in March 1970, and then continued on to a visit to Pakistan. Subsequently, Pakistan sent its Air Force Commander A. Rahim Khan to Peking in May, Navy Commander Muzzfer Hassan in September and President Yahya Khan in November. During his Peking visit, President Yahya Khan obtained a \$200 million loan from China. The first exchange of ambassadors between China and Burma in three and a half years became a reality when U Tinn Uman came to the Chinese capital as Rangoon's ambassador in December 1970. Ch'ên Chac-yüan took the post of Peking's ambassador to Burma in March 1971.

Many important political leaders from the Middle East and Africa also filed through Peking attracting attention around the world to the outward-going Chinese foreign policy. They included Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestine Liberation Organization in March 1970; Ainansh, Vice-President of the Somalia Supreme Revolutionary Council in June; Mansur Mahgoub, Sudanese Finance Minister, Amir Jamal, Tanzania's Finance Minister, and Alfred Raoul, Premier of the Congo (Brazzaville) in July; Salem Robaya Ali, Chairman of the Presidential Council of South Yemen, and Jaafar Al-Nimeirty, President of Sudan's Revolutionary Command Council, in August. China formally decided on July 12 to extend a \$400 million interest-free loan to be repaid in thirty years for the construction of the projected Tanzania-Zambia railroad and on October 26 dispatched Fang Yi, Economic Cooperation Minister, to attend the ceremony starting the railroad construction. These events were interpreted as a concerted effort by the Chinese to advance into Africa.

In relations with West European countries, progress was most conspicuous in the improvement of ties with France. France's State Planning and Regional Development Minister Andre Bettencourt visited China in July 1970, and the former French Premier Maurice Couve de Murville came in September. Relations with Britain were also improved with the visit to China of British Foreign Office

Far East Department Chief Morgan followed by the promotion of the British acting charge d'affaires in Peking to full charge d'affaires. Britain's charge d'affaires office in Peking, which had burned down during the Cultural Revolution, was also rebuilt in the autumn of 1970 and, for the first time in twenty-two years, telephone service between Peking and London was resumed in April 1971.

After the Cultural Revolution, Peking's ambassadors reinstated or newly appointed to their overseas posts had totalled only seventeen at the end of 1969, but sixteen more Chinese ambassadors were sent to respective countries between March 1970 and the end of that year to resume the diplomatic activities.

This active foreign policy initiative by the Chinese induced one country after another to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. Following the Canadian-Chinese negotiations held in Stockholm from February 1969 on, Canada announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on October 13, 1970. The joint communique issued at the time said China claimed that Taiwan was an integral territory of the People's Republic of China and added that Canada "took note" of this Chinese stand. The tropical country of Guinea followed suit on October 15, Italy on November 6, Ethiopia on November 24 (announced on December 1), and Chile on December 15 (announced on January 5). In 1971, Nigeria established ties with Peking on February 10, Kuwait on March 22 (announced on March 29), Camerouns on March 26 (April 2), San Marino on May 6 (May 7), and Austria on May 26 (May 27). Countries recognizing China thus came to a total of sixty-two as against sixty-three holding diplomatic ties with Nationalist China. In these moves, of note was China's flexible attitude in taking into consideration the stand of other nations on the Taiwan issue and making concessions when necessary. Toward those having ties with Nationalist China—for example, Canada, Italy, and Chile—it applied the "take note" formula, but in the joint communique establishing ties between China and Kuwait it was only stated that Kuwait "recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China" without any reference to the Taiwan problem—this is called the "Kuwait formula."

In the midst of this worldwide surge toward recognition of China, deliberations in the United Nations General Assembly on Chinese representation in the world body were carried forward in the autumn of 1970. For the first time the Albanian resolution calling for the seating of China and the ousting of Nationalist China won a majority vote of the assembly with fifty-one for and forty-nine against, twenty-five abstentions and two countries not present. But the entry of China into the world organization was blocked at this time by the resolution sponsored by the United States, Japan, and other countries to designate the question of Chinese representation as "an important question." This resolution had been approved in the assembly before the Albanian resolution vote with sixty-six in favor, fifty-two against, seven abstentions and two not participating in the voting.

##### V. SINCE THE OPENING OF PING-PONG DIPLOMACY

The thirty-first world table tennis championship opened in Nagoya, Japan, in

late March 1971, with a Chinese team participating for the first time in six years. On the last day, April 7, Sung Chung, chief secretary of the Chinese delegation, announced China's decision to accept a request by the U.S. team participating in this tournament to pay a friendship visit to China, thus raising a curtain on the historic ping-pong diplomacy. At the same time, the teams of Colombia, Nigeria, Canada, England, and Nicaragua were also invited to Peking. The bamboo curtain was also raised for American journalists and scholars, who could now visit China and catch glimpses of the realities of post-Cultural Revolution China.

While the Chinese team was still taking part in goodwill matches with the Japanese in various places throughout Japan in the spirit of "friendship first and competition second," the U.S. magazine *Life* caught worldwide attention with its April 30 issue (on sale from April 25) in the interview of Mao Tse-tung by American journalist Edgar Snow where the Chinese leader said he would be willing to meet U.S. President Richard Nixon [16]. The meeting took place in Peking on December 18, 1970. Snow disclosed that it was only very recently he had received confirmation the Chinese would not oppose the publication of the Chairman's remarks in the interview as long as they were not quoted directly. Snow reported:

In the meantime, he [Mao] said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President. [16, p. 47]

This was the go sign for the Nixon's China visit. Premier Chou broadened the Chinese overture to Washington by stating during a press interview with reporters from twelve Arab countries on May 9 that China was ready to negotiate directly with the United States on the question of Taiwan.

Nixon had initiated a series of unilateral measures in 1969 to improve relations with Peking, including easing travel restriction on Americans to China and the embargo on the purchase of Chinese products on July 21, lifting the embargo on trade with China for the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises on December 19 and rescheduling the patrol duty for the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits from regular duty to occasional duty on December 24. In 1970, Nixon used China's formal name, "the People's Republic of China," in his "Foreign Policy Message" submitted to Congress on February 13 and said in the message that an improvement in U.S. operating relations with Peking is certain to serve America's interests and the peace and stability of Asia and the world. Before the opening of China's ping-pong diplomacy, the United States had totally lifted restrictions on U.S. citizens' travels to China on March 15, 1971. Moreover, while the U.S. table tennis team was still visiting China, Nixon announced on April 14 a five-point overture toward China including automatic approval of the export to China of nonstrategic goods and totally abolishing restrictions on Chinese entry into the United States. The President also announced a forty-seven-

item list of goods still to be included in the trade embargo against China on June 10. With this list, the U.S. restrictions on trade with China were reduced to a scale comparable to the restrictions applied in trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

Together with these unilateral-approach measures toward China, the United States was initiating secret maneuvers for the dispatch of Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger to Peking in an attempt to realize a visit to China by President Nixon himself.

Within China, preparations for a thaw in the two countries' relations had also begun. First, since the time of the Communist Party's Ninth National Congress in April 1969, among the selection of Mao Tse-tung's writings that were designated essential study material for all the people was one work in particular which was read throughout the country, entitled "On the Chungking Negotiations." This report was submitted by Mao to a Party Presidium meeting in Yen-an on October 17, 1945 on the results of the forty-three days of negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking after the war against Japan had ended. In this report Mao replied to those who had criticized his negotiations with the reactionary Kuomintang which was attacking liberated districts. He stated: "How to give 'tit for tat' depends on the situation. Sometimes, not going to negotiations is tit-for-tat; and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat" [10, p. 56]. He explained that as a result of the negotiations, the Kuomintang's allegation that the Communist Party did not wish peace had been smashed as a groundless assertion; the Kuomintang had been forced to agree on a course for peaceful unity between the two sides, and it had become discouraged about waging a civil war. He went on to point out three conditions restraining Chiang Kai-shek from rupturing the bilateral talks: (1) There were wide, powerful "liberated areas" (Communist-ruled areas); (2) the people in the "great rear area" (Kuomintang-ruled area) were opposed to a civil war; and (3) a broad range of peoples in foreign countries were dissatisfied with the reactionary force in China, sympathized with the Chinese people, opposed a Chinese civil war and demanded peace and democracy in China [10, pp. 54-55].

If the Kuomintang is replaced in the contents of the report by the United States or the Soviet Union, the same three conditions can be applied to the present situation of Russia exercising pressure on China in the border areas and the United States with its forces continuing hostilities in Indochina. It might be suggested that through the study of this piece by Mao at that time, China was trying to unify opinions within the nation for negotiations with the United States. Shortly we will see how the three conditions may be applied to the negotiations with the United States.

In the background of acceptance to Kissinger's China visit, how had Peking come to view the international situation? First on the domestic front, the success of the Cultural Revolution had brought about a national unification under the command of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Coordination of the party structure and a reform of the administrative system had almost been completed and the long-awaited National People's Congress was expected to be held soon. Under a



prospering domestic economy, a new five-year program was launched in 1971. Hence in domestic matters new political and economic stability was the keynote.

Second, as a result of China's diplomatic efforts for the past two years, the united front with the Indochinese peoples and Koreans had been solidified to the point where China's new diplomatic offensive would not evoke the danger of a split among these nations. In Indochina, the war had been progressing favorably for the liberation forces ever since the complete failure of the invasion of Laos by American and Saigon Government forces from early February to late March 1971. A joint editorial published in *Jênmin jihpao*, *Hungch'i*, and *Chiehfang chiün pao* on May 20, 1971 to commemorate the first anniversary of the "Mao Tse-tung's May 20 Statement" declared:

The Nixon government has landed itself in a blind alley and is at the end of its tether. Its strategic plans have failed completely. The great victory won by the people of the three countries of Indochina has tremendously inspired the people of small countries with a revolutionary fighting will to resist aggression by big countries. . . ." [8, p. A2]

The first condition mentioned in Mao's report "On the Chungking Negotiations" of the wide, powerful liberated areas might in the present instance correspond to the situation within China and Indochina.

Third, the antiwar and anti-Nixon movement within the United States had shaken the Nixon government. Indicative of this was the scoop made by the *New York Times* of June 13, 1971 in publishing the confidential Pentagon papers on U.S. involvement in Indochina. In this movement we have a situation paralleled to the second condition of Mao's report—opposition to war even among people in the "great rear area."

Fourth, Canada's recognition of China in the autumn of 1970 convinced many other countries to follow suit in a chain reaction, conspicuously upgrading Peking's image in the international community. Here the third condition of Mao's report, in reference to the international situation, finds its parallel.

Kissinger's China visit materialized under these conditions. After he had stayed in Peking for three days from July 7 to July 11 and conferred with Premier Chou, both nations on July 16 (Japan time) issued the following joint statement regarding a visit by President Nixon to China.

Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. [2, p. A1]

The statement revealed that Nixon's plan to visit China had been drafted on the initiative of the President himself. In this connection, a memorandum issued on July 30 by Prince Sihanouk, then visiting Pyongyang, said:

The People's Republic of China has never solicited the United States of America

for anything. His excellency Chou En-lai, premier of China, has never sent anyone to Nixon. It is the U.S. President who sent his intimate advisor Kissinger to Peking to greet this excellency Chou En-lai.

And it is Nixon himself who will leave his capital to have a talk with the Chinese Government, which will stay home, in Peking, its capital. [15, pp. H1-H2]

The contents of this memorandum were printed in their entirety in *Jênmin jihpao* on August 4. It conveyed the impression that China enjoyed the high-handed position of a victor meeting the defeated who was coming to sue for peace. Korea's *Rodong shinmun* likewise commented on August 8, "The visit to China which Nixon plans . . . is not the march of a victorious general but a journey of a defeated man" [4, p. D10].

Several months later, while the debate continued in the United Nations on the question of seating China, Presidential adviser Kissinger made his second visit to Peking from October 20 till October 26 for the final round of preparations for the scheduled visit to China by Nixon. He was informed of the results of the voting on the Chinese representation question in the U.N. Assembly aboard the plane on his way back from Peking to Washington.

Under the attentive eyes of the nations of the world, the 1971 U.N. General Assembly opened the vote on the controversial China question on October 5. The outcome was that the so-called "reversed important-question resolution," cosponsored by the United States, Japan and other pro-American countries to designate the expulsion of Nationalist China as an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority vote for approval, was turned down by a vote of fifty-five in favor to fifty-nine against, with fifteen abstentions and two countries absent. The Albanian resolution to seat China and expel Nationalist China was then passed by a vote of seventy-six in favor to thirty-five against with seventeen abstentions and three absent. Just prior to the voting on the Albanian resolution, Chou Shu-k'ai, Foreign Minister, and the other representatives of Nationalist China stepped out of the Assembly hall to express their country's withdrawal from the world body. With that, the fiction of Chinese representation, which continued for twenty-two years in the world organization, came to an end.

## VI. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

The Chinese Government issued a statement on October 29, 1971 disclosing that it would soon send its representatives to the United Nations. In the statement, Peking said:

[The outcome of the voting at the present session of the U.N. General Assembly] indicates that the one or two superpowers are losing ground daily in engaging in truculent acts of imposing their own will on other countries and manipulating the United Nations and international affairs.

This contention by China was not unexpected, but the following words were of greater importance:

All countries, big or small, should be equal, the affairs of a country must be handled by its own people; the affairs of the world must be handled by all the countries

of the world; the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states—this is the irresistible trend of history in the world today. [19, p. A1]

And it went on to say:

Aggression and interference in others' internal affairs are incompatible with the UN Charter. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese people have consistently opposed the imperialist policies of aggression and war and supported the oppressed nations and peoples in their just struggles to win national liberation, oppose foreign interference and become masters of their own destinies. The Chinese people have suffered enough from imperialist oppression. China will never be a superpower bullying other countries. [19, p. A2]

The Chinese attitude toward the United Nations is well represented by this rather lengthy quotation from the Chinese statement. The United Nations is a product of the "Yalta structure" in which five nations—the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China (Nationalist)—rule the world as the big powers after World War II. For this reason, these five big powers came to occupy the permanent seats of the U.N. Security Council. Hence, although China is now sending its own representative to the U.N. Security Council, the reason is believed to be its intention to destroy the "Yalta structure" as a structure no longer fitting the times. Peking has in this respect long contended that now is the era when one or two superpowers cannot control international affairs.

China has declared itself as a leader of the so-called Third World, that is, small countries and especially oppressed nations and peoples. From this standpoint it has opposed a solution of the Vietnam War pressed by the United States and the Soviet Union against the will of the Vietnamese people and supported the struggle of the Arab guerrillas. It also has given its support to the demand for increased prices of crude oil by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) as a "just demand" against international monopoly capital as well as its acknowledgment to the Latin American nations' claim of 200 miles of territorial waters and their seizure of trespassing American vessels as a "just right."

Therefore, the probable opening course China will take as a member of the United Nations is, as a big power, to act in the interests of the small nations. (China denies that it will become a superpower but does not deny that it is a big power.) The possibility is strong that as a member of the U.N. Security Council, China will act as a spokesman in the interests of small nations in their international disputes with superpowers, even exercising its veto right from time to time. This seems to be the strategy China will follow to destroy, step by step, the existing world structure dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

This strategy will no doubt be most evident in the field of disarmament. China opposed the nuclear test ban treaty as a means for nuclear monopoly by the United States and the Soviet Union, and its opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was for the same reason. In the Chinese view, the more the nations of the world develop on their own the capability of making nuclear weapons, that is, if nuclear proliferation progresses in such a manner, the more the possibilities would be for total nuclear disarmament. For this very reason China opposed the recent Soviet proposal of holding a conference

among the five nuclear arm-possessing countries, and instead is calling for a conference of leaders of all the nations of the world for nuclear disarmament talks. If Peking should continue to press this idea of deciding the destiny of all mankind at a meeting of all nations including nuclear have-nots, it would seem that as a related issue the country might also press for a change in the present structure of the Geneva disarmament conference.

Another change likely to be sought by China is in the nature of the U.N. aid programs. Under the present aid system, whether the aid comes from the United States or Russia, it is extended with the obvious intention of exploiting new markets for products of the rich countries. Aid is used as a sort of "priming water" for increasing exports by the superpowers, and even U.N. aid programs are influenced in this direction.

China, in opposition, wants the aim of aid to be the promotion of economic self-support among the receiving nations. A good example of the Chinese philosophy is its aid for the Tanzania-Zambia railway project. The Chinese procured bulldozers in Japan and transported them to the railway construction site. Moreover, Chinese technical officials helping with the project subsist under the same living conditions and work with the same pay as the local workers. If the Chinese way of assisting developing nations were applied to all of the U.N. aid programs, no doubt a radically different approach than the one being applied now to the problem of the haves and have-nots would have to be formulated.

China's aim is to gradually change the established world order with the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominating superpowers. Under this Chinese strategy, the U.N. Security Council would be expanded and eventually promoted into a First (Political) Committee with all members of the United Nations accorded seats in it. Then, at that time, problems of disarmament and economic cooperation could be discussed with all the nations of the world taking part.

Finally, I would like to add a few comments on the scheduled U.S.-China summit meeting. The two leaders are expected to discuss first normalization of relations between the two countries and second other questions of concern to both sides. The former topic naturally includes the Taiwan issue, and in this connection, we might recall that the Chinese took the first initiative on this matter back on November 26, 1968. At that time China broke with custom and announced at the U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial meeting two conditions that it henceforth consistently maintained:

First, the U.S. Government undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces from China's territory Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits area and dismantle all its military installations in Taiwan Province; second, the U.S. Government agrees that China and the United States conclude an agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. [12, p. A2]

China's immediate objective in the invitation to Nixon is to encourage the United States to accept these two conditions. For the United States, though it has commitments in Taiwan under the U.S.-Nationalist China Treaty, that treaty is activated only by a mainland Chinese movement to liberate Taiwan by force.

Consequently, it should be possible for Nixon to accept the conditions Peking has established.

Turning next to the topics that could be included in the questions of concern to both sides, here it can be expected the talks will cover problems related to Indochina, Korea, and Japan. Premier Chou stated in a meeting with representatives of the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars from the United States on July 19, 1971, that the first issue which must be settled between the United States and China is that of Indochina. The Chinese premier told the American scholars that not only troops but also all American personnel and military installations must be withdrawn from entire Indochina. *Jênmin jihpao* confirmed the Chinese stand in its August 3 issue, "The question at present is not one of convening any new Geneva conference. It is up to U.S. imperialism to withdraw its aggressor troops from the whole of Indochina totally, unconditionally and immediately" [20, p. A2].

It is certain that China will press Nixon along this line, and that China considers it the best way to undertake the flank defense of the liberation struggles in Indochina. But it is not conceivable that China would attempt to negotiate with Nixon on an American guarantee for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina over the head of North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, and the Pathet Lao. The Chinese stand in this respect is quite clear in the Chinese Government statement quoted earlier: "The Chinese people have suffered enough from imperialist oppression. . . . China will never be a superpower bullying other countries," and it is again underlined by the joint editorial on New Year's Day, 1971 in two newspapers and a periodical: "At no time will China ever behave like a super power, neither today nor in the future. A super power wants to be superior to others and, proceeding from the position of strength, to lord it over others" [1, p. 147]. What China can do may be only to guarantee what China will do or will not do against any action of the United States.

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