POLITICAL ATTITUDES : SOCIAL DISCONTENT AND PARTY SUPPORT

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The present article attempts to analyze the political attitudes of contemporary Japanese through the utilization of the results of a recent national public opinion survey. The principal data used in this article consists of the results of two related surveys which were carried out in 1967 by the author and his colleagues. The first was quantitative; the second, qualitative. Since in both cases the object was to analyze the values and attitudes of youth and middle age, individuals over the age of 45 were excluded. Precisely speaking, therefore, the discussion which follows is indicative of the political attitudes of the comparatively younger generations of contemporary Japan.

The quantitative survey was conducted on a nation-wide basis with a sample of 4,500 chosen from among individuals aged 15–44 according to a two-stage stratified random sampling method. There were 3,678 respondents (a response rate of 81.7%). However, since the questions concerning the political problems and issues which are dealt with in the present article were given only to individuals aged 18 and over, the size of the sample group relevant here is only 3,204 of the total respondents. The survey was carried out from July 4–10, 1967. Table 1 shows the composition of the sample group of the 3,204 respondents, broken down according to general categories.

The difficulty with this kind of statistical survey of political attitudes, however, is that the responses to structured questions are only rough indicators of attitudes held and do not reveal those attitudes in all their complex and vivid nuances. In order to compensate for this difficulty, an open-ended questionnaire-type survey was designed to tap styles of thinking according to a plan similar to and consistent with the quantitative survey. This was executed at about the same time as the main survey.

The sample group for the open-ended survey was chosen from among the following eleven locations : the cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kita-Kyūshū, Yokkaichi, Kawasaki, Hachinohe, and Matsumoto ; the public-housing complex at Matsubara ; and rural areas in the prefectures of Fukuoka and Kumamoto. There were 785 respondents, a response rate of

Table 1. Composition of Sample

(figures within parentheses indicate %)

Sex	
Male	1373 (42.9)
Female	1831 (57.1)
Age	
18–19	275 (8.6)
20–24	508 (15.6)
25–29	602 (18.8)
30–34	638 (19.9)
35–39	608 (19.0)
40–44	573 (17.9)
Residential Classification	
Seven Major Cities	668 (20.8)
Medium-sized Cities (pop. 100,000 or more)	953 (29.7)
Small-sized Cities (pop. 100,000 or less)	670 (20.9)
Towns & Villages	913 (28.5)
Occupation	
Professional	59 (1.8)
Management, Administration	20 (0.6)
Small- & Medium- Scale Business	226 (7.1)
Technician	106 (3.3)
Clerk	381 (11.9)
Shopkeeper, Store Clerk	133 (4.2)
Service Personnel	103 (3.2)
Skilled Labor	210 (6.6)
Semi-skilled & Unskilled Labor	351 (11.0)
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	277 (8.6)
High School Student	54 (1.7)
Junior College, University Student	73 (2.3)
Housewife	1115 (34.8)
Unemployed*	90 (2.8)
Other	6 (0.2)
Party Affiliation	
L. D. P.	876 (27.3)
J. S. P.	748 (23.3)
D. S. P.	111 (3.5)
J. C. P.	40 (1.2)
Komeito	111 (3.5)
Other	4 (0.1)
Unaffiliated	
Conservative	171 (5.3)
Progressive	216 (6.7)
Neutral	340 (10.6)
Don't Know	587 (18.3)

Note: * Unemployed here includes those who are living on unearned income (pensions, social-security, dividends, etc.); widows & the aged, etc.

74.1%. Random sampling was not employed, as statistical representation was not the purpose of the open-ended survey. Instead, locations were deliberately selected which would represent a variety of typical problem areas in contemporary Japan : the big cities and their environs, the public-housing complexes, the newly-developed industrial cities, the farming areas which are constantly undergoing transformation.

The data from both the "qualitative" and the statistical surveys was combined, and utilized in the analysis. Because the purpose of the surveys was to obtain a general conception of the values and attitudes of Japanese youth and middle age, such related categories as needs, desires, frustration, life philosophies, value orientations, etc., were the subjects of investigation. But due to the limitations of space, the author has decided to concentrate here upon an examination of only those two or three categories which are directly related to politics.

The present paper is in two parts, the first of which seeks the site and nature of the social and political discontent of Japanese youth and middle age ; the second of which attempts to examine the structure of their ideals, the choice of methods for achieving these ideals, and the problems of party support.

I. SOURCES OF ANGER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

"There are lots of things that make me mad. I get mad just looking at television but I can't do anything about it so I just don't pay any attention, but things like taxes and utilities are high anyway and keep getting higher."

"Politics amounts to nothing. It's corruption and bribery from beginning to end. Prices are going up. And because there are too many election violations."

" Minor offenses are caught while major ones are passed over."

" Like isn't it hearing about ' black mist ' and that sort of thing in the news ? So like I think about doing it too. Screwing people's taxes out of them, the s.o.b.'s.

" I guess really it's the state of confusion in the world. But the people who work hard don't get too much done. It's just awful."

" Well, there're a number, probably discrimination and war and that sort of thing. Vietnam and all. Even though they say there's equality, really there isn't. People making war against each other. Innocent people getting sacrificed. That sort of thing makes me mad."

"I suppose the fact that a sense of duty (*giri*) and of humanity (*ninjō*) have become so shallow."

"If you're going to talk about it from the point of view of morals, the confusion of the young people."

"Adults." [Interviewer: " What specifically about adults ? "] " Their selfishness." ["Anything else ?"] "There're some others, but I think all problems go back to that."

" You can't do anything about the kids. And the average citizen relies too much on the politicians."

"There are lots of things that really make me angry. When I get maddest about things, first I get bitter, but then I just laugh it off like a fool."

" Even if I talk about it, it won't do a doggone bit of good."

" Well, there's no end to them. Me, I decided not to get mad about anything. So taxes are high, but you can't do anything about them. If you're gonna talk about politicians being corrupt, it's something serious if they're up for election. But people like me who aren't too smart, I'm resigned to things."

I would now like to explore the discontent with and anger about contemporary politics and society which form the bedrock of the political attitudes of contemporary Japanese youth and middle age. In order to tap the sources of discontent and anger, the following multiple-choice question was asked in the structured-response questionnaire.

Question : What makes you most angry about today's society? Please
select one of the following responses :
1. the corruption of politicians and bureaucrats
2. various kinds of discrimination and inequality
3. Communist China's nuclear testing
4. American military bases in Japan
5. the confusion over morals and manners
6. the rise in prices
7. demonstrations and strikes by labor unions
8. the Vietnam War

If one looks at the responses as a whole, as presented in Figure 1, corruption of politicians and bureaucrats ranks first with almost 30%. This response is primarily a moralistic reaction to the behavior and attitudes of politicians, rather than being related to the content of the policies themselves. Rising prices ranks second, with a fairly high response rate of 20%. The result to which we must pay particular attention, however, is the fact that the Vietnam War ranks third, outstripping by far the testing of the hydrogen bomb by Communist China, American military bases, demonstration and strikes by labor unions etc., as well as discrimination and inequality

Figure 1. "What makes you most angry about today's society?"

(Figures=%)

A. Corruption (28.6)
B. Discrimination, Inequality (10.6)
C. Communist China's Nuclear Testing (2.3)
D. American Bases (2.2)
E. Confusion of Morals (10.9)
F. Rising Prices (22.2)
G. Demonstrations, Strikes (2.4)
H. The Vietnam War (11.4)
I. Others (0.7)
J. Don't Know, No Response (8.6)

and the confusion over morals and manners.

Since the difference in response rate between the Vietnam War and discrimination and inequality, and morals and manners is slight indeed, and cannot be said to be statistically significant; rather it is correct to rank the three together.

If we examine the variety of responses to the question, " What makes you most angry. . ." in terms of age difference, we may note that anger over the Vietnam War receives a much higher proportion of responses among both males and females in their late teens than does any other variety of social discontent. (Cf. Table 2) A similar phenomenon may be seen in Table 3 where, among the younger generation, there is no significant difference between students and employed persons (including laborers).

The problem naturally arises as to what the " content" of the data is: toward which of the two sides is the anger of the young people over Vietnam directed? What aspect of the war causes their anger to explode? As may be seen from the examples which follow, drawn from the open-ended survey, the majority of responses is limited to an emotional repugnance to war in itself.

 " Well, they're having a war over in Vietnam. That's what makes me most angry." [Interviewer : " In reference to which side ? "] " Just the *war itself* really, and that the world ought to be at peace."

(female office worker)

 "The Vietnam War." [Interviewer : " What is it about the Vietnam War that makes you angry ? "] " *War itself.*"

(a high school student)

Upon reflection, it is possible to see in a large number of cases a hidden sense of "if only it doesn't come to us"—as the following examples demonstrate :

Table 2. "What angers you most?": Rank Order According to Age.

(Figures=%)

Male Age Group	1st Rank		2nd Rank		3rd Rank	
18–19	Vietnam	22	Corruption	20	Discrimination	16
20–24	Corruption	33	Discrimination	16	Prices	13
25–29	Corruption	35	Morals	15	Discrimination	13
30–34	Corruption	39	Prices	17	Vietnam	12
35–39	Corruption	35	Prices	20	Morals	16
40–44	Corruption	37	Prices	18	Morals	12
Female Age Group	1st Rank		2nd Rank		3rd Rank	
18–19	Vietnam	28	Discrimination	23	Corruption	16
20–24	Vietnam	19	Corruption	19	Discrimination	17
25–29	Prices	31	Corruption	23	Vietnam	14
30–34	Prices	31	Corruption	28	Morals	9
35–39	Prices	31	Corruption	29	Morals	10
40–44	Prices	34	Corruption	26	Morals	12

Table 3. The Percentage of Respondents Selecting Vietnam as an Answer to "What angers you most?"

High School, University Students	Male	23% (2nd Rank)
	Female	30% (1st Rank)
Working Youths (Late Teens)	Male (largely Factory Employees)	20% (1st Rank)
	Female (largely Office Workers)	26% (1st Rank)

"In whatever country there's war, so long as it doesn't come *to Japan* it's alright. If war were to come, it would be awful—like in Vietnam and all."

(female factory worker)

"They're fighting somewhere outside Japan. It would be just terrible *if it were to have any influence on Japan.*"

(proprietress)

The form of discontent which, along with the Vietnam War, is most conspicuous among the younger generation is concerned with the various forms of discrimination and inequality. This is particularly true among teen-age female office workers, for whom it ranked a clear first with almost 40%. Aside from this group, it also ranked first or second with a range of from 20% to 25% among twenty-year old female office workers and store clerks, service personnel, and teen-age and twenty-year old male office workers, technicians, etc.

When one stops to consider the specific meaning of discrimination and inequality, anger directed at discrimination might include:

1. discontent of the young people over discrimination and inequality directed at them on account of their age, in a society oriented to

seniority
2. discontent over discrimination and inequality between the sexes, and over the so-called "contempt for women"
3. discontent over discrimination and inequality on account of educational background
4. discontent over the so-called "discrimination between the wealthy and the poor," on the basis of the possession or lack of financial means and income
5. discontent directed at urban-rural discrimination and, related to that, discrimination between urbanities and newcomers to the cities
6. discontent over the disparity between large-scale enterprises and medium-, small-, and minute-scale enterprises
7. anger at the discrimination against the outcastes and Koreans.

Until the results of an in-depth survey are available, however, it is impossible to draw any conclusions as to which of these forms of discrimination discontent is chiefly directed.   If we select the answers most·relevant to discrimination and discontent from the open-ended survey, the fact that the forms of discrimination are multiple and varied is certainly evident:

> "What makes me angry? I suppose the sort of thing like between employers and laborers—to correct the disparity between them."

> " To put it bluntly, the difference between the rich and the poor. At school or at whatever you learn, there's a difference between rich people and poor people. Even when I was studying flower-arranging, there was a lot of that sort of thing."

> "Even though they say that ability's the criterion, that's only part of it—especially if you're a man, there's a lot of discrimination as you go up the ladder, on account of your college or school."

> "What makes me maddest is discrimination on account of what middle school or high school you graduate from."

> " I'd like to see seniority done away with! "

> " Things like, well, the problem of finding a job—places where you can't get in if you don't have good connections."

> "The fact that people doing the same job get different bonuses depending on what company they work for."

> "The kinds of discrimination between the sexes. ... Yes, I've come across it frequently."

Looking next at the responses to the question concerning anger as broken down by geographical location, we may note that in contrast with

the cities, where corruption, morals and the Vietnam War rank high, in the towns and villages it is discontent with prices and with discrimination which are high. (Cf. Figure 2) Thus in the towns and villages, anger at rising prices surpasses that over corruption, ranking first.

Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Respondents to Question "What makes you most angry?"

Among the categories to which city dwellers responded with most frequency, anger which is close to a righteous indignation of a moral or humanistic kind ranks first, even though the respondents were not necessarily people who had ever suffered any direct personal calamity. Among respondents from the towns and villages, discontent was frequent among those who had themselves been actual victims of some calamity. That is to say, in reacting to political society, city dwellers tend to be more ideological and idealistic, while people in towns and villages tend to be more utilitarian and realistic.

In what ways do the varieties of social discontent relate to party support? Among those who support the Liberal Democratic Party, corruption and rising prices ranked high as causes of discontent, but when this group is compared with groups supporting other parties, the conspicuous characteristic is that discontent with the confusion of morals is high, while anger directed at the Vietnam War is low. In contrast with the supporters of the LDP, the Japan Socialist Party support group ranks high in anger over

the Vietnam War, and low in discontent over the confusion over morals.

The groups which stand out as rating especially high in anger over corruption are the supporters of the Democratic Socialist Party and the Komeito. To suggest a somewhat bold hypothesis, it may perhaps be that, although there are fundamentally two groups—the realists and the moralists—within the conservatives, the corruption of the politicians of the party in power and bureaucrats is having the effect of drawing the moralists away from the existing conservative party and driving them toward a third power position. This is not to say, however, that they are tending toward progressivism.

II. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT JAPANESE SOCIETY?

"It would be better to have all the politicians done away with and have computers do things."

"Well, really, to have things done rationally according to an ideal of politics. To let us have the figures democratically and have the will of the people reflected in politics."

"I wonder how it would be if members of the Diet and all didn't get any salary?"

[after meditating some time] "... I think things would get better if healthy people were in politics."

"Politicians who think only about their own affairs and their own party should stay in their own homes."

"When all is said and done, I'd like to have campaign promises carried out."

"I think things would get better if young people were to work out in front, and even be active in the political side of things."

"To have individuals be aware of themselves as primarily Japanese."

"There's no doubt about the fact that things will get better when we progress toward the goal the Sōkagakkai aims at. It can all be summed up in this."

"If we are able to achieve improvement in the spiritual composure of our people, love for our country and love for other human beings, then even when the way is bad and life is difficult, I think we will have a good society. I would like to see renewal of the Security Treaty, revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, and legalization of the Self Defense Forces."

"It's bad, isn't it, when you depend on either of two camps, and don't move around with autonomy. Since the LDP has been in power up to now, we've

been stuck with America no matter what."

"Have a socialist or communist society."

"Adopt the essentials of socialism. That would be modified capitalism, wouldn't it. And gradually become socialist—that's the best way."

"I don't think our society today is bad."

"Make things better? They probably wouldn't be any different. What's wrong with things the way they are now?"

"So aren't we doing OK?... Aren't we doing fine economically?"

"I'd like to have it so that Mother wouldn't work late nights. That would be nice."

"That has nothing to do with me."

"It's just so awful—I couldn't care less. Only the things that affect me are important."

"Our little voices don't amount to anything. ..."

"It would be better if every individual could participate in politics. If everybody could take more interest in things, politically."

The above quotations are responses drawn from the open-ended survey, in reply to the questions "What do you think could be done to make Japanese society better?" and "What kinds of things would you like to have done by Japanese politicians?"

In 1955, NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) carried out a survey on "Japan of the Future," which was concerned with Japanese images of an ideal social structure. Let us now examine the results of this survey. (Sample group: 3,632)

The following question was included in the survey:

Question: We hope that Japan will develop into a certain kind of society. From among the types of societies listed below, select the one which most closely expresses your hope.

A. A freely competitive society in which people of ability can gradually become wealthy, but in which there are also people who have difficulty in making ends meet.

B. A society in which, because of a government-controlled economy, people cannot acquire great wealth, but in which there is a guaranteed minimum standard of living.

C. A society in which people of ability can become wealthy, but which taxes such people heavily and keeps in mind the interests of those who have difficulties making ends meet.

Figure 3. Ideal Social Structure (Figures＝%)

From Entire Population   From Youth (ages 20—29)
(ages 20—69)

In other words, the first alternative represents a society of pure capitalism
resting upon free enterprise; the second, a socialist society with a managed
economy; the third, a "welfare state" operating within the principles of
capitalism.

The results, as may be seen in Figure 3, indicate that hopes for a
socialist economic structure are strong. Of course, the question which was
asked is insufficient to permit description of the nature of this socialist
structure, and for the time being, the only thing which can be said with
certainty about the survey results is that the younger generation desires a
society in which a minimum standard of living is guaranteed beyond doubt,
even if there is no opportunity to become wealthy.

In the same NHK survey a question was asked concerning what the
respondents felt would be obstacles hindering realization of the ideal society.

Question: What do you think would be the primary obstacle in creating
the ideal society you envision? Choose one of the following answers.
1. the lack of outstanding leaders
2. too much factional infighting in the parties
3. the opposition party does not maintain realistic policies
4. Japan's poverty
5. the fact that the war was lost
6. the low level of political awareness among the mass of the people
7. the fact that there are people who are just yes-men to America
8. the fact that there are people who are just yes-men to Soviet Russia
and China

The results may be seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Obstacles to the Realization of the Ideal Society

A. Factional infighting within the parties
B. Lack of outstanding leaders
C. Japan's poverty
D. Low level of political awareness
E. The opposition party does not maintain
   realistic policies
F. The defeat of World War II
G. That there are those who are yes-men
   to America
H. That there are those who are yes-men
   to Soviet Russia & China

In general, those who seek to find the cause of hindrance in factional infighting within the parties are numerous. In one sense, this may be interpreted as one stereotyped form of political criticism derived from mass communications. However, may it not in fact be that, thrown together within this stereotyped, there are not only criticism of factional infighting itself, but also a moral repulsion for today's politicians who are moved by private or parochial interests, as well as a variety of anxieties such as feelings of irritation and incompetence on the part of the mass of the people, vis-à-vis conditions outlined above?

In addition, the responses of the younger generation in particular tended to lean toward "Japan's poverty" and "the low level of political awareness among the mass of the people." The latter ranked first among both males and females in their teens, while the former ranked second.

The kind of thinking which underlies such responses as the lack of outstanding leaders, too much political infighting and lack of policies, indicates an essentially passive stance on the part of "those who are awaiting the appearance of a leader"—that is, those who lament either the non-existence or the weaknesses or the deficiencies of either the individuals (leaders) or groups (parties) who should offer guidance to the people. In

contrast, the responses which were chosen with great frequency by the younger generation—Japan's poverty and the low political awareness of the people—suggest a desire to heighten political awareness, or to strengthen Japan economically. Although the two responses differ in the goals to be worked toward, they may be grouped together under the rubric of a capability to be involved in active social participation. (Of course, while there are some who hold these notions, there are others who expose the logic of withdrawal.)

In contrast with this there is a sharp increase in the rate of response to the lack of outstanding leaders among the over-35 age group.

Those in their early twenties who select the third alternative are fairly numerous, a fact which gives witness to feelings of both hope and despair in regard to the opposition party. Attention may be paid to the fact that this response ranked highest among those supporting the JSP.

In another NHK survey, a question was asked concerning the means by which an ideal society might be achieved:

Question: What kinds of things do you think should be undertaken to make the world the kind of place you think it should be? Select one of the following answers.

1. to vote for politicians who will work for society
2. to consider and discuss things thoroughly with the people around you
3. to work through newspapers, radio and TV, and other forms of mass communication
4. to be active in political movements like demonstrations, signature campaigns, petitions, and the like
5. to solve the problem by the power of labor unions
6. to solve the problem by the power of agricultural associations and trade unions
7. to await the appearance of outstanding political figures
8. to purify politics through religion

The results may be seen in Figure 5.

Among all age groups, there was an overwhelming number who felt that they would try to reform things by working through the established channels of parliamentary democracy, in particular voting in elections. For example, even among supporters of the Japan Communist Party, 50% viewed orthodox methods as the most effective means, while the remainder of the respondents were fragmented in their opinions.

Second ranking was the seventh alternative, " to await the appearance of outstanding political figures." Among those over 25 years of age, the

Figure 5. Methods for Achieving the Ideal Society

(Figures = %)

20—29 Year-olds

C
3.8
D
0.5
E
3.5
B
6.2
F
0.6
G
21.7
A
49.5
J
10.8
H
2.2
I
1.2

15—19 Year-olds

B
13.1
C
10.2
D
0.5
A
39.4
E
7.6
G
16.9
F
0.2
J
9.8
I
1.0
H
1.4

A. The ballot
B. Discussion
C. Mass communications
D. Are no means
E. Don't know, Other

F. Religion
G. Outstanding political figures
H. The strength of labor unions
I. Popular mass movements
J. Unclear, No Ideal society

proportion of respondents selecting this alternative rose to approximately 25%. This does not necessarily mean that all of these respondents are people awaiting a great hero; more likely, it indicates a strong feeling that politicians must appear who will have deep sincerity and bright future, and who can be depended upon. We can read into this a deep-seated distrust of today's politicians.

Almost the entire group of respondents chose either of the above two answers; those who selected any of the other methods were few indeed. However, among the teen-agers who were as yet unable to vote, the number who chose considering and discussing with the people around them, and working through newspapers, radio and TV, and other forms of mass communication, was fairly large, amounting to 10%.

Those who would try to solve the problems of society by pressure such as extra-parliamentary or mass movements including demonstration, signature campaigns, petitions, and other group action, were fairly numerous among those under 25 years of age. But even so, they did not amount to 2%, and as a percentage group were so small as to present almost no problem.

But of the twenty-year olds, 10% had had the actual experience of participating in a demonstration; almost 10% had signed petitions; and people who had joined in signature campaigns, election campaigns and political fund raising comprised more than 35%, indicating that many con-

sider these methods to be highly effective supplements to voting in elections.

If we suppose that the majority of today's younger generation seek to reform society through Diet elections, then, whether they like it or not, their ideals must be entrusted to the plans and policies of the various political parties. Let us, finally, examine in detail what sort of political party today's youth supports.

If we look at today's youth as a whole, support for the LDP is strongest, as might be expected, followed by the JSP, with the others trailing. (Cf. Figure 6) However, 22.6% responded as not supporting any party and if to this figure one adds that representing those who responded don't know, the total is 40%. That is to say, we can conclude that those who for the time being place trust in one of the parties are only slightly more than half of the younger and middle-aged generations. Among teenagers in particular, the proportion of both boys and girls who responded don't know or no support is two-thirds. The DSP and Komeito both rated 3.5% while the JCP received 1.2%.

The LDP draws its support chiefly from people of middle and old age, farmers and entrepreneurs, those from rural villages, and those who have received little education. However, the LDP ranks higher than the JSP among twenty-year olds and those who live in the seven major cities.

The JSP draws its support chiefly from professionals, technicians, office workers, factory workers, and university students, etc. Comparatively speaking, the level of education is high.

The DSP draws its support chiefly from white-collar workers, whose level of education is, predictably, high. Seventy percent of the DSP's

Figure 6. Party Affiliation or Support of Youth and Middle Age

(Figures=%)

D.S.P. 3.5

J.C.P. 1.2

Komeito 3.5

D.K. 18.3

J.S.P. 23.3

L.D.P. 27.3

Unaffiliated 22.6

Conservative 5.3

Progressive 6.7

Neutral 10.6

L.D.P.+Conservative-leaning Non-party Member=32.6
J.S.P.+J.C.P.+Progressive-leaning Non-party Member=31.2
Unaffiliated+Don't Know=40.9

supporters cluster in the large- and medium-sized cities with populations of over 100,000; and also the income level is quite high.

The supporters of the JCP are not concentrated in any one particular stratum.

The supporters of the Komeito are drawn from among shopkeepers, wives of service personnel, assistants in minute-scale enterprises, and those whose income level is low.

If one examines more carefully the breakdown according to age, three important facts may be noted. (Cf. Figure 7) First, the power of conservatism has entirely lost its appeal to the generation born after the war. Second, with the waning tide of the power of progressivism, a hiatus has opened up between the two which is spreading among the younger generation. Third, progressivism may be seen among men and women in their early thirties.

Let us first examine the third point. The NHK survey was able to look at both the progressivism of those in their early thirties and the conservatism of those in their early twenties. If we look at the results which Kazuto Kojima of NHK retabulated on an annual basis, we may note that progressivism is strong among those born in 1932, 1933, and 1934, while conservatism is strong among those born from 1935–1939. The former was the generation caught in its teens in the collapse of value system following the defeat in the war; while the latter generation at best has only childish memories of this era. Also, the former is the generation which

**Figure 7.** Party Support by Age Group (Figures=%)

reached maturity in 1945, while the latter attained majority in the latter half of the 1950's.

It is possible to perceive a trend toward progressivism—or rather, toward anti-conservatism—among the generation born after 1941, particularly in the NHK survey. The new generation which is reaching maturity during the 1960's is now making its appearance, holding views of politics which are quite different from those of the progressive generation born around 1926—the generation which has in actuality carried the banners of anti-establishment movements of the postwar decades. This indicates an increase in "non-party progressivism" which is critical of the existing progressive parties and, as will be seen later, an increase in defection from both conservatism and progressivism.

Let us next examine the dual problem presented by established conservatism and established progressivism, against which the younger generation is rebelling. The first matter to be considered is the hypothesis that this is not a problem peculiar to the tendencies of the modern era—that is, that young people in general do not hold structured political attitudes, that the formation of such attitudes is something which comes gradually with age. But this hypothesis is incorrect. For example, a survey carried out some ten years ago by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics revealed that the JSP received support from among 38% of those in their twenties, while the LDP received 34%. At that time both were certainly high, but in contrast to today, progressivism was dominant. In the 1958 survey, 20% responded that they did not support any party, a figure which was not high when compared with older respondents. In short, the younger

Figure 8. The Percentage of Conservative · Progressive by Geographical Distinction

generation now in its 30's had already decided upon which political parties to support ten years ago, when it was in its 20's, and the majority was progressive.

Let us next look at geographical distinctions. As is shown in Figure 8, the LDP and JSP are evenly matched in the major and medium-sized cities, although the LDP has acquired a slight edge.

If one adds those who are uncommitted to a party but have conservative leanings to the LDP group, and those who are likewise uncommitted but lean toward progressivism and communism to the socialist group, then in the major and medium-sized cities progressivism as a whole is dominant, as may be seen in Figure 8. The implication is that if each party were to put up one candidate respectively, the LDP would win, but if the conservatives and progressives were each to unite behind their respective candidates the probability is high that the progressives would win in the major and medium-sized cities. However, since the difference is small it means that the deciding vote is in the hands of the DSP and the Komeito. However, what counts more is which side is able to secure the more than 30% who responded neutral or don't know. In this situation, such factors as the personal charm of the candidate, occasional points of political controversy, policies and slogans, and various other particular and individual factors, come to have a major effect.

Because in the final analysis the results of the survey are for youth and middle age only, if there were to be an election today, there is of course the strong probability that the results of the election would lean further toward conservatism.

If we next examine the pattern of party support from the point of view of geographical location, we may note that conservatism is particularly strong in the Kyūshū and the Hokuriku areas, among both the young and middle-aged generations. (Cf. Figure 9) Within the city of Osaka, however, support for the LDP is extremely low. The JSP is strong among all age groups in Hokkaidō, the Sanin and Sanyō areas, and the Tokyo-Yokohama suburbs. But in the twenty-three Tokyo wards, the LDP is strong. The DSP has some strength in Tokyo and the Osaka suburbs, while the Komeito is fairly strong in Osaka, Shikoku, and Kyūshū.

In Hokkaidō those who are not party members but who are progressives are numerous and, in addition to JSP supporters, amount to 46%. Similarly, progressives are numerous in the Tokyo-Yokohama area.

Within the city of Osaka, those who respond don't know are far more numerous than in any other region, amounting to 30%. If to this figure we add those who do not support a party, the total comes to 50%. This may

Figure 9. Political Consciousness of Young & Mid-age Generations
According to Geographical Location

Areas in which :

▨ = Progressives are
overwhelmingly strong
(R>40%)

▨ = Progressives are
clearly ahead
(R−C>10%)

▨ = Progressives &
Conservatives are
equal (R~C<5%)

▨ = Conservatives are
predominant
(C−R>5%)

▨ = Conservatives are
overwhelmingly strong
(C>40%)

▤ = The responses "Don't Know"
& "No Support" are
numerous

R = Rate of Support for
Progressives
C = Rate of Support for
Conservatives

well be referred to as the political cynicism of Osaka residents.

However, the most important established factors in political party support are occupation and class. Until ten years ago, there was pronounced disparity in the political opinions held by city dwellers versus village inhabitants; the young versus the old; those with high and those with low levels of education. The conservatism of the village inhabitants, the senior generations and those with a low level of education contrast conspicuously with the progressivism of city dwellers, the younger generations and those with a high level of education. Although to some degree this tendency still persists today, disparity due to geographical location, age or education is gradually waning. The difference in position between the entrepreneur and the employee is becoming the most important factor in political party support.

Thus, as has already been stated, the LDP is surprisingly strong among entrepreneurial type occupations such as management-administration, business-industrial entrepreneur, and agriculture. In contrast, the JSP is clearly in the lead among those employed as technicians, office workers, factory workers and other employees, etc. (Cf. Figure 10)

The power of progressivism increased during the immediate postwar

Figure 10. Party Support by Occupation

A. Management, Administration
B. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
C. Small- & Medium-Scale Business
D. Housewife
E. Shopkeeper, Store Clerk
F. Service Personnel

G. Clerk
H. Skilled Labor
I. Semi- & Un-skilled Labor
J. Junior College, University Student
K. Technician
L. Professional

period, riding high on the crest of the wave of modernization suddenly imposed from above. In contrast, the power of conservatism depended in large part on pre-modern attitudes. The meaning of the phrase "imposed from above" includes not only the sense of modernization occurring at the hands of the authorities, but also the sense of modernization deriving not "from the heart but from the head." Therefore, the concept of modernization has captured the intellectuals, the city dwellers and the younger generations—groups which are more easily swayed by their intellect (or their ideals) than by immediate interest. The chief foundation for the progressivism of this kind of era, therefore, is found among the city dwellers and the younger generations, led by the intellectuals who have graduated from college. The fact that education, generation, and region are the chief axes along which conservatism and progressivism polarize, reflects the historical circumstances of postwar Japan. Today, however, the term "modern" has ceased to be monopolized by the anti-establishment forces and instead has almost become a word befitting the establishment itself. Therefore the two axes—modern-premodern and progressive-conservative—are not a very good fit. And furthermore, this situation weakens the ground for saying that level of education and age are the essential and primary factors behind the conservative-progressive dichotomy.

In contrast, it is possible to perceive a tendency for political doctrine and a sense of interests to split along employer-employee lines, by means of standardization of organizations for the respective groups.

The present day has witnessed a situation in which such members of the intelligentsia as professional men and university students become a chief part of the progressive wing, along with white and blue collar workers. (Cf. Figure 11) We may refer to the latter as the "immediate-interest group" of the progressive faction, while the former may be referred to as the "ideological group" of the progressive faction. One predominant

Figure 11.. Composition of Non-party Affiliate Progressives

(Figures=%)

Figure 12. Political Attitudes of Workers According to Type & Scale of Employer

Figure 13. Political Attitudes of Workers According to Generation

characteristic of the ideological group is the high proportion of those who do not belong to a progressive party. (Cf. Figure 11)

It has been known that up to the present youth and middle age of the laboring class, both white and blue collar, have clearly leaned more toward progressivism than toward conservatism. However, when one tries to analyze this more deeply, it becomes evident that this kind of conclusion is nothing but a false generalization.

That is to say, if we look at employment according to the pattern set up earlier, the following becomes evident as may be seen in Figure 12: support for the socialist party is unmistakably high only among civil servants and workers in public enterprises, while the difference in party support becomes slight in large- and medium-scale private companies. Workers in small-scale enterprises clearly tend to support the LDP while at the same time the group which responds don't know rises to 30%. Similarly when one analyzes according to age, as in Figure 13 (distinguishing between male and female but not between white and blue collar) the younger generation is detaching itself from the powerful influence of the JSP. And those who don't know are gradually forming an uncommitted stratum.