

inquiring into the following question: Why and how those *radical-reform-nationalists* could be transmuted to *radical-romantic-socialists*, namely, why and how the nationalist *Weltanschauung* could be enhanced to a socialist *Weltanschauung*.

In conclusion, Dr. Binder's work is undoubtedly one of the most excellent works which has appeared in recent years concerning the subjective part of the Middle Eastern politics and the reader will be much affected by his proposal to emancipate area studies from simple-minded students of comparative politics and *overseasmanship*, thus hoping for an *amphibious animal* who can synchronize reasoning and empiricism, or discipline and application. Dr. Binder's subjective analysis of Arab nationalism is successful in searching for an ideological situation in a changing society, reasonably placing the stress on the ideological crisis rather than the material damage, but, on the contrary, the very merit of his method leaves the objective part of the Middle Eastern politics and any orientation for a revolution implicit. Middle Eastern intellectuals who read his work may be impressed that this is a sincere example of studies conducted by a romantic Westerner who is unable to be either a simple advocate or a critic of Western democracy.

(San-eki Nakaoka)

ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, xv+341 pp.

Arnold Brackman is an experienced American observer of the Indonesian political scene since the days when he covered the independence struggle in Indonesia as a foreign correspondent. In his previous book *Indonesian Communism: a History* (1963), he revealed his considerable knowledge of and original, perceptive insight into not only the Communist movement in Indonesia but also the basic characteristics of the political history of that land since the inception of its nationalist movement. In his new book *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (1966), Brackman continues to concern himself with the problem of Communism but this time in the larger area of what he calls the "Malay Triangle" including Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and the Philippines as well as Indonesia.

This Malay Triangle is important from the standpoint of the author whose central concern, as in his previous book, has been with the problem of "who encircles whom" in the Cold War. In Brackman's view, in the event that the Indochinese Peninsula slides under Communist control, the logical next stage of the Communist enterprise will centre in this area. (p. ix) Brackman is of the opinion that the political happenings of the Malay Triangle, both within and across the countries and territories involved, must be understood in terms of what he deems to be the "multi-complex struggle for power."

In speaking of the multi-complex struggle for power, the author has in mind such relations as: 1) the struggle for leadership and identity, 2) the racial tension between the Chinese and Malays, 3) the Communist efforts to establish a beachhead in the archipelago, 4) Sino-Indonesian relations over their spheres of influence in Southeast Asia, and 5) Sino-Soviet rivalry. On the basis of this framework of essential problems, the book is constructed to describe how specifically these problems manifest themselves in each of the territories involved in the Malay Triangle. The period covered is principally the first half of the 1960's, which each chapter of the book is designed to follow, roughly in chronological succession to the previous chapter. Thus, beginning with what the author calls the Singapore crisis in the early 1960's, the book goes through the West Irian dispute and the Confrontation of Malaysia to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and the latest turn of events in Indonesia subsequent to the September 30 Affair.

In dealing with the events within and across the various territories in their total complex of interrelationship and interactions, Brackman contributed, whether consciously or unconsciously, to the study of this part of Southeast Asia as a *political region*. On the other hand, the author is found to have dealt with the different territories with varying density, due perhaps to his uneven knowledge of them. Of course, the magnitude of the task of grasping the context of a political region or further an international system calls for increased individual and joint research.

In identifying the *multi-complex elements* with which the struggle for power within the region is woven, Brackman proved himself fairly comprehensive. On the other hand, Brackman's perception and interpretation of the interrelationships and interactions among the multi-complex elements do not satisfy this reviewer.

Brackman observes that there has been a growing trend towards the Left in the politics of post-war Singapore. The objective cause for this trend is attributed to the population explosion on the one hand and on the other, growing unemployment in the face of the stagnant entrepot trade, the traditional mainstay of Singapore's economy, affected by the increasing ratio of direct foreign trade on the part of the neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and Malaya. As for the subjective aspect of the cause, Brackman points out the impact of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the attraction of the newly emergent Communist China to the Chinese-speaking section of the Singapore community.

Especially after the middle of the 1950's when institutional changes towards self-rule quickened in pace, the struggle for power within Singapore's domestic political forces came to be waged among groups of various shades on the spectrum of socialism. And by the beginning of the 1960's, the rivals were narrowed down basically to two. One was a group within the governing People's Action Party (PAP) led by largely English-educated, middle-of-the-road social democrats as represented by Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. The other was the radical wing of the same party composed predomi-

nantly of Chinese-educated Marxist intellectuals supported by Chinese-speaking labourers and small traders and perhaps infiltrated by the MCP's bloc-within.

In the neighbouring Federation of Malaya, a dominant section of the Malay political élite grouped into the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was opposed to socialism (the Socialist Front of Malaya, a coalition between the Party Ra'ayat composed of Malays and the Labor Party with dominantly non-Malay membership) as well as to Communism (MCP). The Alliance which the UMNO formed in coalition with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was characterized by Brackman as a multi-racial coalition of communal parties. In describing the MCA, Brackman says that it reflected the almost conservative politics of the upcountry Chinese who were the product of a basically rural Malay society and lived in "integrated communities." By this characterization, Brackman apparently wants to emphasize the distinction between the "assimilated" Peninsular Chinese and the "unassimilated" Chinese as a significant part of Singapore's populace.

In the Malay political community, the UMNO was opposed not only by the Party Ra'ayat but to a more serious extent by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), which Brackman characterized as composed of *religious ultras* who were obsessed with the fear of Chinese domination. Brackman also mentioned the orientation to Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) which was shared by the Party Ra'ayat and the PMIP. In respect of the orientation of these Malay opposition parties to Greater Indonesia, Brackman speculated on the role of the Party Ra'ayat as the "transmission belt" between the MCP and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) through the link of the leaders of the Party Ra'ayat and Ibrahim bin Yaacob who, together with the said leaders of the Party Ra'ayat, was active in the Malay nationalist movement until the end of the Pacific War and in recent years a member of the Partai Indonesia (Partindo) in Indonesia where he had resided in post-war years.

This reviewer is afraid, however, that Brackman's description of the Party Ra'ayat with main emphasis on its role as mentioned above does not sufficiently portray *the context and its dimensions internal to the Malay political community*. Admittedly, this has much to do with the circumstance that adequate work has not yet been done on the Malay political community in general or the pre-war Malay nationalist movement in particular. Making allowance for that, this reviewer is rather inclined to think that the kind of socialism which the Malay Left stands for is by and large similar to that of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) or its left wing at most. Some of the leaders of the pre-war Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, the Young Malay League) were active in the KRIS movement during the war, in the Malay Nationalist Party and its affiliated organizations immediately after the war and in the Party Ra'ayat and even a section of the Pan-Malaya Islamic Party after around the middle of the 1950's.

This stream of Malay leftists seem to have its origin and background

rooted in the Malay rural peasant masses whose upper stratum they come from and whose folk culture and interests they are accordingly in a position to be in close touch with. These Malay leftists, largely educated through the medium of the Malay language, stood opposed to the other group of Malay nationalists whose predominant origin in the traditional Malay political élite enabled them to undergo English education and serve in the colonial government or in the professions. The Malay-educated nationalists had been influenced by the Indonesian nationalist movement and therefore more militant in their nationalistic posture than the English-educated nationalists of the other group. Some of the Malay-educated nationalists who had been in the colonial period denied such opportunities of social mobility as were accessible to the English-educated Malays came with the arrival of independence to find such opportunities through the political channel of parliamentary democracy by joining the UMNO. Whereas those others who did not choose to take that course constitute the Party Ra'ayat and a section of the PMIP.

If we relate the Malay opposition parties such as the Party Ra'ayat and the PMIP to such a background of the Malay-educated nationalists in the context internal to Malay politics, we can more fully understand the impact of Indonesia's confrontation on the Malay-educated leaders. If viewed in this light, it would not seem so *incredible* except, that Mahatir, the man who "let loose the anti-PAP tirade in parliament in May, 1965, contended that persistent Western interference had led to the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and strongly urged the Malaysia government to take the initiative towards an honorable settlement of our dispute with Indonesia. . . ." (p. 275)

In short, since Brackman approaches the development of the political situation in the Malay Triangle in general basically in terms of the struggle for power and that between Communism and/or authoritarianism versus democracy, he fails fully to divulge the subtle dimensions of the actual context internal to the politics of the territory concerned. Thus, Brackman says, the idea of Malaysia was set forth by Premier Tengku Abdul Rahman of Malaya when the radical wing of the PAP infiltrated perhaps by the MCP bloc-within threatened to have Lee Kuan Yew's group of middle-of-the-road social democrats and therefore the PAP government on the run. The radical wing was supported by what Brackman called the Chinese (cultural) chauvinist section of the electorate. Lee Kuan Yew's group and the Alliance of Malaya found common interests in joining hands against Communism, their common enemy, which both saw in the radical wing of the PAP which later became the Barisan Sosialis of Singapore (the Singapore Socialist Front).

In this way, Brackman tends to focus on the link with the Communist Party on the part of not only the Barisan Sosialis of Singapore but also the Socialist Front of Malaya and the Sarawak United Peoples Party which opposed Malaysia. This reviewer does not necessarily deny the possibility of such a role on the part of these parties or of the Communist *bloc-within infiltration of them*. Nonetheless, such an interpretation of the author's remains to be borne out by further substantiation in the future. The data the author

used to support his interpretation are derived from the sources of the governments involved. Besides the shortage of positive proof to back up the author's imaginative interpretation, the reviewer considers that Brackman did not pay proper attention to anti-colonialism and socialism as distinct from Communism as the combined elements which were real in the context internal to the politics of the territories concerned.

For instance, Brackman saw in the threatening fall of the Singapore government into the hands of the Barisan Sosialis early in 1961 the imminent danger of independent Singapore under Communist control tied closely to Communist China. But, as things stood then, the forces led by the Barisan Sosialis against Malaysia as proposed by Premiers Lee Kuan Yew and Abdul Rahman apparently had not as their objective an independent Singapore but aimed at the specific goal of complete internal self-rule, lest the socialist forces should be repressed, in case of the formation of Malaysia, by the central government of Kuala Lumpur dominated by the Malay political élite which was hostile to any brand of socialism.

Brackman referred to the fear on the part of many Malays of what he called a combustible mixture of Communism and Chinese chauvinism. But this reviewer is of the view that the Malay political élite as represented by the UMNO leadership had fear and anxiety about socialism in general. This reviewer thinks that it was because of the hostility of not only the UMNO but also the MCA to socialism that the friction between them and PAP came to the fore with accelerating intensity as soon as they won the battle for Malaysia in concerted action.

In examining in what terms the MCA's antagonism to the PAP became acute, Brackman attributed it partly to the "MCA's fear of having to compete against the PAP for the support of the Peninsular Chinese" and partly to "the social and economic differences between the Chinese in Singapore and in Malaya." (p. 43) This reviewer would like to attribute the sources of the friction between the UMNO and the MCA on the one hand and the PAP on the other after the birth of Malaysia 1) to the fear on the part of the Alliance member parties of socialism including the kind of socialism which the PAP stands for and 2) to the antagonism of the Malays as represented by the UMNO to the Chinese as represented by the PAP which sounded acceleratingly assertive of equal rights for non-Malays.

In the view of this reviewer, the tragedy of the colonially created plural society of Malaya and Singapore in the post-war period is ascribed to the uniquely complicated interaction among anti-colonialism, communalism, democracy, and socialism. To begin with, there are the historically structured division and lag between two major ethnic component communities of this plural society, Chinese and Malay. As the anti-colonial movement proceeds towards independent statehood, the two major component ethnic groups find themselves rapidly becoming conscious of the struggle for political power along communal lines between each other. In other words, progress towards independent statehood somewhat ironically means increasingly acute awareness

of communalism. Secondly, the socially more sophisticated and active Chinese come to clash with the Malays whose privileged position has been guaranteed since the colonial days over the issue of progressively equal rights for non-Malays. In other words, the relation between democracy and communalism is intricate and delicate in the context of post-war Malaya and Singapore. Thirdly, as mentioned above, there is antagonism on the part of the ruling élite on the peninsula to socialism and Communism. And since socialism and Communism have their main protagonists among the non-Malays, especially urban Chinese, the ruling Malay élite's fear of socialism and Communism is fused with its communalistic antagonism to the Chinese.

These multi-complex forces and relationships in the context internal to the politics of this plural society are polarized by Brackman to either side of his dichotomy between what he calls representative forms of government versus Communism and/or authoritarianism. This is also noticed when he deals with Indonesia.

As in his previous book *Indonesian Communism: a History*, Brackman's basic view of the political development of post-independence Indonesia is in terms of the forces as represented by Sutan Sjahrir and Hatta which Brackman regards as democratic forces versus Communist and authoritarian forces as represented by Sukarno, the PKI and their allies. In dealing with Indonesia's central problems for the first half of the 1960's from the West Irian campaign to the Confrontation of Malaysia, Brackman emphasizes the significance of this chain of external events in strongly affecting the internal balance of power in favour of authoritarianism and Communism.

Brackman considers that Indonesia chose after the settlement of the West Irian issue to embark on Confrontation rather than concentrated efforts on economic rehabilitation and development for the following two major reasons in the final analysis. One reason in terms of the power structure is a logical consequence of the self-sustained momentum of the Sukarno régime whose unstable, authoritarian character was as if Sukarno rode a chariot drawn by two powerful, mutually hostile stallions (the PKI and the army) which he had to keep running in the same direction—any direction. The other reason is the régime's desire for a sphere of influence, a desire nurtured by the long-standing orientation to Greater Indonesia and spurred by Indonesia's new sense of "conquest" of West Irian. Brackman goes so far as to say that the PKI, as a National Communist Party, was spreading Djakarta's wings through its influence or control of the Communist Parties in the various countries of the Malay Triangle and that it is not inconceivable that Aidit had won Sukarno's deepening support by unfolding a long-term strategy to restore a Java-based Majapahit empire in modern Communist dress. (p. 256)

From such a perspective framed in terms of the struggle for power, Brackman also surmises as follows. "He [Sukarno] would join forces with Peking to expel Western influence from the region [the Malay Triangle] and then, his own hostility toward the west notwithstanding, accept western support for his sphere of influence within the framework of the West's desire to

contain Chinese Communism. In both maneuvers, Sukarno would be dependent on the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex, particularly for air and naval weapons." (p. 281)

Brackman openly deplores the way the internal political situation and foreign relations developed, especially during the past decade up to the September 30 Affair of 1965, in the direction of strengthening the authoritarian and Communist forces, against what he regards as the democratic forces as embodied by Sjahrir and Hatta. In this connexion, Brackman accuses the former of its "Fascism" and extreme nationalism and attacks what he finds the abominable characteristics of Sukarno's personality with scathing sarcasm.

This reviewer is of the opinion that the kind of analysis and description of post-independence Indonesia which is made in terms of exogeneously conceived standards as well as of power politics is not sufficient or proper in understanding the full context and its dimensions internal to the Indonesian politics of the period covered. The rise of what Brackman called the authoritarian and Communist forces between the middle of the 1950's and 1965 does not seem to be adequately and convincingly explained by attributing it to the political devilry and personal wiles of the forces on the wax. Aside from the observer's personal preference for one of the political forces on the Indonesian political scene, it would be short of efforts at getting as complete a picture as possible if he ignored the ideology *per se* of Sukarno as an at least significant element of the context of Indonesian politics for the said period.

In his account of Indonesia in this book, Brackman's knowledgeability of and "feel" for the politics of Indonesia on which he is better informed than on any other territory in the Malay Triangle, occasionally spark inspiring insights. Take for example Chapter 22 "The PKI Proclaims Merdeka." According to Brackman in this chapter, the PKI's strategy since 1952 of collaboration with bourgeois nationalism, the party's resultant immobility as the economy deteriorated and its failure to oppose Sukarno's imposition of an increasingly authoritarian régime eroded its revolutionary spirit and appeal. As the PKI came to face this situation, the problem of whether to apply a Right or Left strategy generated dissension within the PKI itself coupled with the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the face of this intraparty conflict and external pressure from both giants of the Communist Bloc, the PKI travelled in 1964-65 to the Left and in so doing, Aidit shrewdly and skilfully avoided a party schism, recharged revolutionary ardour, and globally tilted Indonesia further to the Left. (p. 251) This is a crucial question in groping for an answer to the problem of whether, how and to what extent the PKI was accountable for the September 30 Affair and/or the October 1 Affair. This reviewer would like to add that Brackman would have explored the question more effectively if he had delved into the "unilateral action" for the fulfilment of the Basic Agrarian Laws, and the repercussions thereof among the other political forces of Indonesia as a consequence of the PKI's action in the rural areas.

As compared with Brackman's treatment of Indonesia and Singapore, he

does not seem to be versed in the Philippines setting, although it is interesting to note his reference to the role of what he calls the new industrial class which resented the major role of American capital in the economy and cast a covetous glance at Indonesia as a mass market. Brackman's coverage of the Brunei situation gives not a few suggestive glimpses into the social conditions of this tiny sultanate.

This reviewer finds in Mr. Brackman an excellent journalistic mind endowed with rich imagination and a facile pen and nourished by long experience with the area, especially Indonesia, an unusual talent which has produced a remarkable array of interesting interpretations and insights in terms of global power politics. (*Shinichi Nagai*)