

## BOOK REVIEWS

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963, xiv + 487 pp.

The subject of "the relation between modernization and bureaucracy" has of late been the most important point of discussion in American political science, studies of administration, and sociology. In other words, the examination of the role which bureaucracy should play in the modernization of developing countries has become the focus of attention in these fields of study. The present work, *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, compiled by LaPalombara, consists of thirteen papers written on this subject. In Chapter I, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and Political Development," by LaPalombara it is said that "This book (as well as the conference out of which it emanates) is an effort to direct attention to the vital role that bureaucracies can and do play in the various kinds of transformations that the developing nations are experiencing" (p. 5), and in Chapter V by Fred W. Riggs, while quoting the words of Carl J. Friedrich to the effect that "...constitutionalism can emerge only after a substantial development of the bureaucracy...", says that "In the developing countries the extent of bureaucratic involvement in politics is exceptionally high. If this opinion is correct, then it is even more important in the study of the developing countries to consider the role of bureaucrats in politics than to examine this topic in the study of more advanced political systems" (p. 121).

The aims of the present work may easily be understood from these few quotations.

As is well known, attention was early drawn to the relation between the modernization of the state and the development of bureaucracy by such writers as Georg W. F. Hegel and Max Weber. In America during the period between the New Deal and the end of World War II, Weber's studies of Bureaucracy were eagerly taken up by academic circles under the impact of the imminent strengthening of the administrative powers of the government and the rise of the "administrative state." In particular, at a time when the modernization of developing countries after World War II is becoming one of the important tasks of American foreign policy, the Americans are faced with the necessity of finding practical solutions to this problem, and the question of which political system could be best suited to the requirements of modernization becomes an important subject of theoretical study. Further, the present condition in this field is that a very large number of students of this subject have concluded from their examination of the question that the governmental apparatus known as the "bureaucracy" is a necessary condition for political modernization.

Why does bureaucracy hold a fatal key for political modernization? This question is the subject common to all the papers in this book, and we may take it that this is so because the basic characteristic of bureaucracy is that it is an important instrument for political unification (p. 105), and that it possesses the permanent function of constituting the conditions and premises supporting the polity. Of course, as Weber has pointed out, bureaucracy has the general characteristics of administration by specialized knowledge, accuracy and secrecy in the transaction of business, and the making of appointments and promotions on the basis of ability, but it need hardly be said that when viewed in relation to the modernization of developing countries bureaucracy is chiefly valued in respect to political unity and stability deriving from the fact of its being a centralized power apparatus.

To be sure, this point is of great value. However, the mere establishment of a bureaucracy is not the greatest characteristic of political modernization. S. N. Eisenstadt, the author of Chapter IV, which I consider to be one of the most interesting papers included in this book, finds the characteristics of political modernization in the following four points (p. 99). First, the high degree of differentiation among political roles and institutions, and the development of a centralized polity. Second, the enlargement of the activities of the central administrative and political organization, and their penetration into all fields of society. Third, the tendency of potential powers to spread to wider groups and to all citizens in society. Fourth, the decline of the traditional *élite* and the legitimation of traditional rulers, and the increase in ideological and institutional accountability of the rulers to the ruled who hold potential power. According to Eisenstadt, it is not merely the enlargement of governmental powers and their efficacy which is important, but rather it is the participation of the citizens in the choice of their rulers and in the laying down of the principal political aims which is the safeguard of true efficacy of the rule.

Thus, if we suppose that in a pre-modern society or in a state which is passing through the process of modernization, the liberation of the latent, and hitherto suppressed, energies of the individual, free participation in politics on the part of the people, and political responsibility for the ruled on the part of the rulers are the indispensable conditions for political modernization (these items were, naturally, taken into consideration in Weber's view of bureaucracy), emphasis on the role of bureaucracy in the modernization of developing countries of the kind found in this book would appear to constitute an over-evaluation of this latter aspect of bureaucracy. We say this because, first and foremost, the setting up of a powerful bureaucracy in these countries has the result of facilitating the acceptance of influence and demands emanating from powerful countries which supply massive aid (including material aid) to these countries. There are many grounds for fearing that relations of co-operation between state A and state B, or between the people of state A and the people of state B, may degenerate into relations of

aid between state A or the people of state A and the bureaucrats of state B. This is so because in such cases the bureaucracy, organized in centralized pyramidal form, performs to the highest degree of efficiency the function of a pipeline conveying external influences into these countries. There is not merely a fear of this happening, for such a situation is to be seen at this very moment in a number of Asian countries, and, further, it is accompanied by such undesirable phenomena as official corruption over such matters as foreign aid goods. In such cases the vigilance exercised by the people of state B may not be strong, by reason of the fact that the consciousness-systems of popular participation in politics have not yet matured.

Secondly, an over-evaluation of the bureaucracy may easily produce the result that obstacles will be placed in the way of political modernization through participation of the people. While the bureaucracy possesses the functions of bringing an element of permanence into governmental policy and introducing specialized abilities, it differs from political representatives in that its position is assured, and there is no opportunity for testing its responsibility by regular popular elections. Consequently, in proportion as the bureaucratic structure assumes greater and greater expansion of scope of activities in the process of deciding upon governmental policies and carrying them into effect, the opportunities of criticizing it and making changes in it become less and less.

In the developing countries in particular, as Riggs says in Chapter V (p. 120), there is a lack of balance between policy-making institutions and the bureaucratic policy-implementing structure. It is therefore not surprising that, as Peter M. Blau has pointed out in his *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York, Random House, 1956), there is a danger that these gigantic, fixed bureaucratic mechanisms may suppress the right of dissent. This may arise both in relations between superiors and inferiors within the bureaucracy itself, and in relations between individual power-wielders and the general public. We cannot overlook the fact that a bureaucracy which functions well from the point of view of the efficiency and continuity of policy presents an aspect of dysfunction from the points of view of political responsibility and popular participation in politics. There is the possibility that this phenomenon of dysfunction will appear in a particularly marked form in the developing countries, as opposed to the Western countries in which the institutions providing for political responsibility and the participation of the people in politics were formed over a long period of time. There is a precedent for the occurrence of such a thing in the Meiji Restoration in Japan a hundred years ago. At that time, Japan, which had sought to promote its hasty modernization by the establishment of a bureaucracy, succeeded in advance of the other Asian countries in attaining its aims of "enriching the state and strengthening its armed forces" and modernizing society and technology by the production of a corps of able officials, but at the same time this brought about paternalistic dysfunctions in the form of the halting of the

growth of local autonomy as a result of the centralization of power, the imposition of uniformity of thought on the people by means of state education, and the acceptance of the notion that government officials possessed a higher status as persons than members of the public, a notion which depended on the hierarchical scale of social values topped by the authoritarian powers of the Emperor.

Our third point, which is connected with the second, is the question of the recruitment of the *élites*. Leadership by eminent *élites* is an important factor in the development of a developing country, but in such a case it is inevitable, because of the poverty of non-government capital, that training in knowledge and skills should be dependent on state expenditure to a high degree. As a result, while the training of political representatives and members of political parties is dependent on elements of a relatively fortuitous character, it is comparatively easy to provide for the training and supply of the administrative *élites* in a systematic manner by affording government financial facilities. That this is so is due to the fact that although it is difficult to inculcate such normative ideas as responsibility or democracy, it is easy to transplant specialized knowledge and technology.

Fourthly, and by way of conclusion, in developing countries in which modernization is necessary there exists a political climate which includes experience of sudden change (not necessarily through the formal procedure of public institutions) or which is approaching an opportunity for such a change. In these cases there is a tendency for the forces which have succeeded political change to make special efforts to promote the bureaucratization of the political structure, out of a fear that the order established after the change may collapse. As a result there are many cases in which bureaucracy is employed not with the aim of true modernization, but with the intention of rendering permanent the enjoyment of power by certain forces. In other words, there is a danger of the ideologization of bureaucracy in the developing countries. In such a situation the general functions of bureaucracy which the authors of the papers in this book look for are not being appreciated at their true value, and all that has happened is that the specific utility of bureaucracy has entered into combination with political adroitness. In according importance to the role of bureaucracy in the developing countries it is particularly necessary to observe a clear distinction between the true value and the specific utility of bureaucracy.

Considered as a whole, all the papers included in this book are of great interest. However, I have the impression that too much space has been devoted to the role played by bureaucracy in the process of modernization. I feel that for the purposes of true modernization more interest should be shown in the question of whether there is a due balance between the governmental apparatus which we know by the name of "the bureaucracy" and the growth of political responsibility. (*Kiyooki Tsuji*)