

public sector and increases the management capacity of the public enterprises, an evaluation of this point is lacking. This is probably due to the fact that the work is more directly concerned with an analysis of the special characteristics and transformations found in state capitalism than with theoretical study of entrepreneurial activity. In spite of this, the factor occasioning the transformation of the Japanese and Indian types is held to be the mixed enterprises, and since we may suppose that the transition from a public character to a private character or a transition in the opposite direction (that is, an outflow of private capital from the mixed enterprises in the public sector) will be connected with a transformation of state capitalism, it is reasonable to expect that, for the purposes of a typology which seeks to facilitate a theoretical grasp of the problems, all the more care should be taken in producing a theoretical treatment of the composition of mixed enterprises.

In his concluding remarks (pp. 180-181) the author says that the Indian type possesses a higher rate of growth and involves fewer sacrifices than the Japanese type, and that the socialist type is superior to the Indian type. However, the theory of the political order is not to be directly elicited from the study of the factors occasioning the formation of the public sector or from a typology of public sectors. This is a separate act of value-judgment, that is, of political choice. (*Noboru Tabe*)

RUSSEL H. FIFIELD, *Southeast Asia in United States Policy*, New York and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, xiv+488 p.

WILLIAM HENDERSON ed., *Southeast Asia: Problems of United States Policy*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M. I. T. Press, 1963, xvi+273 p.

These works owe their origins to studies conducted by a group of specialists rather than being a direct expression of views or the fruits of research by the author or the editor.

In preparing the former, Mr. Fifield used as his sources discussions held at meetings of the Study Group on Southeast Asia in United States Policy which had been set up at the request of the Council on Foreign Relations and which met from the summer of 1959 to 1960. A professor of political science at the University of Michigan and an authority on Southeast Asian affairs, he claims that this volume reflects his own judgement and responsibility, but it still seems that the keynote of the work had been formulated at these study meetings.

Henderson's book comprises ten reports selected from papers presented to a joint study meeting held, in May, 1963, to elucidate United States policy in Southeast Asia, under the auspices of the Asian Society of which Paul C. Sherbert is the Executive Director and of the Southeast Asia Committee of the Association for Asian Studies of which Professor John F. Cady of Ohio

University is Chairman.

Both works represent, so to speak, a co-ordinated report of group studies, and in fact many responsible persons on governmental and private levels as well as experts in various fields took part in the deliberations. As American appraisals of Southeast Asian affairs have many things in common, these two works have much the same basic ideas. In this way they provide an insight into American thought on Southeast Asia and the stand which it takes in meeting the situation there.

The most revealing account of American appraisals of Southeast Asia is given in Chapter II of the latter work. Here, the "value" of Southeast Asia is considered from three standpoints: military, economic, and political. The "military aspects of value" (p. 30 et seq.) are limited in a "major nuclear conflict," although they are great in localized engagements not accompanied by nuclear warfare, especially in Indo-China. The argument, however, seems to lead to no conclusion other than that "perhaps the military significance of Southeast Asia had been exaggerated" (p. 34). The "economic aspects of value" (p. 34 et seq.) are not very great because United States private investment in this area is less than 10 per cent of that in Central and South Americas (in 1959). Southeast Asia accounts for 9 to 10 per cent of the total American exports and 6 to 7 per cent of the total American imports. It is admitted that for the United States as a world power, the "political and psychological aspects of Southeast Asia's value" are by far greater (p. 39 et seq.).

This shows that the United States regards the value of Southeast Asia from the position of carrying out the policy of the Cold War. In fact, the Southeast Asian policy of the American government has always been developed from such a point of view, and, for this reason, is prone to disregard national aspirations and desires on the part of Southeast Asia.

The same can be said of the former of these studies. Although the American government admits that the challenge facing the United States lies in Southeast Asia and that it stems out of communism as well as economic and social changes in this area itself, it still puts more emphasis on the "menace" of communism than anything else and concentrates efforts on the aspect of security in its approach to Southeast Asia.

The disturbances and instability in Southeast Asia today seem to have resulted from the fact that no stable order has followed the collapse of the Western colonial system during World War II brought about by the short-lived Japanese military occupation. While being more or less aware of this fact, the writers of these studies do not fully examine this point. This is perhaps proof of their failure to provide a penetrating insight into conditions underlying Southeast Asia. They have observed Asian affairs from outside, not from within.

"Neutrality in Southeast Asia... is the result, among others, of a bitter colonial experience and struggle for independence, of a desire to avoid antagonizing a political aggressor, and of an attempt to balance potentially

aggressive forces by relations with their competitors.” “The neutralist wants neither to be abandoned nor overwhelmed, whether by charity or by military force.” “These desires stem from a need for ego satisfaction, whether on the part of the leaders or of their people, and from a duty to protect national interest” (Henderson, p. 100). This analysis may be appropriate in itself, but it also seems true that the writers fell short of inquiry into the background which necessitates a study of neutralism, no matter how involved and intricate it may be. Now throughout the areas known as less- or under-developed countries, invariably a neutral policy has been pursued. It seems to originate in a strong desire of those nations which seek to stay out of power politics and the Cold War among the great powers so that they can preserve independence and sovereignty and achieve progress and development. There is no denying that there are manipulations and bargaining to attract greater aid, but these are factors of secondary importance, and the central problem is their aspiration for national independence and progress. As long as one regards this national aspiration, which almost amounts to a pathetic prayer, as a mere expedient of self-preservation for the leaders and states, one will not be able to adopt a policy which can win support from the people in the area. Although, in this connection, both studies are fairly successful in analysing the existing conditions, they are still lacking in insight into the psychology of those nations. Chapter IV of the latter study reads in part: “Neutralism is thus both a psychological phenomenon and the product of a national calculation of interests” (p. 100). True, a psychological factor is involved here, but it is hoped that consideration be given to a serious and keenly-felt desire for national independence.

On the following page one reads, “In dealing with neutralist regimes, policy must maintain a necessary balance between support, pressure and aloofness” (p. 101). Certainly, if the United States totally pulled out of and discontinued aid to the area, it would only help to pave the way for an expansion of communist influence. Also, excessive pressure would eventually alienate the United States from these countries. For instance, the United States once tried not only to exert pressure on the neutral government in Laos but to overthrow it through latent and even open intervention. The result was that the attempt failed to bring about a stabilized and friendly government as was originally desired, but instead placed the communists in a stronger position and drove the neutralists into the communist camp. In 1958, the United States tried to pressure Indonesia by suspending aid to that country. This subsequently led Indonesia to turn to the Soviet Union for military aid. Thus, the policy of alternating support, pressure, and aloofness may seem most rational from the viewpoint of Machiavellian diplomacy. As far as America’s calculations are concerned, this may be the wisest method. But this method alone, however, will fail to win support of the people of a neutral country.

United States policy in neutral countries, particularly in Southeast Asia, is of course established and pursued for the purpose of serving American

national interests. Even foreign aid does not represent a unilateral act of charity, but it expects some counter-presentation, tangible or intangible. And there can be a diversity of counter-presentations. If the United States is really aware of its position and mission as a world power, it will be able to understand that a great counter-presentation is found in seeking peace and stability for the world. Now, at a time international tension is focussed in the less-developed areas, the United States will greatly benefit by carrying out a proper and efficient policy in those areas. The fact that American foreign aid has served to develop its policy overseas and continue economic growth within the country shows that the United States will be fully and even more significantly rewarded by its policy in Southeast Asia.

More specifically, in the course of waging the Cold War, the United States will need to adopt a policy which secures popularity in the third area where different forces are contesting for hegemony. To this end, a "smart" policy which seems designed only to make ends meet would lead the United States to gain little and lose much. Did not the United States already experience this in Laos and is it not experiencing the same in South Viet-Nam?

Then, what are the objectives of American policy in Southeast Asia? An answer to this question is given where Mr. Fifield writes, "American objectives in Southeast Asia... centre around the promotion of stability on the domestic front and security in the community of Nations" (p. 14). He goes further to recommend a series of measures which he deems necessary.

1. The United States and Southeast Asian countries must be fundamentally in agreement on their common objectives.
2. The United States must advance economic aid to individual countries so that these can steadily go ahead until they achieve economic independence. The economic aid must not be shouldered by the United States alone, but it must be developed under a programme of wider co-operation by the West.
3. The governments of the area must promote social justice and effect reforms with regard to administration, housing, health and sanitation, and the land system. All the countries must aim at democracy.

Next, Mr. Fifield proposes that Southeast Asian countries should take such security measures as the conclusion of bilateral defence agreements, collective defence treaties and treaties of non-aggression, participation in a regional co-operation system, reliance on a unilateral declaration of the United States (e. g., the application to Asia of the Monroe Doctrine or of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957), the adoption of a neutral policy, and the establishment of a denuclearized zone (p. 404 et seq.).

Of these proposals, nobody will voice objection to policies to be adopted within the individual countries, but the author's idea of security for the area may pose a controversial question. Although he does not draw any conclusion nor does he recommend any definite view, Mr. Fifield seems to be in favour of settling the question by taking sides with one of the conflicting forces. The security of underdeveloped countries, particularly of those in

Southeast Asia lying between the two great power blocs, however, would be achieved more effectively by keeping clear of conflict rather than by siding with one or the other of these blocs. At least, such an approach to the problem is conceivable, though the author does not develop this subject. Yet, while admitting that Southeast Asia is changing fast, he still lays emphasis on the aspect of a military approach to the area.

On the whole these two studies agree with the policy the United States has been pursuing. Thus, no matter what it may be, communism is understood to be an antagonizing influence, with virtually no consideration given to the idea of co-existence with it. Any discussion of Asia's future in the long run is bound to bring into question the possibility of co-existence on a broad basis including communism, and yet no germ of such thinking is found in these volumes. Here the utmost concern is how to cope with and confront communism. For instance, when the former study takes the stand that the security of Asia requires the concerted efforts of Washington, New Delhi, and Tokyo, it regards India and Japan as "an effective counterweight to Peking." It is here, in this pattern of thinking, that the limitations of the work lie.

Chapter III of the latter study may be summed up. Southeast Asia has "all four of the only great surviving human traditions: ...the Sinic, Indic, Islamic and the North Atlantic," but "these too are cross-cut by complex and intricate divisions." There is no continuity from past to present and things differ according to time and place. Government and "traditions" are not related to each other. There is no such continuous character of culture as seen in India and China. Further, political independence tends to increase tension and conflict between different elements. American policy should be directed, among other things, at removing these tensions and conflicts and at unifying the nations (p. 70).

Mr. Henderson, the editor, writes in his concluding "Some Reflections on United States Policy in Southeast Asia," "If one of the main purposes of military policy in Southeast Asia is to buy time, this is no guarantee that the time will be wisely used. How effectively has the United States employed its power and influence to promote meaningful, economic, and social reform in the region?" (p. 260)

All this has much truth in it. If the American political leaders had been aware of this earlier and had put this precept into practice, they would not have experienced the setbacks in their Asian policy as they have. In the United States, foreign policy studies are conducted by public and private research institutions, and a great number of reports are produced annually. Not a few of them include excellent analyses and appraisals, which are really worthy of respectful attention. There are few indications, however, that these studies have been incorporated into government policies. Though looked upon as the home of democracy, the United States seldom presents an impressive example of government policy and institutional studies working in close co-ordination. It is a pity that the administration is noticeably undemocratic in this direction.

Both individuals and states can err. Errors in judgement and action may be unavoidable after all. But an error should not be allowed to recur in the affairs of state. The United States has shown by its policies in Asia that the same error can be committed over and over again. A typical example of this is seen in Laos and South Viet-Nam. The United States is repeating in South Viet-Nam the same error that it once committed in Laos. The greatest error of the Americans is perhaps trying to force their own way of thinking and policy on others, and they have yet to correct this practice. China once ran into trouble with the Indonesian authorities in regard to how the Chinese residents should be treated in Indonesia. As soon as Peking became aware that Indonesian law and customs should be respected in that country, immediately its egocentrism was discarded. Despite its reputation of militancy and doctrinarism, Chinese foreign policy has proved flexible enough to adapt itself to the local circumstances of Asia and Africa. In comparison, United States policy in Asia is sometimes lacking in such a flexibility, and this is perhaps because the American policy-makers turn aside the "Vox Populi" in favour of reports produced by research institutions. If this is true, it is hoped that they will, with modesty, listen to what the private institutions have to say and thus give United States a policy of greater flexibility. (*Shizuo Maruyama*)

J. W. F. ROWE, *The World's Coffee*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1963, 199 p.

(1) FAO and the other organs of the UN have made very great contributions to the economic analysis of commodities, especially economic analyses conducted from a point of view embracing the whole world. Examples are to be found in the FAO Commodity Bulletin Series. A global approach or method of analysis which seeks to provide a general view of international demand-supply relations for particular commodities on a world scale, consisting principally of a wide-ranging collection of basic material and statistical analyses of it, supplemented by suitable background information, is a characteristic frequently found in the material published by the UN and in particular by FAO. There is probably no need to give any explanation of the necessity for such analysis or approach, and further, of its efficacy when applied in surveys and studies of problems of international commodities. However, may it not be that there is an insufficient appreciation of the limitations and defects in this kind of approach? Even in the case of commodities which are produced mainly for the international market, production (supply) is likely to be subject to considerable influences from internal factors peculiar to the individual national economies. (This is of course the case in regard to differences in the natural and geographical conditions.) National and regional peculiarities are likely to be found in the consumption of a particular commodity. In the case of a global analysis consisting principally