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Political Determinants of Social Policy

調査研究報告書

Edited by KAWANAKA Takeshi
Published in 2013年3月
Chapter 1
Redistributive Politics in New Democracies: A Theoretical Review / Takeshi Kawanaka
This paper reviews the existing theoretical arguments on redistributive politics under democratic institutions. We focus particularly on the political factors that appear relevant to redistribution in new democracies. These factors are (1) state capacity, (2) beliefs and multidimensionality, (3) the selectorate (winning coalition), and (4) political market imperfections. These factors seem to bring about different patterns of redistribution in new democracies.

Chapter 2
A Review of Cross-section Time-series Studies on Democracy, Social Spending, and Income Distribution in Developing Countries / Yasushi Hazama
Previous research on social spending and income distribution points to the missing link between spending and redistribution in emerging democracies. Insufficient representation of lower income groups may provide part of the answer, as implied by the positive effect on income equality of the strength of the political left and potential labor power. Methodologically, selecting democratic regimes first and then examining the variation among
them would be a logical approach, rather than including non-democratic regimes just to boost the sample size. For cross-section time-series design, OLS models with PCSEs and Prais-Winsten estimates suit the current research project which incorporates time-invariant variables.

Chapter 3
Literature on Social Spending in Asia: A Brief Review / Masashi Nakamura
This paper reviews theoretical and case-study literature on social policy, focusing especially on redistributive public spending in Asia. In the first two sections, we examine how varied degrees of social spending by authoritarian regimes can be explained theoretically and in the light of the experience of Asia. The latter two sections then refer to literature that deals with a problem inherent to new democracies: political market imperfection.